Mangala Sombo Maricheni v Republic [2014] KECA 14 (KLR)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

AT MOMBASA

CORAM: MAKHANDIA,'M'INOTI & SICHALE, JJ.A.

CRIMINAL  APPEAL NO. 172 OF 2012

BETWEEN

MANGALA SOMBO MARICHENI...................................APPELLANT

AND

REPUBLIC......................................................................RESPONDENT

(Appeal from  the conviction and sentence of  the  High Court  of Kenya at Mombasa (Odero, J.)  dated 17th November, 2011

in

H.C.CR. C. NO. 49 OF 2009.

************

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

This  first   appeal arises  from  the  conviction  of  the   appellant, Mangale Sombo Mricheni, of the  offence of murder contrary to section 204 of the Penal Code  by the  High Court  in  Mombasa (Odero, J) on 17th November,  2011.  Upon conviction the  appellant was sentenced to death. The particulars of the  charge as laid  out  in the  information were  that on  7th March,  2007, at  Mtumwa  Village, Mwereni   Location,   Msambweni  District   within Coast   Province,   the   appellant murdered Chibuta Mwachilungo (deceased).

The  rather tragic   background  to  the  commission  of  the  offence  was  an allegation  by two fellow villagers of the deceased, Chaka Nyondo and Mwatsuma Nyonda that  he was a witch. That  accusation was made about three  days prior to the  death  of the  deceased. To  prove  otherwise  and  absolve  him from  the charge that  he was a witch,  the deceased  submitted himself to a Duruma traditional oath conducted by a witchdoctor at a place called Msamani.  As it turned out,  the oath allegedly  confirmed   that the  deceased was  indeed   a  witch,  for  which  he  was ordered   to  pay  a fine,  the  exact  nature being   unclear. Friends and relatives assisted him  to raise  part  of the  fine which  was  paid over to one of his accusers, Chaka Nyondo. Thereafter the deceased  went back to his home.

On 7th March,  2007, at  about  6. 00  pm,  the appellant and  one Mwatsuma Mwero,  who  subsequently fled  and  has  never  been  apprehended, allegedly  set upon  the  deceased outside his house  and  viciously  slashed him  with  pangas. So serious were the cuts and  injuries inflicted upon  the deceased that  he died on the spot. According to the evidence of Samba Mricheni (PW4) who is also the father of. the  appellant, the  appellant and  his  accomplice  had  been  paid  some  money  by Chaka  Nyondo and  Mwatsuma Nyonda, the accusers of the  deceased, to kill him because he was a witch.

After the murder of the deceased on 7th March, 2007 both his assailants fled.   The appellant was not apprehended until 19th November, 2009, more than two years  later,  when  he resurfaced in Mtunwa  village. On 1st December  2009  he was charged  with the  murder of the  deceased and  after  hearing evidence from 12 prosecution witnesses and  the  unsworn defence  of the  appellant, the  trial  judge convicted and  sentenced him as earlier stated,

Aggrieved by the  judgment of  the   High  Court,   the  appellant lodged  the present appeal. His  Supplementary  Memorandum of Appeal  dated 31st  March, 2014  and  which  formed  the  basis of the  appeal before  us,  raised six  grounds of appeal  which,  for  the  avoidance of prolixity,  grammatical errors and  repetitions, may be recast thus:

That   the   learned  trial   judge   erred   in   law   and fact   by   convicting the appellant:

i)  while there was no  psychiatric report  to  confirm  his  mental status before  the  trial;

ii) when no mens rea was proved on his part;

iii) on the basis of prosecution evidence that was inconsistent in material particulars; and

iv) on  the  basis of  evidence that   required  corroboration,  but  was  not otherwise corroborated.

Mr Njenga, learned counsel for  the  appellant argued all  the  grounds of appeal globally.  Counsel started by criticizing the quality and consistency of the evidence relied upon by the trial judge to convict the appellant. He submitted that of the  12 prosecution witnesses who testified, only three,  namely Julius Masudi Ndegwa (PW6), Nadzua Ndegwa (PW7) and  Munga Ndegwa (PW 9) purported to have   witnessed  the   appellant  committing the   offence.   Of  the   three,  counsel contended, the trial judge  had  concluded that PW6 had  not  witnessed  the  actual commission  of  the   offence   and   that    his   evidence   was   embellished.   Having discounted the  evidence  of PW6, counsel submitted, the  trial  judge  had erred  by holding  that the evidence  of PW9 could corroborate that of PW6.

