Milly Masembe v Sugar Corporation Of Uganda Limited and Another (Civil Suit 646 of 1995) [1997] UGHCCD 3 (25 August 1997)

Full Case Text

## TIM; P. . TJL1C or UGANDA

## IK THE RIG!! COOPT or UGANDA AT KAMPALA

## civil, .%T.r no.646 or i225

| WILLY MASEMllli | | plaintiff | | |-----------------|-------------------------------------------|--------------------|---| | | VERSUS | | o | | SCOUL | | IS'.! DEFENDANT | | | KAGIR1 R. | | 2ND DEFENDANT | | | | BEFORE: THE RON. MR, JUSTICE C. M. KATO | | |

## JUDGMENT

Ihc plaintiff in this suit is a lady called tf illy Masembe and the defendants &lt; arc Seoul and Richard Kagiri, whom J shall hereinafter refer to first and second defendants respectively. The suit is for general and special damages arising out of an accident which took place on 23/J2/93 between a mini bus Reg. Mo. UPS 847 and a tractor Reg. No. UXJ 462 togethet with trailer Reg. No. U'vi'V 469 along Kampala linja road near the junction where the road leading to Hamagunga joins the highway. a:; the plaintiff.

The brief facts of the ease arc that on the fateful day (28712/93) the bus hit a stationary tractor to which a trailer was attached- The trailer was loaded £ with sugar canes. of the accident were rushed to Kawolo hospital of the left superior pubic ramus and a fracture of the left left joint. a fracture After hitting the tractor and its trailer, the mini bus overturned injuring the plaintiff and other passengers some of whom died on the spot. plaintiff was a passenger in a mini bus Reg. No. UPS 847 which was travelling from • Kampala towards linja, she was on tier way to Kisumu on a business trip. The mini The plaintiff and oilier victims where the plaintiff was treated fot two days after which she was transferred to I H'llag^ hospital where she remained for about two months undergoing treatment. Ar. ong the injuries sustained by the plakitjff were the loft rib, 3 dislocations of

inferior pubic and money paid fur he J ramus. I he plaintiff filed this suit to recover damages for the injuries she sustained property which she lost as a result of the accident. treatment together wit!; het

At the hearing of the suit 5 issues were framed:

J '

- 5 defendant in the course of his employment. Whether or not the accident was caused by negligence of the- second - Whether or not the first vicarious!y liable for negligence of the second defendant. defendant is - **7** not both defendants owed duty of care to the plaintiff. Whether or - **■1.** Whether the plaintiff Jost any property as a result of the accident *\O* and if so whether she is entitled to recover the said property. - 5. What arc the remedies available to the plaintiff.

Before I proceed to deal with these issues and the moi its of the ease as a i whole there is one matter which 1 feel I must dispose of immediately. The matter concerns an earlier application made by the plaintiff not to proceed with the case 15" against two other defendants in the Mushemura whom the court had c;u Her directed to be added as co- defendants in this ease. This is what happened. On 7/10/96 the learned counsel for the two defendants (Seoul and Richard Kagiri) moved the court to have these other defendants David Mushemura and Abdulai Tusubira added to the suit 5-0 defendants. The counsel who by then was representing the plaintiff Mr. Msibambi did not oppose transpired that the plaintiff had no! given instructions to that counsel to have the added. She accordingly changed the lawyers and the new the two original defendants on the ground that no refuse to proceed with the two new defendants. The right to the plaintiff had opposed by names of Abdulai Tusubira and David the application and it was accordingly granted. Lt later on as co-' lawyer Mr Mutyaba applied to the court to have the two new defendants dropped !<• the plaintiff did not wish to proceed against them. The application was strongly the learned counsel fui two new defendants

