Kabinet Sylla aka Bill Gates v State of Guinea (ECW/CCJ/APP/08/23; ECW/CCJ/JUD/33/25) [2025] ECOWASCJ 18 (16 May 2025)

IN THE COURT OF rusy1cE OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF THE WES~ AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS) In the Matter of KA BINET r LLA A. K. A BILL GA TES v. STATE OF GUINEA Application No. ECW/CCJ/4 P/08/23 - Judgment No. ECW/CCJ/mD/33/25 JUDGMENT LAGOS [On 16th May 2025 = -;- BETWEEN APPLICATJON No. ECW/CCJ/APP/08/23 JUDGME]N'T No. ECW/CCJ/JUD/33/25 KABINET SYLLA A. K. A. aILL GATES APPLICANT AND THE STATE OF GUINEA DEFENDANT COMPOSITION OF THE (1OURT PANEL Hon. Justice Ricardo Claudio f onteiro GON<;ALVES- Presiding/Judge Rapporteur Hon. Justice Sengu Mohamed !KOROMA -Member Hon. Justice Gberi-Be OUAT'tARA -Member ASSISTED BY: Dr. YaouzaOURO-SAMA I -ChiefRegistrar REPRESENTATION OFT$ PARTIES Maitre Lancine SYLLA, Maitre Almamy Samory TRA1 Maitre Jean Marie Lamine KA 2 ~ ' ~ = Maitre Joseph LOUA - Counsel for the Applicant Maitre MOUNIR Houssein Mr hamed and associates, Maitre Mamadou Souare DIOf , P Maitre Pepe Antoine LAMA Maitre Amadou Babahein C I. JUDGMENT - Counsel for the Defendant 1. This is the judgment 9f the Court read virtually in an open court, i accordance with Article ls (1) of the Practice Directions on Electronic Casi Court Sessions, 2020. IL DESCRIPTION OF THE 'PARTIES 2. The Applicant, Mr. Kapinet SYLLA, a.k.a. Bill Gates, is a citizen o Guinea, a Member State! of ECO WAS. 3. The Defendant is the Sate of Guinea, a Member State of the Economi, Community of West A ·can States (ECOWAS). It is a signatory to th ECOWAS Revised Tre and of the Protocol establishing the ECOWAS Court and its Suppleme tary Protocols. i IIL INTRODUCTION 4. In the case sub judice, th Applicant Mr. Kabinet Sy Ila, also known as "Bill Gates", came to claim violations of his rights following a criminal proceeding initiated aga st him by the State of Guinea. On January 27, 2022, the Special Prosec tor at the CRIEF (in French "Cour de Repression des Infractions Economi ues et Financieres" (Court for the Repression o Economic and Financial Offenses)), filed an indictment order against the Applicant and his comp+uies; Djoma S. A., Djoma Logistique and Djoma </ i ::- Groupe S. A., for serio s crimes, including corruption, embezzlement o: public funds, money la dering and other economic offenses. Although th Central Directorate for Judicial Investigations concluded that there wa. insufficient evidence o support the indictment, the Applicant w~ summoned, fonnally harged and placed in pre-trial detention i November 2022. Hi subsequent applications for release wer· systematically rejected y national judicial bodies, leading him to file th instant application wi the ECOWAS Court of Justice. He claim violations of his right t the presumption of innocence, to a trial within reasonable time and to rotection against arbitrary detention, demandin; his release and compe sation of 500 billion CFA francs. The Guinea1 authorities maintain th! the Applicant's arrest was carried out in ful accordance with the I w, based on exhaustive investigations whic; revealed significant inc nsistencies regarding the origin of his properties. IV. PROCEEDINGS BEFON? THE COURT 5. The application initiatr g proceedings (doc. I) was registered at thel Registry of this Court on February 13, 2023, and an application fo expedited procedure ( do . 2) was submitted on the same day. 6. On February 17, 2023, ~ e Defendant State, that of Guinea, was duly served with both applications. 7. On March 16, 2023, th9 Defendant State submitted an application for an extension of time ( doc. ~), which was served on the Applicant. I 8. On March 17, 2023, the t pplicant made his submissions on the application for an extension of time doc.4), which was served on the Defendant. I I • c/. ca- 9. On September 21, 2021 the Court received an application for a hearin from the Applicant (do . 5), dated September 7th. This application w ; served on the State of G inea on the same day. 10. On October 13, 2023, 1 e Applicant filed an application for judgment b: default ( doc.6). 11. On October 18, 2023, thjis application was served on the Defendant State. 12. On October 17, 2024, t1 Defendant State sent a second application for aJ extension of time. 13. On November 11, 2024, jthe Defendant State presented its defense ( doc. 8): which was duly served ~n the Applicant. 14. On December 3, 2025, t e Applicant presented his reply, which was duly served on the Defendant! State, which said nothing. i 15. The parties were heard ?n a virtual hearing held on 11th March 2025, in which they presented th}ir oral submissions on the merits of the case. At the same hearing, the Applicant withdrew his application for judgment by: default and the extensi~n sought by the Defendant was granted, thus1 regularizing the procedutal situation. I 16. The case was adjoum➔d for judgment on 16th May 2025, after the deliberation by the pane~ of Judges. V. THE APPLICANT'S CASJ a. Summary of Facts 17. The Applicant claims that op January 27, 2022, the Special Prosecutor at the Court for the Repression pf Economic and Financial Offenses (CRIEF) submitted an indictment ordbr to the Investigation Chamber of that Court for 4- '= the opening of an investig tion against Djoma S. A, Djoma Logistique an, Djoma Groupe S. A for case of corruption in the private sector, embezzlemen1 of public funds, forgery use of false documents in public deeds, grou1 robbery, illicit enrichment, lawful appropriation, abuse of authority, mone: laundering and complicity; That the Pre-Trial Chamber submitted a lette: rogatory to the Central Dire torate for Judicial Investigations (DCIJ, in Frend for "Direction Centrale des Investigations Judiciaires ''), after the opening o: the pre-trial proceedings, s that it could carry out an investigation into th offenses in question; That n execution of the said letter rogatory (LR), th DCIJ carried out various a ions, including hearing him and Mrs. F atouma1 Diakite TOURE, general m ager of the Djoma companies; That at the end o the execution of the LR, th DCIJ sent the Pre-Trial Chamber the minutes o all the hearings and their c nclusions, in which it notes that the investigatio: carried out did not reveal an plausible reason to charge him with the offense: in question; That, despite th fact that no new evidence was found to contradic1 the DCIJ's conclusions, he r: ceived, through his lawyer, a summons to appear,! for the first time, before the Investigation Chamber for the facts referred to ii the indictment order. 18. The Applicant avers that, hen he responded to the summons on Novembi 3, 2022, he was charged ith the facts referred to in the indictment order,1 despite the absence of evi ence, a fortiori serious and consistent evidence,I which could lead to an · dictment, and placed in pre-trial detention inl Conakry Central Prison, p rsuant to order No. 238/CI/CRIEF/2022. (Exhibit! # 1) 19. The Applicant avers that, y action dated November 4, 2022, he lodged an appeal against the aforem ntioned pre-trial detention order (Exhibit 2) and' highlights that, for immedi te consideration of his appeal, on the basis ofthell provisions of Article 294(2 of Guinea's Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP), he submitted an applicatio , also dated November 4, 2022, to the President o ::: the Special Investigation S ction of the CRIEF (Exhibit 3); That the Presiden of the said Section did not ive-heed to his application, despite being oblige, to rule on it within three (0 ) days; That the same applies to the Section itsel which had ten (10) days om the date of the CRIEF Special Prosecutor': indictment order ofNove ber 7, 2022, sent on the same day to the Regis1 of the said Section with th case file, to give its opinion. 