Tsilo v Tsilo (CIV/A 25 of 92) [1994] LSCA 104 (7 June 1994)

IN T HE H I GH C O U RT OF L E S O T HO In the a p p e al o f: M A K H A L A KI T S I LO and T H A BO T S I LO C I V / A / 2 5 / 92 A p p e l l a nt R e s p o n d e nt J U D G M E NT D e l i v e r ed by the H o n o u r a b le M r. J u s t i ce T. M o n a p a t hi on the 7 th day of J u ne 1 9 94 T h is is an a p p e al from the s u b o r d i n a te Court of B e r e a. T h is m a t t er c o n c e r n ed a claim for m a i n t e n a n ce for the R e s p o n d e nt and a m i n or child a g a i n st the A p p e l l a n t. The claim was filed by way of s u m m o n s. The learned m a g i s t r a te had in her short j u d g m e nt m a de a f i n d i ng that in t e r ms of W a g es and C o n d i t i o ns of E m p l o y m e nt O r d er 1 9 7 8, the A p p e l l a nt ( P l a i n t i f f) w as e n t i t l ed to a s a l a ry of M 2 2 5 . 19 (being a m i n i m um s a l a ry in terms of the said A c t .) The learned m a g i s t r a te p r o c e e d ed to o r d er the D e f e n d a nt ( A p p e l l a n t) to pay m a i n t e n a n ce for the m i n or child L E P E K O LA in the a m o u nt of M 6 0 . 00 per m o n th and for the P l a i n t i ff in the a m o u nt of M 6 0 . 00 per m o n t h. B e f o re s e t t i ng out the c i r c u m s t a n ce of t h is m a t t er as d i s c l o s ed in the C o u rt a q u o, it is u s e f ul to s et o ut the A p p e l l a n t 's g r o u n ds of a p p e a l. T h ey w e re s u b s t a n t i a l ly t h a t: -2- ( a) T he l e a r n ed m a g i s t r a te m i s d i r e c t ed h e r s e lf a n d / or e r r ed in law in h o l d i ng t h at A p p e l l a nt w as g a i n f u l ly e m p l o y ed by h is f a t h e r. ( b) T he l e a r n ed m a g i s t r a te m i s d i r e c t ed h e r s e lf a n d / or e r r ed in law in h o l d i ng t h at A p p e l l a nt w as e a r n i ng a sum of M 2 2 5 . 19 per m o n th f r om s u ch e m p l o y m e n t. (c) R e s p o n d e nt c l e a r ly f a i l ed to p r o ve A p p e l l a n t 's a b i l i ty to m a i n t a in on the b a l a n ce of p r o b a b i l i t i e s. ( d) T h e re is no e v i d e n ce to i n d i c a te t h at A p p e l l a nt w o u ld be a b le to p ay a sum of M 1 2 0 . 00 per m o n th as m a i n t e n a n ce in the c i r c u m s t a n c es of t h is c a s e. ( e) T he j u d g m e nt is a g a i n st the w e i g ht of e v i d e n ce as its r e a s o n i ng is b a s ed on an a r t i f i c i al f o o t i n g. T he p o s i t i on at c o m m on l aw in m a i n t a n a n ce c l a i ms is t h at t he p l a i n t i ff s h a ll p r o ve the f o l l o w i ng e l e m e n ts n a m e l y: ( a) T h at the p e r s on c l a i m i ng s u p p o rt m u st be u n a b le to -3- s u p p o rt h i m s e l f. That the c l a i m a nt is in n e e d. (b) The p e r s on from w h om s u p p o rt is c l a i m ed m u st be a b le to s u p p o rt the c l a i m a n t. T h at the p e r s on from w h om maintenance is c l a i m ed m u st h a ve s u f f i c i e nt m e a n s. (c) T he r e l a t i o n s h ip b e t w e en t he p a r t i es m u st be s u ch as to c r e a te a legal duty of s u p p o rt b e t w e en t h e m. T he l e a r n ed a u t h or P. Q. R. B o b e rg in h is w o rk T he L aw of P e r s o ns and T he F a m i ly - w i th I l l u s t r a t i ve C a s es 1st E d i t i on at p a ge 2 4 9, h a v i ng e n d o r s ed the a b o ve r e q u i s i t es g o es f u r t h er and he s a ys "The first two r e q u i r e m e n ts are c o n c e r n ed w i th q u e s t i o ns of fact to be d e t e r m i n ed by the Court in e a ch c a s e. T he third is a m a t t er of l a w ." In c o n n e c t i on w i th t h e r e q u i r e m e nt u n d er (b) a b o ve the f o o t n o te f u r t h er r e a ds as f o l l o w s: "Now the d u ty to m a i n t a in is f a c u l t a t i v e: It d e p e n ds u p on the r e a s o n a b le r e q u i r e m e n ts or n e e ds of the p a r ty c l a i m i ng it and the a b i l i ty of the p a r ty from w h om it is c l a i m ed to f u r n i sh i t; per Van der H e e v er J in O B E R H O L I Z ER vs O B E R H O L I Z ER 1 9 4 7 ( 3) SA 2 0 4 ( 0) at 2 9 7. For e m p h a