M.P. Electronics Limited & Another v DFCU Bank Limited & 4 Others (Miscellaneous Application 581 of 2024) [2024] UGCommC 196 (5 June 2024)


# **IN THE HIGH COURT OF UGANDA SITTING AT KAMPALA**

# **(COMMERCIAL DIVISION)**

Reportable

Misc. Civil Application No. 0581 of 2024

(Arising from Civil Suit No. 0057 of 2022)

In the matter between

- **1. M. P. ELECTRONICS LIMITED** - **2. NEW MASTER ELECTRONICS (SPARE PARTS) LIMITED APPLLICANTS**

## **And**

- **1. DFCU BANK LIMITED** - **2. COMMISSIONER LAND REGISTRATION** - **3. ASHISHI SHANTAL KAMANI** - **4. TRIPUTI ASHISHI KAMANI** - **5. HIRJI ABDUL HAMID MOHAMED KARIM RESPONDENTS**

**Heard: 30 May, 2024.**

**Delivered: 5 June, 2024.**

*Civil Procedure — Appeals —Leave to appeal—Section 98 of The Civil Procedure Act, section 33 of The Judicature Act, and Order 44 rules 2, 3, and 4 of The Civil Procedure Rules. — The scheme of appellate review distinguishes between cases where the appeal is as of right and cases where the appeal cannot be preferred without leave previously obtained. In the former set of cases the High court cannot refuse to hear the appeals but, in the latter, it has the power to screen. — The reason for requiring leave to appeal from the majority of interlocutory orders is to reduce appeals from such orders as much as possible, to ensure that the hearing of the substantive and non-interlocutory issues in the case is expedited since appeals could be used as a delay tactic.*

## **RULING**

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### **STEPHEN MUBIRU, J.**

#### Introduction:

- [1] The 1st applicant borrowed a sum of US \$ 3,000,000 and shs. 3,000,000,000/= from M/s Crane Bank Limited pursuant to loan facility agreements dated 6th May, 2014. The loans were secured by mortgages over land registered in the names of the 2nd applicant. The 1st applicant defaulted in servicing the said loan facilities resulting in the issuance by M/s Crane Bank Limited of several default notices dating way back to 5th June, 2015. Subsequently on 20th October, 2016, the Bank of Uganda, pursuant to powers vested in it by *The Financial Institutions Act, 2004,* took over the management of M/s Crane Bank Limited by reason of its insolvency and placed it under statutory management. Afterwards, on 24th January, 2017, the Bank of Uganda placed M/s Crane Bank Limited under Receivership. - [2] On 25th January, 2017, the Bank of Uganda as Receiver of M/s Crane Bank Limited, sold and assigned to the 1st respondent, a significant part of M/s Crane Bank Limited loan portfolio and the mortgages and other securities, including the 1st applicant's loans and the mortgage securities in respect thereof comprised in LRV 4009 Folio 11 Plot 88 South Street, Kampala, LRV 330 Folio 11 Plot 56 Seventh Street, Industrial Area, Kampala, and LRV 301 Folio 21 Plot 58 Seventh Street, Industrial Area, Kampala, all registered in the names of the 2nd applicant. - [3] In a multiplicity of suits filed before and thereafter, the applicants contested their indebtedness to M/s Crane Bank Limited and the validity and enforceability by the 1st respondent, of the mortgage securities over the three properties including the question as to whether those mortgage securities were validly and lawfully assigned by the Bank of Uganda (as Receiver of M/s Crane Bank Limited) to the 1st respondent and whether the said assignment was completed in light of the mortgages claimed by the

1st respondent as assignee. The suits include: - (i) consolidated suits (a) H. C. C. S No.229 of 2019 (formerly No.746 of 2016), *New Master Electronics (Spare Parts) Limited v. Crane Bonk Limited/DFCU Bank Limited* and (b) H. C. C. S No. 896 of 2020 (formerly No. 336 of 2017) *MP Electronics Limited v. DFCU Bank Limited*, (ii) H. C. C. S No. 57 of 2022, *New Master Electronics, MP Electronics Limited and two others v. DFCU Bank Limited, Commissioner Land Registration and two others* and (iii) Court of Appeal Civil Application No. 503 of 2022 (arising from Civil Appeal No. 117 of 2022 and H. C. C. S No. 57 of 20221, *MP Electronics Limited, New Master Electronic and two others v. DFCU Bank Limited*. All of them were decided in favour of the 1st applicant.

