Khoapha v Khoapha and Another (CIV/APN/252/98; CIV/T/38/93) [2000] LSCA 18 (1 March 2000)

1 C I V / A P N / 2 5 2 / 98 CIV/T/38/93 IN T HE H I GH C O U RT OF L E S O T HO In the matter between : L E S E N Y E HO K H O A P HA A P P L I C A N T / P L A I N T I FF and P A L E SA ' M A M P HO K H O A P HA (born S E B I L O) 1st T H E KO J. M O R U T H O A NE (Liquidator) R E S P O N D E N T / D E F E N D A NT R E S P O N D E NT 2nd J U D G M E NT F or Applicant/Plaintiff : M r. M da F or R e s p o n d e n t s / D e f e n d a n ts : M e s s rs M a f a n t i r i / MA Ntlhoki D e l i v e r ed by the H o n o u r a b le M r. Justice T. M o n a p a t hi on the 1st d ay of M a r ch 2 0 00 I h ad already m a de my ruling on the 14th D e c e m b er 1 9 9 8. My reasons n ow follow. T h e se p r o c e e d i n gs w h i ch are for a declaratory O r d er are a sequel to a d e c r ee of d i v o r ce w h i ch w as granted on the 29th M ay 1 9 9 5, the parties h a v i ng b e en m a r r i ed by civil rites in c o m m u n i ty of property, on the 6th of F e b r u a ry 1 9 9 1. T he S e c o nd R e s p o n d e nt w as a p p o i n t ed to act as a liquidator on the division of t he parties joined estate p er this C o u r t 's O r d er of the 9th D e c e m b er 1 9 9 6. In this application the A p p l i c a nt ( w ho w as r e p r e s e n t ed herein by M r. M d a) s o u g ht in the m a in a declaratory order that plot N o. 1 4 3 0 3 - 6 69 situated at Ha M a t a l a, M a s e ru u r b an area a nd site n o. 1 2 2 9 2 - 4 70 situated at K a t l e h o ng M a s e ru u r b an a r ea be r e g a r d ed as f o r m i ng part of the parties joint estate a nd that the S e c o nd R e s p o n d e n t 's r e c o m m e n d a t i o ns in his throughly p r e p a r ed report w h i ch will be s o u g ht to be m a de an order of C o u r t. It is to be n o t ed that the S e c o nd R e s p o n d e nt r e c o m m e n d a t i o ns h ad b e en that those t wo sites be r e g a r d ed as part of the joint estate as h as b e en m o re clearly s h o wn in that report w h i ch w as a n n e x ed to these p r o c e e d i n g s. An inventory of the joint estate w as furnished by the A p p l i c a nt to the liquidator as h as b e en s h o wn in o ne of the a n n e x u r e s. It w as to be o b s e r v ed that the First R e s p o n d e nt ( w ho w as represented herein by M r. N a t h a n e) h ad n ot furnished the liquidator w i th a ny inventory. S he h o w e v er h ad clearly indicated w h i ch p r o p e r ty did n ot f o rm part of the joint estate as w as s h o wn in the inventory p r o v i d ed by the Applicant. T he t wo m e n t i o n ed sites, a c c o r d i ng to the R e s p o n d e n t, did not f o rm part of the estate. T h at w as primarily w h at the C o u rt w as d e c i de in this j u d g m e n t. S he c l a i m ed that situated at K a t l e h o ng s he h as sold to o ne P h e t ho Sebilo on or a b o ut J a n u a ry 1 9 9 1. H is a ge w as n ot disclosed. T h e re w as an affidavit by the said b u y er attested to on the 11th O c t o b er 1 9 9 7. S e c o n d l y, the plot situated at M a t a la M a s e ru u r b an area w h i ch w as a d e v e l o p ed site w as said to be h e ld by the First R e s p o n d e nt in trust for h er m i n or s on R o n a ld H a n t le Sebilo (not b om of the parties' m a r r i a g e ). In support of h er assertion the R e s p o n d e nt h as t e n d e r ed the following d o c u m e n t s: the lease d o c u m e nt w h i ch w as in respect of the site at M a t a l a, s e c o n d ly a d e ed of h y p o t h e c a t i on by P a l e sa K h o a p ha the S e c o nd R e s p o n d e nt as a c u r a t or bonis of R o n a ld H a n t le Sebilo p er C o u rt O r d er in C I V / A P N / 5 5 / 92 in favour of L e s o t ho B u i l d i ng F i n a n ce C o r p o r a t i on in respect of that plot. T he d e ed of h y p o t h e c a t i on w as a n n e x ed to the p r o c e e d i n g s. So w as the order of C o u r t. T he said lease d o c u m e nt w as alleged to h a ve b e en issued on the basis of an affidavit by C h i ef K h o a b a ne Letsie T h e ko a n n e x u re " B" to the o p p o s i ng affidavit a nd the letter f r om the s a me chief d a t ed the 13th July 1 9 90 w h i ch w as also a n n e x ed to the p r o c e e d i n g s. T h is letter s e e m ed to go a l o ng w i th an affidavit that w as also s w o rn to by the s a me chief. I n e e d ed f r om the o n s et to c o m m e nt a b o ut the affidavit. First it by w ay of stating w h at w as c o n t a i n ed in the translated version 1 thereof. T he chief said: "1 I am chief of M a t a la T h a ba B o s iu M a s e ru w ho w as reigning a nd I h a ve p o w er to allocate land on this particular site in question before the 16th J u ne 1 9 8 0. I certified that b e f o re publication of the O r d er N O . 