Kelvin Mutale Sampa v Salehe Mbaruku Sengulo and Anor (SP/82/2024) [2025] ZMCA 147 (19 November 2025)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF ZAMBIA SP/82/2024 HOLDEN AT NDOLA (Civil Jurisdiction) BETWEEN : KELVIN MUTALE SAMPA AND • g ,···1 ,,o~· L l J : ,._ : REGISTRY 2 APPLICANT SALEHE MBARUKU SENGULO 1ST RESPONDENT MBARUKU TRADING LIMITED 2ND RESPONDENT CORAM: SIAVWAPA JP, CHISHIMBA AND PATEL JJA On 11 th and 19th November 2025 FOR THE APPLICANT: MR. W. MUHANGA OF MESSRS WILLIS CLEMENT & PARTNERS LEGAL PRACTITIONERS FOR THE RESPONDENTS: MR. M. NKUNIKA OF ZS LEGAL PRACTITIONERS RULING SIAVWAPA JP, delivered the Ruling of the Court Cases Referred to: 1. Bidvest Food Zambia Limited and 4 Othe rs v CAA Import and Exp ort Limited SCZ Appeal No. 56 of 2017 2 . K. V Wheels and Construction Limited v Investrus t Bank PLC S CZ/ 8/ 2 9/ 2 02 1 Legislation referred to: a) The Court of Appe al Act No 7 of 2016 b) The Supre me Court Act, Chapte r 25 of the Laws of Zambia c) The Court of Appe al Rules, Statutory Ins trument No 65 of 2 01 6 d) Rules of the Supre me Court of England, 1999 (White Book) 1.0. INTRODUCTION 1.1. This is an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against our Judgment dated 31 st October 2024. In our Judgment, we upheld the decision of the High Court that ordered the Appellant to pay the Respondents a liquidated sum and costs. 2.0 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL 2.1 The Applicant has moved the Court pursuant to section 13 of the Court of Appeal Act as read with Order VII rule 1(1), Order XI rule 1(1) of the Court of Appeal Rules and section 24(b) of the Supreme Court Act. 2.2 The Applicant invites us to consider granting him leave to appeal on the basis that the intended appeal raises a point of law of public importance and has reasonable prospects of success pursuant to section 13 (3) (a) and (c) of the Court of Appeal Act. 3.0 ANALYSIS AND DECISION 3.1 We have looked at the affidavit in support deposed to by the Applicant and the exhibited intended grounds of appeal. Clearly, the Applicant impugns findings of fact by the Court below which we upheld. 3.2 With reference to the two considerations the Applicant seeks to rely on, and with reference to the Bidvest and Others v CAA R2 Import and Export Limited 1 , the Applicant argues that the mere fact that his intended appeal is of a private nature does not automatically disqualify him from raising a point of law of public importance. 3.3 In the case of K. V Wheels and Construction Limited v Investrust Bank PLC2 , the Supreme Court guided as follows: "For an appeal to be regarded as one raising a point of law of public importance it need not necessarily be one that raises a difficult question of law; it must raise important questions of law, that is to say, a question that presents uncertainty on the state of the law requiring authoritative clarification. Such question must additionally affect a wider audience of the public than the immediate litigants in the appeal. " 3 .4 Having already noted that the intended grounds of appeal largely attack findings of fact, in KV Wheels supra the Supreme Court stated as follows: "An appeal anchored on findings of fact alone, even if it is demonstrated that those findings were perverse or not home out of evidence, does not qualify as raising a 'point of law' in the first instance. An ordinary finding off act ipso facto fails the test on that account alone" 3.5 In our view, the law on interpretation and enforcement of contracts is settled and the Applicant has failed to show how the points of law have transcended the private rights of the parties to this matter so as to extend into the public arena. 3.6 As for prospects of success, we have already noted that the intended appeal is largely anchored on findings of fact and therefore, fails the test. In addition, we have noted R3 that the Judgment intended to be appealed against is not part of the record, making it incomplete. 4.0 CONCLUSION 4 . 1 Given what we have stated above, the application falls short of the criteria under section 13(3) of the Act, upon which leave to appeal to the Supreme Court may be granted. We therefore, dismiss the application with costs to be taxed by the taxing officer in default of agreement. M. J. SIAVWAPA JUDGE PRESIDENT F. M. CHISHIMBA COURT OF APPEAL JUDGE A. N. PATEL SC COURT OF APPEAL JUDGE R4