R v Chabeli (C OF A (CRI) NO.9/2007; CRI/T/184/2002) [2008] LSCA 10 (11 April 2008)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF LESOTHO HELD AT MASERU C OF A (CRI) NO.9/2007 CRI/T/184/2002 In the matter between:­ MOROA HA­BUSOE CHABELI APPELLANT AND REX RESPONDENT CORAM:         STEYN, P SMALBERGER, JA MOFOLO, JA HEARD: 27 MARCH 2008 DELIVERED:  11 APRIL 2008 SUMMARY Appeal   against   conviction   of   murder   without   extenuating circumstances and sentence of death ­Crown conceding conviction should   have   been   one   of   culpable   homicide   ­   appellant   in agreement ­ concession properly and correctly made ­ conviction altered accordingly ­ partly suspended sentence imposed. JUDGMENT SMALBERGER, JA [1] It   is   common   cause   that   Mokutsu   Busumane   ("the deceased")   died   on   25   December   2001   as   a   result   of   injuries sustained by him from a blow or blows inflicted upon him by the appellant with a lebetlela stick (a plain, solid, fairly heavy stick). This led to a charge of murder being preferred against the appellant in the High Court. At the conclusion of the resultant trial, on 29 October 2007, the appellant was convicted of murder by Mahase J and two assessors. No extenuating circumstances were found and he was sentenced to death. The present appeal lies against both his conviction and sentence. [2] At the commencement of the appeal hearing Ms Ngcobo for the Crown informed us that upon consideration of the evidence on record, and after consultation with senior members in the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, it had been decided that the Crown would not support the court  a quo's  finding of murder but would   seek   a   conviction   of   culpable   homicide   instead.   Mr. Masiphole for the appellant accepted that the correct verdict should have been one of culpable homicide on the basis that in inflicting the injuries that caused the deceased's death the appellant had acted beyond   the   reasonable   bounds   of   self­defence.   For   reasons   that follow   we   are   more   than   satisfied   that   these   concessions   were correctly and properly made. [3] The undisputed evidence is that on the late afternoon of the   day   in   question   (which   happened   to   be   Christmas   Day),   the appellant went to the shop of one Molise in a nearby village where he   bought   beer   and   tobacco.   He   was   joined   by   one   Mahlomola Chabeli   and   they   both   partook   of   beer   on   the   premises.   The deceased arrived and twice asked the appellant to buy him beer. On each   occasion   the   appellant   responded   that   he   did   not   have   any money. The deceased took offence to the appellant referring to him on   the   second   occasion   as   "man".   At   that   point   the   appellant apologized and left the shop without finishing his beer. According to   the   appellant   he   did   so   because   he   wished   to   avoid   a confrontation with the deceased. It is common cause that precisely one   year   previously,   also   on   Christmas   day,   there   had   been   an altercation   between   the   deceased   and   the   appellant   which   had resulted in the appellant being seriously assaulted by the deceased. [4] The   appellant   then   proceeded   to   the   shop   of   one Rampone,   some   600   metres   away,   where   beer   was   being   sold, music was playing and people were dancing outside. He purchased another beer. Shortly thereafter he was joined again by Mahlomola, more   beer   was   bought   and   further   drinking   ensued.   Later   the deceased arrived in the company of Sekila Mokhothu ("PW1"). On entering, the deceased drank uninvited from the beer being shared by the appellant and Mahlomola, after which he left again. More beer   was   bought   by   PW1   of   which   the   appellant   claims   he reluctantly had no more than a sip before going outside to relieve himself, taking his stick with him. [5] There is a dispute with regard to the events that occurred subsequently. According to the appellant, he was about to re­enter the   shop   when   he   heard   something   being   said   behind   him.   On turning, he observed the deceased directing a blow at him with a stick.  He was struck on the head but did not fall. The appellant claims that he then retaliated in self­defence, hitting the deceased once   in   the   rib   area   with   his   lebetlela   stick   and   then,   when   it appeared   to   him   that   the   deceased   intended   to   persist   with   the assault   upon   him,   he   struck   the   deceased   a   further   blow   on   the forehead, causing him to fall to the ground. He denied that he struck any further blows after the deceased had fallen. He further claimed that immediately thereafter he was involved in a struggle with PW1, John Chabeli ("PW2") and others during the course of which stones were thrown at him and he was hit with a stick, as a result of which he sustained certain injuries. He handed himself over to the police the following day. The policewoman who arrested him recorded at the time that "the suspect was assaulted on the head, neck, arm and at the back between shoulders and hip". [6] None   of the  four   Crown  witnesses  who testified to the events surrounding the death of the deceased witnessed the start of the fight between the appellant and the deceased. Three of them, PW1, PW2 and 'Mamorena Tsoeu ("PW3") were inside the shop where beer was being served when a commotion  outside alerted them   to   the   fact   that   there   was   a   fight   in   progress.   