Mutale v Munaile (SCZ Judgment 14 of 2007) [2007] ZMSC 188 (25 July 2007)

MATILDA MUTALE V EMMANUEL MUNAILE SUPREME COURT 5. SAKALA C. J, LEWANIKA DC I mtiwda SILOMBAJJS. ' ' UMBA- CHIBESAKUNDA AND 28th MARCH, 2007AND 25TH JULY 2007 (S. C. Z. JUDGMENT NUMBER 14 OF 2007) Statutes - Statutory Construction - Fundamental rule of construction - 10. Statutes must be construed according to words expressed in Acts of Parliament. Civil Procedure-Petition - Whether it is a form of pleading. The brief facts common to both sides and which gave rise to preliminary issues, were that the appellant stood as a parliamentary candidate in the Malole Constituency in the Northern Province. Being 15. dissatisfied with the election results, she instructed counsel to petition and a petition was duly filed. After a few days, an amended petition was filed. According to the record, all this was done within 30 days in compliance with section 96 of the Electoral Act Number 12 of2006. The petition among other matters, sought to declare the election 20. of the 2nd respondent null and void; declare the appellant as the duly elected member of Parliament for Malole Constituency and, therefore entitled to take the seat in the National Assembly and enjoy all the benefits due to that office. Preliminary issues were raised. The preliminary issues raised were couched in the following terms; whether^ 25. a petition filed into court and not signed by the appeUantherself can be: —said to be properlybefdfb the court and'whether or not the court caiy entertain the petition or indeed allow anjimgnjj^^ ASM i^^iri^hb^ute. terms and ous-and^andatory. Ultimately, the tna ju g for-a -pemionito ZAKiBIA law reports petition %uI^ C°mply with the Provisions of section 96 (3) of tie Act The trial judge also ruled that there was no afmits only a Potion that meets the remedy bef Uf^ S^ ™ requirement of the Act. It against the preceding ruling tha t the appellant appealed. 5. HELD: (1) A petition is a rare form of bringing proceedings and is used in cases where it is required by statute or rule. A petition is notapleading. (2) The fundamental rule of construction of Acts of Parliament is 10. that they must be construed according to the words expressed in the Acts themselves. If the words of a statute are precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound on those words in the ordinary and natural sense. 15. (3) Whenever a strict interpretation of a statute gives rise to an absurdity and unjust situation, judges can and should use their good sense to remedy it by reading words in it, if necessary so as to do what Parliament would have done had they had the situation in mind. 20. (4) In the context of section 96 (3) the words used therein do not carry any technical meaning to require further elaboration as to the true intention of the legislature. (5) A petitioner is obliged to sign the petition and where there are more than one petitioner, all the petitioners are obliged to sign the petition before presenting it to the Court not later than thirty days after the date on wliich the result of the 25. election was declared. Cases referred to: ; ljS^eAttomeyXjgnega ! f ! [ W W W /■ - Jhe^ttbj 'othe^-Lewa^ 108:— 5. Queen v The judge of theCity London r , " don Court [1892] Q. B. 273 Legislation referred to: 1. Constitution of Zambia CAP 1 Article 27 fl1 , 2. %(3) ,S(3) ioim iuz. Works referred to: 1. Halsbury's Laws of England 4"' Edition 4. WhiteBookl999EditionOrderS5(5),18,18/02/02and 42/4/2. B Mutale, S. C. of Messrs Ellis and Company with R. M. Simeza of Messrs Simeza and Associates for the appellant. S. Nkonde, S. C Solicitor General with R. Simuna (Mrs.) Assistant Senior State Advocate and E. M Kamwi, Legal Counsel, Electoral Commission of Zambia. 15. SILOMB A, J, delivered judgment of the court. This appeal is against the Ruling of the High Court delivered on the 6th February, 2007. In the Ruling, the learned trial judge dismissed the 20. election petition of the appellant on a preliminary point of law. For convenience, the appellant shall be referred to as the petitioner, while the 1st and the 2nd respondents shall retain their positions as this is what they were in the court below. The brief facts, common to both sides and which gave rise to the 25. preliminary issues, were that the petitioner stood as a parliamentary candidate in the Malole Constituency in the Northern Province. Being dissatisfied with the election results, she instructed counsel to petition and a petition was duly filed. After a few days, an amended petition was filed. According to the record, all this was done within 30 days m 30. compliance with section 96 of the Electoral Act No. 12 o , (hereinafter to be referred to as "the Act"). - ..... ..... ,«e petition, among other- things, sought to dedare thggction respondent null tlec zfak^'her seatTn the Nation^ LAW