Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v Sole (CIV/T 598 of 95) [1997] LSHC 6 (3 February 1997)

CIV/T/598/95 IN T HE H I GH C O U RT OF L E S O T HO In the matter b e t w e e n: L E S O T HO H I G H L A N DS D E V E L O P M E NT PLAINTIFF A U T H O R I TY and M A S U P HA E P H R A IM S O LE D E F E N D A NT J U D G M E NT D e l i v e r ed by the H o n o u r a b le M r. Justice M . M. R a m o d i b e di On 3 rd d ay of F e b r u a r y, 1 9 9 7. On the 4th d ay of N o v e m b e r, 1 9 96 w h i ch significantly w as the first d ay of the trial in the a b o ve mentioned-matter the D e f e n d a nt filed a N o t i ce of M o t i on with this H o n o u r a b le court for an o r d er c o u c h ed in the following terms:- " 1. 2. D i s p e n s i ng with the f o r ms a nd service p r o v i d ed for in the R u l es a nd dealing with the m a t t er as o ne of u r g e n c y, as c o n t e m p l a t ed in t e r ms of R u le 8 ( 2 2) of the R u l es of C o u r t. Directing the Plaintiff ( R e s p o n d e n t) to m a ke d i s c o v e ry as contemplated in t e r ms of R u le 34 (3), as w e ll as m a ke available for inspection a nd c o p y i n g, as c o n t e m p l a t ed in t e r ms of R u le 34 (6) a nd (8), within 3 (three) d a ys of the d a te of this O r d e r, the following d o c u m e n t s :- 2.1 Ail b o a rd m i n u t es a nd a g e n d as for s u ch b o a rd m i n u t es f r om the 1 st J a n u a ry 1 9 88 to date hereof; 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 All m e m o r a n d a, m a n a g e m e nt a c c o u n t s, b u d g e ts a nd reports e m a n a t i ng f r om the Plaintiffs finance d e p a r t m e nt f r om 1st J a n u a ry 1 9 88 to date hereof; All m e m o r a n d a, internal c o r r e s p o n d e n c e, b u d g e t s, a nd O w n e r s h ip m i n u t es pertaining to the L H DA H o me S c h e m e, in respect of Plot 1 2 2 8 1 - 0 4 6, Arrival C e n t r e, M a s e r u; All m e m o r a n d a, reports, b u d g e ts a nd c o r r e s p o n d e n ce in respect of the L e a se A g r e e m e n ts referred to in C l a im 1 of Plaintiffs Particulars of C l a i m; A ll m e m o r a n d a, internal a nd external c o r r e s p o n d e n c e, o p i n i o ns a nd reports f r om the consultants, arising f r om C o n t r a ct 1 2 9 B, m i n u t es a nd reports of the N e g o t i a t i ng C o m m i t t ee in respect thereof, prior to July 1 9 94 a nd a nd f u r t h e r m o re d o c u m e n t a t i on relating to the calculation of b o th present a nd estimated costs in respect of C o n t r a ct 1 2 9 B. all c o r r e s p o n d e n c e, m e m o r a n da 2.6 All d o c u m e n t a t i o n, internal a nd external, relating to the r e n e w al of the L e a se in respect of 1 84 C i n ez R o a d. 3. C o s ts of this Application; 4. Further a n d / or alternative relief." T he f o u n d i ng affidavit in this m a t t er h as b e en filed by D e f e n d a n t 's attorney M r. S e y m o ur C l y de H a r l e y. At the hearing of the m a t t er on the 4 th N o v e m b er 1 9 9 6, h o w e v e r, I directed that M r. Harley give viva v o ce e v i d e n ce in the matter particularly on w h e t h er the d o c u m e n ts s o u g ht to be d i s c o v e r ed w e re relevant. I did so in the interests of justice as I c o n s i d e r ed that there w as n e ed for his allegations contained in his founding affidavit to be p ut to test by cross e x a m i n a t i o n. T h is w as duly d o ne b o th on the 4th N o v e m b er 1 9 96 a nd the 5th N o v e m b er 1 9 96 respectively. After h a v i ng h e a rd b o th c o u n s el in the m a t t er I r e s e r v ed my ruling in the m a t t er until after I h ad h e a rd the o p e n i ng a d d r e ss by M r. Penzhorn S . C for the Plaintiff a nd until after I h ad h e a rd the e v i d e n ce in chief of the a c c o u n t a nt in the matter. I w as assured by Plaintiffs c o u n s el that the said a c c o u n t a nt w o u ld be the first w i t n e ss for the plaintiff. T he m a in reason w hy I decided to defer my decision in the m a t t er w as s i m p ly to give m y s e lf e n o u gh opportunity to familiarise m y s e lf w i th the issues in