Kampala Capital City Authority v Sebuwufu Muhammed (Civil Appeal No. 69 of 2014) [2025] UGCA 174 (12 June 2025)

#### THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

#### IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA

(Coram: Asa Mugenyi, Musa Ssekaana, Stella Alibateese, JJA)

# CIVIL APPEAL NO. 69 of2OI4

(Aising from Miscellaneous Cause No 3OB of 20 13)

# KAIUPALA CAPITAL CITY AUTHORITY : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : APPELLANT VERSUS

SSEBLItrI,IFU MT HAMMED : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : RESPONDENT '10

# (Appeal from the Ruling of Yasin Nyanzi J. delivered on the lTth of January 2Ol4 at the Htgh Court of Uganda, Kampala)

### JUDGMENT OF STELLA ALIBATEESE JA

## Introduction

This is an appeal from the decision of Yasin Nyanzi J. in which he held that the appellant had not given a fair hearing to the respondent before issuing a final enforcement notice ordering the respondent to relocate his business on Plot 6 Lumumba Avenue to another location within 28 days. 20

#### Background

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The background of this appeal as discerned from the pleadings is that the respondent acquired a trade license from the appellant to operate a private car park on Plot 6 Lumumba Avenue. On 6ttt August 2013, the respondent was served with an enforcement notice by the appellant declaring the respondent's business a car bond and ordering the respondent to relocate his business to another suitable place within 28 days under Section 46 of the Physical Planning Act of 2OlO.


The respondent was dissatisfied with the process and manner in which the said final enforcement notice was issued asserting that the process offended the principles of natural justice and Article 42 of the Constitution of Uganda, and thus challenged the said notice in the High Court of Uganda by seeking judicial review.

On the l7s of January 2014, the High Court set aside the said linal enforcement notice ruling that the said notice was issued without giving the respondent an opportunity to be heard and was thus illegal and breached Article 42 of the Constitution. The appellant was not satisfied with the ruling of the Court hence this appeal.

#### Grounds of A al

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The Appellant was dissatisfied with the trial Court's decision and appealed to this Court on grounds that;

l. The learned trial judge erred in law and fact when he held that the final enforcement notice dated 6th August 2013 which was issued by the appellant ordering the respondent to vacate Plot 6 Lumumba Avenue in 28 days was made without giving the

applicant an opportunity to be heard and was therefore illegal'

2. The learned trial judge failed to properly evaluate the evidence on court record and thereby reached a wrong decision.

### Representation

At the hearing of the appeal, Mr. Dennis Byaruhanga, Supervisor Litigation, appeared for the appellants while Mr. Moses Byaruhanga appeared for the respondent.

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#### ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION

Counsel relied on written submissions that were adopted by this court.

# 5A ellan 's Submissions

Ground 1: The learned trial judge erred in law and fact when he held that the final enforcement notice dated 6th Auguet 2O13 which was issued by the appellant ordering the respondent to vacate Plot 6 Lumumba Avenue in 28 daye was made wlthout giving the applicant an opportunity to be heard and wae therefore illegal.

In regard to ground No. 1, Counsel for the appellant submitted that the respondent was issued with a trade license to operate a private car park and was not given a trade license to operate a car bond. That the respondent instead decided to operate a car bond and not a car park in contravention of the terms of the trade license issued to him and there by contravened the law, in particular Section 1 I of the Trade Licensing

Act.

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Counsel submitted that car bond owners are mandated to obtain an operational license from the Uganda Revenue Authority and Commissioner Customs as per Section 62 of lhe East Africa Community Management Act and that they should also obtain clearance from the relevant Physical Planning Committees. Counsel submitted that Plot 6 Lumumba Avenue is located in the commercial central business district in Kampala and the 2011 National Physical Planning Standards and Guidelines restrict the establishment and operation ofcar bonds within zonal areas designated as industrial.

Counsel submitted that the respondent and other car bond owners were illegally operating the business of a car bond along Plot 6 Lumumba Avenue contrary to the provisions of the East African Community


Management Act, Physical Planning Act, Trade Licensing Act and Public Health Act, Kampala Physical Development Plan and the 2Ol1 National Physical Planning Standards and Guidelines and that any activity carried out contrary to the law was illegal and so the respondent was illegally operating the business of a car bond along Plot 6 Lumumba Avenue.