Regarding  the  evidence  of PW7, learned counsel submitted that it  did  not support the finding  by the  trial court  that PW7 had  seen  the  appellant commit the offence. In counsel's view, the  evidence  of PW7 was that she  knew  only one of the two people  she had  seen  slashing the  deceased, and  that assailant whom  she named as "Bunge" was in fact the assailant who was never apprehended.

Next,   learned            counsel  latched onto what he perceived as material contradictions in the  prosecution case.  Mr Njenga submitted that according to the evidence   of  PW9,   the   offence   was  committed  at  4. 20   pm   while   the   other prosecution witnesses testified  that  it was at  about 6. 00  pm. Counsel argued that because of the  above  inconsistencies, there was  reasonable doubt whether any  of the witnesses had  witnessed the commission of the offence.

It was  Mr  Njenga's  further submission that the  prosecution evidence  was riddled  with  contradictions that it could  not  sustain  a conviction without proper corroboration. The  judgement of this  Court  in  CHOGE  VS  REPUBUC (1985) 1 KLR 1, was  cited   to  support the  view  that in  the  circumstances of  this  case, corroboration of the  prosecution evidence was required.

Learned    counsel   concluded  his    submissions  by   contending  that   no psychiatric report  was  presented  before  the   trial   court   to  confirm   the   mental status of the  appellant. In counsel's view, it was desirable to subject the  appellant to mental evaluation before he could be tried for the offence that he faced.

Mr Kiprop, the Senior Prosecution Counsel, opposed. the  appeal, contending that   the   appellant was  properly   convicted   of  the   offence  of  murder.  Learned counsel submitted that even if the  evidence  of PW6, which  the  trial  court found to have  been  exaggerated, was  discounted, there  was  other credible and  consistent evidence   upon   which   the   appellant  was   properly convicted.  Such   evidence, counsel argued, was  tendered by  PW9 who  the  court  believed  as a credible  eye Witness.

Mr Kiprop further submitted that under the  Law of Evidence  Act, the prosecution case  may be proved even by one Witness; that the  evidence  of the  eye Witnesses  was   sufficiently  corroborated   by  the   postmortem report  that  was produced in evidence  by Dr  Anderson Kalundi,  PW12  that discrepancies in the prosecution evidence  regarding time  was  not  material; and  that the  complaint of lack of a psychiatric report  was ill-founded because under section 11 of the  Penal Code,  every person is presumed to be  sane and  that in  any event,  the  appellant had not  suggested that he  was  at  any  time,  prior  or  during the  trial,  mentally unfit.  Neither did he advance the defence  of  insanity.

We  have  perused  the   record   of  appeal,  the  grounds of  appeal and   also considered the  submissions by learned counsel. This  being  a first  appeal, issues of fact  as well as issues of law falls for consideration. In addition, we are in law enjoined  to  subject the  evidence  adduced before  the  trial  court   to  a fresh  and exhaustive examination. (See OKENO VS REPUBUC (1972) EA 32).  In NJOROGE VS  REPUBUC (1982-88)  1  KAR   134 this   Court   rendered  itself   as  follows regarding the duty of a first appellate court:

"It  is  the   duty  of   the   first  appellate  court  to remember that parties are  entitled to demand of  the court  of first appeal a decision on both questions of fact   and  of  law, and  the  court   is required to  weigh conflicting evidence and  draw its own  iriference and conclusions,  bearing  in   mind   always that  it  has neither seen  nor  heard   the  witnesses and  make due allowance for this."

(See also Rule 29(l)(a) of the  Court of Appeal  Rules)

We agree  with  the  appellant that from  the  prosecution evidence, only PW6, PW7 and  PW9 testified  as direct  eye witnesses to the  commission of the  offence. Clearly,  the  trial  judge,  who had the  advantage of seeing the  witnesses testify,  was not  impressed by  PW6  as a witness. She noted  on  the   record   that he  had   a dishonest  demeanor and   was  evasive  in  answering questions.  Moreover,   PW6 readily   admitted  under  cross-examination that  he   had   not   recorded  in  his statement to the  police,  when  presumably the  matter was  fresh in  his  mind,  that he had  seen  accused and  his accomplice slashing the  deceased. What  he had  told the  police  was  that he  had   seen the  appellant and   his  accomplice leaving  the scene of the  crime,  carrying bloodied  pangas. The learned trial  judge  concluded as follows regarding this  witness:

"It is my view  that PW6  did   not   actually witness  the   attack. He probably   only    saw    accused   and   Mwero   as   they    left    the   scene brandishing the blood stained pangas. No doubt PW6 was trying to embellish his testimony in order to ensure a conviction against the accused."

