Molapo v Lewis Stores, Lesotho (Pty) Limited (CIV/APN 280 of 97) [1998] LSCA 106 (20 November 1998)

C I V / A P N / 2 8 0 / 97 IN T HE H I GH C O U RT OF L E S O T HO In the matter between B E R E NG M O L A PO Applicant and L E W IS S T O R E S, L E S O T HO ( P T Y) L I M I T ED Respondent J U D G M E NT D e l i v e r ed by the H o n o u r a b le M r. Justice M M. R a m o d i b e di on the 2 0 th d ay of N o v e m b er 1 9 98 T he A p p l i c a nt h as a p p r o a c h ed this C o u rt on a basis of u r g e n cy for an o r d er declaring that his dismissal by the R e s p o n d e nt on the 2 3 rd April 1 9 97 is unfair He also s e e ks an o r d er that the R e s p o n d e nt p a ys h im arrears of salary f r om the date of the dismissal to the date of j u d g m e nt as w e ll as costs. It will be o b s e r v ed at the outset that unlike in m o st c a s es of this n a t u re the A p p l i c a nt d o es not seek an order of reinstatement. As I see it, his interest is m e r e ly c o n f i n ed to a declaration that his d i s m i s s al is unfair O n ce that is d o ne he w o u ld s i m p ly be h a p py w i th p a y m e nt of arrears of salary f r om the date of his dismissal to the date of j u d g m e n t. T he q u e s t i on of r e i n s t a t e m e nt therefore d o es n ot arise a nd this, I suspect, is by d e s i g n. I shall return to this aspect later. T he relevant facts w h i ch are either c o m m on c a u se or are n ot strictly d e n i ed are briefly as follows:- T he A p p l i c a nt w as e m p l o y ed by the R e s p o n d e nt in July 1 9 94 as a T r a i n i ng M a n a g e r. T he f o l l o w i ng y e ar he w as p r o m o t ed to the position of B r a n ch M a n a g e r. In 1 9 96 he w as p r o m o t ed t w i c e, first into the position of B r a n ch Inspector a nd later as Assistant R e g i o n al Controller. On the 2 1 st A p r il 1 9 97 the A p p l i c a nt a p p e a r ed b e f o re R e s p o n d e n t 's disciplinary h e a r i ng on the f o l l o w i ng t wo ( 2) c h a r g e s: (1) G i v i ng instructions to B r a n ch P e r s o n n el n ot in a c c o r d a n ce w i th C o m p a ny policy by u s i ng credit b a l a n c es on c u s t o m e r s' a c c o u n ts to r e d u ce the B ad D e bt W r i t e - O f f. ( 2) M i s a p p r o p r i a t i on of c u s t o m e r s' m o n i es to r e d u ce B ad D e bt W r i t e - O ff by u s i ng c u s t o m e r s' C r e d it B a l a n c es to do so. T he disciplinary h e a r i ng in question w as chaired by o ne M r. J o h an E n s l in w ho w as the R e s p o n d e n t 's R e g i o n al Controller, G o l d f i e l ds r e g i on a nd w ho w as a m o re senior e m p l o y ee t h an the A p p l i c a n t. It is p e r h a ps pertinent to m e n t i on that at the disciplinary h e a r i ng in q u e s t i on the A p p l i c a nt d o es not s e em to h a ve seriously c h a l l e n g ed the allegations levelled against h i m. He s i m p ly t o ok up the position that the practice he w as c h a r g ed with w as c o m m on at R e s p o n d e n t 's b r a n c h es a nd that it h ad in fact b e en t a u g ht to h im by his senior o ne M r. M o l a to M a t a s a n e. A f t er h e a r i ng several w i t n e s s es the c h a i r p e r s on of the disciplinary hearing M r. J o hn Enslin duly f o u nd the A p p l i c a nt guilty on the c h a r g es set o ut a b o ve as well as u s i ng stock o v e r a g es inappropriately. H a v i ng c o n s i d e r ed mitigating factors on b e h a lf of the A p p l i c a nt the c h a i r p e r s on t h en d i s m i s s ed the A p p l i c a nt w i th effect f r om the 2 3 rd A p r il 1 9 9 7. T he A p p l i c a nt d u ly