- [4] Subsequently, by a letter dated 4th August, 2022 information was relayed that the office of the Minister of State for Lands Housing and Urban Development had received a petition from the directors of the 2nd applicant as registered proprietors of the three plots contending that following the closure of M/s Crane Bank Limited, the 1st respondent was threatening to sell the properties, yet the mortgages were not registered in its favour/name and requested that the said mortgages be removed as they were maintained illegally on the Land Register. By a memo dated 13th June, 2022 the Hon. Minister reiterated to the Commissioner Land Registration that M/s Crane Bank Limited was closed by Bank of Uganda in January 2017 and thus ceased to be a legal entity as a financial institution or bank. Since the Supreme Court had in *Misc. Application No.391 of 2022; Sudhir Ruperalia v. Crane Bank Uganda Limited (in receivership) and Bank of Uganda*, declared so, in the Hon. Minister's view, maintaining the impugned mortgage entries on the 2nd respondent's land title amounted to interference with the decision of the Supreme Court by unlawfully maintaining a mortgage interest to a non-existent bank which constituted a contempt of court. The Hon. Minister advised cancellation of the mortgages under section 91 (2) of *The Land Act* for being illegally and wrongfully retained on the 2nd applicant's land titles. - [5] Upon receipt of the memo, the Commissioner Land Registration formed the view that a mortgage of a defunct organisation could not be maintained on the register.

Therefore, any claim to the defunct M/s Crane Bank Limited mortgages was invalid unless it was supported by a mortgage assignment or transfer instrument from the Receiver (Bank of Uganda) to the 1st respondent. Such a transfer had to be in the prescribed form provided under section 92 (l) of *The Registration of Titles Act*. "The defunct M/s Crane Bank Limited interests as a mortgagee bank were extinguished the moment it was closed as a financial institution, placed under receivership and some of its assets were sold to DFCU." The retention of a mortgage on the register was a continuation of the banking business which was unlawful. Furthermore, the applicants alleged that despite the fact that mortgage deeds were drawn between them and M/s Crane Bank Limited, there were no funds actually credited onto their accounts. Therefore, pursuant to section 91 (2) of *The Land Act,* the Commissioner Land Registration invited the respondents and the 1st applicant to a hearing that was fixed for 29th August, 2022.

[6] This prompted the 1st respondent on 25th August, 2022 to file High Court Civil Suit No. 705 of 2022 against the applicants and the Commissioner Land Registration, seeking, among other reliefs, declarations that; - (i) questions relating to the validity and enforceability of the mortgage charges held by the 1st respondent over the 2nd applicant's three properties are *res judicata* and the subject of issue estoppel, having been conclusively determined in previous suits between the 1st respondent and the 2nd applicant; (ii) being *res judicata*, they could not be the subject of an inquiry by the Commissioner Land Registration, purported to be necessary pursuant to section 91 of *The Land Act* as sought by the Commissioner Land Registration's 4th August 2022 "Notice of intention to Effect Changes in the Register"; (iii) that the 1st respondent as assignee, is the lawful mortgagee of the assigned M/s Crane Bank Limited mortgage charges; (iv) that the matters which the Registrar's Notice sought to determine fall outside the scope of section 91 of *The Land Act*; (v) that the Commissioner Land Registration in execution of his quasi-judicial functions under section 91 of *The Land Act* is not subject to the direction and control of the Minister of State for Lands Housing and Urban Development; (vi) a permanent injunction restraining the Commissioner Land Registration from de-registering the 1st respondent's mortgage charges over the suit properties and the assigned M/s Crane Bank Limited mortgage charges; and (vii) an order that the 2nd applicant's caveat lodged on the suit properties be vacated. On or about 12th April, 2023 the 1st and 2nd respondents compromised that suit when they executed a consent judgment.