Counsel cited the case of Genercrl Medla Councll u Spackman, (19431 ALL ER that fair treatment and hearing means that the affected persons should be given an opportunity to respond to the issue in controversy by contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view.

Counsel further submitted that prior to the issuance of the 6ft August <sup>20</sup>13 final enforcement notice to the respondent, the appellant had issued two notices in March and May 2OL2 to the respondent to relocate the illegal car bond but the respondent chose to ignore and not to respond to the said notices. That even after the issuance of the said final enforcement notice, Pal Safaris Ltd still had an option to appeal against the said decision to the National Physical Planning Board under Section 46(4) ofthe Physical Planning Act. 15 20

Counsel relied on Annebrlt Aslund p AG, HCMC 441 of 2OO4 where court held that a fair hearing means giving a person an opportunity to make, correct or to controvert any relevant statement brought forward to his prejudice in respect of all allegations. That in the instant case, the respondent was treated fairly and so the learned trial judge erred in fact and law to hold that the respondent was not given an opportunity to defend himself before the final enforcement notice was issued since the respondent had almost one and half years to respond to the appellant's concerns. 25 JU

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# Ground 2: The Learned Trial Judge falled to properly evaluate the evldeuce on court record and thereby reached a wroag decision.

5 Counsel submitted that the learned trial judge failed to properly evaluate the evidence on court record and thereby reached a wrong conclusion that the respondent was not given an opportunity to defend himself before the final enforcement notice was issued since the respondent had almost one and half years to respond to appellant's concerns raised in the first notices. That the learned trial judge ignored the notices issued on 2"d March 2Ol2 and 17ft May 2O12 which were unchallenged by the respondent. That the enforcement notice of 6e August 20 13 was only issued after the respondent failed to comply with the earlier notices and that the respondent never denied carrying out car bond business yet he had no trading license for it. 10

## Respondent's Sub!''issions

#### Ground One

The respondent submitted that Article 42 of the Constitution of Uganda is clear on the right to a fair hearing. That the appellant admits that the respondent had a valid trade license to operate a private car park but asserts instead that the respondent was operating a car bond and not a private car park. That if that assertion is true, then this is a case where the respondent should have been invited for a hearing or given an opportunity to rebut the appellant's assertion and evidence that he was instead operating a car bond and not a car park. IU )E,

Counsel submitted that there is no evidence anywhere that the 30 respondent was ever invited to any hearing. Counsel also cited General Medla Councll u Spackman (1943f ALL ER 1 stating the decision supports the respondent's case. Counsel cited Attoraeg General a Sahtatorl Abuki. SCCA No I of 1998, where Justice Wambuzi stated


that Article 42 must be read together with Article 44 which makes the right to a fair hearing a non derogable right. That even when the respondent had prior been given eviction notices in March and May, they were not inviting the respondent to defend himself and were thus not different from the August 2013 final enforcement notice.

That despite the prior notices of 2O12, the appellant went ahead and renewed the respondent's trading licence for 20 13 and so the respondent was shocked to receive another enforcement notice on 6ft August 2013 when his licence had been renewed without any protest from the appellant. Counsel cited the case of Rev. Bakaluba Peter Mukasa a Bettg Nambooze Baklleke SCCA No. 4 of 2OO9 where Katureebe JSC stated that "The constitution only gives the salient features of what constitutes a fair trial. That it must be an independent and impartial court established by the law and that allegations of denial of the right of fair hearing or trial are very serious. They impact on the case of our trial system." Counsel submitted that in the instant case, the respondent was condemned unheard and the appellant does not deny this fact.

### Ground Tlro

On Ground 2, Counsel for the respondent submitted that the notices issued by the appellant to the respondent in March and May 2Ol2 simply declared the respondent's business a nuisance and ordered him to vacate in 28 days. That there was no opportunity offered to the respondent to be heard just like the final enforcement notice of 6fi August 2013 and all these were orders to the respondent to vacate and close his business within 28 days.