REPORTS The preliminary issues, as no- t-- M w fo«y fiIed response to the learned trial fudge s ob?1''1' ‘he fo^al X ° T* accord the election petition thlt Jas not sX?S aS to ^hat status to 5' incompliance with theprovisionsofsectiSXVtfe^ The preliminary issues raised were in rt. reproducing them, we shall, for the purposes of th, lree parts. Without one, which was not only vigorously argued before 'take the first 10 this court, but which is also tire subject of appeal As C°Urt and the 2* respondent and argued by petition filed into court and not signed by the nofi whether a Jdd » be properly before >he entertain the petition or indeed allow an amendment. thecourtcan 15. Mr. Lisimba contended before the learned trial judge that it was a mandatory requirement that the petition is signed by the petitioner in person and not through her legal representative; that an adherence to the procedure provided by the Act was of the utmost importance. Counsel 20. contended that the omission by the petitioner, in not signing the petition herself, was so fatal that it rendered the petition dismissible in its current form for want of procedure; that any defect in the petition could only be corrected within 30 days, the period stipulated for bringing the petition to court. The record shows that Mr. Kamwi, counsel for the 1st 25. respondent, did not submit before the learned trial judge because he was constrained by the application on account of what happened on their part during the elections. He, therefore, found it appropriate not to offer anyposition. In response to the submissions by counsel for the 2nd respondent, counsel for the petitioner, submitted before the learned trial- or rested on a proper )udg^at?flhe-issue thatte^ instruction of section 96(3) of-the^Gt^TQ^i-extent, counseHoffi^^ 30. vs .of. fettled by counsel it must bg^^ k 121 ZAMBI/X LAW REPORTS [1912] 47 C. S. C. 183 Sahuv Singh and Another [1985] LRC 31 (9) (10) The Attorney-General and Another v Lewanika and Others (1993 - 1994) Z. R. 164. 5. (11) Mwamba and Another v The Attorney-General of Zambia [1993] 3 LRC 166 J (12) (13) (14) Sussex Peerage Case [1843-1845] (65RR)11 Seaford Court Estates Limited v Asher [1949] 2KB 481. Shimonde and Another v Meridien BIAO Bank (Z)Limited (1999) Z. R. 10. 15. (15) MlewavWghtman. (1995-1997) Z. R. 171 (16) BatervBater, (No. 2) [1950] 2 ALL ER 458 (17) Zuluv Avondale Housing Project Ltd. (1982) Z. R. 172 (18) MwelwavThe People (1975) Z. R. 166. (19) Mohamed v The Attorney General (1982) Z. R. 49 (20) Mundia v Senior Motor Limited (1982) ZR 66 (21) London Passenger Transport Board vMoscrop [1942] SC 332 (21) Zambia Electricity Supplies Corporation Limited v Red-Line Limited (1990-1992) Z. R. 170 20. (22) Jere v DVR/SGT Shamayuwa and Another (1978) Z. R. 204 (23) Re Robinson Settlement, Grant v Hobbs [1978] ICh. D.728 (24) Kearny Company Limited v Agip Zambia Ltd, Asphalt and Tamar (1985) Z. R. 7 (25) Bank of Zambia v Anderson and Another (1993-1994) Z. R. 47 (26) Attorney General v Mubiana Appeal Number 38 of1993 (unreported). 25. Legislation referred to: Constitution of Zambia, Cap.l: Articles: 34,35,38 (1) (2) (3), 41 (1) (2), 75 Electoral Act, Cap. 13: Sections: 2,8,9 (1), 17,18 (2), 20,27 (1) Electoral (Amendment) Act, No. 23 of 1996: Section 9 (3) 30. Interpretation and General Provisions Act, Cap.2, Section 10,20 (3) 20 (4) Electoral (Presidential Elections) Statutory Instrument Number 109 Of 1991 Regulations: Reg. 17. Supreme Court rules, Cap. 25: Rule 72A Election Petition Rules, Cap. 13: Rule 4 (1) 35. Electoral (General) Regulations Statutory Instrument Number 108 Of 1991Reg.3,22and23 Electoral (Conduct) Regulations of 1996:7 (I) (/) the trial court signed by the petitioner through her counZTw” properly signed as Counsel did not have an existence or life ind^dj of a client. r On the word "shall" in section 96^ L 5. to make the provision mandatory or directory M “ WaS intende< court that although Parliament used the word STth consequences were prescribed in cases of™ ° v the sectlon' no counsel, the requirement to comply was Counsel cited the case of The Attorney Ce imandatory but directory.; proviston requtnng grounds of detention to be written in a language te i detainee (Million Juma) understood was directory and failure to coml with it was a defect tlrat could be remedied. In the alternative, cou£ ; 15. urged the trial court to order an amendment of the petition if the ! foregoing arguments of the petitioner were not persuasive enough He I relied on section 102(3) of the Act, which allowed the court to exercise its r civil jurisdiction as it may deem appropriate, particularly that the petitioner had disclosed triable issues in her pleadings. 