20. He maintains that, until ovember 22, 2022, neither the President of th, Special Chamber for the ontrol of Investigations nor the Chamber ovei which he presides deigned to examine, let alone decide, his appeal. 21. He claims that an offici 1 report was drafted by Maitre Bassekou Sec. CONDE, a court officer at the Conakty courts. 22. He notes that, taking th consequences of the lack of response to hi applications, he appealed t the President of the Special Examining Chamber through his lawyers, for h · to be released immediately, under the terms o the provisions of Article 00 of the CCP. (Exhibit# 5); That curiously, by order No. 010/CRIEF/P/ SCI/2022, of November 25, 2022, the latte rejected his application, n ing that, in matters of applications for immediate consideration of appeals d release, the said Section can only be consulted by referral order and not b indictment order; (Exhibit # 6). i 23. Continuing his ratio, he av rs that, according to a document dated November 28, 2022, received on the s e day at the CRIEF Registry, he filed an appeal for annulment against the a orementioned order issued by the President of the CRIEF's special investigat on control section. (Exhibit # 7); That following this declaration, he submi ed an application and a pleading containing his grounds and conclusions fi r his release. (Exhibit # 8) i 24. He submits that, two (02) onths later, the Supreme Court has still not ruled on this appeal, which shou d be examined quickly due to the illegality of his detention. ' = 25. Considering himself a vic~im of a violation of his rights, he brought his cas1 before to the ECO WAS c burt of Justice. b. Pleas in Law 26. The Applicant relied hi~ claims on the following: i. International Covenr t on Civil and Economic Rights (Articles 9(3), 14-(2)); ii. African Charter on Illuman and Peoples' Rights (Article 7) iii. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Articles 9 & 11 ); iv. Principles and Guif elines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa v. 2005 Supplement1 Protocol (A/SP.1/01/05) on the ECOWAS Court of Justice. vi. Rules of Procedure pf the Court of Justice, ECO WAS. vii. Guinea's Code of v. Reliefs Sought 27. The Applicant concludef by seeking from the Court to: i. Declare itself competep.t; ii. Declare the application. admissible. On the merit: = 1. Declare that ~ e State of Guinea has violated Mr. Kabine1 SYLLA a.k.a. ill GA TE' s right to the presumption of innocenc, and his right t have his case heard within a reasonable time; n. Declare, 1ore, that his detention, since the expiration o the time F that both the President and the Specia. Investigation ~ ontrol Section had to rule on his application fo1 immediate co~sideration of his release, that is, November 17, 111. Also declare ~ at the responsibility of the State of Guinea. through its juct,cial authorities, is compromised. And accordingly: i. Order the State!of Guinea to release him immediately; ii. Order the Statf of Guinea to pay him the sum of five hundred million (500,000,qoo) FCF A as compensation. I VI. DEFENDANT'S ¢ASE 28. On January 27, 2022, th Special Prosecutor at the Court for the Repression of Economic and Fin cial Offenses (CRIEF) submitted an indictment order to the Investigati n Chamber against the companies Djoma Group SA, Djoma SA and Djoma Logistic SA. The charges included embezzlement of public funds, conspiracy, forgery, organized group theft, concealment of public funds, illicit enrichment, corruption, abuse o authority, abuse of o flee, embezzlement, money laundering, illicit acquisition of interests Jnd complicity. At the same time, the Prosecutor requested the preventivd seizure of the bank assets of the aforementioned companies and other coqipanies belonging to the Applicant. 1Vk ~ 29. On November 3, 2022, Mr. Sylla was formally charged and placed in pre• trial detention for the crimes in question. His legal representatives file, applications for the ulment of the indictment and for his release witl the Special Investigatio Control Section, which were rejected. SubsequeO' appeals to the Supreme Court of Guinea were also unsuccessful. In vie· of these results, Mr. Sy ~a filed an application with this Court, seeking hi: release and compensatil n of 500 billion CF A francs, alleging violations o his right to the presump(ion of innocence and to a trial within a reasonabl time. 30. In the course of the proceedings, the Investigating Chamber issued th following decisions: O+ er no. 274 (non-prosecution), no. 276 (lifting o the Preventive Seizure) land no. 277 (restitution order), dated August 14. 2023. The Public Prosecutor's Office and the State Judicial Agent prompt!: appealed against these decisions On October 31, 2023, the Special! Chamber for the Control of Investigations handed down Ruling No. 041 declaring the appeals !admissible but unfounded and confirmed th1 previous orders. The c9urt also ordered that the case be closed at the registry and that the jud ' ment be enforced by the Special Prosecutor. 31. In response, the State J dicial Agent granted, through Power of Attorney No. 09927/PRG/AJE/2 23, dated November 11, 2023, powers to his lawyer to file an appeal for cassation. The said appeal, filed on November 2, 2023, under No. 03r /C/CG/CRIEF/023, is still pending before the Guinea Supreme Court. 32. Mr. Sylla claims that th Public Prosecutor's Office seriously violated the presumption of innoce ce by making public statements during a press conference held on Dec mber 2, 2022, creating a perception of guilt in public opinion and violafing the secrecy of justice. i 33 . However, the Public Pr~secutor's Office argues that it was forced to react because of a media campaign orchestrated by Mr. Sylla's Ia, ·ers, who < = used the DJOMA MEDIAS station and their client's influence to cas1 suspicion on the judi ial system. In order to restore the balance o: information and comb t disinformation, the Public Prosecutor's Offfo called a press conferenc , strictly in accordance with Article 8 of Law No 2016/060/AN of Octob r 26, 2016 (Code of Criminal Procedure), whicl allows the disclosure f objective elements of the case - without an: assessment of the merit - when necessary to correct false information rn preserve public order. 34. The information releas d was limited to verifiable factual elements, particular the seizure of . Sy Ila's assets. It is clear from the case file tha1 Mr. Sylla was unable to ·ustify the lawful origin of his vast properties. Th process was initially cynducted by the National Financial Informatioi Processing Unit (CENtIF, for "Cel/ule Nationale de Traitement de. Informations Financier s" in French) and later referred to the CRIEF. Mr. Sy Ila was formally s oned to justify the origin of his assets and presented documentatio that did not prove the lawfulness of his fortune. 35. Claims of significant over• including revenues of 1.8 million GNF,! imports valued betwee 77,920 and 100,000 euros, and contracts wi1 international companies are clearly insufficient to justify a wealth of ovei 300 million US dollars. he allegations of a turnover of 22 million dollars before his appointment t public office are not documented, and there is nol balance sheet or accoun · g evidence on file. The figures presented for thel I Djoma Group for they ars 2017 to 2021 by Ms. Fatoumata Diakite are! also unsubstantiated and inconsistent with the assets seized. 