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#### Decision

The duty of this court as a first appellate court is provided under <u>Rule</u> 30(1) (a) of the Judicature (Court of Appeal Rules) Directions SI 13-10

$\mathsf{S}$ which states:

> "... (1) On any appeal from a decision of the High Court acting in $\frac{1}{2}$ *the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the court may;*

*a) Reappraise the evidence and draw inferences of fact; ..."*

The duty of the $1^{st}$ appellate court was also delineated in the Supreme Court decision of *Kifamunte Henry v Uganda*, SCCA No. 10 of 1997 (unreported), which highlighted that,

"The first appellate Court has a duty to review the evidence of the case and to reconsider the materials before the trial judge. The appellate court must then make up its own mind not disregarding the judgement appealed from but carefully weighing and *considering it.*"

I have read the record of appeal and written submissions of counsel and have taken them into consideration in determining this matter.

#### 20 Ground 1

This appeal arose from a ruling following an application for judicial review questioning the procedure adopted by the appellant in arriving at its final enforcement notice to the respondent to relocate its business.

The appellant averred that the learned trial Judge erred in law and in fact when he held that the final enforcement notice dated 6<sup>th</sup> August 2013 which was issued by the appellant ordering the respondent herein to vacate Plot 6 Lumumba Avenue in 28 days was made without giving

the respondent an opportunity to be heard and was therefore illegal. 30

Counsel for the appellant submitted that the respondent was issued with a trade license to operate a private car park and not a car bond and that the respondent instead chose to operate a car bond in contravention of Section 11 of the Trade Licensing Act and other laws

such as Section 62 of the East African Community Management Act, the Physical Planning Act and the Public Health Act. Counsel averred that the 2011 National Physical Planning Standards and Guidelines restrict establishment of car bonds within zonal areas designated industrial. As such, the appellant contends that the respondent and other car bond owners were illegally operating the business of a car bond along Lumumba Avenue.

The appellant argued that prior to the issuance of the 6e August 2013 Iinal enforcement notice to the respondent, the appellant issued two notices in March and May 2Ol2 to the respondent to relocate his illegal car bond but the respondent ignored the same. This was not challenged by the respondent. '10

The appellant asserts that this was notice enough to the respondent to make a written response to contradict their intention to relocate the illegal car bond before the final enforcement notice was issued. That even then, the respondent could still appeal against the said decision to the National Physical Planning Board under Section 46(4) of the Physical Planning Act, 2010. )n

The respondent contends that issuing these notices to him merely declared his business a car bond and ordered him to relocate his business and that the manner and process of issuance of the enforcement notice offended principles of natural justice as he was never accorded any opportunity to be heard. 25

The question to be resolved is whether the notices issued to the respondent by the appellant in March and May 2012 were an opportunity for him to be heard prior to issuance of the final enforcement notice on 6ft August 2013.

<sup>8</sup> @

Article 42 of the Constitution of Uganda, 1995 provides for the right to just and fair treatment in administrative decisions and states that "Any person appearing before ang administratiue official or body has a ight to be treated iustlu and foirlu and shall haue a ight to applg to a court of 5 law in respect of any administratiue decision taken against him or her."

I have examined the notices issued to the respondent by the appellant on 2"d March 2Ol2 and 17ft May 2Ol2 that are on pages 36 and 37 of the record of appeal respectively. The notice dated 2"d March 2012 was personally received by the respondent but he refused to acknowledge receipt of the same. In that notice, the respondent was put on notice to relocate his vehicle sale business activity from the Central Business District on the grounds that the land the respondent occupied had never been gazetted as an industrial plot for a car show room and warehouse and that this activity had never been permitted by KCCA and is illegal. It was elaborated in this notice that the illegal business had brought a cluster of people and cars within and out at the road reserve yet with inadequate amenity facilities and was noisy which was a public nuisance under the Public Health Act. The respondent was instructed to vacate within 28 days of receipt of the notice failure to which the appellant would re-enter the premises as provided under Section 55 of the Physical Planning Act,201O.

25 30 On the 17th May 2012, the appellant again sent another notice to relocate the vehicle business activity from the central business district to the respondent instructing him to vacate the said premises within 7 days from the date of receipt of the notice. In this letter, the respondent was reminded about the lst notice that had been issued to him earlier ordering him to relocate his business. Further, the respondent was reminded that he had promised to voluntarily restrict the car sale business activities within the plot and to beautify the reserve of Lumumba Avenue but he had not complied. This letter informed the respondent that this was the 2"d and last warning'

The final enforcement notice was then issued to the respondent by the appellant on 6fr August 2013. It was issued under Section 46 of the Physical Planning Act 201I instructing the respondent to relocate his car bond out of the Central Business District to a suitable location within 28 days. This notice is at page 54 of the record of appeal. The appellant contends that by issuing the notices, it accorded the respondent his right to be heard but the respondent chose to ignore the same.

