Mbotto v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 37 of 2019) [2023] UGCA 26 (30 January 2023)

Full Case Text

#### 5 THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

#### IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF UGANDA AT MBALE

#### CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 37 OF 2019

(Coram: Obura, Bamugemereire & Madrama, JJA)

#### MBoTTo DoMrNrC) APPELLANT

#### 10 VERSUS

#### UGANDA} RESPONDENT

(Appeal from the decision of the High Court of Uganda Holden at Mbale in Crimrnal Session Case No 022 of 2016 before Asiimwe, J delivered on 2Bh November 2018)

#### JUDGMENT OF COURT

15 The Appetlant was indicted for aggravated defil.ement contrary to section 129 (3) and (4) of the PenaL Code Act. He was tried and convicted on his own ptea of guiLty whereupon he was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment.

The appel.l.ant being aggrieved appeal.ed against his conviction and sentence on the foltowing grounds: 20

- 1. The learned triat judge erred in law and fact when he convicted the appel. Lant on his own plea of guitty without foLtowing the right procedures. - 2. The Learned trial. judge erred in Law and fact when he passed an iLtegaL, manifestl,y harsh and excessive sentence of 25 years on the appel. Lant.

At the hearing of the appeaL, the respondent was represented by the learned Senior Assistant DPP Mr. Ool.a Sam whi[e the appettant was represented by learned counseI Mr. Geoffrey Nappa. The appeLtant was present in court.

The court was addressed in written submissions.

## s Ground l

## The learned triat judge erred in law and fact when he convicted the appeltant on his own ptea of guitty without fottowing the right procedure.

The appetlant's counset submitted that in as much as the learned triat Judge stated in the sentence that the accused chose to change his ptea

- and the indictment was read to him aFresh, the accused accepted the charge and a ptea of guitty was entered and the court proceeded to convict him after accepting the fact as read by the prosecution, the proper procedure was not fotlowed. Counsel referred the court to the record of proceedings and submitted that whereas in the said record of 10 - proceedings it reftected that the appel. Lant changed his ptea from "not guilty" to "guitty", the record does not reftect that the charges were ever read back to the appettant nor does it even show that the prosecution equalty read the facts back to the appel.[ant upon which he decided to change the ptea from not guitty to guitty. 15 - The appeltant's counseI submitted that the procedure for recording a plea of guilty was settted by Spry V-P as he then was in Adan Vs Repubtic 0973) EA 446 which he cited for the proposition that where a person rs charged, the charge and the particutars shoutd be read back to him so far as is possibte in his own [anguage but if it is not possibte then the 20 - [anguage which he can speak and understand. The magistrate woutd then explain to the accused person at[ the essentiat ingredients of the offence charged. lf the accused person then admits atl the essentiat etements, the magistrate shoutd record what the accused has said as nearly as possibte in his own words and then formerly enter a plea of guitty. The 25 - magistrate shoutd then ask the prosecutor to state the facts of the atleged offence and when the statement is complete, should give the accused person an opportunity to dispute or explain the facts or to add to any other relevant facts which if true, might raise a question as to his guitt. The magistrate shoutd record a change of ptea to "not guitty" and 30 - proceed to hotd a trial. lf the accused does not deny the alleged facts in any material respect, the magistrate should record a conviction and proceed to hear any further facts relevant to sentence. 35

- 5 The appettant's counseI submitted that the rationate behind this principle is to ensure that an accused person is property convicted on his own plea. As far as the record is concerned, the appettant's counseI ma inta ins that the convict neither admitted any facts nor does the said record reftect that the court/triat judge ever read to the appettant the statement - of the ofFence, and the particulars of the offence. The appettant's counsel Further relies on section 63 of the Triat on lndictment Act which provides that if the accused pleads guitty, the ptea shat[ be recorded and he or she shatl. be convicted. Counsel submitted that it is mandatory for the court to record the ptea on the record which was not the case in the 10 - circumsta nces of this appeat. 15

ln Namara Daphine Vs Uganda; Criminat Appeat No 030 of 2013 the court stated that an accused person must have pteaded to each ingredient of the offence and a generatised statement such as "l ptead guitty" were insufficient in ptea taking. Further in the case of Nsubuga Ati AKA Cobra

