Michael Achieng Odongo v State [2014] KEHC 29 (KLR) | New And Compelling Evidence | Esheria

Michael Achieng Odongo v State [2014] KEHC 29 (KLR)

Full Case Text

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA ATNAKURU

PETITION N0. 11 OF 2011

MICHAEL ACHIENG ODONGO……................................PETITIONER

VERSUS

STATE.............................................................................RESPONDENT

RULING

By an amended petition dated 19th September 2012, this court is  urged to  order for  a new  trial   on  grounds that the   petitioner has  learnt  of  or  accessed  new  evidence after conviction, and it  is  important that he  be  granted leave  to adduce that evidence at the  trial  court.

The background to this matter is that the petitioner was convicted in  Kericho Criminal Case No.2018  of  2001 for the  offence of   robbery   with violence contrary to section  296(2) Penal Code and sentenced to  death. He filed an appeal being Kericho High  Court Criminal Appeal No.2 of 2002, which   was   dismissed.   He subsequently appealed to the  Court of Appeal at  Nakuru  in  Criminal Appeal No.l76  of  2006 which appeal was  dismissed  on 10th June 2011.

The dismissal means he has no  other appellate court to seek redress from.  He relies on Article 51(6)  (a)and(b)of  the  Constitution of  Kenya  and section 358 of  the Criminal Procedure Code.

The evidence  the  petitioner wishes to  adduce includes, but   is  not  limited to  issues of  malicious detention and prosecution by one  DENNIS OTIENO TOGO  who  testified as   a   prosecution   witness,   ostensibly because he "seemed" to  have given  evidence which exonerated the petitioner from  criminal liability on  the  charges he  faced. The  said DENNIS  was  charged for  the  offence  of robbery with  violence in VIHIGA CMCRC.No.1228 of  2001 (R VDENNIS  OTIENO TOGO), which charges the  petitioner said  were    aimed  to   punishing  him    for   the    kind    of evidence he  gave,  which the   prosecution presumed  was to  help the  petitioner out  or  lock  him  out  of the court's jurisdiction.

The  petitioner points out  that charges against  DENNIS involves the  same complainants i.e., HAMADI RASHIDGOSSARI  and LAZARO ODONGO, the  same properties  alleged to  have   been  stolen on  the  same date and place as those alleged against the  petitioner.

Although the   prosecution was   aware of the   petitioner's case in Kericho, and could easily have charged Dennis as the petitioner's co-accused, they elected to charge him separately and at a different court.

The prosecution of DENNIS is described as suppressed of evidence and/ or fabrications of evidence. Incidentally Dennis was acquitted for   want of prosecution, after attempts to have the   charge withdrawn under  section 87(a) were rejected. Thereafter, the Investigating Officer (FREDRICK   ODHIAMBO  MBOYA)  and  one JOHN SHIMAKA  criminally  charged  in   Kisumu  CM  Criminal Case  No.196  of 2002 in  matters  relating to  the circumstances under which the  investigations of the  case was   carried  out. Although the   said  FREDRICK   and JOHN were acquitted, the former was  dismissed from employment on  grounds that he  had solicited bribes from many suspects whom he  had  arrested but  not  charged in the  case where the  petitioner was  charged, and in  which the    petitioners   made  claims  of   bribery.  This is   the evidence the petitioner says he could not have  obtained during  the   trial or  before   the   sub-sequential  appellate courts. Although the   issue was   addressed before the Court of Appeal, the said court could not  deal  with it as it only  deals with  matters of law on  such appeal.

The  application is supported by the  affidavit sworn by the petitioner, and another one  sworn by Dennis Otieno Togo in   which  he   claims  to   have  been  forced  to write a statement  by  police,   incriminating persons  he   initially did    not     know,  and subsequently   to testify as  a prosecution witness against the  petitioner.

However upon realising that  his  false evidence could lead to  the   persons being  sentenced to  death, he  declined to make the  false  allegations and so  was  declared a hostile · witness by  prosecution who  did  not  want him   to  speak the  truth.   It was after such declaration that he  ended up being charged in  the  Vihiga  court for  said offence as the petitioner. After  being  acquitted, Dennis pressed charges against the   investigating officer  (Fredrick) on  charges  of extortion, and although the  said Fredrick was acquitted, he was  dismissed from  employment on  grounds of having interfered with   the   conduct of  the   investigations in  the case against the  petitioner.