2 9 / 80 R o n a ld H a n t le Sebilo w as allocated by l aw a site w h i ch a p p e a rs in the p l an after w h i ch this statement is m a de for. This s w o rn statement is m a de for p u r p o s es of s ub lease to obtain d o c u m e n ts w h i ch certify his lawful allocation on the site w h i ch w as allocated to h im a nd fail to p r o d u ce evidence of allocation or given. S w o rn on the 10th A u g u st 1 9 9 0. Principal C h i ef of T h a ba B o s iu on the 10-8-90". ( My underlining) It also h ad a rubber s t a mp impression of the office of that chief I p r o c e e d ed to o b s e r ve the letter w h i ch f o r m ed an a n n e x u re i m m e d i a t e ly following on the affidavit a nd its translation. T he letter w as f r om the office of Principal C h i ef of T h a ba Bosiu, a nd w as addressed to the C o m m i s s i o n er of L a n d s. T he C h i ef w as recorded to h a ve said that: "I introduce to y ou R o n a ld Hantle Sebilo that he got a site at Ha M a t a la a long time a g o. I will appreciate y o ur confirmation in this matter Sir. W i th thanks (Sg) K H O A B A NE L K T H E KO Principal Chief of Thaba Bosiu and Ha Ratau" ( My underlining) I n e e d ed to point out that clearly no date of allocation w as m e n t i o n ed of the m a k i ng this allocation except that it w as previously alleged (in the affidavit) to h a ve b e en before 1 9 8 0. T h at w as p r e s u m a b ly before the n ew 1 9 79 L a nd A ct c a me into force. I s u p p o s ed the importance that w as suggested w as that the chief w as the allocating . authority t h en (before 1 9 8 0 ). B ut this w o u ld n ot h a ve b e en sufficient b e c a u se since 1 9 73 a nd in t e r ms of the land administration l aw e n a c t ed in that y e ar there w e re allocating c o m m i t t e es of w h i ch the chief w as m e r e ly C h a i r m a n. I w o u ld r e m a rk a nd s h ow my c o n c e rn a b o ut the lack of particularity, the lack of specificity a nd an a b s e n ce of a ny c i r c u m s t a n c es c o n c e r n i ng this allocation that the C h i ef s p o ke a b o u t. O ne w o u ld h a ve t h o u g ht that there s h o u ld h a ve at least b e en a m e m b er of c o m m i t t ee or secretary of c o m m i t t ee (to w h i ch application w as m a d e) to explain the relevant allocation transaction or p r o c e d u r e. Or alternatively the chief s h o u ld h a ve stated the role he p l a y e d, the c i r c u m s t a n c e s, a nd there s h o u ld h a ve b e en an explanation a nd m o re of the r e a s on w hy n o ne of the statutory (regulatory) b o o ks of record w e re available. F u r t h e r m o re the chief ( by w ay of better elaboration) s h o u ld h a ve told this C o u rt m o re a b o ut his k n o w l e d ge a nd by w ay of s o m e t h i ng to do w i th a desire to c o n v i n ce the C o u rt a b o ut the allocation of the site to the particular p e r s on that is R o n a ld H a n t le Sebilo as against the First R e s p o n d e n t. I n a s m u ch as it w as a v e r r ed by the A p p l i c a nt that it m u st h a ve b e en the First R e s p o n d e nt w ho w as allocated a nd no o ne else m u ch m o re particularity w as required f r om the C h i ef in his supporting statements. T h is w as so, as submitted, considering the general c i r c u m s t a n c es a nd information c o n t a i n ed in a n n e x ed d o c u m e n t s. T h e se d o c u m e n ts i n c l u d ed those that indicated on their faces that the First R e s p o n d e nt w as the o w n er of the described properties s u ch as registered leased a nd d e e ds of h y p o t h e c a t i o n. To clarify these: In the lease N o. 1 4 3 0 3 - 6 69 