- Vs Uganda; Criminat Appeat No 276 of 2017, the court was faced with a simitar ditemma where the appeltant after hearing of the first prosecution witness is said to have changed his ptea from "not guitty" to "guitty". However, according to the record, the learned trial. judge onl.y read out the charge to the appettant who merety stated that he had 20 - committed the offence and then the prosecution read back to the appetlant the facts which he admitted but the ingredients of the offence were not read back to the appettant. The appettant's counsel submitted that it was required of the trial judge to exptain atI the essential ingredients of the offence of murder to the accused and therefore the 25 - trialjudge was fautted on that. 30

As Far as the facts of the appettant's case are concerned, the appe[[ant's counsel submitted that the situation was even worse where the record does not even indicate that the charge was ever read back to the appettant, the essentiaI ingredients of the oFfence were not read and even

the prosecution never read out the facts but instead the record merely show that before the trial. judge's summing up for the assessors, he went ahead to convict the appettant on his own plea. ln the premises, the appellant's counsel prayed that the court be pteased to quash the conviction, set aside the i[[egaI sentence and acquit the appellant. 35

# s Ground 2

## The learned triat judge erred in law and fact when he passed an ittegat, manifestty harsh and excessive sentence of 25 years to the appettant.

The appeliant's counseI subn]itted that the learned triaI judge did not deduct the period the appellant spent on remand prior to his conviction when he imposed a sentence of 25 years'imprisonment. ln the premises, the sentence passed by the trialjudge was an ittegaI sentence.

Further, the appellant in mitigation submitted that he was a first-time offender and a young person who could be usefut to society. There was no doubt that the appeLl.ant was a first-time offender since there was no evidence brought by the prosecution to the contrary. He had spent 3 years and 12 months on remand. ln the premises, the appettant's counsel submitted that the sentence of 25 years' imprisonment was in the circumstances, harsh and excessive. The appettant's counseI submitted that white the trial judge had the discretion, one of the aims for punishments is reformation and this could not be achieved by tengthy terms of imprisonment. lt is contended that the period of three years spent on remand was sufficient for the appettant to reform (see

The appel.tant also retied on the Sentencing Guidetines and the question of consistency in sentencing and submitted that the court shoutd consider other precedents in simitar cases. ln German Benjamin Vs Uganda; Crimina[ Appeat No 142 of 2010, the appetla nt had been convicted of aggravated defilement of a girt of five years. The appettant was 35 years otd and had been on remand for four years whereupon he was sentenced to 20 years'imprisonment after deducting the period he had spent on remand prior to his conviction and sentence. CounseI submitted that in the current matter, the victim was six years otd and the appettant was aged 33 years otd, he was HIV negative and a sentence of 21 years after deducting the period spent on remand was excessive. ln German 25 30

Aharikundira Yustina Vs Uganda; SCCA No 27 of 2015)

Benjamin (supra) after the court considered the mitigating factors, the appetlant was, on appeat, sentenced to 15 years'imprisonment. Counsel also re[ied on Ninsiima Gitbert Vs Uganda; Criminat Appeat No 0180 of 2010. The appettant had been found guitty of defilement of a girt aged I 35

5 years whereupon he was convicted and sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment. 0n appeat, the sentence was reduced to 15 years.

The appel.l.ants counsel relied on other precedents and submitted that in cases of aqgravated defitement, without additionaI aggravating factors, the sentences ranged between 11 years and 15 years. ln the premises, he prayed that the court appties the principte of consistency in sentencing and be pteased to set aside the sentence imposed on the appettant and

that the court exercises its discretionary power under section ll of the Judicature Act and sentence the appetlant to an appropriate sentence.

ln repty, the respondents counset opposed the appeat.

ln as far as ground I of the appeat is concerned, the respondent's counset drew the attention of the court to the proceedings on 20 November 2018 where the tearned triat judge adjourned the case for summing up to the assessors on 21'' of November 2018. The supptementary record of proceedings showed that the procedure for ptea taking was followed. 15

- Further, the respondent's counseL submitted and the effect of those submissions is that the law is as submitted by the appetlant's counseI in the appeltant's submissions and the controversy seems to be in its apptication to the facts. The respondent's counset contended that the onl.y irregularity was that the triat judge did not record the detaited facts of 2A - the case as narrated by the prosecutor. However, the appetiant in his own words admitted that the facts are correct which demonstrated that the facts weTe Tead to the appettant. He submitted that the omission by the learned trial. judge to record the facts as read by the prosecutor was a mere irregutarity and did not occasion any miscarriage of justice. 25 - Further that the irregularity was curabLe by section 139 (l) of the Triat on lndictments Act. 30

Additionatty, the respondents counsel submitted that section 34 ('l) of the CriminaI Procedure Code Act, stiputates that the appell.ate court shatt, notwithstanding that it js of the opinion that the point raised in the appeal.

might be decided in favour of the appettant, dismiss the appeat if it considers that no substantiaI miscarriage of justice has actualty occurred. The respondent's counsel maintains that the appettant knew the ofFence he was pleading to and admitted the facts as read by the 35

5 prosecutor were correct. The appei[ant was therefore property convicted and ground'l of the appeat has no merit and ought to be dismissed.