It  is  the   petitioner's case that there was  no  case  proved against  him    at  the    trial.  The    petitioner annexed a statement by  Dennis in  which the  latter stated that the Viking  charges were  brought against him  because:-

"I did not  give evidence that incriminated the suspects he   (i.e. the investigating officer) had levelled the (sic) the charges  against   and particularly that I had made revelations he had  been   soliciting   money from every person he  had apprehended in the name of making a kill."

In arguing the petition, Mr.Maragia submits that the applicant   has  met the conditions  envisaged by  Article

50(6) of the  Constitution of Kenya  namely that:-

(a)    The appeal has been dismissed by the highest court in the land (the Court of  Appeal  at the time   was   the highest    court).   In    any event, although a  Supreme    Court   new   exists,   he argues    that  no act of Parliament has  been established to  operationalize the proceedings; secondly, that even after the passing of  an Act  of Parliament, the qualification for the appeal to be entertained is too high for any convicted person  to  pass without undue difficulty. He points out  that there is no  room for  an appeal out of time - taking   into   consideration the time lapse since the pursuit of  Judgment, and the establishment of   the Supreme Court Act and  Rules. Further, that a person intending to appeal, may be  forced to lodge an application seeking leave from the Court of  Appeal (which is bereft   of provisions for  grant of    such an application).

The  new  and compelling evidence being Togo's status  on the  proceedings is described as relevant as sit  would help to reveal  that there was  a frame-up and fixing  of persons by  the  investigating officer.  Togo testified in  the  matter as PW6.

Mr. Maragia  argues   that   the    court   can  easily   call Vihiga Criminal Case  No.1228 of  2001 R V DENNIS OTIENOTOGO, and  Kisumu CMCRC.No.196 of  2002  R VFREDRICK ODHIAMBO MBOYA, to confirm the  issues raised by the  petitioner, and that even  if the  files  are not available, the  respective court's registries will  reveal the existence of these cases and the  results.

So why didn't counsel just have  copies of the  proceedings in  the  two files annexed to the  petitioner's affidavit? Mr.Maragia explains that:-

"Our   attempts   to   get    the   files   for purposes of annexing the  same as our evidence has been hitting a  snag to the extent that we  sought administrative assistance  of  this  honourable court  to have   ·the   files  forwarded, but that notwithstanding,  it has taken  quite  a long time,  and the  last   position being that wrong files  were   sent  instead.  It will  be  at  the expense of  the petitioner to  continue waiting for the  files."

Counsel  also    points   out    that  the    dismissal  of   the Investigating Officer  for  alleged misconduct is a private and  confidential matter which unfortunately can  only  be obtained through orders of this court.

Mr. Maragia argues that  the  reason why  the  prosecution did  not  amend the charge sheet so  as to include Dennis Togo   (PW6)  as  the petitioner'  co-accused/ accomplice after  he was declared    hostile was because    the prosecution's  sole intention  was   to block    PW6   from telling  the   truth, as  it   can   counter  the prosecution's interest.  He explains that the petitioner could not  have known what had   befallen PW6 as  they  were  not  related nor   were  they   meeting.   He opines that  perhaps  when PW6 was  declared hostile, he  was  actually speaking the truth, and  if the  information about PW6's  woes  had been disclosed during trial, perhaps the  trial  court would have taken that into  consideration when  making its  decision.

Further, the  fact  of the  investigating officer  being charged and    later  relieved   of his   duties  is   also   described as significant  evidence  which  had   been   within the petitioner's  knowledge and  offered   to   the   trial  court, would perhaps have resulted in a different outcome.

Counsel also  wishes  to  exhibit  the  OB  from   various stations  to   demonstrate that  despite allegation that various   items  were   stolen, the OB  from Vihiga  and Kisumu police station bear  no such records.

