Kenafric Industries Limited v Nairobi City County & Richard Masinde [2017] KEHC 4416 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

JUDICIAL REVIEW NO.  426  OF 2015

IN THE MATTER OF FAIR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS ACT

AND

IN THE MATTER OF NAIROBI COUNTY GOVERNMENT

AND

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPLY FOR ORDERS

OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE NATURE OF MANDAMUS,

CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION

AND

KENAFRIC INDUSTRIES LIMITED ………...……....………...……APPLICANT

VERSUS

NAIROBI CITY COUNTY ……………………......................1ST RESPONDENT

RICHARD MASINDE…………………………………........2ND RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

1. This judgment was to be delivered on 10th April, 2017 at 2. 30 pm but owing to urgent pre-election disputes that the court was handling, the judgment was rescheduled to today and an appropriate notice posted to all the parties involved for today. By notice  of motion dated   11th December  2015  and  filed in court on 14th December 2015 vide leave granted on  4th December  2015,  the  exparte applicant  Kenafric  Industries  Ltd seeks  from this court  orders:

1. That  an order of certiorari do issue to bring into the High Court for  purposes of being quashed the  decision of the  Ag Assistant Director Environment in charge of Environment Monitoring Compliance and Enforcement made on 25th November, 2015 and  all consequential orders and  acts.

2. An order of prohibition restraining the respondents, their servants, agents or otherwise from entering into the premises of Kenafric Industries Limited and closing the factory activities.

3. An order of mandamus directed at and compelling the  respondents to undertake an Environment Impact  Assessment  of  the applicant’s  premises before  any action on closure  of the factory  is made:

4. An order of prohibition restraining the respondents from receiving, entertaining, proceeding with or in any manner  dealing  with the complaint  on the wage  of the  applicant’s  and  discharge  of waste water (efficient) after or before  the  applicant’s  premises  have  been surveyed  by National Environment Management Authority .

5. Such further  and  other  reliefs  as the Honourable  court may  deem  just and   expedient  to grant:

6. Costs of and incidentals to this application be provided for.

2. The application  is supported by an affidavit sworn by  Ketan Shah  and  the  grounds on the face of  the application; the  statutory statement  and  annextures  to the verifying   affidavit.

3. The brief  facts of  the case  are that   the  applicant  is a limited  liability  company and  one  of the largest  manufacturing   industries  in Kenya.  It is situate in the Industrial Area of Nairobi City County.  That on or about  the  20th day  of May  2015  the respondent’s  officers visited the applicant’s  premises and inspected  the  water effluent  treatment  facility and  in  their report  dated  19th June  2015  confirmed  that the system  met the required  legal environment   standards.

4. However, that on  25th November  2015  and  without prior  notice of inspection and   or conducting  any inspection  the  2nd respondent  descended  in the premises of the applicant  and issued a closure   notice of  the  factory.

5. That  on 26th November  2016  the applicant wrote to the  respondent’s  protesting  the closure  of the factory  but that todate  there  has  been no  response.

6. According to the applicant, it had complied with all the Environment Legal requirements  and  despite  all approvals  that had been shown to the respondents, the agents  of the respondent  have violated  the  legitimate   expectations  of the applicant  and  abused it  to transgress  in the undisputed matters  and created   issues which   they are  neither  competent  nor qualified  and  authorised  to undertake, allegedly at the  behest  of the neighbouring  families  yet there  has been no  inspection  of the applicant’s premises upon  which a rational  or reasonable   decision  can be made.

7. The applicant claims that the  respondent’s  actions  are illegal  and are  at the behest  of its  competitors aimed  at clogging  the  trading  and manufacturing process  of the applicants with the  sole  intention of  pressurizing the applicant to give  bribes.