- [7] The applicants then filed Miscellaneous Application No. 0510 of 2023 seeking orders that; - (i) the suit be struck out for non-disclosure of a cause of action, for being barred by law and for perpetrating an illegality; (ii) the consent judgement entered into by the 1st and 2nd respondents and endorsed by the Court on 13th April, 2023 be reviewed and set aside; (iii) a temporary injunction issues restraining the 3rd, 4th and 5th respondents, their agents or servants from alienating or transferring the suit properties comprised in; LRV 4009 Folio 11 Plot 88 South Street, Kampala, LRV 330 Folio 11 Plot 56 Seventh Street, Industrial Area, Kampala and LRV 301 Folio 21 Plot 58 Seventh Street, Industrial Area, Kampala, pending the determination of the main suit; (iv) a temporary injunction issues restraining the 3rd, 4th and 5th respondents from taking possession of or otherwise evicting the applicants from the suit properties, pending the determination of the suit, and the costs of the application. - [8] In a ruling delivered on 10th November, 2023 this Court found that all the reliefs sought in the compromised suit were against the Commissioner Land Registration. The respondents were joined simply as proper parties in whose absence, although an effective order could be passed, their presence was necessary for a complete and final decision on the questions involved in the proceeding. Their presence or involvement was thus only required for completeness. This Court found that a consent judgment may be signed between the necessary parties to a suit without involving those joined as proper parties (see *Rup Chand Gupta v. Raghuvanshi Private Limited and another, (1964) AIR 1889; 1964 SCR (7) 760*). The respondent's exclusion from the processes leading to the consent judgment therefore did not provide proof of bad faith since generally, a party from whom no relief is sought is not a necessary party.

[9] The Court observed further that in paragraph 4 of the respondent's counterclaim it was admitted that the suit properties were transferred to the 2nd 3rd and 4th applicants on 12th April, 2023 and 5th May, 2023 respectively. Therefore, the intended purpose of the injunction sought, had already been overtaken by events. A temporary injunction could not issue to reverse that fact. For those and other reasons, the application was dismissed. The applicants have since appealed to the Court of Appeal, and now seek leave of this Court to appeal a part of the decision as required by Order 44 rule 2 of *The Civil Procedure Rules*.

### The application;

- [10] The application by Notice of motion is made under the provisions of section 98 of *The Civil Procedure Act*, section 33 of *The Judicature Act*, and Order 44 rules 2, 3, and 4 of *The Civil Procedure Rules.* The applicants seek orders that; - (i) leave be granted to the applicants to appeal against the dismissal of their application for review and setting aside of the consent judgement entered between the 1st and 2nd respondents in Civil Suit No. 0705 of 2022; (ii) Civil Appeal No. 0234 of 2024 filed in the Court of Appeal be validated in respect of the grounds challenging the dismissal of the applicants' application to review and set aside the consent judgement; (iii) the costs of the application be provided for. - [11] It is the applicants' case that the decision they seek to appeal was in respect of an omnibus application containing orders some of which are appealable as of right, but one of them requires leve of this Court. The appeal contains grounds which merit judicial consideration by the Court of Appeal and it has high chances of success. Appealing against an order dismissing an application to review a consent judgment requires leave of court. The respondents shall not suffer any prejudice if this application is allowed. The application has been brought without undue delay.

## The affidavit in reply;

[12] In the respondents' affidavit in reply, it is contended that the application for leave to appeal was filed over five (5) months outside the statutory fourteen (14) day period within which it ought to have been filed and the applicants have not sought leave to enlarge that time. The appeal does not raise any questions that merit serious judicial consideration. The applicants' allegation that they will suffer prejudice by losing their properties pursuant to loans that were not disbursed is unfounded and does not measure up to the prejudice being suffered by the 3rd to 5th respondents who are the purchasers and have been the registered proprietors of the suit properties since April and May of 2023 but have never been granted quiet enjoyment of the said properties by the applicants. The applicants have continued to abuse court process through such frivolous applications and appeals with the intention of reopening questions of their indebtedness which this Court rightly found to be *res judicata*.