36. The disproportion betw en the assets currently held by Mr. Sylla and his, declared income prior to his appointment as Intendant of the Presidency o the State on February 4, 2014 is evident. In view of these objective facts, public. As the main p; the Public Prosecutor's 1 ffice acted legitimately in making these elements :al proceedings, the Publiih "• , in crim ~ Office has the right to at tively defend its position, with no obligation to b neutral. 37. With regard to the al,eged violation of the right to a trial within . reasonable time, Mr. S Ha claims that his applications for release hav been considered too slo ly. However, this claim does not stand up, sine the Guinean courts - om the CRIEF's Investigative Section to th Supreme Court - have a ways ruled diligently. The concept of "reasonaM time" must be analyzed aking into account the complexity of the case, th behavior of the parties d the workload of the judicial authorities. 38. The case in question i highly complex, involving extensive files ani technical financial inve tigation reports. In addition, Mr. Sylla's lawye: filed multiple appeals, any of them abusive, which inevitably extende◄ the procedural time. It · s unreasonable to expect the Supreme Court o Guinea to rule on a cas ation appeal in less than two months in a case o this magnitude. 39. It should be noted th the case involves complex technical matters, intricate business netwo ks and the concealment of more than 450 trucks and heavy equipment i ported from Gennany, each valued at more than 200,000 pounds sterling. There is no indication of inaction on the part o the Guinean courts. T erefore, the allegation of a violation of the reasonable time limit is founded. u 40. With regard to the all ged arbitrary detention, Mr. Sylla contests the national decisions that r dected his applications for release. However, this Court is not a court of ap eal or cassation and can only intervene if a human rights violation is prove . The applicable standard, reaffirmed in Judgment No. ECW/CCJ/JUD/35/ 3 of October 16, 2023, follows the criteria of the United Nations Workin' Group on Arbitrary Detention. The said criteria establish that the depriv~tion of liberty is arbitrary when there is no legal : basis, when it results fr m the exercise of fundamental rights or when ther1 are serious violations o the guarantees of a fair trial. 41. In the instant case, Mr Sylla's pre-trial detention is the result of forma. judicial proceedings ini iated by the CRIEF on January 27, 2022, relatin: to serious crimes provi ed for and punishable under the Guinean Pena. Code and related legisl tion. The charges were duly served at the time o: his first appearance be re the Investigating Chamber. The arrest is full: based on national legal rov1s1ons. 42. In conclusion, both the indictment and the maintenance of Mr. Kabine1 Sylla's pre-trial detenti n are legitimate and are supported by solid lega: grounds. The allegation of violation of the presumption of innocence, th1 right to a trial within a reasonable time and arbitrary detention ar1 unfounded and must be ejected. b. Pleas in Law 1. In its defenseJ the Defendant essentially invoked the Guine: 1al Procedure, the case law of the Court and th1 'ted Nations Working Group. v. Reliefs Sought i. In view of the matters in ff ct and in law set out below, and without prejudici to the matters of law, fact f d evidence that may be produced subsequently,: the State of Guinea seeks i om the ECO WAS Court of Justice the followini reliefs: ii. To determine, as a matterlin law, the admissibility of the action brought by Mr. Kabinet SYLLA, also ltjiown as "Bill Gates"; iii. A Declaration that the State of Guinea has not violated the right to th1 presumption of innocence or the right to have one's case heard within : reasonable time limit; iv. Order Mr. Kabinet SYt LA, also known as "Bill Gates", to pay the cos1 and other expenses of the pr ceedings. VII. PROCEDURE BE}fORE THE COURT On the Application for E~pedited Procedure The Applicant' s Case 43. The Applicant claims at it is urgent to submit his case to the expedite procedure because the e is a fear that his detention, which is alread arbitrary, will be further extended and has invoked the provisions of Articl 59 of the Rules of the C urt to this effect. The Court's Analysis 44. The Court recalls that Article 59(2) of its Rules of Procedure states that: "1. On application by t e applicant or the defendant, the President ma;, exceptionally decide, on the basis of the facts before him and after hear in; the other party, that a ase is to be determined pursuant to an expedite, procedure derogating om the provisions of these Rules, where th particular urgency ofth case requires the Court shall give its ruling wit, the minimum of delay. 2. An application for a ase to be decided under an expedited procedur shall be made by a se rate document lodged at the same time as th application initiating th proceedings or the defense, as the case may be. " 45. In accordance with this provision, an applicant may exceptionally submit case to the expedited plocedure in cases of justified urgency. In additio1 any application for an expedited procedure must be made by separat1 application. 46. The Court notes that, the instant case, the Applicant submitted a1 application for expedited yrocedure on February 13, 2023. This applicatio was submitted separately rom the main application and should therefore b1 considered to have been submitted in accordance with Article 59 of the Rule: of the Court. I 47. The Court notes, however,1 that in view of the time that has elapsed and th fact that the procedure is being processed in accordance with the time limit: of ordinary law (the time imits in Article 35 of the Rules), and since it ii examining the merits of th case, there is no longer any need to rule on th application for an expedi ed procedure, which has been submitted sine, February I 3, 2023, becaus it has become devoid of purpose. VIIL JURISDICTION 48. Article 9(4) of Suppleme tacy Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 of 19 January 20051 amending Protocol A/P.1/ /91 on the ECOWAS Court of Justice provide: that: "The Court has juris iction to determine case of violation of huma, rights that occur in any Me her State."; 49 . It follows from this provi ion that, in order for the Court to declare itsel competent, the application ust refer to a human rights violation committed on the territory of one of th Member States and by that State. 50. The Court has repeatedly held that the mere mention of a human rights violation in the applicatio is sufficient for it to declare itself competent (Judgment No. ECW/CC /JUD/57/23 of December 15, 2023: Mohame, BAZOUM and Two Others v. State of Niger, §28). 51.ln the case sub judice, the Applicant invokes in his application the violatioi of his rights, namely the ri t to the presumption of innocence, the right to bi tried within a reasonable ti e and the violation of the prohibition of arbitr: arrest and detention. He a so relies on legal instruments relating to hum, rights, namely the lntemati nal Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and th, African Charter on Hum and Peoples' Rights, all ratified by the State o Guinea on January 24, 197 and February 16, 1982, respectively. 