In  opposing the   petition, Mr. Omari argues  on  behalf of the  DPP that the petitioner had  his  day  in court, from  the lowest   to  the   highest court,  and   the respective courts considered  the   conviction  and   sentence and  upheld  it. While conceding that some  aspects of what the  petitioner raises, may  not  have  been within the  court's knowledge, the   DPP   argues  that  the   details  would   not alter  the findings   of    the     trial     court.   He    insists   that,   the prosecution case at  the  trial,   left  as it  is,  even  with  the new   information,  would   still   lead   to  a conviction and urges the  court to dismiss the  petition.

In  response  Mr. Maragia submits  that  the  Constitution of Kenya   does   not provide that  the   new-found  evidence must lead  to  an  acquittal - what is  required is that the evidence  should  be   compelling. Further  that,  at  this stage, it  is  not for  this court to  go  through the   mind of the  trial court to  determine what the outcome would be in the  light  of the  new evidence.

The relief being sought here is a constitutional one under Article   50(6) of the Constitution of   Kenya, which provides that:-

"(6) A person who is convicted of a criminal offence may petition the High Court for  a new trial if:-

(a)  The person's appeal, if any has been dismissed by the highest court to which the person is entitled to appeal, or the person did   not appeal within the time allowed for appeal.

(b)   And new and compelling evidence has become available."

I need   not   repeat  what  Mr. Maragia has  submitted  on regarding the  petitioner's demonstration   that   the avenues of appeal have  been  exhausted. Should the petitioner have  pursued his appeal  right    up    to   the Supreme Court?

Article 163(4)  of the  Constitution of Kenya  provides that:­

"(4)  Appeal shall be from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court:-

(a)  As a right in  any case involving the interpretation or application of this Constitution.

(b)   In any other case in which the Supreme Court as the Court of  Appeal clarifies that   a matter   of general public importance is involved. . ."

My view is that the  petitioner's criminal appeal does  not fall within two specifications, so that he had  effectively exhausted his  crucial appeal at ·the  highest court which could  deal   with   such an   appeal,  namely  the   Court  of Appeal  of  Kenya.     Secondly,  even   if  he  was   to  try   his chance and   have  the  Court of Appeal certify the  matter as meriting a hearing before  the  Supreme Court, I think an   assortment of  inhibition,  ranging from   the   lapse of time,  the  Court of Appeal  Rules   vis a vis Supreme Court Rules, application for enlargement of time, would militate against  the   applicant.  I  find   that  the    applicant has satisfied the  constitutional threshold as regards Article50(6)of the  Constitution.

The second   aspect   is    whether   there   1s   new    and compelling evidence which has become available.

I appreciate this issue with  a host  of caution, bearing in mind  that what was  observed 1n the  case  of WILSONTHIRIMBA  MWANGI V   DPP   (Nrb  JR   Misc. Appl.  No.271 of  2011 to the  effect that:-

"A person who is convicted  has gone through the  legally established process with the necessary protection contemplated under Article  50. ...A petitioner seeking a new  trial moves the court without the presumption of innocence and the  burden to  upset  a lawful decision of the trial and appellate court is  equally  on    the  petitioner's shoulders."

Yet there must have  been  very good  reason why  Kenyans elected to  retain Article  50(6)  in  the   Constitution  when they   overwhelmingly  voted   for  the   same.  I can   do   no better than borrow again from  the  words of the  Judge in Wilson ThirimbaMwangi's case that:-

"Article 50(6) seeks to balance the public interest  in having finality in criminal   cases on one hand, and ensuring that  where there is new   and compelling evidence, an innocent person should not suffer the  penalty of a conviction."

The Constitution is clear, that there are instances where having a second bite at the cherry of justice should not be frowned up.   The question courts have to grapple with is what constitutes new and compelling evidence?