The notices issued by the appellant were a requirement under Section 46 of the Physical Planning Act and were informing the respondent that he was illegally operating a car bond against the terms of his trading license that was issued to him to operate a private car park' This allegation is denied by the respondent.

The main grievance of the respondent is that he was not offered an opportunity to be heard before the linal enforcement notice was issued to him. The respondent does not deny the fact that he was served with prior notices in March and May 2072. He only asserts that these notices

did not in any way accord him a right to a fair hearing and that they merely declared his business a public nuisance and illegal. 20

ln Rldge o Balduln o,nd Others, [1963] 2 AU ER 66 it was held that a body clothed with powers to decide cannot lawfully proceed without affording the person to be affected with an opportunity to be heard. 25

It follows thus that the right to be heard is a tenet of the principles of natural justice. The import of the application of the audi alteram partem rule is that both sides must be heard before passing any order. It is a fundamental principle of natural justice that before an order is passed against a person, he should be given an opportunity to be heard in the matter. This principle protects individuals from arbitrary decisions of 30

 bodies and Courts. See Mpungu & Sons Transporters Ltd -Vs-Attorney G neral & Kambe ColJee Factory poach) Ltd. SCCA No. 17 Of 2OO1.

5 Counsel for the appellant and respondent rightly relied on the authority of General lvledla Councll a Spackmo,n, 11943) 2 All ER 337, that states that fair treatment and hearing means that affected persons should be given an opportunity to respond to the issues in controversy by contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view.

In this particular case, the question is whether the appellant has demonstrated that it acted in a just and fair manner before the issuance of the final enforcement notice. I note that in arriving at an answer to the above question, there is need to contextualize the right to a fair hearing and to appreciate the fact that every case is determined based on its own peculiar facts and circumstances.

In the case of Russell u Norfolk, (19491 All ER lO9, T\rrker LJ held that;

" there are in my uietu no u.tords uhich are of uniuersal application to euery kind of inquiry and euery kind of domestic tribunal. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstdnces of the case, the nahtre of the inquiry, the ntles under uhich the tribunal is acting, the subject matter that is being dealt with, and soforth...... Whateuer standard is adopted. uhat is essential is that the oerson concerned should haue a reasonable oooortunitu of )q presentina his case"(emphasis mine).

Counsel for the appellant submitted that issuance of the preliminary enforcement notices to the respondent in March and May 2012 served as an invitation to the respondent to present his case and contradict the appellant's instruction for him to relocate the illegal car bond.


I agree with counsel for the appellant that these prior elaborate notices written to the respondent were an opportunity for the respondent to rebut any allegation therein or to seek audience with the appellant and be heard. The notices are proof that prior to issuing the final enforcement notice on 6ft August 2013, the appellant laboured to put the respondent on notice. From the record of appeal on Page 29, it appears there were also correspondence between the appellant and the lawyers of the respondent on the same issue. This is evident from the letter dated 19th August 2013, from the Director of Legal Affairs of the appellant to Web Advocates and Solicitors the respondent's lawyers in response to their letter to the appellant of 7ft August 2013. Further, the second notice issued in May 2Ol2 also alluded to engagements with the respondent over the same matter.

- <sup>15</sup> I hold the view, that the above communications and correspondences were avenues for the respondent to be heard. The respondent had more than one and halfyears to exercise his right to be heard by challenging the notices sent to him instead of ignoring the same. The essential elements of a dual process are stated in Black's Law Dlctionary sth - 20 Edition at 449. It states that "the essential elements <sup>o</sup> ue rocess <sup>o</sup> Iatu are notice and oDDOrfirntt<sup>u</sup> to be heard and to de d in orderlu proceedinqs adapted to the nature of the case and the guarantee of due process requires that euery man haue protection of day in court and benefit of the general law. It is further stated that "tlrc fundamental - requisite of "due process" is the opportunitu to be heard, to be anuare that a matter is pend to moke an informed choice u.thether to acquiesce or contest, and to assert before tte appropiote decision-making bodg tLe reasons for such choice". - I have read the afhdavits in support of the notice of motion in the lower court and the affidavit in rejoinder deponed by the respondent. The respondent acknowledged receipt of letters/notices from the appellant in2Ol2 and states that he even had meetings with the appellant on the 30