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court, however. granted a g ainst the t 7. c nc w defon cl anI r> dropped by the plain tiff but reserved its reasons for 1hc decision. 1 now proceed to give the reasons. the request to have the ease

two defendants it was clear that it the wish of the plaintiff to have **5'** anything to do witll tkcnl\_ On fh{. aull)orit> of lhc ease of: Santana Fernando:; v 119GT] f'A 673 no plaintiff can be forced to proceed against the ucicndanl whom he or she dees not wish to litigate against in a ease of tort like this one. It may be that there which the plaintiff has taken into consideration for not proceeding against a person, for example that person might 10 have settled the matter with the plaintiff amicably. It is also possible that the plaintiff might have seen no merit in the ease against the defendant. In my view the plaintiff was justified in not proceeding against the other two defendants because in the event of her losing the ease against them she might have been compelled to pay their costs. It was proper that she avoided such costs from the ID" very start. She quite rightly decided not to have the two proposed defendants served with summons to enter .appearance. For these reasons 1 felt that it was not necessary for this court to force the plaintiff to gel the two defendants involved in this matter. In the ease of; Santana Fernandes (supra) the ease of; Horwcll v London General Omnibus Co. Ltd, re London Tramway Co. Ltd. 11877 J 2 Bx. D.365 was *20* pointed out that a plaintiff being dominus litis cannot be compelled to sue a person for damages in respect of a tort if he docs not wish to sue such person. The two eases arc only of persuasive value they do not originate from this country but they originated from to this court as with which we share the same common Law, tone is from the other is from Britain), t have however found the two eases quite Tanzania and this point- The position would possibly have been different if the two Kara Axjan <£, Soiu com mon wealth countries arc reasons Adiiough the two defendants had been dragged into tills ease by the other quoted with approval. In both eases it was was not helpful on • -f ' dant" (Seoul and Ragiri) had sought the aid of the provisions of Oi dor 1 rule

pair/ notice if they strongly felt that they 7/cic entitled to recover from the other two defendants. 11 Ot il 1 roccdurc Pules whereby they would have proceeded by way of third

I now turn to the rcat issuer for determination in tins ease. I will deal with the 5 issues in the order they arc listed above starting with the first and second **5** issues which 1 propose to deal with jointly as they an related.

It was the ncghgcncc of the. second defendant (Kagiri) in the course of his employ '-lent as the driver of the 1st defendant Seoul (Sugar Corporation of Uganda Ltd.; On the other hand the dele-nee docs not deny the second defendant being the employee of the **•D** fust defendant. In fact the learned counsel for the two defendants conceded that the first defendant was vicariously liable for the accident if it was proved to have been caused by the negligence of the second defendant. The tael of the accident having taken place is not denied, what is denied is the negligence of the second defendant. case for the plaintiff that the accident was caused by the

The plaintiff testified on her own behalf to the effect that when she was travelling in a taxi she heard people in the front scat shouting and raising alarm. She saw a tractor ahead of then: and the next thing she heard was a bang and a taxi overturning. Accenting to her when she saw the tractor it was in the middle indication that it had broken down and the night was SO dark as it was about 8.00 p.m. when the accident occul ted. She saw no lights on and its trailci but the taxi in which she was travelling had its lights the tractor called by the plaintiff in an effort io establish as to who was negligent was SSP ti actor which appeared to have been abandoned and there he saw the the scene that it had broken down. The trailer was loaded with sugar were signs showing no on. According to her the taxi was running at about 70 Km p.h. The other witness of the road and there was no Ben'amin Namanya(rV.'3) who visited the scene of the accident im mediately after it I -id occurred. According to him the accident happened at about 8.00 p.m. and at

canes which were hanging by Its sides and according to him even I\* the indicators There ilicy were travelling in the same vehicle wh\*-n they camo to the see nc o' the tractor. The **6** txa^ioi had broken down and it was facing lu% aids Jinja. Auccs ding to him th Lrauior had covered the left side of the road and in order to by pass it one had to use the lane meant for the vehicles coming flora Jinja towards Kampala. I'inalty, the place where the accident tool; place. That on the day in question the tractor IO and its trailer broke down bed ween 10.30 and 11.00 a. in. According to him the tractoi remained there the whole day and night tint it the following day, there was an accident about 8.00 p.m. the same nig lit al the same place, lie did nut witness the accident as he was untcthcring his goats. According to his observation there were no warning signs •O' that the tractor and its trailer had broken down and there was nobody to look after the tractor and its trailer and that can::: were protruding dangerously on the sides of the vehicle. He admitted that there were reflectors on the two vehicles but they could not be seen as they were covered by sugar canes. sugat wao a«so evidence of Apunyo J. (?W 1) whose evidence was similar to that of **r^'3 as** accident, he also confirmed that there were no reflectors on th. the plaintiff called f-iisimasi Musisi Itigonya U'W5) who testified that he lives near ..cu, on c.icy could not be seen as they we.:;. covered by tin hanging sugar er.