a p p e a l ed against this decision in t e r ms of R e s p o n d e n t 's Disciplinary C o de a nd p r o c e d u r e. T he a p p e al w as h e a rd on the 2 3 rd M ay 1 9 97 a nd w as presided o v er by o ne M r. G S. v an d er W a lt w ho w as R e s p o n d e n t 's R e g i o n al Controller, L e s o t ho B o r d e r. He t oo w as an e m p l o y ee m o re senior to the A p p l i c a n t. It is c o m m on c a u se that the p r o c e e d i n gs in the a p p e al h e a r i ng in q u e s t i on w e re m e c h a n i c a l ly r e c o r d ed a nd a transcript of s a me h as b e en attached as A n n e x t u re " H G C 4 ". M o re a b o ut this later. N ow against this b a c k g r o u nd the A p p l i c a nt h as raised o n ly three ( 3) c o m p l a i n ts in this application n a m e l y- (1) that at the appeal the A p p l i c a nt w as d e n i ed d o c u m e n ts that he h ad a s k ed tor on t he g r o u nd that t he R e s p o n d e nt c o m p a ny w as " n ow a d m i t t i ng the u se of credit b a l a n c es to clear the write-off list" ( p a r a g r a ph 5 ( e) of the f o u n d i ng affidavit of B e r e ng M o l a p o ). ( 2) that the A p p l i c a nt w as d i s m i s s ed for c o n d u ct w h i ch c a n n ot p r o p e r ly be t e r m ed m i s c o n d u ct w a r r a n t i ng dismissal in t e r ms of R e s p o n d e n t 's Disciplinary C o de a nd P r o c e d u re ( p a r a g r a ph 7 of the f o u n d i ng affidavit of B e r e ng M o l a p o ). ( 3) that the A p p l i c a n t 's dismissal w as "clearly o u t w e i g h ed by the w e i g ht of the nature a nd facts p r e s e n t e d" a nd that consequently it w as "substantively unfair" ( p a r a g r a ph 9 of the f o u n d i ng affidavit of B e r e ng M o l a p o ). (turn n ow to e x a m i ne e a ch of the three c o m p l a i n ts by the A p p l i c a nt as set o ut a b o ve T HE A P P L I C A N T 'S F I R ST C O M P L A I NT T he R e s p o n d e nt deals with the Applicant's allegation that he w as d e n i ed a c c e ss to d o c u m e n ts in p a r a g r a p hs 42 a nd 53 of the A n s w e r i ng Affidavit of H u gh G. C l a r ke w ho w as the R e s p o n d e n t 's G e n e r al M a n a g e r, H u m an R e s o u r c es at the material time. In p a r a g r a ph 42 of his A n s w e r i ng Affidavit H u gh G. C l a r ke m a k es the telling point that at the appeal hearing in q u e s t i on the A p p l i c a nt as well as his representative accepted the presiding officer's a s s u r a n ce that he w o u ld a c c e pt as a fact for the p u r p o s es of the a p p e al that the practice of utilising credits on o ne a c c o u nt to off-set debits in a n o t h er a c c o u nt h ad b e en w i d e s p r e ad an c o m m on practice in p r e v i o us years a nd that it w as a g r e ed by the parties c o n c e r n ed therefore that it w o u ld not be n e c e s s a ry to furnish the d o c u m e n ts s o u g ht h e n ce the a p p e al p r o c e e d e d. I n d e ed H u gh G. C l a r ke repeats this a v e r m e nt in p a r a g r a ph 53 of his A n s w e r i ng Affidavit. It is significant that the contents of b o th p a r a g r a p hs 42 a nd 53 of the A n s w e r i ng Affidavit of H u gh G. C l a r ke as set o ut a b o ve h a ve r e m a i n ed c o m p l e t e ly u n c o n t r o v e r t ed in the replying affidavit of the A p p l i c a nt B e r e ng Molapo. A c c o r d i n g ly I consider that this is a fit c a se w h e re the version of the facts d e p o s ed to by the r e s p o n d e nt s h o u ld be a c c e p t ed as correct S ee P l a s c o n - E v a ns P a i n ts v V an R i e b e e ck P a i n ts 1 9 84 ( 3 ) S . A . 