## Submissions of counsel for the applicants;

[13] Counsel for the applicants submitted that reviewing and setting aside the consent judgment requires leave. The rest of the grounds do not. The applicants filed a notice of appeal and requested for a record of proceedings on 13th November, 2023. The record was availed on 21st march, 2024. Civil appeal No. 234 of 2024 is already filed in the Court of appeal be validated in respect of the ground challenging the dismissal and review.

## Submissions of counsel for the 1st respondent;

[14] Counsel for the 1st respondent submitted that under Rule 40 (2) (a) of *The Judicature (Court of Appeal Rules) Directions*, the time for seeking leave is on the date of the order is made and before the same judicial officer. Alternatively, by application within 14 days. the order was made on 10th November, 2023. The application was filed on 5th April, 2024. It is over five months after the order was made. The applicants ought to have applied to enlarge time and given sufficient reason for waiting five months after the order of the court to seek leave. There must be good reason to stall the proceedings in this court. There is a pending counterclaim.

[15] The order sought to be appealed is one that refused to set aside the consent. It revives an event that happened in 2017; assignment of all crane bank mortgages to the 1st respondent. The applicant's complaint is that the properties registered in the names were affected by the assignment. It affected the owner of the encumbrances. They claim that their proprietary interests were affected. In this particular case the matter of proper parties cannot be taken to appeal. The counterclaim paragraph 3 is a combination of it is an abuse of process. The applicants' best approach would be to fix the counterclaim.

#### Submissions of counsel for the 3rd to 5th respondents;

[16] Counsel for the 3rd to 5th respondents submitted that leave is not automatic. It was held in *Southern Union Insurance Brokers Limited and others v. NIKO Insurance Uganda Limited, H. C. Misc. Application No. 568 of 2022* that there should be serious points to take to appeal, that merit consideration by the Court of Appeal; significant misdirection on law or fact, a point which is novel, principle with no authoritative decision. Grounds for reviewing a consent judgment were clear and a third-party situation too was covered in *Attorney General and 12 others v. Charles James Mark Kamoga and another, S. C. Civil Appeal No.8 of 2004*. The affidavit did not show which of the grounds is important. The grounds are outside the ambit of that specified by the Supreme Court. They are not known in law. ## The decision.

- [17] The right of appeal is a creature of statute and must be given expressly by statute (see *Hamam Singh Bhogal T/a Hamam Singh & Co. v. Jadva Karsan (1953) 20 EACA 17*; *Baku Raphael v. Attorney General S. C Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2005* and *Attorney General v. Shah (No. 4) [1971] EA 50*). By virtue of section 76 (1) (h) of *The Civil Procedure Act,* a right of appeal exists from orders made under rules from which an appeal is expressly allowed by rules. Order 44 of *The Civil Procedure Rules* specifies orders from which appeals arise as a matter of right. Rule 2 thereof states that an appeal under the Rules shall not lie from any other order except with leave of the court making the order or of the court to which an appeal would lie if leave were given. The order sought to be appealed is not one of the listed orders, hence this application. - [18] The scheme of appellate review distinguishes between cases where the appeal is as of right and cases where the appeal cannot be preferred without leave previously obtained. In the former set of cases the High court cannot refuse to hear the appeals but, in the latter, it has the power to screen. The differentiation is intended to leave it to the High court to decide, where leave to appeal is a precondition of an appeal, whether it will entertain it. - [19] The regime for interlocutory appeals was not designed to cater for appeals against routine procedural and evidentiary rulings, not determinant of the rights of the parties, made in the ordinary course of a trial. Therefore, there is no right of appeal from an order overruling a preliminary objection, or an objection raised during the course of the trial, based on point of law. According to Order 44 rule 1 (2) of *The Civil Procedure Rules,* an appeal under *The Civil Procedure Rules* does not lie from any other order except with leave of the court making the order or of the court to which an appeal would lie if leave were given. Applications for leave to appeal should in the first instance be made to the court making the order sought to be appealed from. The requirement of leave is intended as a check to unnecessary

or frivolous appeals (see *Lane v. Esdaile (1891) A. C. 210 at 212* and *Ex parte Stevenson (1892) 1 Q. B. 609).*