52. The Court therefore declar s itself competent to hear the instant case. IX ADMISSIBILITY 53 . It is a rule of common la that the competence to examine and decide application is distinct fro its admissibility. Admissibility refers to th1 assessment of whether the application will be accepted for consideration o the merits and, eventually, final decision on the matters in dispute. It is woi noting that international h man rights courts have developed the idea tha1 admissibility rules should e applied with a certain "degree of flexibility ani without excessive formalis ". Human rights treaties must be interpreted an1 applied in such a way as o ensure that their safeguards are practical an1 effective. (YASA v. TU Y - 1998 - VI; 28 EHRR 408). 54. Article lO(d) of the Protoc l on the Court, as amended by the Supplemen1 Protocol of January 19, 2 05, states: "Access to the Court is open to ti following: Individuals on 'Plication for relief for violation of their humai rights; the submission of a lication for which shall: not be anonymous; nor, ii) Will only be submitted t the Community Court of Justice if it has not beeJ submitted to another Comp tent International Court." 55. It follows from the abovf provision that, in order to be admissible, th application submitted to e Court must be made by a person who claims ti be a victim of a violation o their rights, must not be anonymous and must no have been submitted to an ther international court with the same jurisdictio as this Court. These condit ons must be met cumulatively. 56. The Court observes that, i the instant case, the application was filed by a natural person, Mr. Kabin SYLLA, also known as Bill Gates, who clearly identified himself by ment oning in his originating application his full name, his nationality, his professi n, his domicile and address; that he claims to be the victim of a violation o his rights; that, furthermore, it does not appear from the case file that the pplication in question is pending before another international court, which ould be competent to examine it. I 57. Consequently, the applicat on is declared admissible. X MERITS 58. The Court will now procee~ to analyze the alleged human rights violations t, determine whether they arJ well-founded. a) On the Alleged Violati~n of the Right to the Presumption oflnnocenc1 The Applicant's Cas, 59. The Applicant submits th t the right to the presumption of innocence enshrined in international struments, namely Article 14(2) of the ICCP: Article 7(b) of the ACHPR as well as in the Principles and Guidelines on th Right to a Fair Trial and L gal Assistance in Africa. Furthermore, this right i. provided for in Guinean le islation, specifically in the preliminary article o the Criminal Procedure Co e and article 44 of the Civil Code, which state tha, anyone accused of a crime as the right to be presumed innocent until prove1 ~~- ~ ; 60. The Applicant submits th t during a press conference held on December: 2022 by the Special Pr ecutor at the CRIEF and his deputies, publi, statements were made tha directly implicated him in crimes of corruptio: embezzlement of public funds, forgery, money laundering and illic"' enrichment. Among other tatements, it was said that, before 2014, Kabin1 SYLLA only owned one c mpany, but that, after taking up public office, h created other private entiti s, which would be incompatible with his positio: in violation of articles 65 and 651 of the Penal Code. They also detaile, significant financial move ents in the accounts of his companies. 61 . The Applicant argues that !uch statements induced the public to believe in hi: guilt, violating his right to e presumption of innocence. He stresses that th, duty to respect this right i absolute and cannot be relativized based on th, need to inform the publi about the progress of cases. He relies on th judgment render in the c e Ababacar Khalifa SALL, in which this Cou: stated that concern for the "ght to information does not justify violating th, presumption of innocencl . Finally, he maintains that the creation o companies and the funds ound in his accounts are legal and the result o legitimate business transac · ons, which have never been contested in court. The Defendant's Cas, 62. The State of Guinea expla~ s that on January 27, 2022, the Special Prosecuto submitted before the CRJEF an order to the Investigation Section to' investigate crimes of embe lement of public funds, forgery, organized the:ft,I abuse of trust, concussion, oney laundering, illegal taking of interests and complicity, involving the c mpanies Djoma Group SA, Djoma SA and Djoma Logistic SA. A preventives izure of the bank assets of the Applicant and other 1 companies belonging to . Kabinet SYLLA ("Bill Gates") was requested. He was formally charged d arrested on November 3, 2022. \ '/Jt ~ 63. The Applicant tried unsuc essfully to have the indictment order annulled am his release, by filing sever 1 appeals that were rejected by the Supreme Cou: of Guinea. After orders o no/le prosequi, lifting of seizure and restitutioi were issued, the Public Pr secutor's Office lodged appeal, but ruling no. 04 upheld the decisions. The tate of Guinea has lodged an appeal, which is stil pending. 64.ln response to the Applican 's media allegations, the Public Prosecutor's Offic1 communicated publicly to counter the misinformation, disclosing objectiv1 elements of the case in ac ordance with Article 8 of Law No. 2016/060/AN. without making any judg ents on the merits of the charges, respecting th presumption of innocence. The Court's Analysis 65. The Court notes that the ri t to the presumption of innocence is a legal principle according to whi anyone accused of an offense is presumed innocent until proven guil by law. This right is enshrined in various international and regional I gal instruments relating to human rights. 66. Article 14(2) of the ICCPR tates that:"(..) Everyone charged with a criminai offense shall have the ri t to be presumed innocent until proved guili according to law." Article (1 )(b) of the ACHPR states that: "Every individuai shall have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises: ( .. .) b. the righ to be presumed innocent un ii proved guilty by a competent court or tribunal". 67. The Court also notes that e legislation of the State of Guinea has enshrine1 this right in the Code of Cr minal Procedure, the preliminary article of whicl states that: "Every suspect d or accused person is considered innocent unti. proven guilty by law. Viola ions of his/her presumption of innocence must be; prevented, remedied and p nished in accordance with the law. " I 68. The Court stresses that it jfollows from all these provisions that a person1 accused of having committf d an offense is presumed innocent until h~guilt! i ~ : has been established by a judicial decision. It should be added that such cou decision must be final, i.l that it can no longer be appealed against. Th existence of an appeal alway s leaves the right to the presumption of innocenc, intact. 