Miriam Njeri Kirathi v Shiphira Naguthii Ngugi & Michael Kamunya Ngugi [2013] KEHC 5534 (KLR)

REPUBLIC  OF  KENYA

IN THE  HIGH  COURT  OF  KENYA  AT  NAKURU

E.L.C  92  OF  2013

MIRIAM  NJERI  KIRATHI …………...………….PLAINTIFF

VERSUS

SHIPHIRA   NAGUTHII NGUGI……...…..1ST   DEFENDANT

MICHAEL  KAMUNYA  NGUGI …………2ND  DEFENDANT

RULING

By originating summons dated 26th  April,2012 the  plaintiff ( respondent) brought the  suit herein seeking among other orders, that:

1.    The plaintiff is the beneficiary of land parcel Nyandarua /Lesirko/369 (''suit land'')by virtue of  being  the second wife to the 1st  Defendant’s  late son, Paul Karanja Njugi which the plaintiff had possession and the defendants be  restrained  from  using the said title for any transactions whatsoever pending the hearing and  determination  of this  suit.

2.    That  the  1st  Defendant be  compelled  by  this Honorable Court to transfer the suit  land to the  plaintiff or in the alternative the Deputy Registrar to sign the  consent  and  transfer documents  in favour of  the  plaintiff.

3.    That the 2nd Defendant be compelled by this Honorable Court to remove the caution he lodged  against the suit land.

Aggrieved by the  suit the  defendants ( applicants) have  brought the  motion dated 29th  June, 2012 praying  that the  suit ( originating summons) be struck out  with  costs  as the same  is an  abuse  of the  process of  court which also  does  not  disclose any reasonable  cause  of  action under  order 37 of the  civil  procedure  rules.

The  application  is   premised  on the grounds that the  1st Defendant is the registered  proprietor  of the suit   land thus vested with  absolute  ownership: That the  originating  summons  does not  fall  under  the  ambit of the  provisions of order 37 of the Civil procedure rules: That the suit does not  fall  under the tenants  of  acquisition of title to land under section 7  of the land  Act  2012: That   the  respondents  claim  is remote  and farfetched as she  does  not   have  any  overriding interests  in the  suit premises: That the  applicant (1st  Defendant) is alive  and  her  property  is  not  yet available  for  inheritance  and  she  cannot  be forced to  distribute  it among  her  children  against  her  will.

The  application  is  supported   by the affidavit  of the  1st applicant  in  which she  has  deponed that  she  is the Registered proprietor of the suit land, having  purchased the same  from  the settlement  fund trustees  in 1971 by rights  conferred to her  by the  married Women’s   property  Act  of  1882: That  her  land is  not  available for inheritance as she is still alive and  the  Respondent does  not  have any  legal rights  against  her  in the suit  land.

The respondent did not file any reply to the  application although she was served through her   advocate on  18th  July 2012.

When  the  application came up  for  hearing,  counsel for the  applicant  in  his  submissions  made  reference  to  section  7  of  the  Land  Act  2012, section 24(a) 25( 1) and 28 of the  Land Registration Act  Cap  300  and submitted that  marriage  into  a family does  not  necessarily guarantee one’s  right to property .

This suit is brought by way of originating summons. Under Order 37 of the Civil procedure rules, a party  can only approach court under very specific instances.  These are listed to include a claim against the executor or administration of Estates of a dead person, a purchaser or vendor of land, a mortgagee or mortgagor of the suit premises, adverse possession, extension for limitation period, variation of trust, persons interested in wills and deeds and partnership.

The applicant’s claim does not fall within any of these categories.

Secondly, Section 7 of the Land Act 2012 outlines the methods through which one may acquire title to land. These include Allocation, land adjudication process, compulsory acquisition, prescription, settlement programs, transmission, transfers and long  term  leases  exceeding  twenty  one  years  created  out  of  private land.

I find that the  plaintiffs’ claim  does not  fall within any  of the above methods either.

The 1st defendant in the instant case purchased the suit land from the late Wambugu wa Muria in 1971. No evidence has been presented to the contrary. The 1st defendant is still alive. Her estate is not free property for distribution under section 3(1) of the law of succession Act Cap 160 therefore she is free to deal with it as she deems fit. She is under no obligation while still alive to share or divide her property with any person against her will, not even her children. I find that her interest in the suit property is indefeasible. She is protected by Sections 27and 28 of the Registered land Act, Chapter 300 laws of  Kenya  (repealed). Whichprovide:-

“(27) Subject   to this  Act-

(a)   the registration of a person as the  proprietor  of  land shall vest  in that  person  the absolute ownership  of that  land together with all rights and  privileges   belonging  or appurtenant thereto;

(b)……………………………………………

28. The right   of  a proprietor, whether acquired on first  registration or whether  acquired  subsequently  for  valuable consideration  or by an  order  of  court, shall not  be liable  to be defeated  except  as  provided in  this Act, and shall  be  held  by the  proprietor, together with all privileges and appurtenances  belonging   thereto, free  from  all  other interests  and  claims  whatsoever, but  subject-

(a)   to the lease, charges and other encumbrances and to the conditions and restrictions, if any, shown in the register; and

(b)   unless the contrary is expressed in the register, to such  liabilities, rights and  interests  as  effect the same  and  are  declared  by section 30  not  to require Noting on the  register Provided that nothing in this  section shall be taken  to relieve  a proprietor  from any duty  obligation to which he  is subject as a trustee.

Although courts should aim at sustaining rather than terminating a suit, l find that this is one such suit which is beyond redemption. See DT Dobie & Company (Kenya) Ltd V. Muchina(1982) KLR 1 in which the Court of Appeal held:-

“No suit ought to be summarily dismissed unless it appears so hopeless that it plainly and obviously discloses no reasonable cause of action and is so weak as to be beyond redemption and incurable by amendment. If a suit shows a mere semblance of a cause of action, provided it can be injected with real life by amendment, it ought to be allowed to go forward for a court of justice ought not to act in darkness without the full facts of a case before it.”

To me this suit does not disclose any reasonable cause of action and is an abuse of the court process. The upshot of the foregoing is that the application dated 29th June 2012 has merit and is allowed. l invoke the inherent power of the court under section 3A of the civil procedure Act and dismiss the suit with costs to the defendants.

Dated, signed and delivered at  Nakuru this  19th day  of  July 2013

L N WAITHAKA

JUDGE

Present

Mr Kibiru holding brief for Mr  Njuguna  the  defendants.

N/A  for  plaintiff

Cc:  Stephen   Mwangi

L N  WAITHAKA

JUDGE