s is I m ay say that t o g e t h er w i th the a b o ve r e q u i s i t es is the need for the p l a i n t i ff to p r o of that the D e f e n d a nt is g a i n f u l ly e m p l o y ed and that he h as s u ch m e a n s. T he o n us to d i s c h a r ge this e l e m e n ts is t h r o u g h o ut w i th the P l a i n t i f f, T h at -4- is why it has b e en s u b m i t t ed the e v i d e n t i al b u r d en or the need for r e b u t t al only . a r i s es w h en there is a o r i ma f a c ie c a se e s t a b l i s h e d. T he p r i ma f a c ie case c o n s i s ts of the k ey e l e m e n ts s t a t ed a b o ve in the a b s e n ce of w h i ch there is no p r i me f a c ie case and t h e re is no need for r e b u t t a l. A f i n d i ng of a b s o l u t i on from the i n s t a n ce w o u ld be a p r o p er f i n d i ng in the c i r c u m s t a n c e s. Tied up w i th the a b o ve c o n c e p ts is that of the i n q u i ry as to w h at " s u f f i c i e n t" means: and as w h en is there " u n w i l l i n g n e ss to p a y" on the part of the D e f e n d a n t. T he P l a i n t i ff and D e f e n d a nt are m an and w i fe w i th a m i n or c h i ld L E P E K O L A. D e f e n d a nt w o r k ed in the m i n es and w h i le on h o l i d a ys used to w o rk at his f a t h e r 's s h o p. It a p p e a rs that D e f e n d a nt for some r e a s on lost his job in the m i n es and w o r k ed at his f a t h e r 's p l a c e. At one time P l a i n t i ff and D e f e n d a nt w e re s t a y i ng at the D e f e n d a n t 's f a t h e r 's h o me w h e re they w e re g i v en a c c o m m o d a t i o n. T h is c o n t i n u ed to be so u n t il as a r e s u lt of a q u a r r el or a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i ng b e t w e en D e f e n d a n t 's m o t h er and P l a i n t i f f. P l a i n t i ff r e m o v ed to her m a i d en h o me t o g e t h er w i th the m i n or c h i l d. I formed an i m p r e s s i on that the P l a i n t i ff was not w o r k i ng at all m a t e r i al times or at least the r e c o rd did not r e v e al so. What g i v es a d e f i n i te c o l o ur or c h a r a c t er to this d i s p u te is the fact that the record does not r e v e al if D e f e n d a nt e m p l o y ed -5- w h at w e re the t e r ms and c o n d i t i o ns of s u ch e m p l o y m e nt by the f a t h er of the D e f e n d a n t; w h e t h er or not D e f e n d a nt w as g e t t i ng a s a l a ry and if so how m u c h. It is c o m m on c a u se that t h e re is no e v i d e n ce that the d e f e n d a nt w as w o r k i ng for a s a l a r y. T he D e f e n d a nt w as s e en to be c o n t r i b u t i ng to the f a m i ly b u s i n e s s, as is s t a t ed in P l a i n t i f f 's e v i d e n ce in c h i ef that "As D e f e n d a n t 's w i fe we used to take out our m o n ey to buy s t o ck for the s h o p s. We w e re not e x p e c t i ng to get a n y t h i ng in r e t u rn but we w e re just h e l p i ng as c h i l d r en in that f a m i l y ," I w o u ld r e j e ct the s u b m i s s i on that this is an a n s w er in any w a y, to that the D e f e n d a nt o u g ht to be g e t t i ng a s a l a ry or w a g e s. N e i t h er w o u ld it be an i n d i c a t i on of the D e f e n d a n t 's a b i l i ty as at the m a t e r i al t i m e. I w o u ld r e f u se to d r aw any i n f e r e n ce that he did get a s a l a ry or w a g e s. S u f f i ce it to say that t h e re w as no p r o of of w a g es or s a l a r y. T h is is the d i f f i c u l ty that the l e a r n ed m a g i s t r a te had to c o n t e nd w i th in the c o u rt a q u o. T he l e a r n ed m a g i s t r a te w as not a b le to find that the D e f e n d a nt w as g a i n f u l ly e m p l o y ed as a f a c t. I e m p h a s i ze as a p r o v ed f a c t. I w o u ld say that t h is R h o d e s i an c a se of R v D E N IS 1 9 6 6 ( 4) SA 214 ( R A D) w as very h e l p f ul in i l l u m i n a t i ng the q u e s t i on of o n us in s t a t u t o ry o f f e n ce ( i n v o l v i ng m a i n t e n a n c e) as a g a i n st the c o m m on law s i t u a t i o n. It a l so had a lot to say a b o ut i n a b i l i ty to pay and the o