20. With the foregoing submissions before him, the learned trial judge first dealt with the issue of whether a petition was a pleading that could be signed by counsel as an agent of the petitioner. After examining the various authorities on tire matter, including Odgers on Civil Court Actions, Practice and Precedents, 24th Edition (2) and Order 18A of the 25. Rules of the Supreme Court, 1995 Edition (3), the learned judge came to the conclusion that a petition was not a pleading. On the signing of pleadings, the learned trial judge observed that although the general position was that pleadings may be signed by counsel or his principal, this was not the case where a statute makes 30. specific provisions as to who should sign the petition. With reference to section 96(3), the learned trial judge.qgreed with counsel for the Petitioner that the issue.at hand -rested .011. the construction of the statute. He said that those w^ —^-T^^ofthecaseshe^cdupom^ —---- v jr/-^^^<;^^r^Lord Estherhad^^^ - In the light of the definition ofr - —— irt commonly known as the inm. Petltioner" in-------------------- -------- . dae was of the strong view that thPPretati°n clause the'?1 of the petitioner was in absolute terms and h pehtl°n to be ^section £ mandatory. The learned2*" ‘he st*ute was*^ by the use of the word "shall" in section 963) was^Jf As far as he was concerned the caseof thea„ n0 relevance as it was decided in cl presentcase. Stances different £ " In the final analysis, he ruled th nt because it did not comply with the provisions^ He also ruled that there wasnoremedybeciu^q c I0n 96(3) of the Act. apetitionthatmeetstherequirementoftheAct. 10n96® admits°nly nOt proceed . 10. 15. 1, That the learned trial judge in the court below misdirected hunseW m construing section 96(3) of the ElectZl Ztal requiring the petitioner to personally sign the petition; 2. That the learned trial judge in the court below erred in law 20. when he held that section 96(3) of the Electoral Act is a mandatory provision; 3. That the learned trial judge in the court below grossly erred when he held that the petition in its current form is not in substantial conformity with section 96(3) of the Electoral Act 25. and that there are no circumstances which would warrant it being remedied; and 4. That the learned trial judge erred when he held that the petition cannot proceed, as it does not comply with the .provisions of the Act. to thecourt. that he would suh -^SSShe lower court and anddour. Both coQhJeg^ theohset we wish to observethab?^ ^submissions onappeatandit^^ aeans that the risk ofbeirigdepe^ ---- ---------------------------- — MuTALE V MUNAILE may not be minimised. After quoting section 96(3) of the Act in in the heads of argument, with reference State Counsel contended examination of the section does not in anv °ne'that a Proper 5. petition can only be signed by the petitinn?^'SUggest that an election own hand to the document. State Counsel n? ?T°n by aPPW her interpretation would certainly lead to P ?°Ut that such literal amount to reading words into the statute wht^ if would intend to. He argued that counsel, as her a^rn did not 10. petition on her behalf. s r'was ln order to sign the As far as State Counsel was concerned u. Parliament intended to cure to justify such nd j n° mischief —, law position wh™Z2 « “* p!^ on behalf of his ctaf “ S’ 15.«8<«l<l»t»eeaon%<3)shouldnolbesiv«.a„m>„i„tal,IetiJoll.' He pointed out that the purpose of section 96(3) is not to invalidate an election which is signed by the petitioner through counsel, but to ensure that the petition is, on its face, signed by the petitioner or by the person . authorized by the petitioner. He further pointed out that the Act and its 20. Rules do not say what should happen in the event that the petition is signed by counsel as an agent of the petitioner. In his oral submission, Mr. Mutale, S. C., briefly alluded to the background of the case and especially what happened before the preliminary issue was raised. In the main, he submitted, under ground one, that the learned trial Judge was 25. wrong in adopting a literal interpretation as opposed to a more liberal interpretation as is the trend with courts today. He submitted that the learned trial judge placed reliance on an old English case of Queen v The Judge of the City of the London Court (5), when tile thinking had changed in the Commonwealth. According to learned 30. State Counsel, the trend now was for the Courts to adopt a more liberal approach to achieve a purposive result. He cited-the case of The Attorney— -^General andAnother- v-Lewunikaand'Oth~efs(4)fm^id of-his position. On M^ground three. State Counsel cc^endg^Atbg^ kerequiremei&h£t] ^oFa hiatteno^ul^ latter of form anH^ mailer of 5 W and is=a- ZAMBIA LAW REPORTS He contended that the signing ofpeff their clients in Zambia is historical and daf^ iawyers a‘one or win, all thiS time the petitions have been deaK to the sixS bound ,o uph„M process. State Counsel relied on the prinS Mwmbazt v