With regard to ground 2 of the appeaI that the sentence passed was ittegat, manifestty harsh and excessive, the appettant's counset submitted that the premises of the sentence was incorrect in that the appettant was not sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment but to 2'l years,

1'l months and 13 days'imprisonment. 10

Further, the respondent's counsel submitted that an appropriate sentence is a matter for the discretion of the sentencing judge and this court as an appe[[ate court wiI not normatly interfere with the sentence

- unless it is ittegaI or manifestty harsh or excessive or where the trial judge overtooked some materiai factor or acted upon wrong principtes. He submitted that the sentence passed against the appettant had not been shown to be ittegat, neither has any of the other grounds been proved to warrant interference by this court. 15 - CounseI sought to distinguish the facts of the case of the appetlant from other facts with emphasis on the age of the victim. ln the cases cited, the age of the victims ranged between 12 years, 9 years and 15 years white in the instant case the victim was aged only 6 years. He submitted that at the age of 43 years, the appetLant was capabte of being a father to the 20 - victim but instead [ured her and sexualty ravished her. The prosecution had prayed for the maximum sentence of death. The Learned triat judge spared the appeLl.ant the maximum penalty and instead imposed a sentence of onty 21 years, 11 months and '13 days after deducting the period he had spent on remand. In the premises, the respondent's counsei submitted that it was in the interest of justice not to interfere with the sentence against the appettant and if this court is inctined to do 25 30 - so, it wit[ be acting contrary to the principle of consistency and uniformity of sentences.

The Iearned triat judge considered both the aggravating factors and mitigating factors before imposing the sentence and there was no competting Teason advanced to warrant interference by the court with the sentence. He prayed that the conviction and sentence of the appellant is upheld and the appeat dismissed. 35

5 In rejoinder, the appettant's counseI submitted that he had read through the supplementary record of proceedings for 21 November 2018 and that it stitt offends the guidetines for ptea taking as submitted earlier.

Further, the appettant's counseI submitted that the supptementary record oF proceedings shows that the triat judge read the charges to the appettant and he said that it was true. But the authorities cited show that

- the accused person must ptead to each ingredient of the offence and generatised statements such as "l ptead guilty" were insufficient in plea taking. ln the premises, the omission by the triat judge in fottowing the right procedure in recording the ptea can never be taken for granted to 10 - conclude that it did not occasion a miscarriage of justice. lt was an ittegatity which goes to the root of the ptea taking process that shoutd never be sanctioned by this court. 15

The appetlant's counsel reiterated eartier submissions that the court disregards the submissions of the respondent's counset.

With regard to ground 2 of the appeat, the appeLtant's counsel reiterated eartier submissions. 20

### Consideration of appeat.

We have carefutty considered the appel'l'ant's appeat, the submissions of counseL, the record of appeal. and the law generat[y.

- 25 This is a first appeat from the decision of the High Court in the exercise of its originat jurisdiction and we have the duty to reappraise the evidence on record and subject it to exhaustive scrutiny. However, bearing in mind that the matter proceeded on the basis of a ptea of guitty, it is sufficient to consider the proceedings retating to the ptea taking and - it is not necessary for that purpose to reappraise the evidence on Tecord. The ptea taking came after at[ evidence had been adduced and the matter was adjourned for summing up to the assessors. 30

The first ground of appeaI is that the triat judge erred in law and fact when he convicted the appellant on his own ptea of guitty without fottowing the right procedure.

5 The question of whether the right procedure was fotlowed or not, is a question of Law though it may be based on fact as to what the record discloses in terms of how the court proceeded with the pLea taking.