the m a t t er in order to arrive at a just decision. In a d o p t i ng this a p p r o a ch I d r ew c o m f o rt f r om the d e c i s i on of M a r go J in Continental O re v H i g h v e ld & V a n a d i um Ltd. 1 9 7 1 ( 4) S. A. 5 89 ( W . L . D ) AT 5 9 5 G. T h en on 20th January, 1 9 97 a nd 2 1 st J a n u a ry 1 9 97 respectively I duly h e a rd the e v i d e n ce of the aforesaid a c c o u n t a nt P W1 D e r e ck A n d r ew D a v ey a nd the following is n ow my ruling on D e f e n d a n t 's application m a de in t e r ms of R u le 34 ( 3) (6) a nd ( 8) of the H i gh C o u rt R u l es 1 9 80 as aforesaid. I d e em it necessary h o w e v er to give a brief outline of the material facts in this m a t t er in o r d er to fully appreciate the issues i n v o l v ed therein. On the 6th d ay of N o v e m b e r, 1 9 95 the Plaintiff issued s u m m o ns against the D e f e n d a nt claiming a b o ut M5 Million arising o ut of the latter's alleged w r o n g f ul c o n d u ct and/or unjust enrichment at the e x p e n se of the f o r m e r. T he D e f e n d a nt w as at all material times e m p l o y ed by the plaintiff as its C h i ef E x e c u t i v e. D e f e n d a n t 's p l ea in the m a t t er w as d u ly filed on the 2 3 rd d ay of F e b r u a r y, 1 9 96 a nd on 2 6 th April 1 9 96 the m a t t er w as d u ly set d o wn by m u t u al c o n s e nt of b o th attorneys on either side for hearing starting on the 4th d ay of N o v e m b e r, 1 9 9 6. On 17th April, 1 9 96 the D e f e n d a nt a d d r e s s ed a " N o t i ce to D i s c o v er R u le 34 ( 1 )" to Plaintiffs attorneys. T h is notice w as apparently s e r v ed u p on the latter on the 1 8 th d ay of April, 1 9 9 6. T h en on 3 0 th M ay 1 9 96 o ne M a k a se M a r u mo w ho is the current C h i ef E x e c u t i ve of Plaintiff filed a discovery affidavit on b e h a lf of the latter. T he material aspect of his affidavit is that he states u n d er o a th in p a r a g r a ph 5 t h e r e of as follows: "5 A c c o r d i ng to the b e st of my k n o w l e d ge a nd belief, the plaintiff d o es n ot n ow h a v e, a nd n e v er h a d, in its p o s s e s s i o n, c u s t o dy or p o w er or in the possession, c u s t o dy or p o w er of its attorney or a g e nt or a ny other p e r s on on its behalf, a ny d o c u m e nt or c o py of or extract f r om a ny d o c u m e nt relating to a ny m a t t e rs in question in this c a u se other than the d o c u m e n ts set forth in the First a nd S e c o nd S c h e d u l es h e r e t o ." T h en I o b s e r ve that the d e f e n d a nt s i m p ly sat b a ck a nd d id n o t h i ng a b o ut plaintiffs aforesaid d i s c o v e ry for a l m o st four (4) m o n t h s. He did n ot raise a ny c o m p l a i nt that the plaintiff h ad n ot fully c o m p l i ed w i th the d i s c o v e ry notice. T h is c o u p l ed w i th the d e l ay in r e s p o n d i ng to plaintiffs d i s c o v e ry of 3 0 th M ay 1 9 96 is certainly an aspect to w h i ch this court m u st inevitably h a ve r e g a rd in exercising its discretion in the matter. It w as only on 2 3 rd S e p t e m b er 1 9 96 w i th o n ly six (6) w e e ks r e m a i n i ng b e f o re t he trial actually started that D e f e n d a n t 's attorneys g a ve notice to plaintiffs a t t o r n e ys in t e r ms of R u le 34 ( 6) of the H i gh C o u rt rules. I o b s e r ve that the said notice is basically in the s a me t e r ms as the order s o u g ht for in the application b e f o re m e. T h en on 11th O c t o b e r, 1 9 96 Plaintiffs attorneys w r o te to D e f e n d a n t s' attorney as f o l l o w s: "I refer also to o ur telephonic discussion of t o d ay as w e ll as y o ur letter of 1 1 th O c t o b er 1 9 96 relating to the d i s c o v e ry of further d o c u m e n ts a nd c o n f i rm that it is a g r e ed that this w o u ld be d o ne informally." A l t h o u gh this informal a r r a n g e m e nt for discovery is d e n i ed by D e f e n d a n t 's attorney in his letter of the 18th O c t o b er 1 9 96 w h e r e in he insists that the r e q u i r ed d i s c o v e ry be m a de u n d er o a th I am satisfied that f o l l o w i ng the aforesaid