8. It is further claimed  that the  respondent’s   action is  against the   applicant’s  legitimate  expectation  and  that the  respondents  are purporting  to arbitrarily  enforce the National Environmental Management Authority Act  contrary to  known  legal  principles  of  fairness and fair  hearing.  That  the  notice to the  applicant  to close   its factory  is intended  to force  the  applicant to  concede  to illegal practices  by the  2nd  respondent  and that  the  applicant  stands to suffer  grave  harm  and  prejudice  and  will be unable  to meet its  financial  obligations  and  close its business  in the face  of oppressive  demands  made by  the respondents which would  lead to closure  of the factory  and loss of  thousands  of jobs.

9. That the applicant had not violated any law prior to the issuance of the closure notice which notice was unprocedural and marred with bad faith.

10. The motion  was opposed  by the respondents who filed grounds of opposition  dated  16th December  2015  on 17th December  2015   contending  that: The application  lacks  any merit  to warrant a  grant of an order of  Judicial Review  in so  far as  it is grounded  on the Enforcement  Notice of  25th November 2015; The applicant is guilty of non disclosure of material facts to court; That the enforcement notice is in respect of a construction of a boundary wall and other unapproved structures   in the suit   property as opposed to discharge of effluent;  That the applicant is seeking   to divert the attention of the court from the real issues in dispute   and does not merit the orders sought.

11. The respondent further contends that the  application is  premature, misconceived  and  bad in law   and that  there is  non compliance  with  Section  13(1)  of the Physical Planning Act Cap  286  Laws of Kenya  which requires that any  person aggrieved  by a decision of the Director  concerning any physical development plan or matters  connected  therewith, may within sixty  days of  receipt  by him of  notice of  such decision, appeal  to the respective  Liaison  Committee  in writing  against the  decision in  such manner  as may be  prescribed.

12. It  was therefore  contended  that the  application  is hopelessly  misconceived, frivolous, totally  devoid  of merit  and  malafides  for the  reason  inter alia,  that the  applicants  followed  the wrong procedure  in that it  should have  instituted  an appeal to the Liaison  Committee.

13. The respondent further contended that  the court has no jurisdiction to grant  the application dated  11th December  2015  by virtue of Section  13(1)  of the Physical Planning Act which  provides for a more  efficient  and effective  remedy  to the applicants.

14. Further, that there is no authority given  to the  applicant to  erect  the disputed building on the suit property and that any  development  within the  jurisdiction  of the respondent  must seek  approval from the respondent.

15. The respondent maintained that  the applicant   has no right of audience before  the court because  he has refused to comply  with the Physical  Planning  Act which  requires  approval by the  County Government before  any construction  is undertaken.

16. In addition, the respondent states that  under Section  30(3)  of the Physical  Planning Act, it is illegal  to construct  or deal  in any  development   without   an approved   development  plan hence a   person who is   in breach of the  law  cannot   purport to derive  an interest  capable  of being  protected  by law.

17. In the respondent’s view,  there  is no requirement  under the  law  for a hearing  before  issuance of an enforcement  notice  but that after issuance   of notice, the person  objecting  can be  heard at that  stage of  objection.

18. The  respondent invoked Sections  29 and  30  of the Physical Planning Act which empowers it regulate the use and development  of land, buildings within its jurisdiction hence it’s actions are said to be within  the confines  of  the law.

19. According to the respondent, Section  38  of the Physical Planning Act empowers  the respondent to issue an enforcement notice which will be  effectual after the expiration of such period as may be prescribed  in the notice hence the respondent followed the right  procedures  prescribed by the law and that therefore the grant  of the orders  sought  by the exparte applicant will highly  prejudice the  respondent’s  statutory  powers under  the  Physical  Planning  Act.

20. The respondent urged the court not to grant any of the orders sought.

21. The parties; advocates filed written submissions which they   canvassed by way of oral highlights.  The   exparte   applicant filed   its submissions on 12th July 2016 whereas the respondents filed theirs on 26th July 2015.

22. I will  consider  all submissions  and  cited  authorities   in line with the  highlights  which basically reproduced  the  respective  parties  grounds  in favour of and  against   the  notice of motion.

23. According to the  applicant, as  argued  by Mr Mogeni advocate  on  its behalf, the subject  matter is  the  notice dated  25th November 2015 to close the applicant’s factory by the respondent  on account of factory waste  water(effluent) being  discharged  into  the environment  and  subsequently flooding  the residential  houses  at Riverside Estate, ending  up  polluting Gitathuru  River.