notilication to relocate his business. While the respondent asserts that his trading license was renewed by the appellant for ten years in 2013, there is no such licence on court record. However, based on the affidavit of the respondent, this renewal appeared to have the same rights as those which were issued to respondent to operate a private car park and not a car bond. The appellant's contention with the respondent was in respect of the operation ofa car bond contrary to the law and not the private car park. Therefore, extending a similar license would not have been a contradiction.

Given the notices that were issued to the respondent in March and May 2012, tt.e final enforcement notice should not have been a surprise to him since he had received previous notices stating the reason why KCCA wanted him to relocate his business and no action was taken by

him. 15

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The appellant body, KCCA is a creature of statute; that is the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) Act, 20 10 with powers to administer Kampala Capital City on behalf of the central government. Its functions are provided under Section 7(k) of the KCCA Act, and include carrying out physical planning and development control.

Section 46 of the Physical Planning Act 20l0 provides for issuance of notices where any development is deemed not to be compliant with the development permission granted under the Act and is reproduced below. 25

#### Section 46 Enforcement Notice

(1) A local phgsical planning committee shall setve anA enforcement notices on an owner, ocanpier or deueloper of land in tte form specified in tlrc Ninth schedule where ttre committee is satisyted that the deuelopment of land has been or is being carried out tuithin the required deuelopment permission or that


anA of the conditions of deuelopment permission granted under this Act haue not been complied uith.

- (2) Enforcement notice shall specifu a peiod within which tLrc owner, occupier or deueloper shall complg tuith tlrc notice. - (3) Upon the seruice of an enforcement notice, deuelopment in respect of the land to tuhich enforcement notice relates shall be discontinued. ana \*rc

(4) An owner, occupier or deueloper of land on u.thom an enforcement notice is serued mau uLithin the time specifted in the notice for comoluino utith the notice aoDEal the notice to the nert hiaher phusical olannina committee.

- (5) Where an appeal is lodged under this section, enforcement notice shall be staged pending determination of the appeal. the the - ,n 25 The Physical Planning Act 2010 clearly provides for issuance of enforcement notices and provides the remedy for any occupier dissatislied with the notice. It thus follows that if the respondent was dissatisfied with the enforcement notice, he should have appealed to the next higher physical planning committee. The respondent chose not to explore this remedy and instead filed a notice of motion in the High Court for judicial review.

Rule 7A (l) (b) of the Judicature Review (Amendment) Rules 2019 is to the effect that court must satisfy itself that the aggrieved person has exhausted existing remedies available within the public body or under the law before pursuing judicial review. It thus follows that judicial review is not intended to replace statutory procedures. Once the law has created a statutory procedure to address a grievance, it is deemed mandatory to explore that alternative procedure before trying to seek


courts discretion in availing the same remedies under judicial review. It was thus incumbent on the lower court to satisfy itself before seizing jurisdiction, that the respondent seeking its intervention had lirst exhausted the prescribed statutory mechanisms for redress under the Physical Planning Act, 2010.

ln Natlonal Councll Jor Hlgher Educatlon u Kauooga, (Constlttttlonal Appeal a of 2O11) [2015] UCSC 9 (12 May 2015)

C. N. B Kitumba, JSC stated;

'Clearly, it would be improper for courts of lau to usurp the powers that are explicitly set out for an institution in an Act of Parliament. Courts can onlg interuene if the appellant in exercise of its pouters fails to obserue the correct procedures and in case of the Constitutional Court, if there is failure to obsetae the prouisions of the Constihttion. "

In the instant appeal, the respondent had the opportunity to rebut the allegations of the appellant for over a year and a half before the final enforcement notice was issued to him but he chose to sit on his rights

20 and ignored the notices. He also had the remedy to appeal against the final enforcement notice to the next higher physical planning committee but did not do so. In my view, the argument that the respondent was not accorded the opportunity to be heard yet he received various notices on the matter and had ample time to respond to KCCA's assertions fails.