The defence *X)* called the evidence of Richard Kagiri, the second defendant. who admitted having been the driver of the ti actor and its liailer but he denied negligent. According to him the tractor broke down abruptly at about that he was mechanics branches of trees on the road to show that the vehicle had after placing that the accident had taken place. According to him the sugar tractor he found canes with the mechanics to repair the me not protruding. DW1 Charles broken down, lie left Charles Lukwago to guard the tractor. When he went 6 00 p.m. and he left it at the place where it had broken down and wont for back to the tractor al about 7.30 p.m. or /. 15 p.m. had been piopcrly packed and they

l.ukwago who was the v r*:: r>* n down they *::* along Hie road to show oth<,r road users that th-:: 11actor and its trailer had broken down and that he ul«o reiaaincd at \* n bUaid the tractor and it:; trailer. At about 8.d0 p.ia. a r.ini bus travollin f; uai **5** Kampala side came switching on and eft its lights while swerving from side to . 3. hc a(:c.id c *1*11 happcncd i n his presence but when lie heard people asking v;he the returned. lie denied that there were sugar canes protruding dangerously from the !0 tT alter. turn boy on the It color gave more or less the sanu lhe second defend r.cnt in th,at when the v .duels kicks dt »\ er cd the vehicle was, he escaped and went into hiding until Intel on when he placed some branches of Ire:

It is trite law that leaving unlit vehicle on the road unattended to and without any '.valuing that the vehicle lias broken down is an act of negligence on the part of the person who leaver that vehicle on the road in such a position. As outlined by the plaintiff's side clearly shows that the vehicles (tractor and its *IS'* trailer) were abandoned on the road and at the time of the accident there ia nothing to indicate that that vehicle had broken down. I do not believe the story boy that al the time of the accident the? vehicle had signs to show that it had broken down so as to warn other load users about of **-20** the p la in till and hoi w i t nc ssc s t:? t he effect that the vehicle was left on ths road unlit and unattended to this leaving thcr road users of the crnstancc of the tractor on the road. The Police officer Mr. Menjamin Manianya who saw the vehicle when going to Hukono back at the time when the accident happened was an and who saw it on his way witness and had no reason for tolling this court a lie when he said independent to indicate that it had broken down; in the same way the no signs that there were as told by the driver and his turn the da tiger ahead. I accept the evidence no sign warning o indicated above in evidence it is a question of who to believe. Thu evidence c of driver Apunyo al"-.? was evidence of an independent witness, lie vehicle was pa; Led on the road without anything to shew that also agreed that the

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**l**

It had broken down and there were no reflectors on either the tracter of its tialler. I also agree with Apunyo's cridence that the vehicle was dangerously parked almost in the middle of the road so that if comebody had to by pass it he had to use the lane for the vehicles facing the opposite direction. This piece of evidence is supported by the evidence of the second defendant who said that the tractor stopped abruptly and he left it at the place where he was driving it which means it was on the driving lane not off the road. There was no evidence from the defence side to show that after the vehicle had broken down, it was pushed aside In order to clear the road for other traffic. The pictures (ex. D1) of the photographs taken by DW2 S. Ochieng do not show any objects lying on the road showing that some branches had been placed on the road. The same pictures also do clearly show some sugar canes dangling on the side of the traffer No. UWV 469.

In these circumstances I find that Kagiri was negligent when he left both the tractor and its trailer parked on the road without being guarded and without any sign that it had broken down. I do not agree with Lukwago when he says that he was guarding the vehicle at the material time when the accident happened, if he had been there this man Erisimusi Musici Rigonya (PW5) would have seen him, on the contrary 1 believe Rigonya when he says that there was nobedy guarding the tractor and its trailer after breaking down. Rigonyn was an independent vitness who has nothing to gain out of this case unlike Kagiri and Lukwago who are the employees of the first defendant. In coming to this decision, I have found great assistance in the two cases decided by the East African Court of Appeal. The two cases are: Kihambi & Another va Mahithi & Another 119691 EA p.70 in particular at p.71, and Karisa & Another vs Solanki & Another [1969] EA p.318 in particular at pages 320 322. Although these cases are from Kenya they are of great persuasive benefit to this court as they were decided by East African Court of Appeal to which Uganda was a partner. The facts of these cases were similar to the present case except that in the two cases the plaintiff had the problem of other

$\mathbf{10}$

ち

16T

$20$

$70\,$

vehicles coming from the opposite. Recation at the time of the avoidant which was not the case in the present ears.