6 2 3A at 6 3 4 - 6 3 5. In this regard I w o u ld also respectfully w i sh to associate m y s e lf w i th the r e m a r ks of S t e yn JA (as he t h en w a s) in S u p r e me F u r n i t u r es a nd A n o t h er v L e t l a f u oa M o l a po 1 9 9 1 - 1 9 96 L LR 1 4 76 at 1 4 77 in w h i ch the L e a r n ed J u d ge of A p p e al succinctly stated the principle as follows:- " it is clear that in the ordinary c o u r se of e v e n t s, a nd in the a b s e n ce of facts or c i r c u m s t a n c es w h i ch cast d o u bt on t he acceptability of a R e s p o n d e n t 's v e r s i o n, w h e re an a p p l i c a nt institutes p r o c e d u r es by w ay of notice of m o t i on the v e r s i on of t he facts d e p o s ed to by a R e s p o n d e nt s h o u ld be a c c e p t ed as correct." On this principle therefore I find it as a fact that the A p p l i c a nt significantly a g r e ed to d i s p e n se w i th the n e ed to p r o d u ce the d o c u m e n ts s o u g ht at the a p p e al h e a r i ng in q u e s t i o n. A c c o r d i n g ly there is no s u b s t a n ce in Applicant's first c o m p l a i nt a nd in my v i ew no irregularity h as t a k en p l a c e. T HE A P P L I C A N T 'S S E C O ND A ND T H I RD C O M P L A I N T S. I s h o u ld like to point o ut at o n ce that it is readily c o n c e d ed by the R e s p o n d e nt that there is no specific disciplinary o f f e n ce of the n a t u re w i th w h i ch the A p p l i c a nt w as c h a r g ed referred to in the R e s p o n d e n ts D i s c i p l i n a ry C o de a nd P r o c e d u re (see p a r a g r a ph 57 of t he A n s w e r i ng Affidavit of H u gh G. C l a r k e ). It is s u b m i t t ed on b e h a lf of the R e s p o n d e n t, h o w e v e r, that t he C o de d o es not contain an all-inclusive list of offences w i th w h i ch an e m p l o y ee c an be c h a r g e d. In o r d er to fully a p p r e c i a te the R e s p o n d e n t 's c o n t e n t i on in this r e g a rd it p r o v es c o n v e n i e nt to q u o te S e c t i on 3.5 of the R e s p o n d e n t 's D i s c i p l i n a ry C o de a nd P r o c e d u r e. T h is section d e a ls w i th S u m m a ry D i s m i s s al a nd it p r o v i d es as f o l l o w s- "3.5.1 An e m p l o y ee m ay be s u m m a r i ly d i s m i s s ed ( eg w i t h o ut notice p a y) o n ly w h e re the o f f e n ce is serious e n o u gh to w a r r a nt s u m m a ry dismissal, w h e t h er or n ot the e m p l o y ee h as received p r e v i o us w a r n i n g s. S u ch action m ay be t a k en in the c a se of the f o l l o w i ng o f f e n c e s: T h e f t, assault, p o s s e s s i on of f i r e a r ms or d a n g e r o us w e a p o ns w i t h o ut the p e r m i s s i on of m a n a g e m e n t, forgery, fraud, driving m o t or vehicles u n d er the influence of intoxicating liquor or d r u g s, wilful d a m a ge of c o m p a ny property, negligence to a serious d e g r e e, refusal to carry o ut lawful requests, revealing trade secrets to a c o m p e t i t o r, u n a u t h o r i s ed u se of c o m p a ny vehicles. T he a b o ve list is n ot e x h a u s t i ve a nd s u m m a ry d i s m i s s al m ay be i m p o s ed for other c o n d u ct w h i c h, in the o p i n i on of the C h a i r p e r s o n, is appropriate in the c i r c u m s t a n c e s ." ( My underlining). As I read this section there c an be no d o u bt in my m i nd that it w as n ot the intention of the l aw m a k er to m a ke the list of o f f e n c es tabulated in the C o de exhaustive. It is specifically stated in so m a ny w o r ds that the list is " n ot e x h a u s t i v e" a nd that s u m m a ry dismissal m ay be i m p o s ed for o t h er c o n d u ct w h i c h, in