In the case of Godfreg l,Igako,ana and others u NEIIIIA, SCCA No. O5 of 2011, in which an environmental restoration order was being challenged, Justice Bart Katureebe, CJ held that;

The impugned prouisions of NEMA Act contained prouisions tuhere

30 tle appellant could haue exercised his right to be Leard bg challenging the enuironmental restoration order uithin the stipulated period. Had he done so, he had the ight to be heard in person.. .. . . He chose not onlg to ignore the enuironmental


restoration order but continued in carrying out the uery actiuities he had been aduised to discontinue. In those ciranmstances, I find it unacceptable that he should nout be heard to saA that le uas denied a fair heaing. He just refused to take tLe opporhnitg accorded to him by the law.

The above applies to the instant case. The respondent simply refused to respond to the notices issued to him earlier. He only reacted after receiving the final enforcement notice by applying for judicial review instead of appealing the decision of the committee to the higher physical planning committee as provided under Section a6\$l of the Physical Planning Act, 201O. In any case, lodging an appeal under the Act would have stayed any action against the respondent by the appellant thus protecting his rights. Section a6(5) of the Physical Planning Act states;

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"Where an appeal is lodged under this section, the enforcement notice shall be stayed pending the determination of the appeal."

I find that the said final enforcement notice was legally issued and should be enforced. Ground I succeeds.

### Ground 2

The appellant contends that the learned trial judge failed to properly evaluate the evidence on court record and thereby reached a wrong decision. I note that Ground 2 offends Rule 86(1) of the Judicature (Court of Appeal Rules) Directions as it does not state the specific evidence the appellant is challenging. The rule states:

"86. Contents of memorandum of appeal

<sup>I</sup>) A memorandum of appeal shall set forth concbelg and under distinct heads, without argument or narratiue, the grounds of objection to the decision appealed against, specifuing tlrc points which are alleged to haue been wrongfullg decided, and the nature of the order which it is proposed to ask the Court to make. .."


ln Ranchobhal Shlua.hhal Patel Ltd and Anor a Henry Wambuga & anor, CA 06 of 2017, a similar ground was found to be "...too general and does not specify in what way and in which specific areas the learned Justices of appeal failed to evaluate the evidence. It does 5 not set out the particular wrong decision arrived at by the learned justices of appeal..." Since ground 2 of the appeal does not comply with the Court of Appeal Rules, it is struck off.

Since ground 1 succeeded, I would allow this appeal with costs to the appellant in this Court and in the Court below.

E,.^ Dated at Kampala this 12- day of J "n-,.-.s.- 2025.

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Stella Alibateese JUSTICE OF APPEAL

# THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

# IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA

(Coram: Asa Mugenyi, Musa Ssekaana, Stella Alibateese, JJA)

# CIVIL APPEAL NO. 69 of 2OL4

(Arising from Miscellaneous Cause No. 308 of 2013)

## KAMPALA CAPITAL CITY AUTHORITY : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : APPELLANT

#### VERSUS

SSEBIIWITFU MUHAMMED : ! : : : : : : : : : 3 : : : : : : : : : : : 3 3 : : : : : : : : RESPONDENT

(Appeal from the Ruling ofYasin Nyanzi J. delivered on the 17th of January 2OL4 at the High Court of Uganda, Kampala)

## JUDGMENT OF DR. ASA MUGENYI. JA

I have had the advantage of reading in draft the judgement prepared by my learned sister, Justice Stella Alibateese, JA. I agree with the reasoning and orders proposed.

Dated at Kampala tti".....(lXry 2025

\

Dr. Asa Mugenyl JUSTICE OF APPEAL

| 5 | THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA | |----|---------------------------------------------| | | IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA | | | CIVIL APPEAL NO: 69 OF 2Ol4 | | | APPELLANT<br>KCCA | | | VERSUS | | 10 | SSEBUWUFU MUHAMMED<br>RESPONDENT | | | |

# JUDGEMENT OF JUSTICE MUSA SSEKAANA JA

I have heard the benefit of reading the leadingjudgment of Her Lordship Hon. Lady Justice Stella Alibateese and I concur with the same.

15 +1^ t\* Dated at Kampala this day of 4L.<-- <sup>2025</sup> MUSA SSEKAANA JUSTICE OF APPEAL