the lessee is s h o wn as P A L E SA S E B I L O, Civil S e r v a nt - Spinster (Trustee of R o n a ld H a n t le Sebilo). A nd in the d e ed of h y p o t h e c a t i on the First R e s p o n d e nt w as described as P A L E SA K H O A P HA ( b o rn S e b i l o) on the 15th M a r ch 1 9 52 as curator bonis of R o n a ld H a n t le Sebilo p er C o u rt O r d er C I V / A P N / 5 5 / 99 dated 23/02. I f o u nd no reason to d o u bt the Applicant's submission a b o ut the role of a liquidator. T h at firstly, a liquidator w as an officer of C o u rt a nd not representative of either party. In this regard I w as referred to EX PARTE DE WET N. O. 1 9 52 (4) SA 1 22 ( O P D ) at 1 2 4 D. S e c o n d l y, the c o m m on l aw role of the liquidator after the dissolution of the joint estate w as to collect, realize a nd divide the estate. S ee G I L L I N G H AM v G I L L I N G H AM 1 9 04 TS 6 09 at 6 13 w h i ch w as cited with approval in EX PARTE DE WET (supra) 1 2 5 A - C. Thirdly, w h e re division could not be effected in cases w h e re the parties do not agree to an amicable division assets are normally sold a nd p r o c e e ds divided b e t w e en them. S ee that case of EX PARTE DE WET (supra) . I believed that selling of the sites a nd division of the p r o c e e ds w as w h at the Applicant looked forward to. T h at is w hy he applied the w ay he did in the a b s e n ce of an amicable division as already indicated a b o v e. T he S e c o nd R e s p o n d e nt h ad m a de r e c o m m e n d a t i o ns as regards the division of the joint estate. T he Applicant did not h a ve a ny objection to the said r e c o m m e n d a t i on except that she contended that s o me property allegedly sold by the Applicant, that is site N o. 1 2 2 9 2 - 4 70 a nd another allocated property being plot N o. 1 4 3 0 3 - 6 69 allegedly allocated to R o n a ld Sebilo did not f o rm the part of the joint estate. T he g o od position in l aw as submitted by the R e s p o n d e n t 's C o u n s el w as that those properties no longer b e l o n g ed to the First R e s p o n d e nt or at least o ne of t h em h ad never b e en her site at all but h ad b e en an a direct allocation to that person called R o n a ld Hantle Sebilo while the other h ad b e en sold off. I a p p r e c i a t ed M r. M d a 's c o n c e rn a b o ut t he fact that the First R e s p o n d e nt h ad n ot filed a ny affidavit reflecting h er objections in t e r ms of an o r d er w h i ch w as issued at h er request. T h is w as the o r d er w h i ch is reflected at p a ge 64 b e i ng an o r d er I issued on t he 27th O c t o b er 1 9 9 7. In that o r d er I h ad s u g g e s t ed a m o n g st others that the liquidator, the S e c o nd R e s p o n d e n t, s h o u ld h o ld the joint m e e t i ng of t he parties a nd their C o u n s e ls to r e c e i ve w h a t e v er representations including t h o se in r e s p o n se to the report w i t h in f o u r t e en ( 1 4) d a y s. A nd f u r t h e r m o re that t he parties w e re to file affidavits reflecting a ny objections a nd r e s p o n s es of the liquidator. M e a n i ng also that the parties w e re to v o i ce their objections w h i ch w o u ld also b e l o ng to additional report w h i ch w o u ld be r e c o r d ed by the liquidator. I h o w e v er s aw no significance to the a b s e n ce of t he First R e s p o n d e nt , r e s p o n se in v i ew of t he fact that M r. M da a p p l i ed for this special declaration w h i ch the R e s p o n d e nt earnestly resisted. T he failure of the First R e s p o n d e nt to file a ny objections as I directed t h en w as no o n g er of a ny s u b s t a n c e. I d id n ot intend to f o l l ow the m a t t er of h er failure b e c a u se it w as clear n ow that s he w as objecting that the t wo sites f o r m ed part of the estate in the m a n n er I h a ve a l r e a dy s h o w n. In no w ay in my v i ew w o u ld the failure close o ut the First R e s p o n d e n t 's o b j e c t i on n or w o u ld that be h e ld to h a ve adversely affected h er right to fight the application. T he salient q u e s t i on for determination this C o u rt w as w h e t h er or n ot the i t e ms of p r o p e r ty f o r m ed part of the joint estate. T