The   fourth witness Janefeke Ratolo ("PW4") was en route to the village when informed of the fight. All four testified that when they arrived at the scene the appellant was hitting the deceased with a stick while the latter lay helpless on the ground. According to PW1 and PW2 they tried to intervene but were prevented from coming to the deceased's assistance   because   of   the   appellant's   aggressive   conduct   and threatening attitude. PW2 admitted striking the appellant once on the back with a stick; the Crown witnesses denied that any stones were thrown at him. [7] PW1 testified that while the deceased was lying on the ground the appellant struck him "many times" on the head with his stick   "until   he   was   satisfied".   He   was   unable   to   say   how   many blows   in   all   were   struck.   PW2   also   claimed   that   the   appellant assaulted the deceased "until he was satisfied". He too was unable to say how many blows were struck. The evidence of PW3 was in similar vein. When PW4 was asked how many times the deceased was struck while he was on the ground, she replied that "it could be about three times". [8] The post­mortem report on the body of the deceased was handed in by consent. It reflects the cause of death as "brain tissue laceration; cut skull bone right facial region". Under the heading "External Appearances" there appears the following: "Long opened (sic)   wound   on   right   facial   region.   Visible   brain   tissue". Examination   of   the   skull   revealed   "Brain   laceration,   fracture   of frontal bone, zygomatic bone and right parietal bones". In addition there   were   cut   wounds   of   the   palate   and   right   nose.   The   report reflects no view on the likely number of blows that would have been   necessary   to   cause   the   damage   found,   or   the   degree   of violence used. This is  par excellence  an   example   of where   the doctor who performed the post­mortem should, if available, have been called to elaborate on his findings. Without such elaboration one is left in the dark as to the likely number of blows struck. [9] There   are   a   number   of   major   shortcomings   in   the judgment   of   the   court  a   quo.  It   proceeds   from   the   unjustifiable premise   that   the   appellant   started   the   fight   with   the   deceased because, as found by the court a quo, he harboured a grudge against the deceased arising from their clash a year ago when the deceased assaulted him, a fact said to have been conceded by the appellant in his evidence in chief. I have found no such concession on record; in fact under cross­examination the appellant persistently denied that he   had   assaulted   and   killed   the   deceased   because   of   a   festering grudge.         Admittedly   the   appellant   was mindful of what had happened the previous year which is why, according to him, he was anxious to avoid a confrontation with the deceased. There is simply no justification for finding that the appellant attacked the deceased simply out of revenge. Moreover, there is nothing to gainsay the appellant's evidence that the deceased was the initial aggressor. The deceased   had   earlier   manifested   a   somewhat   provocative   and aggressive attitude when first requesting money from the appellant and later taking an uninvited sip of his beer. Given the past history between   the   appellant   and   the   deceased,   the   circumstances   that pertained that evening, and the inability of the Crown to provide contrary evidence, the appellant's version of how the fight started could  reasonably possibly have been true, and should have been accepted. [10] Furthermore, from the tenor of its judgment the court a quo appears to have viewed the assault upon the deceased in a far more serious light than the evidence justified. It repeatedly made statements   such   as   the   appellant   "mercilessly"   belaboured   the deceased; he "continued to belabour the helpless deceased with a stick   all   over   his   body   and   in   particular   on   his   head   until   the deceased's skull was fractured and its contents were exposed" (this despite the fact that no witness testified to the deceased being hit on the body and no signs of injury to his body were found); the "brutal assault upon the deceased"; and "the manner in which he brutally and mercilessly assaulted the deceased", to cite but a few examples. One is left with the impression that the court a quo considered the deceased to have been beaten to a pulp, yet in sharp contrast the post­mortem report reflects only one visible external wound. This does not mean that only one blow was struck, but given the court a quo's  findings one would have expected far more visible signs of external injury. [11] The court a quo also rejected out of hand the appellant's evidence that he had been struck and stones had been thrown at him at the scene of the crime, causing him certain injuries, without any regard to the fact that he exhibited such injuries when he handed himself over to the police the following day. The fact that he had