Accordingly  the  learned judge  was  cautious in  the  manner in which  she  treated the evidence  of  PW6, and  rightly  so in our view.

The evidence  of PW7, who. described herself  as the  wife of the  deceased, was also largely self contradictory. In her evidence in chief, she  testified as follows:

"I know one of those slashing the deceased. His name is 'Bunge". I knew him before as he is my relative. He is my uncle. I only know him as "Bunge". Bunge escaped. I could not identifu the other man, who was cutting the deceased. Bunge has not been traced to date."(Emphasis added).

From this  evidence, PW7 was saying  that the  deceased's assailant whom  she  knew ("Bunge") is  the  one  who  is still  at  large  and  that she  did  not  know the second assailant, who is presumably the appellant.

A few lines  later in  her  evidence-in-chief, with  regard to the  identity of the assailants of the  deceased, PW7 took a radical turn, when  she  testified:

"I saw Bunge. He escaped   and   has   not been found   to date. I can identify the second man I saw slashing the deceased. It was accused (identified).  He is my nephew. He is my sister's child." (Emphasis added).

Cross-examination further compounded the inconsistencies in PW7’s evidence regarding the murder of the deceased. The witness stated that she saw the appellant and Bunge cutting the deceased from about 70 yards. A short while later, she told the Court:

"It is true I was in a state of shock. It is true that due to shock I could not see who was cutting my husband."

If the identification of the  appellant as one of the  murderers of the  deceased was  hinged   on  the   evidence   of PW6 and   PW7 alone,   we  would  agree  with  the appellant that  his   conviction would   be  ill founded. There  was  however   other evidence  which  the  trial  court took into  account in convicting the appellant, which in our view was sound evidence.

The  evidence  of  PW9,  which  was  largely  unchallenged,  was  such  other evidence  that  was considered by the  trial  court. The evidence  of that witness was that  after  hearing PW7 screaming, he ran  back home and  found  the appellant and Mwatsuma Mwero,  who  were  well  known  to  him   as  neighbours, slashing the deceased with  pangas. As he approached, the appellant warned  him  to keep  off; otherwise he  would  also  be  killed.  It was his  evidence  that he  witnessed the appellant cut  the  deceased on the  neck.  On its  own,  the  evidence  of PW9, which the  trial  court  believed after  finding that the  witness had  no reason to lie against the  appellant, would  have  sufficed  to sustain the  conviction  because, as rightly submitted by  the  respondent, under section 143 of the  Evidence Act,  in  the absence  of  any   legal  requirement  to  the   contrary,  no   particular  number  of witnesses are required to prove a fact in issue.

The  postmortem report  which  was prepared by Dr Onzere and  produced in court  by  PWI2  indicated that   the  cause of  death of the  deceased was  severe hemorrhage secondary to cut  wounds. The report  tabulated the  injuries inflicted upon  the deceased as a deep cut  wound  12 cm long on the  right side  of the neck; a 6 cm  cut  wound   on  the  back  of the  head;  near  total  amputation of the right forearm  due  to cut,  leaving only a 3 cm skin  hold; a 6 cm cut  wound  on the  right wrist;  severed   right   great   vessels   (carotid  and   jugular  systems)   at  the   neck; severed  spinal cord due to cut wounds on the neck; and  prolapsed spinal cord.

In  our.  view,  these   injuries  were  consistent  with   the   evidence   of  PW9 regarding the slashing of the deceased. PW9 was known  to both the appellant and his  accomplice,   who  were  his  neighbours. The  offence  was  committed   at  about 6. 00  pm when it was not yet dark  and  visibility was good. In the  circumstances of this  appeal,  the  question of the  identification of the  appellant could  not  possibly arise.

It is important to also point out that the learned  trial judge did not discount the  evidence  of PW6 in its  entirety.  She  disbelieved  only the  part  of the  evidence that  stated that PW6 witnessed the actual slashing of the deceased. The court  was prepared to  believe,  and  indeed  believed,  that PW6 had only  seen  the  appellant and  his accomplice  as they left the scene  of the  offence, brandishing bloodstained pangas. That  evidence was strengthened by that  of PW9, who the court  believed to have witnessed the  commission of the  offence, when  PW9 told  the  court  that he got to the scene  of the crime before PW6, thus strongly  suggesting, as the  learned judge  held,  that  PW6 only came  to the  scene  as  the  appellant and  his accomplice were leaving, having accomplished their murderous enterprise.