invitation of Plaintiffs attorney c o n t a i n ed in his letter of the 11th O c t o b e r, 1 9 96 D e f e n d a n t 's attorney d u ly p e r u s ed a n d / or i n s p e c t ed Plaintiffs B o a rd M i n u t es on 1 4 th O c t o b er 1 9 96 a fact w h i ch D e f e n d a n t 's attorney h i m s e lf a c k n o w l e d g es in his letters of 1 8 th a nd 2 5 th O c t o b er 1 9 96 respectively a d d r e s s ed to Plaintiffs attorney. As I stated in my ruling against an application for p o s t p o n e m e nt of the m a t t er on the 2 nd D e c e m b er 1 9 96 I am further satisfied on a b a l a n ce of probabilities that it w as b e c a u se of the denial of d e f e n d a n t 's attorney of the alleged a g r e e m e nt to m a ke i n f o r m al d i s c o v e ry that plaintiffs attorney filed a S u p p l e m e n t a ry D i s c o v e ry affidavit on 2 5 th O c t o b er 1 9 9 6. I h a ve a c c o r d i n g ly a d m i t t ed this affidavit as part of the p r o c e e d i n gs b e f o re me in the interests of justice. In the said s u p p l e m e n t a ry affidavit the C h i ef E x e c u t i ve of the Plaintiff M a k a se M a r u mo o n ce m o re d e p o s es in p a r a g r a ph 5 t h e r e of as follows:- "5 To the best of my k n o w l e d ge a nd belief, the Plaintiff d o es not n ow h a v e, a nd n e v er h a d, in its p o s s e s s i o n, c u s t o dy or p o w er or in the p o s s e s s i o n, c u s t o dy or p o w er of its attorney or a g e nt or a ny other p e r s on on its behalf, a ny d o c u m e nt or c o py of or extract f r om a ny d o c u m e nt relating to a ny mattes in question in this c a u se other t h an the d o c u m e n ts set forth in the First a nd S e c o nd S c h e d u l es hereto." In f o r w a r d i ng the said d o c u m e n ts to D e f e n d a n t 's attorney M r . M o i l oa attorney for the Plaintiff w r o te to the f o r m er on the 2 5 th O c t o b er 1 9 96 as follows:- " 25 O c t o b er 1 9 96 M e s s r s. H a r l ey & M o r r is 3 rd F l or Christie H o u se O r p en R o ad M a s e r u. D e ar Sir re: L e s o t ho H i g h l a n ds D e v e l o p m e nt A u t h o r i t y / ME S o le Y o ur letter of 18 O c t o b er 1 9 96 refers. H e r e w i th extracts f r om the M i n u t es y ou requested. A l t h o u gh in o ur v i ew n o ne of the material in these extracts is relevant to the issues in the trial we h a ve m a de t h em available so as to a v o id an u n n e c e s s a ry dispute. We h a ve w i t h h e ld all the r e m a i n i ng material in these M i n u t es on the basis that it is obviously irrelevant. It so h a p p e ns that a lot of it is also sensitive. We also place on r e c o rd that w h en we a l l o w ed y o ur M r. H a r l ey to v i ew the M i n u t es we did so on the u n d e r s t a n d i ng that the privilege w o u ld n ot be a b u s e d. C an we n ow h a ve a c o py of y o ur b u n d le please. Y o u rs faithfully W e b b er N e w d i g a t e ." S i n ce the d o c u m e n ts referred to in M r. M o i l o a 's letter of 2 5 th O c t o b er 1 9 96 w e re in fact supplied b e f o re the l a u n c h i ng of the application b e f o re me I d e em it u n n e c e s s a ry for me therefore to d e t e r m i ne w h e t h er t h ey w e re relevant a nd w h e t h er t h ey s h o u ld h a ve b e en d i s c o v e r ed on the 3 0 th M ay 1 9 9 6. I c o n s i d er that s u ch a determination w o u ld o n ly be a c a d e m ic a nd serve no p u r p o se in the p r e s e nt matter. In a ny event there is no e v i d e n ce b e f o re me at this stage that s u ch d o c u m e n ts w e re in the possession of the plaintiff on 30th M ay 1 9 96 w h en M a k a se M a r u mo filed the d i s c o v e ry affidavit. A g a in as I stated in my ruling on p o s t p o n e m e nt on the 2 nd d ay of D e c e m b er 1 9 96 the D e f e n d a n t 's legal representatives did n ot raise the question of further d i s c o v e ry at the p re trial c o n f e r e n ce h e ld on the 1st d ay of N o v e m b er 1 9 9 6. O ne w o u ld h a ve thought that if M r. H a r l ey for the d e f e n d a nt h ad s e en a ny d o c u m e n ts of r e l e v a n ce in the m a t t er in his inspection