69. The Court also notes that, ir several of these decisions, it found a violation o the right to the presumptior of innocence due to statements made by judicia. authorities at press f onferences. In . fact, in Judgment No ECWICCJIJUG/04/ 13, of 1ebruary 21, 2013, 10 case ABDOULAYE BALD. and Ors v. SENEGAL (Collection of Law Report 2013, § 67 to 69, p.97), state, that: "§67. The Court observes that the presumption of innocence provided Jo. in Article 7. {I )(b) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 'Rights ha. I been violated in that, withdut having previously proven his guilt, the Specia Prosecutor, through his press conference, made it appear that the Applicant. are guilty of embezzlement ... " In Judgment No. ECW /CCJ/WG/l 7 /18, o June 29, 2018, in case AB BACAR KHALIFA SALL and Ors v. SENEGAL the Court stated that: "(..) it should be noted that the respondent State has1 never contested the remar imputed to the Attorney General and alleged{ made during his press con rence of March 3, 2017. These obsel'Vations lei the Attorney General to st te that the case of the revolving fund is nothing ' more than the justification a sum of one billion eight hundred million, which was taken from the coffers o the city of Dakar on the basis of false documents. The Court stressed that uch statements, made by a judicial authority called upon to take part ·n the proceedings, could leave no room for doubt in the minds of th public, to whom they were addressed; In fact, the Attorney Ge eral's statements simply tend to make the public believe that public fi ds have been misappropriated using false documents, when there i still no court decision to that effect ... " 70. The Court notes that, in case sub judice, the Special Prosecutor at the CRIEF and his deputies hel4 a press conference on December 2, 202: t, ~ which these public prosec tors, the competent authorities in the case agains Mr. Kabinet SYLLA, state that: "Before 2014, Mr. Kabinet SYLLA had ant one company called Busin ss Marketing International. However, from 2014. while he was working as civil servant, three other Djoma companies weri created, namely Djoma SA, Djoma Logistique SA and Djoma Groupe SA. An, all the more so because i was incompatible with his position as Intendan. General, therefore, in his apacity as a civil servant, he does not have thi possibility of creating thes private companies at the same time (in July 2016, and contrary to the provisi ns of articles 65 0 and 651 of the Penal Code. The accounts of all his c mpanies are expressed in Guinean.francs, dollar: and euros. Several as nomical sums of money were found and seized. I The Djoma Group com any recorded a total payment of 962 million 9 3 thousand 500 Guinean ancs. In his personal account, a deposit by chec, of 212,500,000 Guinea francs, several bank transfers of 8, 717,806, 7 4 Guinean francs. Transfi rs of funds, in particular to the BCRG, amountin. to 10,876,251,856 Gui eanfrancs. Transfers of funds with unidentifie, donors of 38,673,274 ,000 Guinean francs, transfer interfaces (?, 16,040,316,017 Guinea francs, etc." 71. The Court observes that e statement by the competent authorities of th Public Prosecutor's Office is nothing more than a way of presenting th Applicant, in the eyes ofpu lie opinion, as the author of the facts of which h is accused and which enab ed him to create or set up companies, since they clearly state that it was d ing his professional activity that he created such companies. Such a state ent, made by the magistrates of the Public Prosecutor's Office at the s ge of the preliminary inquiry process, that is, in the absence of any decision on the guilt of the accused, manifestly violates the latter's right to the presump ion of innocence. There is, in fact, a desire to lead the public to believe that e Applicant is guilty of the facts of which he is accused, when the case is o ly at the preliminary investigation stage. 72. The Court also observes t at, by mentioning the sums of money found in th Applicant' s various bank a counts without it being possible to establish a 1· between those sums of mo ey and the facts alleged against the Applicant, th public prosecutors also te d to make the public believe that those sums o money represent the fruit f the acts of misappropriation of public funds an illicit enrichment of which he Applicant is accused. This obviously represen an imputation of the fac of misappropriation of public funds and illici enrichment to the Applic t, although there is no final decision establishin; this. 73. The Court takes note that fact that sums of money are found in the accoun of a person prosecuted for conomic and financial offenses is not synonymou with guilt, if no link has b en established between those sums of money an the facts imputed to that pe on following a final judgment. Thus, also in thi case, the public prosecu ors, by making such references, violated th Applicant's right to the prefumption of innocence. 74. The Court observes that, although the Public Prosecutor's Office may provid information to the public n the course of criminal proceedings, it remains! imperative that its desire to inform the public does not, in any case, affect th rights of defense of the pe ons involved and, in particular, the right to the! presumption of innocence, · ofar as the violation of that presumption is often difficult to remedy, even b decisions not to indict, acquittal or exoneration. 75. From the above, it must erefore be concluded that the State of Guinea, through the conduct of th CRIEF prosecutors, violated the provisions o Article 14(2) of the ICCPR d Article 7(1) of the ACHPR and consequently, the right to the presumption of innocence of Mr. Kabinet SYLLA, also known as Bill Gates. b) The alleged violation of the right to be tried within a reasonable time The Applicant's Case 76. The Applicant submits th t the right to be tried within a reasonable time i: guaranteed by Articles 9(3 and 14 of the ICCPR and Article 7 of the ACHP He points out that more th two (02) months after he appealed to the Suprem1 Court on the basis of Artie e 300 of Guinea's Code of Criminal Procedure, h1 has not been given any jud cial follow-up. 77 . He also notes that both the President of the Special Chamber for th• Examination of Pre-trial J dges and the Chamber itself failed to respect th time limits within which 1'ey had to examine his appeal and his applicatio: for immediate examinationl in breach of the provisions of the CCP. Defendant's Case 78. The State of Guinea reports that in January 2022, an investigation w, launched against Djoma roup SA and other companies linked to Kabine· SYLLA ("Bill Gates") for financial crimes. After his indictment and arrest several appeals were rejec ed by the Supreme Court. Although subsequen1 decisions have lifted seizur sand ordered restitutions, the Public Prosecutor' Office has appealed, and the case is still pending. The State of Guine: maintains that the case is omplex and voluminous, aggravated by abusiv• defense appeals, and argu s that there were no undue delays, rejecting an· violation of the right to a tr al within a reasonable time. The Court's Analysis j 79. The right to be judged with+ a reasonable time is a fundamental guarantee fo the subjects of the law. It fi ds particular expression in the right to liberty orl security, through the right f persons arrested or detained to obtain in "short term" a judicial decision on the lawfulness of their detention and to put an endl to their deprivation of lib rty if it proves unlawful (ECHR, July 9, 2009,J MOREENv. GERMANY, nJ. 11364/03, § 106). 80. The Court recalls that t! right to be tried within a reasonable time i: guaranteed by Articles 9(3 and 14 of the ICCPR and Article 7 of the ACHP Article 9 (3) of the ICC R establishes that: "(..) 