Pl.ea taking in capitaL and other offences triabLe by the High Court are governed by the Triat on lndictments Act, Cap 23. Under section 60 of the TlA, an accused person is required to ptead to an indictment which is read to him or her before the triat commences. Section 60 of the Trial on lndictments Act provides that:

50. PLeading to indictment.

The accused person to be tried before the High Court sha[[ be ptaced at the bar unfettered, unless the court shatl cause otherwise to order, and the indictment sha[[ be read over to him or her by the chief registrar or other officer of the court, and expLained if need be by that officer or interpreted by the interpreter of the court; and the accused person shatl be required to plead instantty to the indictment, untess, where the accused person is entitted to service of a copy of the indictment, he or she shatt object to the want of such service, and the court shatt find that he or she has not been du[y served with a copy. 15 20

The accused shaLt pLead instantLy to what has been read and exptained. The statement of offence and the particutars of the offence are contained in the indictment which have to be framed according to the rutes for the framing of indictments under 25 (a) - (q) of the TriaI on lndictments Act. 25

ln short, section 60 of the TIA provides that the indictment sha[[ be read over to the accused and where he or she does not understand, the same shatL be translated or expLained to the accused. Thereafter where the accused pLeads not guiLty the matter proceeds for tria[. Where the accused pteads guiLty, section 63 of the Tria[ on indictment Act indicates, a ptea of guitty shaLt be recorded and this is a preLiminary requirement

as the pLea of guil.ty is to be tested as to whether it is equivocal or unequivocaL. ln the subsequent proceedings, the ptea can be changed to a ptea of not guitty subsequentty. Section 63 provides as foLtows: 35

63. Ptea of guitty.

lf the accused pteads guitty, the ptea shalt be recorded and he or she may be convicted on it.

5 The question of whether the court wit[ convict on a ptea of guitty depends on the subsequent proceeding to the ptea of guitty that has been preLiminarity entered. When a pl.ea is taken by a prisoner at the commencement under section 60 of the TlA, it is not a finding of the court but a statement taken from the accused. Thereafter the court may find the accused guilty and convict him or her. Under section 63 of the TIA the court merely records the ptea and thereafter it provides that the accused may be convicted on it. 10

The totaLity of the procedure for recording a pLea of guiLty was set out by the East African Court of Appeal. in Adan v Repubtic [973] 1 EA 445 per Sir WiLliam Duffus P, Spry VP and Mustafa JA. Spry VP read the judgment of the court and said at pages 446 - 447:

We think the practice is desirabte and shoutd generaL[y be foLLowed throughout East Africa. So that there may be no doubt in the matter, we set out the procedure in the foltowing paragraph. We would add aLso. with respect, that we are in comptete agreement with a further observation by the Chief Justice and MuLi, J., also in Criminal AppeaL No. 743, that a plea shoutd not be taken untess the prosecution are in a position to state the facts. An adjournment between the plea and the statement of facts ought never to be necessary and is most undesirab[e.

When a person is charged, the charge and the particuLars shoutd be read out to him, so far as possible in his own Language, but if that is not possib[e, then in a language which he can speak and understand. The magistrate shouLd then exptain to the accused person at[ the essentia[ ingredients of the offence charged. lf the accused then admits at[ those essentiaI etements, the magistrate should record what the accused has said, as nearly as possibte in his own words, and then formatty enter a plea of guitty. The magistrate should next ask the prosecutor to state the facts of the atleged offence and, when the statement is complete, should give the accused an opportunity to dispute or expLain the facts or to add any reLevant facts. lf the accused does not agree with the statement of facts or asserts additionaL facts which, if true, might raise a question as to his guiLt, the magistrate should record a change of plea to "not guiLty" and proceed to hold a triat. lf the accused does not deny the aLLeged facts in any materiaI respect, the magistrate shou[d record a conviction and proceed to hear any further facts retevant to sentence. The statement of facts and the accused's reply must, of course, be recorded. 25 30 35 40

> The statement of facts serves two purposes: it enabtes the magistrate to satisfy himsetf that the ptea of guilty was reaLly unequivocal and that the

> > 9

accused has no defence and it gives the magistrate the basic material on which $\mathsf{S}$ to assess sentence. It not infrequently happens that an accused, after hearing the statement of facts, disputes some particular fact or alleges some additional fact, showing that he did not really understand the position when he pleaded quilty: it is for this reason that it is essential for the statement of facts 10 to precede the conviction.