Another  piece of evidence which corroborates the evidence adduced to prove that  the  appellant was one  of the  murders of the  deceased, is the conduct of the appellant immediately after  the  deceased was  murdered. The appellant fled from Mtunwa Village for more than two years, and  was only arrested on 19th November, 2009 when  he resurfaced in the village. This piece of evidence is significant when considered against the  evidence  of Sombo  Mricheni,  PW4, which  appears to have been  largely ignored.  PW4's evidence was that his son,  the  appellant, had  on the date  the  offence was  committed, informed  him  that he,  the  appellant, had  killed the deceased at the request of Chaka  Nyondo and  Mwatsuma Nyondo, because the deceased was a witch. The appellant further informed PW4 that he was about to flee. Although PW4 tried to dissuade him and advised him to report to the chief instead, the appellant nevertheless fled the village.

The  conduct of the   appellant of fleeing  the  village  immediately after   the murder of the  deceased is not  consistent with  the  conduct of an  innocent person. In   similar  circumstances,  this   Court    found    such   evidence to   amount   to corroboration in   ALEX WAFUIA  VS  REPUBUC Crim. Appeal   No  7 of  2008 (Eldoret).In that case  the  Court  stated as follows:

"Some corroboration for that finding, if any  was  necessary, was found in the   conduct of  the   appellant who   had  been  escaping from   the police  for  about  one  week  and  also  ran  away  and  had  to  be chased and  arrested by the vigilante group  led by Patrick Wepukulu (PW 4). It was  not  the conduct of an innocent person."

Regarding  the   alleged   contradiction  on  the   time   when the offence  was committed, we do not  think much turns on  that ground of appeal. Having  heard the  evidence,  the  learned trial  judge  found that the  offence  was   committed at about 6. 00  pm.  We do not  see  any  basis for holding otherwise. In any  event,  the contradiction alleged  by the  appellant is not  a material contradiction as it did not go to the  root  of the  prosecution case.  The Uganda Court  of Appeal  aptly  noted  in TWEHANGANE ALFRED VS  UGANDA, Crim. App.  No 139 of  2001, [2003] UGCA 6, that it  is  not  every  contradiction warrants  rejection of evidence. The court stated:

"With regard   to  contradictions in the  prosecution's case  the  law  as set  out in numerous authorities is that grave  contradictions unless satisfactorily explained will  usually but  not necessarily lead to the evidence of  a  witness being   rejected. The   court   will   ignore  minor contradictions unless the court  thinks that  they  point  to deliberate untruthfulness or if they  do  not  affect the main  substance of  the prosecution's case.,

The last issue in this  appeal regards lack  of a psychiatric report. The general rule,  as stated in section 11 of the  Penal  Code is that every person is presumed to be of sound mind  and  to have  been  of sound mind  at  any  time  which comes in question, until the  contrary is  proved.  During his  trial,  the  appellant, who  was represented by  counsel, never  indicated that he was  of unsound mind  and  never raised any  issue regarding his  mental status. Neither did the  trial  court observe anything that could  have suggested mental challenge on the part  of the  appellant. Indeed,  before  us,  counsel for the  appellant maintained that the  appellant was not suggesting that  he  was  of  unsound mind   or  that he  had   wished to  raise   the defence  of insanity. Nevertheless, he still faults the trial court for essentially failing to confirm his soundness of mind, even though there is no such legal requirement. In this case  the  appellant himself  maintains that he is and  has all along  been  of sound mind.

We do  not think, in view of the  provisions of section 11 of the  Penal  Code that there is any  merit  in this  ground of appeal. To hold that the  appellant has, as of law,  a right to  be  mentally evaluated before  he  is  tried  would  be  to  negate section 11 of the  Penal  Code and  create a contrary presumption to the  effect that an  accused person is presumed to be mentally unsound, unless after  due  mental evaluation he is proved  to be of sound mind,  in which  case  he may  be tried.  That is clearly not the law.

The appellant did not canvass  or press  the ground  of appeal  relating  to whether mens rea on his part was proved, which we deem to have been abandoned. Whatever it is worth, it is our view too that that ground had no merit because malice aforethought can readily be inferred from the circumstances of this appeal.

We have ultimately come to the conclusion that this appeal has no merit and the same is accordingly dismissed.

Dated at and delivered at Mombasa this 21st day of July, 2014

ASIKE-MAKHANDIA

………………………

JUDGE OF APPEAL

K.M'INOTI

………………………

JUDGE OF APPEAL

F. SICHALE

………………………

JUDGE OF APPEAL

I certify that this is a true copy

of the original.

DEPUTY REGISTRAR