Morester Farms limited® Wh °Und in ‘he case of practice in dealing with bona fide interior ! e we said that, "it is the allowtriable, issues to come to court despite the 7^ T*01*8 forc°urts to 5. F medefaultoftheparties " Inhis oral arguments, Mr. Mutale S C , On ground two, the contention of Mr. Simeza, with reference to the case of The Attorney General v Juma (3), was that if the word "shall" was 15 held to be merely drrectory in the case, which was a constitutional case where the liberty of an individual was at stake, the court could not now hold that the use of the word in section 96(3) was mandatory. He contended that if it was the intention of the legislature to make it mandatory for the petitioner to sign the petition under her Own hand, 20. then no prejudice is occasioned to the respondents by the omission since they clearly understand the grounds upon which the petition is founded. Mr. Simeza contended that the respondents' have in fact already answered the grounds raised in .the petition and that since the answers are signed by their respective counsel, they (respondents) have waived 25. their right to object to the petition. Mr. Simeza further contended that where a statute requires that something shall be done in a particular manner or form without expressly declaring what shall be the consequence of non-compliance, such statutory requirement cannot be regarded as imperative or _ mandatory but merely directory. Mr. Simeza. drew .our attention to. ^ec^ 98(3^^f^ which respectively provide for consequent^ 30. Kv-juneaseof failure do payJor security hovered in earliersubinissions, his-oral^ubmi at is coritaOOf ■ —.; t ■ p. "" ihesoncitor-GeneraljM^^^ relied on the heads of an»m» P nSe*°^PetitioneP7~-r------------ submissions. We note that in the he^tf General has compressed the four grounc^ the Sol cho grounds one and two forming the fi° t pX , aPP^ into two part . 5- SeC0.nd Part- On the first and three a"d four' Solicitor-General argued that the learnnHTrdsroundsof appeal the himself when he held that section petitioner is required to personally sign the peHa“ and the The Solicitor-General was in a? 10. issue at hand is one of construction of the Mr Mutale dlat the not the petitioner is required, under section 9?^ ? establish whether or petition. The Solicitor-General, like Mr Muhi Personally sign the and contended that where the words f * ' C'ted *he Lewanikl’ case unambiguous no more should be done thin T precise and 15. natural and ordinary meaning. According tn u fT*6 words their natural and ordinary meaning of the wfrd „ ,eJ?hcdor^ener^ the simply that the petitioner must personal m m SGCti°n 96® is position of the law is emphasised bv the ron G P^011' fhat this 2Q more than one petitioner, all the petitioners ,, /^ardmg groundsdhree and four, the Solicitor-General contended d tr‘t JUdge correcdy interpreted the law and facts when he held that the petition was not in conformity with the Act and that it could, therefore, not proceed. It is common practice, according to the Solicitor General, that when a statute declares that something "shall'' be 25. done the language is considered imperative or mandatory and that thing must be done. The Solicitor-General argued that the effect of non-compliance, that is failure to personally sign the petition, is fatal; that the defect cannot be cured because, legally, the petition is null and void ab initio. He also 30. argued that in certain rare circumstances, imperative provisions have been held directory, such as, in tire Juma case; and that the present case does not fall in the exceptions as it ^^substantially differentfrom the- icbhcededthatThere; learned Solicitor General submitted thar m was to avoid frivolous petitions h! ^"'■P^oftheF?' ~_____ ________ etitioners to sign them personally With contention that the respondent / through their counsel and thereby ZvVk ansvve« petition, the learned Solicitor General s ri§ht to challf^T3 require the respondent to sign the aLw bm'tted that the Act d he 5' . regard to ' r fhe Mr. Lisimba, on behalf of the 2"dresno d undertook to file the heads of arguments h Mr did. The gist of Mr. Lisimba’s arguments'in hi"|Sameday-which he relation to ground one, is that the requirement inT r „ar6uments, in petition within 30 days is so strict that no petition nnh°" %(3) f° fUe the theexpiryofthatperiod. Mr. Lisimbacontended ater the learned trial Judge held that the use of th! wort resPonded orally and 10. 