24. It was submitted that no inspection or notice of activities was issued prior to closure notice, which is in violation of Article 47 of the Constitution and the Fair Administrative Action Act.

25. It  was  further submitted by Mr Mogeni  that the closure  of the exparte applicant’s factory was unwarranted, unreasonable, illegal and contrary to Wednesbury  Principles hence  the  notice should  be  quashed.

26. In addition, it was submitted that the respondent’s actions  were without  jurisdiction and that the grounds  of opposition  filed are  irrelevant   in that  they do not address  the  issues  raised  in the motion  since the   applicant  has not  challenged  any notice   issued  under the Physical  Planning Act.  Further, that neither do the submissions by the respondent address the impugned notice and that factual depositions have not been controverted.

27. It was submitted that the factory employs over   1000 employees and that no hearing was accorded to the applicant before closure of the factory notice   was issued.  Counsel urged the court to issue the orders sought with costs.

28. Reliance  was placed  on Associated  Provincial  Pictures  House Ltd V Wednesbury  Corporation  [1948] 1KB  223  on the test  for unreasonableness, and bad faith on the part of the  respondent; Joram Mwenda  Guantai v Chief Magistrate Nairobi [2007] 2 EA  170;  Mexner  & Another  v Attorney General [2005] 2 KLR  189;  Kuria  & 3  Others vs Attorney Generao [2002] 2 KLR  69;  Mutemi  Kithome  Vs District   Land Adjudication Officer Mwingi [2006] 1EA 166and  Municipal Council of Mombasa v Republic and Umoja Consultants  Ltd  Civil Appeal  No. 185  of  2001  on the scope   of  Judicial  Review.

29. On the part of the respondent,  Mr Ilako submitted in opposition  contending  that the City County is bound  by the Physical  Planning Act and that  the  applicant  had  refused to  obey the law and  was seeking court’s protection.  He relied on Chanadin  V City  Council  of Nairobi  & Another [2009]e KLR  where  the court  emphasized that  citizens  must obey  the law and  that   constitutional provisions should not be used as  a  shield  against  the proper administration of justice unless it can be part in bringing   about the  actions  complained of.

30. It was submitted that there is a  Liaison Committee set   up which  parties  should appeal  to if they are  dissatisfied  with decisions   of the respondent, which  process is  faster  and effective  hence the court  should  allow the County to serve  its people.

31. Reliance  was placed on  Moses Maroko  V Frakash  Maunital Barot  & Another  [2014]  eKLR where  the court maintained  that the Liaison Committee has  technical  competences  that the local authorities  tap  on in case of need   when  considering   the  applications  before them hence the requirement for  exhaustion of the  approval  process  set out in the Physical Planning Act.  Further, that an  enforcement  notice of  25th November  2015  can only  be challenged through the Physical  Planning Liaison Committee hence the applicant  has no  right of  audience  before this  court; and that the  supporting  affidavit  is full of hearsay hence  it has no probative value. Reliance was place on Life Assurance  Corporation of India v Paneser [1967] EA 614 where Sir  Charles  Newbold  emphasized that affidavits  are intended  to be  of probative  of the facts  which  the party  is filling.

32. The respondents maintained that the application before the court is premature and misconceived and urged the court to dismiss it with costs.

33. In  a rejoinder, Mr  Mogeni  counsel for the applicant submitted that they had  not raised  any complaint  regarding  powers of the respondent  under the Physical  Planning  Act and  or  its non compliance.  Further, that there was abuse of power hence the court must intervene.  That notice to close the factory does not refer to any noncompliance hence there  is no reason why  the notice  of  28th November  2015  was issued  and that the respondent  had not  adduced any defence to counter the challenge hence the notice which was illegal must be  quashed.

Determination

34. This court has considered the application by the applicant, and   the grounds of opposition filed by the respondent.  I have also considered the written, oral submissions and authorities cited by both parties’ advocates.  The main issue for determination is whether the application herein is properly before the court and if so, what orders should this court make?