injuries prima facie lends support to his evidence in this regard. [12] While   the   appellant's   conduct   must   be   viewed   on   the basis that he did not start the fight and did not assault the deceased to the extent found by the court a quo, it cannot be accepted, as he claims, that he only struck the deceased once on the head, and did not strike him while he was on the ground. A realistic appraisal of the internal skull injuries sustained by the deceased suggests, as an overwhelming probability, that he was struck more than one blow on the head. This lends credence to the evidence of the Crown's witnesses that the appellant continued to strike the deceased while he was lying on the ground, even though some of them may have exaggerated the extent to which he did so having regard to the post­ mortem   report.   PW4's   evidence   that   the   appellant   struck   the deceased three blows while he was on the ground is perhaps nearest the mark. [13] Whatever justification there may have been for the first blow to the deceased's head, once he had fallen to the ground and no longer posed any threat to the appellant, any further assault upon his person was unjustified and unlawful. In inflicting further injury on the deceased the appellant clearly exceeded the bounds of self­ defence and unlawfully caused the death of the deceased. Having regard to the circumstances surrounding the deceased's death the Crown in my view failed to establish the requisite intention to kill on the part of the appellant, either in the form of direct intention or dolus   eventualis,  and   the   appropriate   verdict   is   therefore   one   of culpable   homicide,   as   conceded   by   both   the   Crown   and   the appellant. It follows that his conviction must be altered accordingly, and the death sentence set aside. [14] Even on the court a quo's own findings, given the events that preceded the assault, the nature of the weapon used, the extent of the injuries inflicted as reflected in the post­mortem report, the fact   that   a   fair   amount   of   liquor   had   been   consumed   by   the appellant and the history of a previous assault upon the appellant by the deceased, there were clearly extenuating circumstances present and no justification for the imposition of the death penalty. This Court has emphasized in the past that the death penalty should not lightly be imposed; it is only called for in exceptional cases where there is no possible extenuation and where no other sentence would be adequate. [15] The   unlawful   killing   of   a   human   being   constitutes   a serious   offence   which   generally   merits   a   substantial   custodial sentence.   For   purposes   of   sentence   it   must   be   accepted   that   the appellant was not the initial aggressor, that he was mildly under the influence of liquor and was probably incensed by the deceased's conduct.   However,   this   cannot   excuse   the   excessive   vigour   with which he assaulted the deceased while the latter lay helpless on the ground.   Our   sentence   must   needs   reflect   disapproval   of   such conduct. In arriving at an appropriate sentence due regard must be had to the fact that the appellant is a first offender and that he was imprisoned on death row awaiting the outcome of his appeal for approximately five months. Account must also be taken of the fact that the appellant handed himself over to the police which may be an indication of some remorse on his part. [16] Mr.   Masiphole   referred   us   during   argument   to   the decision of this Court in  MPAKA MOSALA v REX 1997­1998 LLR­LB   240  where   there   was   a   substituted   verdict   of   culpable homicide   and   part   of   the   sentence   imposed   was   suspended   on condition  inter alia  that compensation of seven head of cattle be paid to the family of the deceased in that case thereby "raising the head" of the deceased, as it is customarily known. We agree that a partially suspended sentence with a similar condition of suspension should be imposed on the present case. However, the circumstances of the present case call for a more severe sentence than in Mosala's case,   and   we   consider   compensation   of   ten   head   of   cattle   to   be appropriate. The appellant is apparently in a position to pay such compensation. [17] The appeal succeeds to the extent that the conviction of murder   without   extenuating   circumstances   and   the   sentence   of death are set aside and replaced by the following:­ 1. The appellant is found guilty of culpable homicide. 2. The sentence imposed is one of six years imprisonment calculated from the date of his conviction (29 October 2007) of which two years are suspended for three years on condition that the appellant­fa)   Delivers  ten  head of cattle  (or their equivalent value) to the family of the deceased within one month of the date of this judgment; (b) Is not convicted of an offence, committed within the period of suspension, involving violence against the person of another,   in   respect   of   which   he   issentenced   to   direct imprisonment for a period in excess of six months. J W SMALBERGER JUDGE OF APPEAL I agree: I agree: JH STEYN PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL G N MOFOLO JUSTICE OF APPEAL For Appellant : Adv B. M. R. Masiphole For Respondent   : Ms L Ngcobo