$\cdot$ $\cdot$

It must, however, be pointed out that the presence of the tractor and the traffer on the road were not the only cause of the accident, the driver of the task (whom the plaintiff decided not to proceed against) had also his share of blame for the accident. He must have been somehow unreasonable in the way he was driving his taxi because if his speed was reasonable and he was on the look out for other objects on the road he would have seen the tractor and the traffer at a distance long enough to enable him dodge the two objects and more so as there was no any other vehicle coming from the opposite side at the material time as it was in the two cases I have just quoted. Considering all the facts surrounding this case the driver of the taci must have been 20% to blame for the accident while Kagiri and 20% to blame.

My finding on the first and accord issues is that the second defendant was negligent and partly responsible for the accident, the first defendant is vicariously liable for the negligent act of the second defendant: Muxonge y Attorney General of Uganda 119671 EA 17 followed on the issue of vicarious Hability.

Having said all that I must at this point turn to the third issue which deals. with the question of whether the two defendants owed duty of care to the plaintiff. The law on this point was well stated in the case of: Donoghue r Stevenson [1932] AC 562, in that case when answering the question "who is my neighbour", Lord Atkin said it is that person you must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure him. He extended the definition of neighbour to those persons who are so closely and directly affected by your act that you ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when directing your mind to acts or emissions called in question. This principle of the law when reduced to ordinary terms $\mathbf{U}$

トカー

$5^-$

$25$

$71$ dimply means that a person owes duty of care to others when lie can foresee that was pausing **3** happened to be one of the road users along Jinja Kampala road. My finding on this is.>uc is that the secund defendant owed duty of care to the plaintiff, since the first defendant is vicariously responsible for the torts of the second defendant in this ease he too is to be held as owing that duty ol care to the plaintiff- The third issue is accordingly to be answered in the affirmative. ni.» a^t or omission will Injure those others. In the present ease there is no doubt °'crinc iact that the secund defendant owed duty of care to other road users, he outoht to aa\c foreseen that by leaving his tractor and trailer unattended to he a real danger to those other road users. The plaintiff on that evening

• I

The next issue to be consider cd is issue Ho. 4 which concerns the plaintiff's property which she says she lest at the time of the accident. This issue is divided into two parts. The fiist part being whether the plaintin lost any property at all; the second part is whether the plaintiff can recover the value of such property from the two defendants or any uf the two of them. I will deal with the first part **<5** cf the issue first. In paragraph 12(a) of the plaint the plaintiff pleaded that she lost 100,000 Kenya shillings whoso value was equivalent to .1,600,000/-- Uganda shillings, in the same paragraph 12(b) of the plaint she stated that she had also lost 20 packets of photo films worth 600,000/-. These items constitute what may be special damages. It is (rite law that special damages must only be pleaded but must be proved: Kampala City Pouncil v Makayc 119721 F. A not 446 at page 112.. properly referred to as

In the instant ease the plaintiff did not only plead the losses she suffered behalf as to the amount she lust. She said sire was carrying 100,000 Kenya shillings, since she was going was expected to carry certain amount of money. As for the going to Kenya and she was on a business trip she even a receipt issued to her when she was buying them. The films she produced but she testified on her own , nt. infh p3 which shows she bought these packets of films at receipt is marked a.» uxbu *ID*