The facts of the instant case demonstrate that the proceedings took place after the closure of the prosecution and defence cases and it was for summing up to the assessors. The supplementary record is hereby reproduced as follows:

## o Defence: 15

- o the accused would like to change his plea. - o Court: - Explain to the accused and get his response. - Accused: I want to change my plea. I instructed my lawyers. - o Court: 20 - The charge be read to the accused again. - o Accused: it is true. - o Court: a plea of guilt is entered. - State: facts ready to the accused. - Accused states: the facts are correct. 25 - o Court: the accused is convicted on his own plea of guilty in this case of aggravated defilement.

Clearly the record shows that the charges were read again. It however does not show what those words were. In other words, it is not recorded what words were used when the charge was read to the accused. The 30 court only recorded what took place. Ordinarily, this would be reflected in the audio record. If the recording of the court is taken to be an account of what transpired rather than a verbatim translation of what occurred, then the procedure was followed.

- It is our conclusion that the record of appeal was inadequate and the 35 supplementary record likewise was inadequate in that it does not have the words which were spoken in the proceedings so much so that the words of the charges and the particulars of the charge are not reflected in the proceedings. Secondly the explanation which the court recorded - took place, was not recorded. Thirdly, the facts which were read by the 40 state after the plea of guilty was entered are not recorded. There ought

- 5 to have been a transcript of the recording but none was avai[ed. NonetheLess, we are satisfied that the proceedings demonstrate that the procedure was fotlowed and the faiLure to record or transcribe the actuaI words spoken did not occasion any miscarriage of justice and is an irregutarity that has no bearing on the proceedings which took pLace. - Moreover, the change of ptea took pLace after aL[ the evtdence had been adduced by al.l. the prosecution witnesses and the accused had atso given his defence to it. The matter was for summing up to the assessors and it cannot be said that the appettant may not have understood the ingredients and the facts before changing his ptea to guitty. 10 - ln the premises, ground 1 of the appeal has no merit and is hereby disaLlowed. 15

With regard to ground 2 of the appeat, the appettant had been sentenced to 21 years' imprisonment and not 25 years' imprisonment as submitted by the appetLant's counset. The record is clear in that respect and the sentencing notes of the l'earned triat judge are inter alia as follows:

The maximum sentence in an aggravated defilement case is death which is not mandatory according to the decision in Attorney General Vs Susan Kigula and 417 others; Constitutional Petition Appeat No 03 of 2006, this court has power to pass a death sentence. However, this case is not the rarest of the rarest cases and therefore a death sentence is ruled out.

The circumstances surrounding the commission of this case also do not fa[[ in the sentence of Iife imprisonment. This court wit[ therefore ru[e out a sentence of life imprisonment hence leaving the only option of a custodiaL sentence.

Under custodiaI sentence, the minimum jait period recommended under the sentencing guidelines for a person convicted of aggravated defilement is 30 years'imprisonment. lt can be reduced or moved upwards depending on the aggravating and mitigating factors. 30

Iwit[ consider a custodia[ sentence of 30 years for this case as a starting point.

ln this case, I have taken into account the fact that the convict has pleaded gui[ty, as one of the factors mitigating his sentence. However, it has come way too [ate on a day fixed for summing up of assessors are not at the earliest opportunity, lwitt not grant the convict the traditionaI discount of one third (1/3) (ten years) because at the time of summing up, court has IiteratLy gone through the entire triat. ltherefore wiLL discount the sentence by a sixth 1/6th (five years) bringing the sentence to 25 years, 40

5 I have atso considered the submissions made in mitigation of sentence in re[ation to a period the convict has spent on remand, ln accordance with Articte 23 (8) of the Constitution and Regutation 15 (2) of the Constitution (Sentencing Guide[ines for Courts of Judicature) (Practice) Directions, 20']3, to the effect that the court shouLd deduct the period spent on remand from the sentence considered appropriate, after atL factors have been taken into account. I note that the convict has been in custody since 13rh November,2015. I hereby take into account and set off 3 years and 17 days as the period the convict has atready spent on remand. I therefore sentence the convict to a term of imprisonment of 21 years and 11 months and 13 days to be served starting today. 10 15

> Having been convicted and sentenced his own pLea of guitty, the convict is advised that he has a right of appeaL against the LegaIity and severity of this sentence, within a period of 14 days.