the o p i n i on of the c h a i r p e r s o n, is a p p r o p r i a te in the c i r c u m s t a n c e s. N o t h i ng c an be clearer. It r e m a i ns then to d e t e r m i ne w h e t h er the facts of the m a t t er justified the o p i n i on w h i ch the c h a i r p e r s on f o r m ed n a m e ly that the A p p l i c a nt k n ew very well b o th f r om his e x p e r i e n ce as a senior e m p l o y ee of R e s p o n d e nt a nd f r om p e r s o n al w a r n i n gs a nd or instructions f r om the R e s p o n d e n t 's D i v i s i o n al G e n e r al M a n a g er a nd Applicant's i m m e d i a te superior o ne M r. Y o u ng that the practice w i th w h i ch the A p p l i c a nt w as c h a r g e d, w h i ch for that m a t t er he admitted, w as u n a c c e p t a b le to the R e s p o n d e nt c o m p a ny a nd w as n ot a l l o w ed a nd that a c c o r d i n g ly the trust relationship b e t w e en the A p p l i c a nt a nd his seniors as representing the R e s p o n d e nt C o m p a ny h ad b e en "totally d e s t r o y e d ." I s h o u ld like to say at o n ce that the story that h as u n f o l d ed against the A p p l i c a nt b o th in the disciplinary h e a r i ng a nd in the affidavits b e f o re me is a story of d i s h o n e s ty in the e x t r e m e. It is i n d e ed a story r e m i n i s c e nt of the p r o v e r b i al c a se of r o b b i ng Peter to p ay P a u l. In this r e g a rd a nd on the authority of P l a s c o n - E v a ns P a i n ts v V an R i e b e e ck P a i n ts ( s u p r a) I a c c e pt the u n c h a l l e n g ed version of the R e s p o n d e nt e x p r e s s ed in p a r a g r a p hs 1 3, 16 - 20 of the A n s w e r i ng Affidavit of H u gh G. C l a r ke to the f o l l o w i ng effect:- " 13 W h at the A p p l i c a nt either authorised or h i m s e lf did, t h r o u gh the u se of the R e s p o n d e n t 's c o m p u t er s y s t e m, w as to " r e f u n d" the credit balance on the o ne a c c o u nt a nd then take that " m o n e y" a nd m a ke a " c a sh instalment p a y m e n t" into the o t h er a c c o u n t. T h is latter a c c o u nt w o u ld o b v i o u s ly be the o ne w i th the debit b a l a n c e. In fact no m o n ey w as e v er r e f u n d ed a nd no c a sh i n s t a l m e nt p a y m e nt w as e v er m a de by either a c c o u nt holder. Instead the 'cash r e f u n d" w h i ch w as t a k en f r om o ne c u s t o m e r 's a c c o u nt a nd u s ed to m a ke a " c a sh instalment p a y m e n t" into the o t h er a c c o u nt w as all d o ne t h r o u gh the c o m p u t er s y s t e m. 16 T he effect of utilizing the credit b a l a n ce in o ne c u s t o m e r 's a c c o u nt to r e d u ce or e x t i n g u i sh the debit in a n o t h er c u s t o m e r 's a c c o u nt is to activate the a c c o u nt a nd clear or r e d u ce t he d e bt o w ed to the R e s p o n d e nt by the a c c o u nt h o l d e r. It creates the i m p r e s s i on in the R e s p o n d e n t 's b o o ks of a c c o u nt that t he a c c o u nt is active a nd that the a c c o u nt h o l d er is reliable, t r u s t w o r t hy a nd a g o od risk. In fact in m a ny instances this is n ot the c a s e. T he a c c o u nt h o l d e rs w ho h ad their d e b ts c l e a r ed as a result of Applicant's c o n d u ct w e re v e ry b ad c u s t o m e rs a nd n ot the k i nd of p e o p le that the R e s p o n d e nt likes to do b u s i n e ss w i t h. By clearing their d e b ts the A p p l i c a nt created the i m p r e s s i on that t h ey w e re better c u s t o m e rs t h an they in fact are. At the s a me t i me t h o se c u s t o m e rs w ho h ad their credit b a l a n c es utilised to r e d u ce or clear the debit lost the benefit of that credit. In effect their m o n ey w as b e i ng stolen. T h is practice w as prejudicial to the interests of the R e s p o n d e nt in that the R e s p o n d e nt w o u ld h a ve to restore the credit a nd return the customers' m o n e y. It w o u ld also d i s c o u r a ge g o od c u s t o m e rs f r om d o i ng b u s i n e ss w i th the R e s p o n d e nt b e c a u se their m o n ey w as b e i ng stolen. 