In  the   case   of  Rodgers  Ondiek Nyakundi and  2 others V State    (Kisii   High CourtCriminal    Appeal No.135 of2006), Sitati J  examined the   legal   definition, drawing from  the  Court of Appeal's expression  in  a civil matter  D.J. Lowe   & Co. Ltd.   V  Bangue  Indosuez  - (although a civil matter, at  least  gave  some  hint of what amounts to new evidence as follows:-

"Where such  a   review    application  is based on  fact of  the discovery of  fresh evidence, the  court  must  exercise greatest care as it is  easy for  a  party who  has  lost, to see  the weak part of his case, and   the temptation to lay  and produce evidence which will  strengthen that weak  party and  put  a different completion  in   such  comprehension in such event to succeed, the party must show that  there was  no  remissness on his  part   in  adducing   all  possible evidence at the hearing."

The  underlying factor is  that apart from  being new  and compelling, the  evidence must not  have  been  within the knowledge of  the  petitioner and   he/she  could not  have obtained review  with  the  exercise of due  diligence.   From that new evidence to be  considered as compelling, then the  petitioner must demonstrate that it would  probably

"Have an  important influence on  the result of the case, though it need not be decisive, and must be  such as is presumably to be believed....."

[See  Chesoni Ag. JA  in  MZEE  WANJIE  and 93 Others Vs A.K. SAKWA & 3 Others [1982-88] 1 KAR 465)

In the    circumstances of the   case what the applicant alluded to was not  available to him  during the trial;  and was a  development which   occurred while he was in custody. This means the  petitioner   could   not have obtained  the evidence,     even if   he  had exercised   due diligence, and  used it during his  trial  or at the  hearing of the  subsequent appeals.   The  evidence is significant and material,  especially taking into   account the   manner  in which the   prosecutor treated PW6,  and   his  subsequent arraignment in court and acquittal.

Also significant is the role of the  investigating officer  and the   subsequent  events thereon.   Would   this require a complete new trial?  I don't think this needs re-opening of  the    prosecution  case,  what  it   means  is   that  the petitioner merits being  given  a chance to adduce further evidence  regarding  what  he   has so   far   referred  to  in respect of the  two individuals.  The prosecution evidence would remain as having been presented and no  prejudice would  be occasioned as under section 34  of the  Evidence Act the  previous evidence can  be adopted.   Should the prosecution then seek to counter that evidence by production    of    new     evidence?   I    am     certain   that opportunity would  be available in the  course of cross­ examination and  upon appropriate application.

In  my  VIew, the  scenario here   is  not  so  much that the judgment was  right or  wrong, in  fact  it  is  not  a claim  of error on  the  part of the  court, but  a plea  to  be  given  a chance to demonstrate why  there may  be  a chance that he  is innocent.  He is not  accusing the  courts of violating his   rights, or  attacking the   decision of  the   courts that there was  an  error of fact  or substantive law- nay,  what he  contends is that if the  evidence he  now  has, had  been made available at trial  and on  appeal, just perhaps, the outcome could  be different.

I  perused  the   two  files  i.e.   VIHIGA CMCR.C.N0. 1228 of2001 R V  DENNIS OTIENO TOGO  and  KSM CMCR.C.N0. 196 of 2002, R V FREDRICK ODHIAMBO MBOYA.

The petitioner was convicted  and    sentenced on 31/12/2001 and by 11/01/2002 he  had  filed  his  appeal, which was  eventually heard on  15/12/2005.

PW6 was  charged in  court on  26/9/2001 with  the  same offence that the petitioner was charged   with  and eventually  acquitted  on   29/10/2010 - it  follows  thus that even  at  the  hearing of the  appeal at the  High  Court, the  petitioner did not" have  the  information he alluded to.

I am  persuaded that to this  extent the  petitioner's prayer is  merited but  will be  limited to  adducing  evidence only for   the   defence,  and   only   with   regard  to   the   role   of Dennis Togo and Fredrick Odhiambo.

The   issue  regarding  the   entries  in   the   var1ous    OB's (bearing in  mind   that the  petitioner was  moved  around various police  stations) is  a  fact  which   with  just a little diligence,  his  counsel would   have   been   able   to  access and  present at  the  trial  and  he should not  introduce that portion of the  evidence at  the  re-opened trial which shall take  place  in Kericho.

Delivered and  dated this 7th day of  October, 2014 at Nakuru.

H.A. OMONDI

JUDGE