3. Anyone arrested Oi detained on a criminal ch rge shall be brought promptly before a judge o; other officer authorized by aw to exercise judicial power and shall be entitle, to trial within a reasonabl time or to release." Article 14(3)(c) of the ICCP: establishes that: "In the di termination of any criminal charge against him. everyone shall be entitle to the following minimum guarantees, in Jul, equality: To be tried witho t undue delay." As for the CADHP, its article establishes that: "Every ind vidual shall have the right to have his cause heari That right includes (..) th right to be tried within a reasonable time by aJ impartial court or tribunal. ' 81. The Court recalls that, in i s case law, it bases its assessment of reasonabli time on criteria already id ntified by the European Court of Human Rights. which relate to the comp le ity of the case, the conduct of the Applicant am that of the administrative uthorities. In the proceedings IBRAHIM SOR: GUINEA (Judgment No. ECW/CCJ/JUG/03/16, of ebruary 16, 2016), the Court stated that two (02)j years without any decision a case that does not present any complexity does; not seem reasonable (Couieports, §113; P.54). In the case TIM SARLU v. J i /CCJ/JUG/22/24, of June 6, 2024), the Court TOGO (Judgment No. EC t found that the right to be ied within a reasonable time was violated by the! failure of the Togolese CO' to respect the time limits laid down by national law for the processing of p1 82. The Court notes that, in e instant case, the Applicant lodged an appeal against preventive detentio order No. 238/CI/CRIEF/2022 on November 4, 2022. On the same date, asked the President of the Special Examining Chamber to immediately e amine his application, in accordance with Article 300 of the Guinean Code o Criminal Procedure. As of November 22, : no decision has been h➔ded down by the CRIEF's Special Examinin. Chamber, nor by its Presid! nt. 83. The Court notes that Articl 294 of Guinea's CCP states that: "In the event l?i an appeal against a prev ntive detention order, the accused or the pubU prosecutor may, if the a~ al is lodged no later than the day following th detention order, ask the President of the Special Investigation Contro. Chamber or, if he is prev ted from doing so, the magistrate who replace, him, to examine the appea immediately without waiting for the Chamber t, hear it. This application m st, under penalty of inadmissibility, be submitte, at the same time as the app al before the Examining Chamber. ( . .) The President of the pre-trial chamber or the magistrate who replace, him shall take a decisio , no later than the third worldng day following th application, on the basi of the information in the case file, by means of a, unfounded and non-app a/able order." 84. It follows from this provis·on that the President of the pre-trial chamber, or the magistrate who replace him, must give his opinion no later than the third working day following the pplication. 85. The Court notes that, wi h regard to the aforementioned provision, the President of the special pre trial chamber, to which the appeal was submitted on November 4, 2022, ther fore the day after the date of the order (November 3, 2022), did not rule withi the time limits laid down in Article 294, in fine. The report by Maitre Bass ou Seek CONDE, bailiff at the Conakry courts, clearly attests to the absen e of a decision on the application for immediate consideration of the appeal n November 22, 2022. 86. The Court notes that exact! 18 days elapsed between the date on which the case was referred to the Pr sident of the Special Chamber for the Control o Investigations and the date of the bailiffs report, when the President of ~e ~~ Chamber should have tak:1n a decision no later than the third day followin referral. 87. By failing to issue a decisi n within the time-limits laid down by Article 294 in fine, the President of the special pre-trial chamber infringed the Applicant': right to obtain a decision n the lawfulness of his detention within the lega time-limits. 88. The Court also notes that t e Examining Chamber, which was required to rul on the appeal lodged by the applicant within ten (10) days of the date on whici the case was referred to it, ad not issued a decision by November 22. 89. Article 300 of Guinea's C P states that: "The Attorney General shall prepar◄ the case file within 48 hou s of receiving the documents relating to pre-tria1 detention and within 10 da s in all other matters, and shall submit it, togethe, with its indictment order, t the investigating chamber. In the event of pre-trial etention, the latter must give its opinion within maximum of 10 days fro receipt of the file at the Registry". 90. However, by failing to rul on the appeal within the time limit laid down by Article 300, the Chamber also infringed the Applicant's right to obtain a decision on the lawfulness fhis detention within a reasonable time. 91. The Court also notes that t e Applicant lodged an appeal with the Court o Cassation on Nov 28, 2022, against Order N o. 010/CRIEF/P/CSCI/2022 f November 25, 2022, of the President of the Special Pre-Trial Chambe , which rejected his application for immediate release, in accordance wit Article 300 of the CCP. Furthennore, two (02) months after the appeal w filed, no decision was handed down by the Court of Cassation. 92. The Court observes that, ~ the instant case, two months to hear an appeal against a decision denyin an application for immediate release seems abnormally long, given th issue at stake, the deprivation of a pers9n's freedom of movement. Th s, there are also reasons to consider that there ha: been a violation of the ri to be tried within a reasonable time. 93. The Court notes that, wi regard to issues of detention, in particular issue: relating to challenging the wfulness of detention, respect for short time limi for their examination must be the norm, since detention deprives the arreste1 person of their freedom of movement. It is therefore the responsibility of th criminal courts to exami e cases challenging the lawfulness of pre-tria detention within reasonabl time limits and, where appropriate, to allow th, persons concerned to reg in their freedom of movement in the event o unlawful detention. 94. It is necessary to prevent d~tention, which is an exceptional measure, freedo being the principle, from ~eing used for purposes other than those provide,' for by domestic law. 95. From the foregoing, the cohrt must find that the State of Guinea has violate1 the Applicant' s right to be · ed within a reasonable time, through the action of the Special Examining hamber of the CRIEF and the Court ofCassation. c) Of the Alleged Arbitra Detention ! The Applicant's Case 96. The Applicant maintains tht t his arrest was made in violation of the provisions of the Guinean CCP and inr okes Articles 294 and 300 of that text. He claims that, under the terms of Artiple 294( 6) of the CCP, the President of the Special Pre-Trial Chamber had 3 da~s to rule on his application for release, which was submitted to him on Noveniber 4, 2022; that he therefore had until November 9 to do so; that failure to pomply with the deadlines set by this provision constitutes a violation of hif rights and that it was only intended to keep him in detention as long as poss,ble. 97. He also avers that the Specifil Examining Chamber, which had IO days to rule on the application for imme~iate consideration of his release, also failed to do \ ~ ~ so within the legal time Ii its; that, in fact, it had until November 17, 2022 t1 do so, given that the case as referred to it on November 4, 2022. 