The learned triat judge took into account the period the convict spent on remand and therefore the sentence is a LegaL sentence. Secondty, on the question of tegatity of sentence, the learned triaL judge clearly stated that he had discounted life imprisonment and the maximum penaLty of death had preferred to give the appel.l.ant a lesser punishment of a custodiaI sentence. 20

- 25 We have considered severaI other precedents and find that the imposed sentence of 2'l years''i1 months and 13 days'imprisonment after deduction of the period spent on remand wou[d be excessive in [ight of the pLea of guil.ty and other precedents of this Court and the Supreme Court and we set it aside on this ground. - Having set aside the sentence of 21 years, 11 months and 13 days imposed on the appeLlant, we exercise the powers of this court under section 11 of the Judicature Act, to impose a sentence of our own. 30

For purposes of establ,ishing the most current trend in sentencing, we have considered the recent precedents.

ln Kizito SenkuLa v Uganda; (Criminat Appeal No. 24 of 2001) [2002] UGCA 36 the victim of the offence was 11 years oLd and the Court of Appeat, on appeat, hetd that a sentence of 15 years'imprisonment was appropriate. 35

SecondLy, in Katende Ahamad v Uganda; (Criminat Appeat No. 6 of 2004) [2007] UGSC 11 the appeLl.ant defiled his biotogicaI daughter of 9 years of 5 age and the Supreme Court on a second appeat imposed a sentence of 10 years' imprisonment after deducting a period of 2'/" years the appel.l.ant had spent in [awful custody prior to his conviction.

ln Babua Rotand v Uganda; Criminat Appeat No. 303 of 2010 [2016] UGCA 34, the appettant was married to the victim's aunt. The victim was 12 years otd at the time of the offence and was under the care of the appettant and her aunt. The appettant was convicted of aggravated defilement and sentenced to [ife imprisonment.0n appeat, thas court held that the sentence of life imprisonment was harsh and excessive and substituted it with a term of 18 years'imprisonment. 10

- ln Ninsiima Gitbert v Uganda; Criminat Appeat No. 0180 of 2010 [2014] UGCA 65 the appettant was convicted of aggravated defil'ement of a victim of 8 years of age and the triat court convicted and sentenced the appet[ant to 30 years'imprisonment.0n appeal. this court reduced the sentence of 30 years' imprisonment to l5 years' imprisonment. 15 - Lastty in Lukwago Henry v Uganda; Court of Appeal Criminat Appeat No 0036 of 2010 [2014] UGCA 34, the appelLate was convicted on h is own ptea of guitty and sentenced to 13 years'imprisonment and this court upheld a sentence of 13 years imposed on the appeltant for the offence of aggravated defilement of a victim of 13 years. 2A - The facts of this case are that the appe[ant pteaded guitty to the offence of aggravated defitement where he defiled a chitd of onty six years of age. The convict was 43 years of age. We have estabtished from the record that the state attorney submitted that the appel.l.ant had no previous criminaI record. Further in aggravation, it was submitted that the sexuat 25 - act was repeatedl.y committed because the evidence demonstrated that the sexual act had been done on her for more than once. The convict was a guardian and abused his trust. ln mitigation, it was submitted that that the convict pteaded guilty and was remorsefu[. He was a first-time offender and woutd stil'[ be a usefuI member of society and prayed for a 30 - sentence of five yea rs. 35

The fact that the appet[ant pteaded guitty after evidence had been adduced should not be used against him because he was entitled to change his mind at any stage of the proceedings. The burden was on the prosecution to prove the offences beyond reasonabte doubt. The fact that

the appellant pleaded guilty at the end of the proceedings can be taken $\mathsf{S}$ as a mitigating factor as far as sentence is concerned. Secondly the appellant has no previous record of conviction. The learned trial judge discounted the maximum penalty of death and the next severest sentence of life imprisonment. In the premises, we would impose a custodial sentence that is appropriate in the circumstances. 10

The appellant pleaded guilty, and there is a chance that he would reform. He had committed a serious offence given that the victim was only six years old. In the premises we would find that a sentence of 18 years' imprisonment would be appropriate. From this period, we would deduct

the 3 years and 17 days that the appellant spent in pre-trial detention 15 before his conviction by the High Court on 30 November 2018.

We therefore sentence the appellant to 15 years, 11 months and 13 days' imprisonment. The sentence shall be served with effect from 30 November 2018, the date when the appellant was convicted and sentenced by the High Court.

Dated at Mbale the $\frac{1}{2}$ day of \_\_\_\_\_ 2023 Justice of Appeal $\mathcal{L}$ andom Catherine Bamugemereire Justice of Appeal

Christopher Madrama

Justice of Appeal