35. On whether the  application is properly before the court, the   respondent argues that the applicant  should have  challenged  the notice  through the  Physical  Planning  Liaison Committee as required  by Sections  13, 29,30 and  38  of the  Physical  Planning  Act  and that  the  Liaison Committee  is a technical  committee which  handles  such disputes  not the  court.  It  was  further contended that the applicant did not disclose to court that it had disobeyed the law as per the notice of  25th November  2015 which   was an   enforcement  notice under  Section  30(1), (ii) of the Physical  Planning  Act.  “To construct a collapsed wall.”

36. On the other hand, the applicant  believes  that the respondent  is diverting the court’s attention to the issues before the court  which  concern  closure of its factory  on 25th November  2015  for noncompliance  with effluent  discharge  regulations  and not failure to construct  the  collapsed  wall.

37. The material placed on record   shows that  indeed there are two notices  issued by the respondent  on 25th November 2015 namely, the one signed by Richard K. Masinde Ag Assistant Director of Environment in charge of Environment Monitoring Compliance and Enforcement (EMCE) and served by Nyambura Mathu Environment Officer, witnessed by  Joash  Kaserah, Inspector; and the notice dated  the same  day issued  by unidentified person which latter is an enforcement  notice  under Section 30(1),(11) of the  Physical Planning Act for construction of a boundary wall within the Riparian Way leave by 2nd  December  2015.

38. However, the former notice concerns closure of factory activities by the Department of Environment and forestry on account of pollution and more specifically, discharging of factory water (effluent) into the residential houses at Riverside Estate, ending up polluting Gitathuru River, contrary to Articles 42, 69 of the Constitution and Section 3(1) of Environment Monitoring Compliance Authority and Regulation 4 of the Environment Monitoring Compliance Authority (Water Quality) Regulations, 2006.

39. Against  the closure notice is the  challenge herein  pursuant  to the leave granted by Honourable  Korir J  on 4th December  2015   by consent  of both  parties’  advocates, which  consent   was adopted  by the court  and the  parties’  advocates  did  append their signatures  to the court  record  in affirmation  of their  consent, as shown on page  7 of the handwritten  proceedings.

40. In the consent, the parties  agreed  that the substantive  motion  was to  be filed  within  7 days  from the date of the  consent  order, which  was  4th December  2015.  It follows that the main motion was to be filed on or before 11th December 2015.  However, the same was filed on 14th December 2015, three days after the 7th day.

41. 11th December  2015    was a   Friday  and  a working  day whereas  12th December  2015   which  was  a Saturday   was a public  holiday.  It follows, therefore, that there is no reason  why the main  motion  was not filed by  11th December  2015  and  instead  filed on  14th December  2015   which  was  a Monday after expiry of the period granted by the court.  No leave   of court  was  sought  and  or obtained  to file the notice of  motion  outside the 7 days   granted  to the applicant  by consent  of all the parties.

42. In my humble view, this court would  only have  jurisdiction to hear and  determine  the notice  of motion dated  11th December  2015 and  filed in court  on  14th  December  2015  if the  motion  was  filed within the  timelines  given by  the court  as per the  consent   of the parties, who considered the matter to be so urgent that shorter timelines were appropriate.

43. This is so because  albeit Order 53  of the Civil  Procedure  Rules  gives to the  applicant  who has  obtained  leave to file the  substantive  motion to do so within  21 days  from the date of  leave, nonetheless, the court  having granted  a shorter  period as  agreed  by the parties’ advocates  in their consent  wherein they even  proposed  the number  of days for filing    of the  response  and  submissions, failure to comply with the time frame renders the substantive motion as filed out of the 7 days incompetent.  In United Housing Estate Limited vs Nyals (K) Limited Civil Application No.  Nairobi 84 of 1996 the Court of Appeal stated:

“ a party  who obtains an order of a court on  certain  specified   conditions  can only continue  enjoying the benefits  of that order if the conditions attaching to it are scrupulously  honoured  and  in the event  of a proved  failure  to comply  with the attached  condition, the court has the inherent power to  recall or vacate  such an order.”