98. He observes that the reject on of his application for immediate release by th President of the Special P -Trial Chamber, in violation of Article 300(2) o the CCP, is intended to k ep him in detention, which constitutes arbitr: detention; that, in fact, as icle 300(2) of the CCP provides for immediat, release, the refusal to app y this provision renders his detention illegal an arbitrary. 99. He concludes that his prol nged detention is a violation of Articles 6 of the ACHPR and 9 of the UD and invokes, in support of this argument, the Court's judgment in the c e of BADINI Salfo v. Burkina Faso (Judgment ECW/CCJ/JUD/ 13/ 12of310/ 2012). 100. In his application for a earing dated September 7, 2023, he explained tha1 he had benefited from a no le prosequi order dated August 14, 2023, but ha, not benefited from a releas4 in accordance with article 284 of the CCP, whic states: that: "If the investiJatingjudge finds that the facts do not constitute crime, felony or misdemeapor, or if the perpetrator remains unknown, or i there are no sufficient charJes against the accused person, he shall declare, b: order, that there is no reaso to continue the proceedings." The accused persons, pr visionally detained, are released. The order put; an end to judicial proc dings"; that, despite this provision, he has been! kept in detention, on the grounds that the Special Prosecutor at the CRIEFI appealed against the no e prosequi order, in accordance with Article 293 in fme, which states th t: " ( . .) In the event of an appeal by the Public Prosecutor's Office, the detained accused person shall be kept in prison until the appeal is decid d within the time limit and, in any event, until the expiry of the time limits t for the Attorney General, unless he consents to immediate release." \ ~ 101. He maintains that he s mitted an application for provisional measures ti the President of the Specia Examining Chamber, in order to establish that hi: detention order, issued sin e November 3, 2022, had not been renewed and ti order his release, in accor ce with Article 238, which states that: ""(...) Oi expiry of the period of lidity of the preventive detention warrant, th investigating judge mus under penalty of disciplinary proceeding~ immediately order the rele e of the accused person, unless he is detained fo. another reason. Otherwise, and in exce tional circumstances, the president of the cou, may order the accused erson's release "; which, curiously, the presiden1 of the Special Chamber or the control of the investigation declared himsel incompetent. Defendant's Case 102. The State of Guinea reports that, in January 2022, an investigation w: launched against the companies Djoma Group SA and others for financia: crimes, and the seizure of ~lsets linked to Kabinet SYLLA ("Bill Gates") wa: ordered. SYLLA was foJ any charged and arrested on November 3, 2022 After successive appeals w re rejected, orders of no/le prosequi and restitutio were issued, confirmed by ruling No. 041, currently pending an appeal i cassation. The State of Gu· ea maintains that ECOW AS is not a substitute fo national courts in the abs nee of human rights violations and claims tha1 SYLLA' s detention is a leg~l consequence of the proceedings. The Court's Analysis 103. The Court recalls that th~ prohibition of arbitrary detention is enshrined in 1 Article 6 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) and Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Article 6 Oi ACHPR establish that "Eveyy individual shall have the right to liberty and to It ~~ the security of his person. INo one may be deprived of his freedom except Jo. reasons and conditions previously laid down by law. In particular, no one m be arbitrarily arrested or betained. " Similarly, Article 9 of the UDHR state. that "no one shall be subj, cted to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile". 104. In its judgment no. ECmJ· 1/CCJIJUG/03/16, ofFebruary 16, 2016, in the cas of IBRAHIMA SORY TO 'RE and ISSIAKA BANGOURA v. the STATE 0, GUINEA, the Court reaffirmed, based on the standards established by th Working Group on Arbir Detention, that the deprivation of liberty i to justify the detention; (id when the deprivation results from the exercise o considered arbitrary in three main situations: (i) when there is no legal basi fundamental rights or freedoms; and (iii) when there is a serious violation o fundamental procedural Jarantees to the point of rendering the deprivatio of liberty unlawful. 105. In the instant case, the Court notes that the Applicant was detained · Conakry Central Prison on November 3, 2022, in compliance with th indictment issued on the sJme date. The following day, November 4, 2022 the Applicant appealed against that order and submitted an application fo urgent consideration to the lPresident of the Special Chamber for the Control! of Investigations. 106. It should be noted thatl according to Article 300 of Guinea' s Code o Criminal Procedure, the General Prosecutor has 48 hours to prepare the case for pre-trial detention and fend it, together with his indictment order, to the Investigation Control Secti9n. The latter, upon receiving the case, must issue a decision within a maximtlm of IO days. The article expressly states that i these deadlines are not met, he accused erson will automaticall be released by decision of the Presiden of the Chamber, at the application of the accused person, his lawyer or the p~son administrator. This release is irrevocable. I 07. In this particular case, ~ e Prosecutor General's indictment order is dated November 7, 2022, which ~ eans that the Investigation Control Section would i have until November 17, 2022, to issue a decision. However, according to th bailiffs report, dated Nove ber 22, 2022, no decision had been handed dow1 by that date. Even after is failure to comply, the Chamber only ruled 01 November 25, 2022, more han a week after the legal deadline. 108. The Court notes that, de pite the fact that the time limit laid down in Articl 300 of the Code of Cri inal Procedure had clearly been exceeded, th Applicant's application for release was rejected, contrary to the legal regim which required his immed ate release. This shows that, as of November 18 2022, the Applicant's det ntion no longer had a legal basis and becam arbitrary, as defined by nat onal and international law. 109. The Court recognizes at the Defendant State argued that the legal tim limit provided for in Artie e 300 was insufficient to carry out the necessa1 steps in a highly complex i vestigation, such as the one in question. However. it observes that it has n t been duly demonstrated how the Applicant' detention, after the expiry the legal period, remained in conformity with th1 legal requirements. Simpl claiming that time was short to conclude th1 investigations does not re lace the legal obligation to strictly observe thi deadlines and procedural g antees established by domestic legislation. 