*^5*

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600,000/. The pkiintllf imp rar.sen! me as a truthlul witncsi. on this point and f ! no reason story that she lost this amount <?f mcr.cy (2,200,000). Regarding the second part of this Issue the learned counsel for defence Serwanga argued that the plaintiff was nut entitled to recover this amount of money from the defendants because 'tic money was taken from her by thugs who 5' Cumc io the scene of the accident. He relied on the ease of: Rima <£. Others vs Hirai i/. A 5.)/. fhe pertinent question to be answered here is did the defendants foresee that .such a loss could occur? It is common knowledge that in Uganda when there is generally tush to the scene of accident for double purposes. Some come to assist the victims of the accident **but** the majoiity **iO** of them come there to help themselves with the property of the unfortunate victims. The second defendant by parking the vehicle in the way he did he must have foreseen that an accident might lake place and as a result of that accident villagers may' gather to help them selves with the property\* available at the scene. The ease of Rima which was referred **I** io this court by the learned counsel for defence cun easily be distinguished from the present ease because in that ease the petrol was deliberately lit prevented from looting the petrol by a policeman, the driver of the vehicle in that ease could not have foreseen that somebody' disgruntled would set the petrol % the doctr ine of novus actus Intel vcnie.ns.ln the ease of\*. Lord vs been based on RnHfic Steam Navigation Co. [19131 1 AR I/.. R. 211 p.211 it was said that the mere human action intervenes does not perse prevent the sufferers from fact that for injury due to that human action, as one of the elements In the ease ofJley nc j KJ2. 1-16 at pages 153 and 156 it was fuxthci pointed out that Harwood [19351 vs if vhat is relied upon an accident the villagers saying that damages in the sequence, is recoverable from the original wrong dorr. to disbelieve her as a novus actus intorvcnicns is the very7 kind of thing ablaze unlike in the present ease. The argument of Mr. Serwanga seems to have by a member of the crowd because he had been ... i *.* h inijcn if the want of care which is alleged takes place, the which is likely to nappci

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pari doc;; not break [he chain of aeln the principle decs not apply. In the In.'.tent accident would suffer the kind of loss which the plaintiff In this case suffered. Il is tiy finding that the plaintifl has tablishcd that she lest that amount of money and the defendants arc liable to pay the money to her '2,200,000/ ). The doctrine cl novus autur. Intcrvcnlcn is nut applicable to the present ease. With this finding, 1 feel the fourth issue has been put to an end. c^.»c x i.avc just said above the second defendant ought to have known that in the event of an accident i i u.iciplu c i.j bud led in the. maxim is nc rk.f'-jk c. ?'hcic the ii.k i »ention *of* a third taking ; lace as a result ef the obstacle he had placed an the read, the victims of that

**IO** 1 consider this to lie an appropriate moment te consider the fifth and last issue in this ease. This issue Is related tn the question of remedies which the plaintiff say be entitled to get. A: 1 slated earlier in this judgment the plaintiff is seeking two types of damages. special and general.

Special damages as pleaded in the plaint consisted of: .1,600,000/ hai d cash taken away; 20 packets of films worth 600,000/ 106,000/- medical expenses and •&" plaintiff was in the hospital. 1 have already dealt with the first two items when dealing with the 4th issue so there is no need to discuss them here. Regarding 436,000/- the plaintiff testified that she stayed al Mulago hospital for 2 months for «11 c dru g ". According t o h ci she paid about\* *20* and she had to pay money 150,000/- to Mulago hospital and private clinics, tier evidence was supported by who treated the plaintiff told the court that the plaintiff was admitted to Ward 2A side normally provided by the hospital free but in this ease the pa/ had to continue with treatment even after her discharge ft on the that the plaintiff unspecified amount in the plaint being loss of earning during the period the receipts which were issued to hci after payment: E.<.1'.2. Dr. Kayanja RU2 room where she was expected to pay about 5000/- per day excluding cost of drugs. He said drugs are required for the treatment of the plaintiff were not available, so she had to for them outside the hospital. Doth the plaintiff and doctor Kayanja testified

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j00*! -*. I 7/j || a w a r |lcT ra s receipts. not challenged by defence, I take it to be true. Although the plaintiff hi her plaint s g ;.p ;iit .1 inc.c estimate but the figure of 107,500/- has been conclusively proved by tb.iw amount of 407,500/' as being the amount proved far medical treatment, the amount of 150,000/- stated in court by the plaintiff ■'o-P>.d.. .heendem..; of theso 17/o witnesro.: icgauling the plaint if! hav money on treatment is amount to be about 450,000/-; addition of the amount appearing on the receipts (I'x. PZ) shew that the amount actually receipted was poke cl 18k,000/ as being the amount spent cn 1realmvnl, in court she estimated the