18 It will be s e en f r om the a f o r e g o i ng that the effect of the practice w as that the A p p l i c a nt w as a l l o w i ng g o od c u s t o m e rs to be p r e j u d i c ed a nd b ad c u s t o m e rs to be benefited (sic). In a d d i t i on the.financial s o u n d n e ss of the R e s p o n d e nt w as b e i ng distorted. A false financial picture w as b e i ng painted. T h e re is a further d i m e n s i on to this practice. T he A p p l i c a nt p e r s o n a l ly benefits thereby. As stated t he effect of the practice w as to substantially r e d u ce the e x t e nt of the R e s p o n d e n t 's b ad d e b ts on its b o o k s. T h is w as a c h i e v ed by u s i ng the m o n i es s t a n d i ng to the credit of g o od c u s t o m e r s. On the R e s p o n d e n t 's b o o ks of a c c o u nt t h en the picture is painted of a financially s o u nd set of stores in L e s o t ho u n d er the m a n a g e m e nt of the A p p l i c a n t. T he i m p r e s s i on is t h e r e by created that the stores a re b e i ng w e l l- m a n a g ed a nd that the business is flourishing. In fact this is n ot so at all. T he true position is v e ry different. H o w e v e r, an A s s i s t a nt R e g i o n al Controller is entitled to b o n u s es w h i ch a re related to t he p e r f o r m a n ce of the stores u n d er his control. In the A p p l i c a n t 's c a se he s t o od to be p a id a b o n us on the profitability of t he three stores u n d er h i m. T h is c o u ld be a n y t h i ng up to M 2 0 , 0 0 0 . 00 a year. F u r t h e r m o re the better the p e r f o r m a n ce of the A p p l i c a n t 's three stores the better his c h a n c es of p r o m o t i o n. 20 It follows f r om all the a f o r e g o i ng that the A p p l i c a nt w as a l l o w i ng a nd e n c o u r a g i ng a b u s i n e ss practice to be f o l l o w ed w h i ch benefitted h im a nd w h i ch w as potentially disastrous to the R e s p o n d e n t ." Significantly the A p p l i c a nt d o es n ot d e ny the c o n t e n ts of p a r a g r a ph 21 of the A n s w e r i ng Affidavit of H u gh G. C l a r ke to the effect that the O p e r a t i o ns G e n e r al M a n a g er o ne M r. C . H. M a r k h an h ad in fact c o m m u n i c a t ed to the A p p l i c a nt that the d i s h o n e st practice referred to a b o ve w as contrary to the R e s p o n d e nt c o m p a ny policy. A c c o r d i n g ly I a c c e pt the R e s p o n d e n t 's v e r s i on in this regard. I n d e ed I o b s e r ve that M r. C . H. M a r k h an h ad written a letter A n n e x t u re " H G C 1" on the 6th J a n u a ry 1 9 97 a d d r e s s ed to " A ll B r a n ch M a n a g e r s / M a n a g e r e s s e s" including the A p p l i c a nt a nd h ad said, inter alia: " P l e a se n o te that o ne full i n s t a l m e nt is required to r e m o ve a b a l a n ce f r om this list a nd that this m u st be a p a y m e nt r e c e i v ed a nd n ot reversals or credit n o t es for a l l o w a n ce etc. P l e a se also r e m e m b er that t wo full instalments h a ve to be collected on a c c o u n ts older t h an 3 years eg t h o se o p e n ed prior to M a r ch 1 9 9 4 ." It is further m o re significant that the A p p l