he u n d e r s t a n d i ng w as b e i ng that e v en if b e f o re the m a r r i a ge the First R e s p o n d e nt a c q u i r ed a ny p r o p e r ty in h er n a me that property automatically b e c a me part of the joint estate u n l e ss it w as a d o n a t i on in w h i ch the d o n or stipulated that s u ch p r o p e r ty w o u ld n ot f o rm part of the joint estate. It b e c a me a q u e s t i on of a b a l a n ce of probabilities w h e t h er the properties in reality b e l o n g ed to the First R e s p o n d e nt a nd so by o p e r a t i on of the l aw b e c a me part of the joint estate. T he First R e s p o n d e n t 's position that there existed a trust in f a v o ur of R o n a ld H a n t le Sebilo w as later a b a n d o n ed by h er C o u n s el M r. Mafantiri. It w as b e c a u se no reply h ad c o me forth against this s u b m i s s i o ns put f o r w a rd by M r. M d a. Firstly in o ur l aw no unilateral act of a party c an create a trust. Usually in a d e ed of trust there is a settler trustee a nd beneficiary ( S ee C H A L L E N O R 'S E S T A TE vs C O M M I S S I O N ER F OR I N L A ND R E V E N UE 1 9 6 0 ( 1) SA 13 N PP at 2 2 - C E) T h at this (first) h ad to be for a benefit of a third party w as trite (see EX P A R TE O R C H I S ON 1 9 5 1 ( 3) SA 5 50 T PD at 5 52 F ). Thirdly there w e re later r e q u i r e m e nt to be satisfied in order to create a trust. Sufficient w o r ds of the f o u n d er of his intention to create o n e. In addition s u ch intention w as to be e x p r e s s ed w i th sufficiently clarity or aptness to indicate an intention to create an obligation. F u r t h e r m o re the subject matter h ad to be defined w i th reasonable certainty. A nd still furthermore the object of the trust h ad to be a lawful. If a ny of the essentials w e re lacking the trust w o u ld be invalid ( S ee D E M M P E RS A ND O T H E RS vs M A S T ER A ND O T H E RS 1977(4) SA 44 ( S W A) at 56 C - E. T h at the settler could also be a beneficiary w as pointed out by reference to G O O D R I CH A ND S ON ( P T Y) L TD vs R E G I S T R AR OF D E E DS N A T AL 1 9 7 4 ( 1) SA 4 0 8 ( W) no w o n d er that a r g u m e nt that there w as a trust in favour of R o n a ld H a n t le Sebilo w as a b a n d o n e d. This m e a nt that the reference to the First R e s p o n d e nt as being a trustee of R o n a ld H a n t le Sebilo at p a ge 88 of the record w as b o g us in the circumstances that no s u ch trust could be p r o v ed in that e v en u n d er c u s t o m a ry law. T he Applicant besides asking for a declaration that the site at M a t a la b e l o n g ed to the First R e s p o n d e nt be a t t a c k ed w h at he called t he unreality that the m o r t g a ge b o nd ( p a ge 9 4 - 1 0 8) of the r e c o rd w as n o ne other t h an that of the First R e s p o n d e nt herself a nd n ot the alleged beneficiary R o n a ld H a n t le Sebilo. It w as against the First R e s p o n d e nt herself w ho in fact m a de p a y m e n ts a nd their d i s p u t ed the estate w h e t h er it w as b e i ng serviced or not. If it w as n ot serviced this w as e v en m o re serious b e c a u se resort w o u ld h ad against the estate of w h i ch the p r o p e r ty w as part. In further reference to the plot at Ha M a t a la the C o u rt w as referred to the Minister's c o n s e nt to the m o r t g a ge of the property (at p a ge 1 08 of t he r e c o r d) s h o w ed that the First R e s p o n d e nt w as the o w n er of the site. It did n ot in a n y w ay s h ow that the site b e l o n g ed to a n y b o dy else b ut the First R e s p o n d e n t. I a c c e p t ed n o ne of the d e f e n c e s. On probabilities there w as n o ne of the properties w h i ch did n ot b e l o ng to the joint estate. T he t wo sites w e re to be r e g a r d ed as h a v i ng b e l o n g ed to the joint estate at the material time. T h ey s h o u ld a c c o r d i n g ly d e v o l ve a c c o r d i ng to the p l an of division of the liquidator. C o s ts of the application w o u ld be costs by the liquidation. T he A p p l i c a nt therefore s u c c e e d e d. T h at w as the O r d er that I m a de on the 14th D e c e m b er 1 9 9 8. T. M o n a p a t hi J u d ge 1st M a r ch 2 0 00