of plaintiffs d o c u m e n ts on 14th O c t o b er 1 9 96 as aforesaid then d e f e n d a n t 's legal representatives w o u ld certainly h a ve b r o u g ht up this issue at the p re trial c o n f e r e n ce on 1/11/96. In the c i r c u m s t a n c es I h a ve no hesitation in d r a w i ng an a d v e r se inference against the d e f e n d a nt b a s ed on the attitude of his legal representatives on this issue. T he crisp question for determination by this court is w h e t h er the d o c u m e n ts called to be p r o d u c ed are relevant to a ny m a t t er in the action. As earlier stated Makase Marumo's discovery affidavit is to the effect that the documents sought do not relate to the matter in question and are therefore not relevant. It is settled law that prime facie the oath of a person w ho deposes to an affidavit of discovery is taken as being conclusive and that it is for the party who seeks further discovery to make the running and show on a balance of probabilities that such documents are relevant. The onus is clearly on the latter. See Tractor & Excavator Spares (Pty) Ltd. V Groenedijk 1976 (4)S. A. 359 ( W L D) at 361. In Federal Wine and Brandy Co Ltd v Kantor 1958 (4) S. A. 735 (Eastern Cape Division) at 749G W y n ne J stated the principle succinctly as follows:- " An affidavit of discovery is conclusive save where it can be shown either (i) from the discovery affidavit itself or (ii) from the documents referred to in the discovery affidavit or (iii) from the pleadings in the action or (iv) from any admissions made by the party making the discovery affidavit, that there are reasonable grounds for supposing that the party has or has had other relevant documents in his possession or power, or had misconceived the principles upon which the affidavit should be made." The Learned Judge therein referred to Compagne Financiere et Commerciale du Pacifigue v Peruvian Guano Company (1882) 11 Q. B. D. 55 in which Brett LJ stated the following at pp 61-62: "It s e e ms to me that e v e ry d o c u m e nt relates to the m a t t e rs in question in the action, w h i ch n ot o n ly w o u ld be e v i d e n ce u p on a ny issue, b ut also w h i c h, it is r e a s o n a b le to s u p p o s e, contains i n f o r m a t i on w h i ch m ay - n ot w h i ch m u st - either directly or indirectly e n a b le the party requiring the affidavit either to a d v a n ce his o wn c a se or to d a m a ge the c a se of his adversary. I h a ve p ut in the w o r ds 'either directly or indirectly' b e c a u se a d o c u m e nt c an p r o p e r ly be said to contain i n f o r m a t i on w h i ch m ay e n a b le the party requiring the affidavit either to a d v a n ce his o wn c a se or to d a m a ge the c a se of his a d v e r s a r y, if it is a d o c u m e nt w h i ch m ay fairly lead h im to a train of e n q u i r y, w h i ch m ay h a ve either of these t wo c o n s e q u e n c e s ." M r. Fischer for the D e f e n d a nt h as f o u nd solace a nd a s o u r ce of inspiration in the last s e n t e n ce f r om the a b o ve m e n t i o n ed quotation. He s u b m i ts t h en that the plaintiff is obliged to, discover a ny d o c u m e nt w h i ch m ay fairly lead the d e f e n d a nt to a train of enquiry w h i ch m ay either a d v a n ce his o wn c a se or d a m a ge the c a se of his a d v e r s a r y. I do not h o w e v er think that Brett LJ in the c a se of C o m p a g ne Financierer et C o m m e r c i a le du Pacifigue (supra) m e a nt to introduce speculation as a test here. In my j u d g m e nt relevance r e m a i ns the singular test in a m a t t er s u ch as t he o ne b e f o re m e. In this r e g a rd I am m a i n ly attracted by the r e m a r ks of M a r go J in Continental O r e 's c a se ( s u p r a) at p a ge 6 00 w h e r e in he states as follows:- " B u t, w h e re relevance h as b e en denied on oath, it w o u ld n ot be p r o p er to o r d er further d i s c o v e ry unless the basic p r e m i s e s, f r om w h i ch the inference of r e l e v a n ce is to be d r a w n, a p p e ar sufficiently f r om the information before the court. T h o u gh the R u le as to relevance is stated in