t h er o p p o s i te of w h i ch is u n w i l l i n g n e ss to p a y. In the R h o d e s i an c a se it had b e en s u b m i t t ed that "in v i ew of the -6- s t r a i t e n ed financial c i r c u m s t a n c es of the company the A p p e l l a nt could not be expected to b o r r ow £120 a m o n th from the C o m p a ny to meet his l i a b i l i t i e s. The A p p e l l a nt had thus d i s c h a r g ed his onus of showing that he cannot pay the full m a i n t e n a n ce of £70 b e c a u se of lack of m e a n s ." The learned chief J u s t i ce B e a l le went on to say at page 215G: "This a r g u m e nt turns on the proper i n t e r p r e t a t i on of the r e l e v a nt s e c t i on of the s t a t u te w h i ch r e a d s ": (4) Proof that any f a i l u re w h i ch is the s u b j e ct of a c h a r ge under this s e c t i on was due to lack of m e a ns and that such lack of m e a ns was not due to the u n w i l l i n g n e ss to work or m i s c o n d u ct on the part of the p e r s on c h a r g e d, shall be a good d e f e n ce to any such c h a r g e. Provided that if the Court finds that the p e r s on charged was able to pay a p o r t i on of any p a r t i c u l ar p a y m e nt and failed to do s o, such proof shall not be a d e f e n ce in r e l a t i on to the p o r t i on of the p a r t i c u l ar p a y m e nt w h i ch the p e r s on may be able to pay. The q u e s t i on for d e t e r m i n a t i on here is w h e t h er the word "lack of m e a n s" in the o p e r a t i ve part of the s e c t i on m e an simply lack of a v a i l a b le liquid a s s e ts from w h i ch the a c c u s ed can pay the m a i n t e n a n ce or w h e t h er "lack of m e a n s" m e a ns the lack of a b i l i ty to p a y ." The most i m p o r t a nt thing to note is that a d i s t i n c t i on is m a de b e t w e en the two c o n c e p ts of lack of m e a ns and u n w i l l i n g n e ss to pay. But even most important is the onus on the accused person to show that lack of means was not due to the causes stated in the section four (4). -7- In seeking support from the said case of R v DENIS the R e s p o n d e nt was taking a d v a n t a ge of the d e c i s i on in the case namely that "an Accused is required to prove in his defence that he is simply not able to pay and his ability to pay must be judged in the light of all existing c i r c u m s t a n c e s, if he has r e a s o n a b le f a c i l i t i es for b o r r o w i ng he fails to d i s c h a r ge the onus of e s t a b l i s h i ng lack of m e a n s ." (See h e a d n o t e) (my u n d e r l i n i n g ). In this case the accused was possessed of assets and a running company and current a c c o u n t s. The short fall to full m a i n t e n a n ce could be raised by seeking a loan to which he would be e l i g i b le (reasonable f a c i l i t i e s ). This was to make up for what the Court decided was or would c o n s t i t u te s u f f i c i e nt m e a n s. In this case a few things seem to have been c o m m on cause or proved, namely that the Accused was g a i n f u l ly employed or possessed means and he could pay more by securing a loan. U n f o r t u n a t e ly this case is not useful to the R e s p o n d e nt in the instant case for the following r e a s o n s: (a) there was no proof that A p p e l l a nt was g a i n f u l ly e m p l o y e d; (b) His ability to borrow is just only assumed but not p r o v e d. I w o u ld have great d i f f i c u l ty in s u r m i s i ng that his father would be ready to a d v a n ce such a loan, -8- Indeed it is s t r a n ge that a m a j or m a r r i ed m an w i th a family to s u p p o rt would be content to w o rk w i t h o ut a s a l a ry or reward and w i t h o ut a thought (and a c t i o n) of s u p p o r t i ng his f a m i l y. It would f u r t h e r m o re be a g a i n st p u b l ic policy (if not o u t r i g ht i l l e g a l) for the A p p e l l a n t 's father to h a ve kept him w o r k i ng for him (his f a t h e r) w i t h o ut a s a l a r y. Indeed it is s t r a n ge as M r, M o h au s u b m i t t e d. But h a ve we got proof that the A p p e l l a nt did w o rk for a salary and how m u ch