110. In addition, it should e noted that, although the Defendant State has] maintained the complexity of the investigation and the practical difficulties encountered, the facts sho that, since the initial arrest, more than two years have passed without a fina decision being handed down or any substantial conclusive development f the investigations. This situation not only aggravates the perception at there has been an excessive extension of pre trial detention but also r · ses legitimate concerns about respect for the principles of due process reasonable time. I 111. The Court, without beli ling the challenges that may be inherent in cases of a complex financial and 1conomic nature, considers that the extended time, even if justified by difficulties in the investigation, cannot serve to mitj t ~t$ .. the need to comply with e legal rules on deprivation of liberty. Respect fo Article 300 of the Code of riminal Procedure requires that if the deadline fo a decision is not met, th accused person must be released immediately! regardless of the complexi of the case or the allegations made by the Publi Prosecutor's Office. 112. Therefore, the Court fi ds that the continued detention of the Applican beyond the legal time limi constituted a direct violation of national law an the applicable international instruments, in particular Articles 6 of the ACHP and 9 of the UDHR. Alth ugh the Defendant State has attempted to justi: this situation on the basis o the difficulties inherent in the investigation, it h, not been demonstrated tha the judicial authorities have adopted adequate o effective alternative meas es to mitigate the impact of this legal non compliance on the Applic t's fundamental rights. 113. In conclusion, the Court finds that, despite the justifications put forward by the Defendant State, it has ot been proven that the Applicant's detention afte November 18, 2022, remaip.ed in compliance with national and internationa. legal provisions. On the coi trary, maintaining the detention beyond the legall established period, withou a valid legal basis, is arbitrary. Thus, the Cou finds that the Applicant as been a victim of arbitrary detention from1 November 18, 2022. XI. REPARATION 114. The Applicant sought fr~m the Court: - Damages that must bf repaired by awarding the sum of 500,000,000 FCF A as compensation. - He claims that these dahiages are material and moral, in the sense that the refusal of his immediate release has deprived him of his freedom of movement, to visit his family and friends, to carry out his professional • activity without prejudii e to the media effects of his publicity, sufficientl fueled by the Public P osecutor's Office, which justifies the urgency o putting an end to his pr -trial detention. The Court's Analysi: 115. The Court notes that r aration must be considered a right of victims o human rights violations. In doing so, the State's failure to make reparation fo the rights violated must als be analyzed as a violation ofhuman rights, insofi as the ineffectiveness ofth reparation ordered allows the violation of hum rights to persist. The object ve of reparation is to put an end to the violation o rights, or at least to compe ate for it. 116. The Court recalls that i has always ordered reparation for rights when i considers that they have b en violated; that, depending on the nature of th, violation, it can order re aration which can take the form of restitutio (restoration to the state before the violation occurred), compensatio ( compensation for the d age suffered as a result of the v iolation} rehabilitation, satisfaction ( doption of measures to put an end to the violatio or other measures such truth-seeking, public apologies, human righ~ training, etc.) and guarante s of non-repetition, which aim to adopt reforms tol prevent further violations o the same nature from occurring. 117. The Court notes that, the instant case, reparation must be ordered according to the nature of ~e right violated. Reparation for the violatif n of the right to the presumption of innocence and the right to be tried lliithin a time limit 118. The Court finds that t~ State of Guinea has violated the right to the 1 presumption of innocence ➔nd the right to be tried within a reasonable time through the actions of the ju~icial authorities, in particular those of the CRIEF. t -~ 119. The Court notes that, i this case, it can only order compensation by wa of reparation, since no othe form of reparation is adequate. However, the Stat1 of Guinea should be invite to call on the judicial authorities, in particular th CRIEF, to respect the righ s of the defense and the time limits for process in: cases laid down by nationa law, particularly the Code of Criminal Procedure! 120. The Court emphasizes at the damage is a moral nature as regards th violation of the right to e presumption of innocence. With regard to th violation of the right to b tried within a reasonable time, even if it wer1 considered that it may hav caused loss of earnings to the Applicant becaus, of the length of his detenti n due to the absence of a decision within the tim limits established by the Ct P, the fact is that he has not demonstrated sue; loss. Such compensation 1 ust, however, be awarded to compensate for th violation of this right as w~ll. Reparation for the prohi~ition of arbitrary detention 121. With regard to this is ue, it is important for the court to verify Applicant's prison situatio at the time of the hearing because it does no· appear in the case file that e has been released. This information is important to allow the Court to deci on the appeal in relation to the violation of the prohibition of arbitrary det ntion, in particular on the application for release. 122. However, in addition t release (if applicable), the Applicant will be entitled to compensation fqr the time spent in arbitrary detention, i.e. from! November 18, 2022, until t~e date of his release. XII. COSTS 123. The Court recalls Articlel66(1) of its Rules of its Procedure, which provides that "A decision as to costs j hall be given in the final judgment or in the order, which closes the proceedin s ". ~ f ~ . - 124. Furthermore, Article 6! (2) of the Rules of Procedure provides that "Thi unsuccessful party shall b ordered to pay the costs if they have been appliei for in the successful party' 1 pleadings". 125. On the basis of that prt vision, the Defendant, as the unsuccessful p. should be ordered to pay a 1 the costs. XIII. OPERATIVE CLAUSJ 126. For these reasons, the f mirt held a public hearing and having heard th parties: On Jurisdiction i. Declares itself compe~nt to hear the Application. On the Admissibility: ii. Declares the application admissible. The merits of the case: 1. Declares as established the violation of the right to the presumptio1 of innocence and the right to be tried within a reasonable time, en shrined in Article~ 9 (3) and 14 of the ICCPR. 11. Declares as established the arbitrary detention enshrined in Articles: 6 of the ACHPR ahd 9 of the UDHR. · Reparation: iii. Orders the Defendant to pay the Applicant the sum of 30,000,000 FCF A, as reparatiqn for the violation of his human rights. .f ~ • 1v. It also orders the p efendant to: Take the necessai measures to ensure that the CRIEF respects the rights of the defense in t;he processing of cases submitted to it. Take the necessatiy measures, as soon as possible, for the release o: Mr. Kabinet SYLLA, if pecessary (if he is still in detention). ON THE COSTS: 127. Pursuant to the Court's f ecision, the Defendant State is ordered to pay al the costs. Signed by: Hon. Justice Ricardo C~ GON<;AL VES ~Presiding/Judge Rapporteur ~~ 4'.l c:.... Hon. Justice Sengu Mohamed Hon. Justice Gberi-Be OUAT Assisted ey, I ~ Dr. Yaouza OURO-SAMA - ¢ hiefRegistrar ___ ==--- - - - - -- 12s. Done in Abuja on the 11th of May 2025, in Portuguese and translated inti English and French. 36