i c a nt h as n ot d e n i ed the c o n t e n ts of p a r a g r a p hs 33 a nd 44 of the A n s w e r i ng Affidavit of H u gh G. C l a r ke to the effect that at the disciplinary h e a r i ng in q u e s t i on the A p p l i c a nt a d m i t t ed his guilt to the c h a r g es a nd that h e, h o w e v e r, s o u g ht to justify his c o n d u ct by a r g u i ng that w h at he did w as w i d e s p r e ad a nd h ad b e en practised for a l o ng t i m e. As I h a ve stated a b o ve the practice f o r m i ng the subject m a t t er of Applicant's disciplinary c h a r ge is clearly struck t h r o u gh w i th dishonesty. T h at the A p p l i c a nt w o u ld in effect steal m o n ey f r om g o od c u s t o m e rs a nd u se it to m a ke a c c o u n ts of b ad c u s t o m e rs l o ok better w i th the o b v i o us intention of c r e a t i ng the g o od financial i m p r e s s i on of the stores u n d er his control m u st i n d e ed a m o u nt to m i s c o n d u ct of the w o r st kind. I c a n n ot fault t he c h a i r p e r s on of the disciplinary h e a r i ng in q u e s t i on for h a v i ng treated the A p p l i c a n t 's c o n d u ct in the m a n n er that he did. T h e re is no e v i d e n ce that the R e s p o n d e nt a c t ed unfairly. In a ny e v e nt e v en if there w as s u ch e v i d e n ce I c o n s i d er that this is a fit c a se w h e re t he e m p l o y er w o u ld not strictly be obliged to act fairly in d i s m i s s i ng the A p p l i c a nt as l o ng as it o b s e r v ed the Disciplinary C o de a nd P r o c e d u re as it surely did. In this r e g a rd I respectfully associate m y s e lf w i th the f o l l o w i ng r e m a r ks of M a h o m ed JA (as he then w a s) in K o a t sa v N a t i o n al U n i v e r s i ty of L e s o t ho 1 9 9 1 - 92 L LR 1 63 at 1 69 ( A l so r e p o r t ed in 1 9 8 5 - 89 L AC 3 35 at 3 4 0 ): "A private e m p l o y er exercising a right to t e r m i n a te a p u re m a s t er a nd servant contract is n o t, at c o m m on l a w, o b l i g ed to act fairly. As l o ng as he g i v es the requisite notice r e q u i r ed in t e r ms of the contract, he c an be as unfair as he w i s h e s. He c an act arbitrarily, irrationally or capriciously." Indeed I accept that the e m p l o y e r / e m p l o y ee relationship is a relationship of trust requiring, as it m u s t, u t m o st g o od faith a nd h o n e s ty It f o l l o ws therefore that d i s h o n e s ty d e s t r o ys that trust. In this regard I respectfully associate m y s e lf w i th the f o l l o w i ng r e m a r ks of De K l e rk J in C e n t r al N e ws A g e n cy (Pty) L t d. v C o m m e r c i al C a t e r i ng a nd Allied W o r k e rs U n i on of S o u th A f r i ca a nd A n o t h er ( 1 9 9 1) 12 I LJ 3 40 L AC at 3 4 4 :- "In my v i ew it is a x i o m a t ic to the relationship b e t w e en e m p l o y er a nd e m p l o y ee that the e m p l o y er s h o u ld be entitled to rely u p on the e m p l o y ee not to steal f r om the e m p l o y e r. T h is trust w h i ch the e m p l o y er p l a c es in the e m p l o y ee is basic to a nd f o r ms the s u b s t r a t um of the relationship b e t w e en t h e m. A b r e a ch of this d u ty g o es to the root of the contract of e m p l o y m e nt a nd of the relationship b e t w e en e m p l o y er a nd e m p l o y e e. If the so-called e x t e n u a t i ng c i r c u m s t a n c es are t a k en into a c c o u nt they are n ot s u ch that dismissal as a fair a nd p r o p er c o n s e q u e n ce of theft by an e m p l o y ee c o u ld be q u e s t i o n e d. I repeat, an e m p l o y er u n q u e s t i o n a b ly is entitled to e x p e ct f r om his e