w i de terms, as I understand the practice, the court c a n n ot go b e h i nd the o a th of the party objecting to d i s c o v e ry m e r e ly b e c a u se there is a speculative possibility that the d o c u m e n ts in q u e s t i on m ay lead to a train of enquiry in the s e n se stated a b o v e ." ( My underlining). I respectfully agree a nd it is on this principle that I a p p r o a ch the m a t t er b e f o re m e. As earlier stated M r. H a r l ey g a ve viva v o ce e v i d e n ce b e f o re me on the question of relevancy of the d o c u m e n ts s o u g ht to be d i s c o v e r e d. He c o n c e d es that he d u ly inspected Plaintiffs B o a rd M i n u t es a nd b u d g e t s. T h is w as on the 15th O c t o b e r, 1 9 9 6. He further c o n c e d es that after receipt of M a k a se M a r u m o 's d i s c o v e ry affidavit of the 2 5 th O c t o b e r, 1 9 96 he n e v er c o m p l a i n ed a b o ut lack of d i s c o v e ry in relation to a ny other d o c u m e n ts b e s i d es the B o a rd M i n u t es w h i ch he h o w e v er inspected his only c o m p l a i nt b e i ng that he w a s n 't a l l o w ed to m a ke c o p i es thereof. He c o n f i r ms that e v en in his letter of the 2 8 th O c t o b er 1 9 96 a d d r e s s ed to Plaintiffs attorneys he n e v er m e n t i o n ed a ny other d o c u m e n ts e x c e pt the said B o a rd M i n u t e s. 1 w as certainly left w i th the distinct i m p r e s s i on that M r. H a r l e y 's insistence on the so called other d o c u m e n t a t i on w as n o t h i ng b ut an afterthought. At a ny rate I o b s e r v ed that M r. Harley c o u ld n ot e v en s ay of w h at r e l e v a n ce the d o c u m e n ts s o u g ht for d i s c o v e ry w e r e. E v en in his affidavit he failed to state w h at r e l e v a n ce those d o c u m e n ts w e r e. I n d e ed I g a i n ed the i m p r e s s i on as I listened to M r. Harley giving e v i d e n ce that he w as on a fishing expedition a nd did n ot see a ny d o c u m e n ts or B o a rd M i n u t es w h i ch m i g ht h a ve h ad a ny relevance or bearing on the c a se before me at all. In this regard this is w h at he states at p a ge 1 45 of the r e c o rd of p r o c e e d i n gs u n d er cross e x a m i n a t i on f r om M r. Penzhorn S . C m a i n ly on the B o a r d 's M i n u t e s: " Q: Y ou told H is L o r d s h ip y e s t e r d ay that these d o c u m e n ts are crucial, e a ch a nd e v e ry o ne of t h em is crucial to y o ur client's d e f e n c e. Y ou c o me across a d o c u m e nt like this that h as got nothing to do w i th the c a se at all. A: Y es well, y ou see, M r. Penzhorn, the position is this. I n e ed to s ee w h e t h er there are a ny d o c u m e n ts or b o a rd p a p e rs or a ny other material e m e r g i ng f r om the b o a rd up to the recent p a st to determine the board's attitude in r e g a rd to tin's c a se w h i ch m ay be relevant to my client. I n e ed to eliminate, I n e ed to by process of elimination, I n e ed to eliminate the m e e t i n gs as they, as I p e r u se t h em as to w h e t h er they are relevant or n o t ." A g a in on p a ge 1 47 of the r e c o rd of p r o c e e d i n gs M r. Penzhorn, S. C. c o n f r o n t ed M r. H a r l ey w i th his fishing expedition in the following terms:- " Q: Section 34 (6) still gives the o p p o s i ng party that c o v e r. If they are n ot relevant y ou are n ot a l l o w ed to go on a fishing expedition. T he R u l es n e v er p r o v i d ed for that. A: M r. Penzhorn, allow me to a n s w er y o ur question, I am trying to assist. H ow do I k n ow w h e t h er a d o c u m e nt is relevant or n ot if I h a ve not h ad the time to consider a c o py thereof? It m ay be part of a g e n d as or d o c u m e n t s, v e ry i m p o r t a nt d o c u m e n ts s u ch as the m i n u t es w h i ch I n e ed to see. At the t i me of m a k i ng the r e q u e st or raising a notice in t e r ms of R u le 34 ( 6 ), h ow do I k n ow w h e t h er the d o c u m e nt w h i ch I h a ve n e v er s e en b e f o re is relevant? I c an o n ly k n ow that it is relevant w h en I briefly p e r u s ed it a nd a c o py is m a de