1 de next item under special damages is a claim for 1,800,000; per month for **• p** i.hc tine the plaintiff was hospitalised. This item as I said earlier was not valued in the plaint but it was pleaded. In her evidence the plaintiff stated that before the accident she used to import food stuff from Konya to Uganda and she used t. o get o net profit of about 1,300,000/- per month from that business. During the time she was in hospital .she could net car ry on any business as she had no assistant **■5'** to run the shop in her absence. When she came out of the hospital she could not continue with the same business as she had no capital and her former shop had been allocated io somebody else. In the absence of any piece of evidence to the contrary, I am inclined Lu believe the plaintiff's story that she was importing food stuff from Kenya and that she was making some profit from the business before the accident. In my view, a person who places an obstacle on the way as a result of which an accident occurs which keeps the victim of accident away from his work be held liable for any loss which ensues as such loss is not such person must hold that the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendants some remote. I •which she lost in form of profit. Since the plaintiff war; likely to close her *^Ed* money days when fur example, she was sick or she had gone to attend 1 feel a sum shop on some relative which is a common practice\* in this part of the world, burial of a o<- 1 800 000/- profit per month was put on the higher side of the scale I

**7j**

**75**

accordingly reduce the amount from 1,000,000/- to 1,000,000/- per month, giving an allowance of 300,000/~ to the above eventualities. I do award the plaintiff a sum of 3,000,000/- being loss of profit for the two months she was in the hospital (i.e. 1,500,000 pcr month).

I must finally address myself to the issue of general damages. The plaintiff requested the court to award her general damages for the injuries she sustained and pain she went through. According to the medical report (Ex. P.4) presented by Dr. Kayanja in court, the plaintiff suffered the following injuries as a result of the accident:

- (a) fracture of left superior public ramus. - (b) fracture of left inferior public ramus - (c) fracture of left 7th rth - (d) dislocation of left accredities joint.

In that report the doctor described the injuries as grievous harm. The plaintiff in her evidence said she still feel; pain in her left hip joints. Mr. Mutyaba the learned counsel for the plaintiff suggested a figure of 8,000,000 as reasonable for general damages, on his part Mr. Serwanga the learned counsel for defence suggested a figure of 2,000,000/=. There is no doubt over the fact that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff were quite serious. The plaintiff must naturally have experienced a great deal of pain from the injuries. I feel an award of 7,00,000/- as general damages for pain and injuries suffered by the plaintiff, will be reasonable. A sum of 7,000,000/- is accordingly awarded as general damages.

The final outcome of this case is that judgment is entered in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of: 12,607,500/- broken down as follows:

1,600,000/- (Ug.shs.) equivalent of 100,000/- Menya shillings lost by $25^ (a)$ plaintiff at the time of the accident.

$76 -$

- 600,000/- value of 20 films lost by plaintiff. $(b)$ - 407,500/- cost of medical treatment. $(c)$

$76$

$\mathcal{F}$

$10$

$2D$

3.000.000/ loss of carning for two months. $(b)$

$\cdot \in$

7,000,000 for general damages for pain and injuries suffered by the $(c)$ plaintiff.

$\overline{D}$

$16$

$77$

The defendants are to pay to the plaintiff costs of this suit. The decretal sum is to earn an interest of 10% p.a. from date of judgment till payment in full.

Since the second defendant was only 80% to blame the two defendants are to pay 30% of the amount awarded in equal shares. So it is ordered.

> C. M. RATO l U D G E 25/8/97

$77 -$

## THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE HIGH COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA CIVIL SUIT NO. 646 OF 1995

MILLY MASEMBE:::::: : PLAINTIFF VERSUS

:: DEFENDANTS SURA CORPORATION OF UGANDA LIMITED KAGIRI RICHARD :: : : : : :::::::::: : :

## DECREE

THIS SUIT coming for final disposal before the Hon Mr. Justice C. M. Kato,Judge of the High court in the presence ofgempa counsel for the plaintiff and Sserwanga counsel for the defendants it is odered and decreed that:-

1. The defendants do pay to the plaintiff shs. 12,607,500=

being

- (a) by the 1,600,000= equivalent to 100,000= Kenya shilling lost palintiff. - (h) 600,000= value of 20 film; - 5c) 407,500)4 cost medical treatment - (d) 3,000,000= loss of earning for 2 months - (e) 7,000,000= general damages - interest on the detxetfel sum 2. That the defendants pay 10% per annum from dote of judgment till payment in full. - 3. That the defendants do pay costs '8f the suit - 4-. That the defendants having been 80% to blame"-fof the accident shall pay 80% of the decretal amount in equal shores.

GIVEN under my hand and the seal of the court this 25th day of August, 1997.

## DEPUTY 'REGISTRAR