he e a r n e d? T h is is d i f f i c u lt on the e v i d e n ce b e f o re u s. It would a m o u nt to u n f o u n d ed s u s p i c i on and s p e c u l a t i on to s u r m i se that the A p p e l l a n t 's father must h a ve been p a y i ng him a salary and could not keep his son w o r k i ng for him w i t h o ut a r e w a r d. There is a f u r t h er p r o b l e m. That i s, t h a t, even if we w e re to a s s u me that A p p e l l a nt was e m p l o y ed for a salary (which is still a bad i n f e r e n c e) we would still have to fix a r e a s o n a b le a m o u nt ( q u a n t u m) w h i ch he must pay. T h is is so for the f o l l o w i ng r e a s o n s; (a) Each p a r ty has to c o n t r i b u te to such m a i n t e n a n ce in a r e a s o n a b le a m o u nt in p r o p o r t i on to the m e a ns of such p a r t y. -9- ( b) E a ch p a r ty w o u ld still be r e q u i r ed to pay a c c o r d i ng to his m e a n s, (c) A r e a s o n a b le e s t i m a te w o u ld h a ve to be a r r i v ed a t. S u ch r e a s o n a b le e s t i m a te w o u ld s t i ll be r e q u i r ed to take a c c o u nt of the f a c t o rs in (a) and (b) a b o v e. I h a ve a l r e a dy a l l u d ed to the n a t u re of this c l a im from the p o i nt of v i ew of p r i ma f a c ie c a s e, o n us of p r o of and a b i l i ty to pay as a g a i n st u n w i l l i n g n e ss to pay. I a p p r e c i a te that o ne of the p r o b l e ms on the part of the p l a i n t i ff could h a ve b e en as w ho to call to p r o ve the a g r e e m e nt of e m p l o y m e nt as b e t w e en f a t h er and son and as to h ow m u ch d e f e n d a nt a c t u a l ly got as w a g e s. H a v i ng said this I c an s a f e ly c o n c l u de that I w o u ld find f a u lt w i th the l e a r n ed m a g i s t r a t e 's a p p r o a ch and c o n c l u s i o n. T h is is m o re so b e c a u se it is not based on any p r o b a b i l i t i e s. 1 w o u ld a g r ee w i th the A p p e l l a n t 's s u b m i s s i on that it was b a s ed on a f i c t i o n al f o o t i n g, I a g r ee that the W a g es and C o n d i t i o ns of E m p l o y m e nt O r d er w o u ld e n t i t le a C o u rt in a p r o p er case to a w a rd a m i n i m um w a g e, m ay be of the a w a r d ed M 2 2 5 . 1 9, at the m a t e r i al t i m e. But t h is w o u ld still d e p e nd on p r o of of a c o n t r a ct of e m p l o y m e nt and that the c o m p l a i n a nt was e i t h er paid too l i t t le (below the s t a t u t o ry m i n i m u m ), was paid in kind or was b e i ng -10- unpaid. The magistrate came to a c o n c l u s i o n, that on the e v i d e n c e, that helping parents at their cafe, as such is to be taken as employment of Appellant by his p a r e n t s. This is e r r o n e o u s. The facts actually render the Wages and Conditions Law not applicable to the extent that the Court would be precluded from presuming a minimum wage when a contract of employment has not been proved. I do observe that at the material time the ruling minimum wages law was Wages and Conditions of Employment Order 1 9 7 8. Section 2(1) of the said Order is framed as f o l l o w s: "2 (1) This Order shall apply to all persons employed in any Commercial or Industrial undertaking whose minimum rate of r e m u n e r a t i o n, excluding any allowance b o n u s, overtime payment or other additional b e n e f i t, does not exceed " It is important to note that the person must be employed. The word "employee" in the Employment Act 1967 was interpreted as meaning "a person who works under a contract with an employer, whether for manual labour, clerical work or o t h e r w i s e. The word Contract in the 'said A c t' means a Contract of e m p l o y m e n t, whether oral or in w r i t i n g, express or emptied, by which an emmployee enters the service of an employer " T he legal s i t u a t i on is now c l e a r. In the p r e m i s es I w o u ld a l l ow the a p p e a l. T h e re ought to h a ve been an order for a b s o l u t i on from the i n s t a n c e. -11- T. M O N A P A T HI J U D GE For the A p p e l l a nt : Mr. L. P h e ko For the R e s p o n d e nt : M r. G. N t h e t he