available to me to t h en c o n s i d er its w e i g ht or o t h e r w i se a nd its r e l e v a n ce in the p r o c e e d i n g s ." R e g r e t t a b ly M r. H a r l ey m a de a v e ry p o or i m p r e s s i on on me as a witness. I n d e ed he w as finally driven to c o n c e de that at the stage w h en he w e nt on oath on the issue of further d i s c o v e ry he did n ot e v en k n ow w h e t h er the d o c u m e n ts s o u g ht to be discovered w e re relevant or not. He h as thus failed to assist the d e f e n d a nt to discharge the o n us as set out a b o v e. M r. H a r l ey further c o n c e d e d, a nd this is c o m m on c a u s e, that at the disciplinary inquiry in w h i ch the defendant faced c h a r g es f o r m i ng the subject m a t t er of the c l a im in this m a t t er d e f e n d a nt n e v er called for the B o a rd M i n u t es a nd the other d o c u m e n ts n ow s o u g ht to be discovered. A g a in throughout the pleadings there is no reference to s u ch d o c u m e n t s. M r. H a r l ey w as then c o n f r o n t ed w i th the contents of p a r a g r a ph 4 of the s u p p l e m e n t a ry discovery affidavit of M a k a se M a r u mo in w h i ch he states on oath as follows:- "4 To the best of my k n o w l e d ge a nd belief there are no other d o c u m e n ts w h i ch the Plaintiff h as h ad b ut d o es not n ow h a ve in its p o s s e s s i on or p o w er relating to the matters in question in this action." M r. H a r l ey w as asked:- " Q: A p a rt f r om the b o a rd m i n u t es y ou h a ve s e e n, do y ou h a ve a ny basis for d o u b t i ng that? A: I m u st a s s u me that w h at I read is correct. It is u n d er o a t h, I h a ve no other alternative than to a c c e pt it." T h at in my v i ew then disposes of the matter a nd I really w i sh that I c o u ld s ay no m o r e. B ut m en m e re is the aspect of the nature of the relief s o u g ht in the N o t i ce of M o t i o n. T h is calls for c o m m e n t. As earlier stated the application before me is m a de in t e r ms of R u le 34 ( 3) ( 6) a nd ( 8) of the H i gh C o u rt R u l es 1 9 8 0. In order to appreciate the full i m p o rt of the w h o le of R u le 34 it is n e c e s s a ry to h a ve r e g a rd to subsection 1 thereof w h i ch is to the f o l l o w i ng effect:- " 34 ( 1) A ny party to an action m a y, by notice in writing, require a ny other party thereto to m a ke discovery on o a th within t w e n ty - o ne d a y s, of all d o c u m e n ts relating to a ny m a t t er in question in s u ch action, w h i ch are or h a ve at a ny t i me b e en in the p o s s e s s i on or control of s u ch other party." As I s ee it, it w as p u r s u a nt to this s u b s e c t i on that Plaintiff furnished a d i s c o v e ry affidavit on 3 0 th M ay 1 9 96 as earlier stated. S u b s e c t i on 3 of R u le 34 m e r e ly p r o v i d es that " t he p a r ty required to m a ke d i s c o v e ry shall within t w e n t y - o ne d a ys f r om receipt of s u ch notice, or within the time stated in a ny order of a J u d ge m a ke d i s c o v e ry of s u ch d o c u m e n ts on affidavit w h i ch m u st be in a f o rm as n e ar as possible w i th f o rm " O" of the First S c h e d u l e ." It s e e ms to me that the d e f e n d a nt d o es n ot c o m p l a in a b o ut late d i s c o v e ry as s u ch n or d o es he c o m p l a in that s u ch discovery w as not m a de on oath. It is therefore not clear to me w hy reliance w as m a de u p on this part of the rule altogether. In my v i ew the real c o m p l a i nt by the d e f e n d a nt is directed at s u b s e c t i o ns 6 a nd 8 of R u le 34 w h i ch p r o v i de as follows:- " ( 6) If a ny party h as reason to believe that, in addition to d o c u m e n ts disclosed as aforesaid, d o c u m e n ts or copies of s u c h, w h i ch m ay be relevant to a ny m a t t er in question, are in the p o s s e s s i on of a ny party thereto, the f o r m er party m ay g i ve notice to the latter requiring h im to m a ke s u ch d o c u m e n ts available for inspection in a c c o r d a n ce with sub-rule (8) infra, or to state on o a th within fourteen d a ys that s u ch d