96(3) was mandatory. He further contended tint nm • • to time are always obligatory unless the pow3^^^^^ tIOn 15- given to the court. He gave the example of the case of The A h 8 *e‘™e * ’ Chipango(l) which was cited in the JUma(3), case on the obhgato^ provisions relating to time, as his authority. To this end he__ ™ that if 30 days in sub-section 3 of Section 96 of the Act is obligatory thm the signing of the petition personally by the petitioner in the same sub- section cannot be directory. Under ground three, Mr. Lisimba contended that the learned trial 25. judge correctly held that the petition was not in conformity with section 96(3); and that there were no circumstances to warrant it being remedied. It was contended that the case of Mwambazi v Morester Farms Ltd (2), is distinguishable from tire present case. Mr. Lisimba argued that in the former case, the Courts are mandated to extend time within which to do an act (see Order 42, rule 4(2), of the RSC), while in the present case, there 30. is no mandate to extend time to amend a petition after the expiration of 30 days.7 . -Proceed f gSfeH^°r himself when he held that the petition could not comP^ance with the. law. As far as hewasTonrerned, 35 Ws o^^Wnissions; Mr. Lisimba repeated, toldarge' a ; on of petitioner'Linsebtion2(l)of ____ ted _____________________________MUTALE v MUNAILE that it was the petitioner who presented tho and should have, therefore, signed the petition. ‘ ‘°n m thc Court below , 5. grounds of appeal. We have also dul/considS -° ““ court below, including the submissions made h Proceedings m the learned trial judge and the judgment of that co kA1*11!6 before the foregoing,wewish to regis^romaXrXn and the authorities cited to us. We note at the ouK “'^slonsmade W. similarity in the manner the grounds of appeal are That being the case, the view we take is that all the grounds of anneal shall be disposed of together in order to avoid being repetitive. PP At this preliminary stage, we wish to agree with the finding of the learned trial judge that a petition is not a pleading. This finding is well 15. supported by authorities. In particular, Order 18 of the RSC, 1999 edition (4), adequately deals with the issue of pleadings. In the explanatory notes under editorial introduction, in which Order 18/0/2 of the RSC is covered, the learned authors state that the term "pleading" does not include a petition. 20. We also want, at this preliminary stage, to deal with the contention by the petitioner that there is no mischief that Parliament intended to cure to justify the drastic departure from the common law position where counsel is literally authorized to sign all pleadings on behalf of a client. First of all, we are dealing with a petition and not a pleading. Under 25. section 102(1) of the Act, it is provided that an election petition shall be tried and determined within 180 days from the date of presentation in the High Court. Under the proviso to the same subsection, it is stated that an election petition shall be dismissed if it not tried and determined within 180 days due to failure by the petitioner to prosecute the petition. The 30. message from section 102(1) is that an election petition - is an urgent and serious business that calls for the personal attention and commitment of the petitioner. In these circumstances, we are persuaded to agree with ——The learned Solicitor^ehefal. That Parliament, by enacting section 96(3)z TP ^^i^de.cLto:di^oujLagiafrtg^^ of appeal and the submissions made bqfpm__^. p^^^ShoW^ in - this appeal are not. many. As ^-1 7^,«frilG&On ! ‘ —--------------- ------------ is section 96(3):® which is ZAMBIA LAW REPORTS couched in the following words:- 96(3): Every election petition shall be signed by the petitioner or by all the petitioners if more than one, and shall be presented not later than thirty days after the date on which the result of the election to which it relates is duly declared (underlining ours). We have been called upon to decide whether or not it is mandatory or as was pointed out in the case of The Attorney General and Another v Lezuanika and Others(4), the fundamental rule of construction of Acts of 10. Parliament is that they must be construed according to the words expressed in the Acts themselves. The petitioner, through counsel, contends that the use of the word "shall" in sub-section (3) of section 96 does not suggest that it is mandatory for an eleclion petition to be signed by the petitioner in person by applying her own hand to the document. 15. She contends that such a literal interpretation would certainly lead to an absurdity and would amount to reading words into the statute that the legislature did not intend to. Further, that Where a statute requires something to be done in a particular manner without declaring the consequence of non-compliance, such statutory requirement cannot be 20. regarded as imperative or mandatory, but merely directory. On the other hand, the 1st respondent submitted, through the learned Solicitor Genera:! that where the words of a statute are precise and unambiguous no more should be done than to give the words their natural and ordinary meaning. He submitted that the natural and 25. ordinary meaning of the words in section 96(3) was that the petitioner must personally sign the petition and that this position of the law is made clearer by the requirement, in the same sub-section, that where there are more than one petitioner all the petitioners must sign the petition. The position of the 2nd respondent is that the use of the word "shall' in section 30. 