m p l o y e es that they w o u ld not steal f r om h im a nd if an e m p l o y ee d o es steal f r om the e m p l o y er that is s u ch a b r e a ch of the relationship a nd of the contract b e t w e en t h em a nd s u ch a g r o ss a nd criminal dereliction of d u ty that dismissal u n d o u b t e d ly w o u ld be justified a nd fair." T h e se r e m a r ks a p p ly w i th e q u al force to the p r e s e nt m a t t e r. In my j u d g m e nt the c o n d u ct of the A p p l i c a nt as fully set o ut a b o ve clearly w a r r a n t ed s u m m a ry d i s m i s s al as it fell w i t h in t he letter a nd spirit of S e c t i on 3.5.1 of the R e s p o n d e n t 's Disciplinary C o de a nd P r o c e d u re n a m e ly " c o n d u ct w h i c h, in the o p i n i on of the c h a i r p e r s o n, is a p p r o p r i a te in the c i r c u m s t a n c e s ." In all the c i r c u m s t a n c es of the c a se I am u n a b le to find a ny g r o ss irregularity that h as led to a m i s c a r r i a ge of justice in t he instant m a t t e r. I n d e ed n o ne h as b e en alleged in the p a p e rs b e f o re me for that m a t t er A c c o r d i n g ly the A p p l i c a n t 's s e c o nd a nd third c o m p l a i n ts h a ve no s u b s t a n ce a nd m u st therefore fail. To the extent that the A p p l i c a nt s e e ks a declaratory o r d er that his dismissal by the R e s p o n d e nt is unfair it f o l l o ws f r om the a f o r e g o i ng that the A p p l i c a nt h as failed to establish a clear right to r e m a in in R e s p o n d e n t 's e m p l o y m e n t. H e n ce I find that the A p p l i c a nt h as failed to d i s c h a r ge o ne of the essential r e q u i r e m e n ts in o r d er for the C o u rt to judicially e x e r c i se its discretion w h e t h er to g r a nt a declaration of rights. S ee F a m i ly B e n e f it F r i e n d ly S o c i e ty v C o m m i s s i o n er F or I n l a nd R e v e n ue 1 9 95 ( 4) S . A. 1 20 a t 1 2 4. As I h a ve stated at the b e g i n n i ng of this j u d g m e nt the A p p l i c a nt h as n ot s o u g ht an o r d er of reinstatement. I c o n s i d er therefore that the d e c l a r a t o ry o r d er s o u g ht to t he e x t e nt that the A p p l i c a n t 's d i s m i s s al is u n f a ir w o u ld m e r e ly be a c a d e m ic a nd s e r ve no real p u r p o se in the c i r c u m s t a n c e s. I n d e ed d e c l a r a t o ry o r d e rs b e i ng discretionary as t h ey are, a c o u rt will readily n ot exercise its discretion a nd g r a nt a declaratory o r d er if no tangible relief will f l ow therefrom. T h is is so b e c a u se c o u r ts are disinterested in h y p o t h e t i c al or a c a d e m ic situations. It is n ot the f u n c t i on of c o u r ts to g i ve legal a d v i c e. M o r e o v e r, in all the c i r c u m s t a n c es of the c a se as fully set o ut a b o v e, I consider that this is not a p r o p er c a se for the e x e r c i se of the court's discretion in f a v o ur of the declaratory o r d er s o u g h t. N o t w i t h s t a n d i ng the fact that he h as n ot a p p l i ed for r e i n s t a t e m e nt the A p p l i c a nt s e e ks an o r d er for p a y m e nt of "arrears of salary f r om the d a te of the p u r p o r t ed dismissal to the d a te of j u d g m e n t ." W h i le it is trite that this C o u rt is v e s t ed w i th a discretion to o r d er specific p e r f o r m a n ce in fitting c a s es the instant m a t t er is in my v i ew n ot a p r o p er o ne for s u ch an order. T h is is so b e c a u s e, inter alia,: (1) T h e re is no p r a y er for reinstatement. It c an r e a s o n a b ly be inferred therefore that the A p p l i c