o c u m e n ts are n ot in his p o s s e s s i o n, in w h i ch c a se he shall if k n o wn to h i m, state their w h e r e a b o u t. ( 8) A ny p a r ty m ay at a ny t i me by notice, w h i ch shall as n e ar as possible be in a c c o r d a n ce w i th F o rm " P" of the First S c h e d u le hereto, require a ny party w ho h as m a de d i s c o v e ry to m a ke available for inspection a ny d o c u m e n ts disclosed in t e r ms of sub-rule ( 3) a nd ( 4) herein. S u ch notice shall require the party to w h om notice is g i v en to deliver to h im within s e v en d a ys a notice w h i ch shall, as n e ar as m ay b e, in a c c o r d a n ce w i th f o rm " Q" of the First S c h e d u le hereto, w h i ch notice shall state a t i m e, within three d a ys f r om the delivery of s u ch latter notice, w h en s u ch d o c u m e n ts m ay be i n s p e c t ed at the office of his attorney, or, if n ot represented by an attorney, at s o me c o n v e n i e nt p l a ce stated in the notice, or in the c a se of b a n k e r 's b o o ks or other b o o ks of a c c o u nt or b o o ks for the p u r p o s es of a ny trade or undertaking, at their usual place of c u s t o d y. In c a s es w h e re the d o c u m e n ts are to be i n s p e c t ed at the office of an attorney s u ch office m u st be that of an attorney within five k i l o m e t r es f r om the office of the Registrar. T he party receiving the notice a l l o w i ng h im to inspect shall be entitled at the time therein stated, a nd for a p e r i od of s e v en d a ys thereafter during n o r m al b u s i n e ss h o u rs or on a ny o ne or m o re of s u ch d a y s, to inspect s u ch d o c u m e n ts a nd to t a ke c o p i es thereof. A party's failure to p r o d u ce a ny s u ch d o c u m e nt for inspection shall p r e c l u de h im f r om u s i ng s u ch d o c u m e nt at the trial unless the court, on g o od c a u se s h o w n, o t h e r w i se o r d e r s ." As I r e ad these subsections 34 (6) (8) it is clear to me that t h ey are m e a nt to g i ve notice to the party w ho h as n ot m a de full d i s c o v e ry to m a ke available for inspection a nd c o p y i ng the d o c u m e n ts w h i ch the other party h as r e a s on to believe w e re n ot disclosed in the d i s c o v e ry affidavit m a de in t e r ms of R u le 34 ( 1 ) ( 3 ). M o re importantly subsections 34 (6) (8) do not provide a r e m e dy in themselves in a situation w h e r e by a party against w h om the N o t i ce for inspection is m a de fails to c o m p ly with the notice other than that he m ay not use the d o c u m e n ts c o m p l a i n ed of at the trial unless the court orders otherwise on g o od c a u se s h o w n. T he real r e m e dy to a party giving notice in terms of subsections 34 (6) (8) therefore is provided for u n d er R u le 34 (9) w h i ch reads as follows:- " ( 9) If a ny party fails to give discovery as aforesaid, or h a v i ng b e en served with a notice u n d er sub-rule (8) omits to give notice of a time for inspection as aforesaid or fails to give inspection as required by that sub-rule, the party desiring discovery or inspection m ay apply to court w h i ch m ay order c o m p l i a n ce with this rule and, failing such c o m p l i a n c e, m ay dismiss the claim or strike out the defence." It is significant h o w e v er that this application is not m a de in t e r ms of R u le 34 (9) of the H i gh Court Rules. T he Notice of M o t i on as fully r e p r o d u c ed a b o ve bears testimony to that effect a nd no a m e n d m e nt thereto w as ever sought by the defendant to bring the application u n d er R u le 34 (9). I accordingly find that by p r o c e e d i ng u n d er R u le 34 (3) (6) (8) a nd not u n d er R u le 34 (9) the defendant h as m i s c o n c e i v ed his r e m e dy a nd on that g r o u nd alone this application stands to be dismissed. It is further c o m m on cause that on the 30th O c t o b e r, 1 9 96 the defendant w as duly ordered by the C h i ef Justice to m a ke discovery of certain d o c u m e n ts in this matter within three (3) d a ys of the order. T he defendant h as failed to c o m p ly w i th the said order a nd