96(3) is mandatory. In lliis regard, both respondents are agreed that the effect of failurc-fo sign the petition personallyTs^atal in that the defect ^._cannotbe cured after the time allowed fog foe-Fght ion has g Wehaye^i^^ ^h°^enhahd,?weh<T^ petition is not a pleadi . statement o .agjfe^ defence,issighedbycounseFiThe has be^i^trumenfal.m p repa . ^weris: What is a petition? . -i.. ' • tta w*?'* . _ According to the learned authors of OH Practice and Precedents, 24'" Edition (2) a b QviI Court Actions made reference to, it is stated at page 27 tl2° ' learned trial Mge bringing proceedings ... and is used in case wh ” * "a rare fo™ of es where it is required by a 5. particularstatuteorrule...." Further, under Order 5, rule 5, of the RSC, 1999 edition (4), it is provided that. ’’proceedings may be begun by originating motion or petition if, but only if, by these rules or by or under any Act the proceedings in question are required or authorized to be so begun." 10. From the foregoing exposition of the law, we can say that a petition is a rare mode of commencing an action in this jurisdiction and its application is specially provided or authorized by an Act of Parliament. And as the learned trial judge rightly observed, it is that 15. particular statute that gives authority to commence an action by petition that should give guidance on the type or form of petition to be filed with the Court. In construing whether it is mandatory or directory for the petitioner to sign the petition personally, we had occasion to visit the case 20. of The Attorney General and Another v Lewanika and Others(4), which both * the petitioner and the 1st respondent referred us to. In that case we said:- "If the words of tire statute are precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expand on those words in their ordinary and natural sense. Whenever a strict interpretation of a statute gives rise 25. to an absurdity and unjust situation, the judges can and should use their good sense to remedy it by reading words in it, if necessary, so as to do what Parliament would have done had they had the situation in mind." _In the context of section 96(3), the view we hold is that the words used therein do not carry any technical meaning to require further as t0 true mtentiqnj^ the21egislature.-As^far^a^ve can ~ Werf^ words in section 96(3) are clear, plain and Unambiguous. 7 (1) and the second one is in section 96(3) itself. Under Section inSech01' 1 Refines petitioner, in relation to an election petition, as any 2(1)/ th6 M ho signs and presents an election petition under section definition of petitioner is, in our considered view, quite person finely ' plain and str 5 ahtforward and cannot be taken any further, 5. Coming to section 96(3), it is provided th.i n petitioner' as defined, is obliged to sign the petition and where th- petitioner all the petitioners are obliged to sion l;aremore than one presenting it to the court not later than thirty days8,ft-1 PT‘b°n before the result of the election was declared. If there Ire m whether a single petitioner is obliged to sign the J d°ubts yarding 10. those doubts are completely eliminated in case of a P f?°n personally' so because » . join, pe.i aB ,He s " supposed to be reflected in the petition As such , petlboners are counsel cannot repres^it the signatures of all the petitioners. °n Which °f Haying come to the conclusion that it is mandatory for the petitioner to sign the petition personally, we find that section 96(3) is at par with sections 98(3) and 101(1) of the same Act as the consequence of filing a petition that is not signed by the petitioner makes the petition misconceived. r 20. We also heard spirited arguments regarding the case of The Attorney General v Jumci(3), a constitutional case, and its application to the present case. These arguments are summarised in this judgment and in the judgment of the trial Court. In the view we take of the arguments, we have refrained from delving into the case because the grounds for its 25. • irrelevance to the case at hand were adequately dealt with by the trial court., In summary, our position is that the appeal has no merit. We reiterate our finding that section 96(3), as read with section 2(1), makes it mandatory for the petitioner to sign the petition personally under her or 30. his hand before presenting; it to the High Court for trial and determination.- As this wasanovel appeal case on a matter of-public interest, we shall make no order foncosts. Each party to bear h own costs. VOTES?: 131