a nt d o es n ot intend to w o rk for R e s p o n d e nt a n y m o r e. N or h as he t e n d e r ed his services at the material time. ( 2) T he A p p l i c a nt h as obviously n ot w o r k ed for R e s p o n d e nt at all material t i m es since his dismissal ( 3) T h e re is no e v i d e n ce that the A p p l i c a nt h as m i t i g a t ed his loss in respect of a ny salary he m ay h a ve e a r n ed e l s e w h e re since his dismissal. An o r d er for p a y m e nt of arrears of salary that in effect a m o u n ts to a d o u b le salary w o u ld no d o u bt be inequitable a nd therefore n ot p r o p e r. S ee L e s o t ho T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o ns C o r p o r a t i on v T h a m a h a ne R a s e k i la C of A ( C I V) N O . 24 of 1 9 91 ( u n r e p o r t e d) T he c o n c l u s i on at w h i ch I h a ve arrived in this m a t t er r e n d e rs it strictly u n n e c e s s a ry for me to deal w i th all the points raised by b o th C o u n s el in their h e a ds of a r g u m e nt T h e re is h o w e v er o ne last c o m m e nt I s h o u ld like to m a k e. It is this: A dv M o s i to s u b m i ts that A n n e x t u re " H G C 4" is n ot t he " r e c o rd of disciplinary as well as a p p e al p r o c e e d i n g s ." Y et as I r e ad p a r a g r a ph 41 of the A n s w e r i ng Affidavit of H u gh G. C l a r ke a specific allegation is m a de that A n n e x t u re H G C 4" is in fact a transcript of the m e c h a n i c al r e c o r d i ng of the disciplinary a p p e al h e a r i ng in question. T h is allegation is n ot c h a l l e n g ed in p a r a g r a ph 4.22 of the replying affidavit of the A p p l i c a nt B e r e ng M o l a p o. On the contrary the latter d e p o n e nt m e r e ly c h a l l e n g es t he a c c u r a cy of A n n e x t u re " H G C 4" not that it is n ot the record of p r o c e e d i n gs altogether. As I q u o te h im this is w h at he s a ys in full: " 4 . 22 AD P A RA 4.1 T H E R E OF I deny that A n n e x t u re " H G C 4" is an accurate rendition of w h at transpired at the hearing. It d o es n ot m a ke s e n se in m o st c a s e s ." It s e e ms clear to me therefore that w h at A dv M o s i to is n ow a t t e m p t i ng to do is to shift the g o al posts s o m e w h a t. T h at I c a n n ot accept. On the authority of P l a s c o n - E v a ns P a i n ts v V an R i e b e e ck P a i n ts ( s u p r a) I accept the v e r s i on of the R e s p o n d e nt that A n n e x t u re " H G C 4" is in fact a transcript of the m e c h a n i c al recording of the disciplinary a p p e al h e a r i ng in question. T h i s, I o b s e r v e, is in k e e p i ng w i th C l a u se 2 . 17 of the R e s p o n d e n t 's Disciplinary C o de a nd P r o c e d u re w h i ch p r o v i d es as f o l l o w s: " C l a u se 2 . 17 All a p p e al h e a r i n gs m u st be r e c o r d e d. C o m m e n t: N o r m al h e a r i n gs m u st be r e c o r d ed in writing by the C h a i r p e r s o n. In the c a se of a p p e al hearings b e c a u se criticism h as b e en m a de that C h a i r p e r s o ns of disciplinary h e a r i n gs m a de inaccurate a nd b i a s ed m i n u t es of a p p e al h e a r i n g s, tape r e c o rd t he e n q u i r y, t h en there c an be no dispute as to w h at w as said." In all the c i r c u m s t a n c es of the c a se therefore I am satisfied that there is no merit in this application. A c c o r d i n g ly the R u le is d i s c h a r g ed a nd the application d i s m i s s ed w i th costs. M . M. R a m o d i b e di J U D GE 20th N o v e m b er 1 9 98 F or the A p p l i c a n t: A d v. M o s i to F or the r e s p o n d e n t: A d v. W o k er