on the 5th N o v e m b er 1 9 96 this court m a de it clear to the d e f e n d a nt that he w as p r i ma facie in c o n t e m pt a nd g a ve h im additional t i me within w h i ch to c o m p l y. He h as n ot d o ne so to d a te a nd I a c c o r d i n g ly feel that this is o ne of t he factors that this court s h o u ld t a ke into a c c o u nt in refusing the application b e f o re me as in general a party s h o u ld n ot be h e a rd b e f o re he h as p u r g ed his c o n t e m p t. I feel that the circumstances of this case a nd the c o n d u ct of the d e f e n d a nt in the m a t t er w a r r a nt this a p p r o a c h. In this r e g a rd I h a ve c o n s i d e r ed the timing of this application as a m o u n t i ng to d e l a y i ng tactics. T h is is b e c a u se as earlier stated the Plaintiffs d i s c o v e ry affidavit w as filed as l o ng a go as the 3 0 th M ay 1 9 96 y et the d e f e n d a nt sat b a ck for an inordinate length of t i me a nd o n ly filed R u le 34 ( 6) N o t i ce on 2 3 rd S e p t e m b er 1 9 96 w i th the actual date of h e a r i ng just a r o u nd the c o m e r. T h en the actual application itself w as m o v ed on the actual d a te of trial itself n a m e ly the 4th N o v e m b er 1 9 9 6. I h a ve since h ad to deal w i th a series of applications by the d e f e n d a nt in an a t t e m pt to p o s t p o ne the matter. I n d e ed s u ch is the d e f e n d a n t 's d e t e r m i n a t i on to p ut e v e ry s p a n n er in the p r o g r e ss of this trial that it h as n ow b e en intimated to the c o u rt on his b e h a lf that Plaintiffs resolution authorising this claim b e f o re court will n ow be c h a l l e n g ed at this stage of the p r o c e e d i n g s. In dealing w i th a similar situation B r o w de JA in Pitso P h a k i si M a k h o za v L e s o t ho L i q u or Distributors C of A ( C i v) N o . 34 of 1 9 95 h ad o c c a s i on to r e m a rk as f o l l o ws at p a ge 10 of the j u d g m e n t :- " As r e s p o n d e nt m a de d i s c o v e ry on 17 July 1 9 95 i.e. a m o n th b e f o re the trial w as to start the c o m p l a i nt raised at the trial that the affidavit of d i s c o v e ry w as defective for the r e a s on set o ut a b o ve c an o n ly be r e g a r d ed as o ne of m a ny e x a m p l es of the appellant's efforts to t a ke e v e ry technical point in o r d er to p r o l o ng the m a t t e r ." I respectfully find that these r e m a r ks are a p p o s i te to the c a se b e f o re m e. T h e re is also n e ed to c o m m e nt on the fact that the d e f e n d a nt h as n ot filed a ny affidavit in this application. T he b o a rd m i n u t es in t he m a t t er indicate that the d e f e n d a nt as the C h i ef E x e c u t i ve of Plaintiff sat on the b o a rd m e e t i n gs of Plaintiff. I c o n s i d er therefore that he is in a better position t h an his attorney M r. Harley to k n ow if there w e re a ny relevant d o c u m e n ts left o ut in Plaintiffs d i s c o v e ry affidavit o f 2 5 th O c t o b er 1 9 9 6. In my v i e w, probabilities are that the d e f e n d a nt h i m s e lf w o u ld h a ve said so if there w e re s u ch d o c u m e n t s. It is for that r e a s on that courts h a ve insisted as a general principle that parties a nd n ot attorneys s h o u ld file d i s c o v e ry affidavits. S ee R e l l a ms ( P t y) L td v J a m es B r o wn & M a n n er L td 1 9 83 in S . A. 5 56 at 5 58 p er V an H e e r d en J. H a v i ng h e a rd M r. Harley's e v i d e n c e, P W1 D e r e ck A n d r ew D a v e y 's e v i d e n ce in chief, h a v i ng also listened to counsel's s u b m i s s i o ns as w e ll as h a v i ng p e r u s ed the pleadings a nd the b o a rd m i n u t es in q u e s t i on I r e m a in u n p e r s u a d ed that there is a ny n e ed to go b e h i nd the Plaintiffs discovery affidavit filed by M a k a se M a r u mo in the m a t t er on 2 5 th O c t o b er 1 9 9 6. In t he result therefore the application is d i s m i s s ed w i th costs. M M. Ramodibedi J U D GE 3 rd F e b r u a ry 1 9 97 F or Applicant/Defendant: M r. Fischer F or Respondent/Plaintiff: PenzhornS. C. M r. Assisted by M r. W o k er