44. What the above holding  is saying  is that  a party cannot unilaterally  decide not to comply  with the conditions   attached to the  exercise of discretion  in his  or her favour on the ground  that he  or she  ought to  have access  to justice.

45. In this  case, the applicant  should  have filed the  motion by  11th December  2015  or sought for  enlargement  of time   as stipulated  in Order  50  Rule  6 of the Civil Procedure  Rules, notwithstanding  the  expiry  of the stipulated  time frame.  In  Wilson  Osolo  V John  Ojiambo  Ochola  & Another  CA  NO.  6  of  1995  the Court of Appeal  held that:

“although there  was no provision  for extension of the six months period   under  Section 9(3) of  the Law Reform Act after  the  order of decision being challenged, but  that where  the  motion  was  filed after grant of leave, it   had to  be filed  within 21 days   of such leave  or on an application for extension of time for filing as  stipulated  in the then Order 49  of the Civil Procedure  Rules now Order  50 Rule  6 of the  Civil Procedure  Rules. However, where the court grants such shorter period, then the parties must   comply with the timelines given by the court.”

46. In John Ongeri Mariaria & 2 Others Vs Paul Matundura CivilApplication No.  Nairobi 301 of 2003 [2004] 2 EA 163, the Court of Appeal stated:

“Legal business can no longer be handled in such a sloppy and careless manner.  Some  clients  must  learn  at their costs that the consequences of careless and leisurely  approach  to work must  fall on their  shoulders…..whereas  it is true that the court has unfettered  discretion, like  all  judicial discretion must be  exercised upon  reason not capriciously or sympathy  alone……justice must look both ways as the rules of procedure are meant  to regulate  administration  of justice and  they are not  meant   to assist  the indolent.”

47. In the circumstances, this court   cannot   ignore  the  consent  of the parties  recorder by the court on   4th December  2015  which  was  endorsed   by the court  directing  on when and  how the  substantive  motion would  be filed and  responded  to, and  unless  there was  another order enlarging the time frame within which the  substantive motion  ought to  have been  filed, failure to  comply with the consent  rendered  the motion  as filed  highly  and  fatally  incompetent and  incapable  of being   cured by  Article  159  of the Constitution which stipulates that justice shall be administered without undue regard to procedural technicalities.

48. Honourable  Odunga J in  Republic  vs Cabinet  Secretary  Information  Communication  & Technology  & Another  Exparte  Celestine  Okuta  & Others  [2016]  e KLRfaced   with a similar  situation  held that:

“ In my  view, court  orders  are serious  decisions   that can only  be excused  based on  material  placed  before  that court  and cannot be ignored on the ground that they are  technicalities.

In my  view, the law is   that technicalities  of procedure  ought  not to  automatically  lead to termination of  proceedings   and  that the court  must have  the  power to save the same  where material exist before the court to justify non-compliance.  However where there is none and where in fact the applicant adopts an incorrect position of the law to justify his inaction, such omission cannot be   exercised.”

49. It therefore  follows that  where the  motion was  not filed  within the  7 days stipulated  in the endorsed  consent of  the  parties as  adopted by  the court on  4th December  2015, to delve into the merits  of the motion  is an  absolute  waste of precious Judicial  time  and  resources, in these  proceedings.

50. Accordingly, I find and hold that  the  notice of motion  dated  11th December  2015 and filed  on 14th December  2015  is incompetent   as it  is  incapable of being  adjudicated  upon by the court   and  therefore  the  order that  commends  itself  for me to issue is to strike   out the  notice of motion as filed .

51. As the discovery of the  incompetence  of the application   was made by the court which is  deemed  to know  the law, I order  that each party  shall bear  their own costs  of these Judicial Review  proceedings  both at the  leave stage  and  at the  substantive  stage.

Dated, signed and delivered in open court at Nairobi this 25th day of May, 2017.

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE

In the absence of all parties’ advocates

CA: George