- [20] An interlocutory order affects only the course of proceedings in litigation, not the substantive rights of the parties. The process of interlocutory appeals exists in part to reduce the number of retrials by allowing the appellate court to correct erroneous decisions before the commencement or conclusion of a trial. Thus, the general restriction on interlocutory appeals in civil proceedings is designed to limit interlocutory appeals to questions of very real significance to the trial. It is propelled by the fact that without leave, such appeals could be used to interfere with the proper conduct of the trial and delay a hearing of the substantive issues. - [21] The interlocutory appeals provisions under Order 44 of *The Civil Procedure Rules,* in both automatic right and with leave perspectives, were enacted precisely so that difficult legal issues of significant importance could receive appellate consideration before the conclusion of the trial. There are so many considerations that enter into a refusal to give leave as to make the matter one peculiarly for the experienced judgment of the Court from which leave is sought. One such consideration is whether or not the issues sought to be raised on appeal are sufficiently important to be brought forward as they affect the competence or fairness of the trial or that the grounds on which leave is sought would be dispositive of the subject matter of the litigation. The test to be applied before leave to appeal is granted is whether the question of law or equity before the Court is of sufficient difficulty or importance to warrant or require the decision of or consideration by the High Court. - [22] The reason for requiring leave to appeal from the majority of interlocutory orders is to reduce appeals from such orders as much as possible, to ensure that the hearing of the substantive and non-interlocutory issues in the case is expedited since appeals could be used as a delay tactic (see *Thomas Borthwick & Sons (Pacific Holdings) Ltd and Others v. Trade Practices Commission, (1988) 18 FCR 424 at 433 per Bowen CJ, Lockhart and Sheppard JJ;*). The provision therefore is

essential to the achievement of a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every suit; it is necessary in order to avoid the delay in reaching trial finality which ensues when piecemeal appeals are permitted. The requirement that leave be obtained reduces the opportunity for such tactics to be employed. It ensures that the trial of the substantive issues does not become mired by interminable delays. Many times, interlocutory questions sought to be appealed from may be mooted by trial on the merits when they are merged in final judgment. Leave to appeal though should not be refused simply because the court is of opinion that the decision was correct.

- [23] If the question is one of principle and a novel one, ordinarily leave to appeal should be granted. Substantial justice should not altogether be lost sight of in considering finality of decision, in cases where the Legislature has thrown the duty of deciding whether the litigation should be continued further, on the trial court or alternatively the appellate Judge who considers an application for leave to appeal. It would be obviously absurd to allow an appeal against a decision under a provision designed to limit the right of appeal. However, if the question raised be one in respect of which there is no authoritative decision that would be a guide to the parties, then the circumstances favour granting of leave. For this purpose, the material consideration is whether a particular interlocutory order is of a kind which would preclude the agitation of the same question before the same court in further stages of the same proceeding, or on appeal. - [24] Although it is unnecessary and indeed unwise to lay down rigid and exhaustive criteria, leave will ordinarily be granted in the following circumstances, namely; (i) if the interlocutory order has the practical effect of finally determining the rights of the parties, though it is interlocutory in form; (ii) where the correctness of the interlocutory decision is open to dispute or at least attended with sufficient doubt such as exists where there is conflicting binding authority, and the applicant would suffer significant consequences if the decision were wrong; (iii) an issue of importance is raised, which is appropriate for determination by the appellate court;

(iv) when it involves a question of law, in respect of which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion, the resolution of which could materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation; (v) the issue to be decided appears to be dispositive of the case; (vi) the point would not be considered on appeal or would otherwise be barred if an appeal is delayed until after a final trial, for example when by such delay it is rendered a pointless academic exercise. The applicant seeking leave to appeal bears the burden of establishing that justice does require that leave to appeal be granted, setting forth facts showing how the applicant would suffer substantial harm by awaiting final judgment before taking an appeal.

- [25] When determining whether to grant leave, the court must consider: (a) the extent of any disruption or delay to the trial process that may arise if leave is given; and (b) whether the determination of the appeal against the interlocutory decision may; - (i) render the trial unnecessary; or (ii) substantially reduce the time required for the trial; or (iii) resolve an issue of law, evidence or procedure that is necessary for the proper conduct of the trial; or (iv) reduce the likelihood of a successful appeal against the decision at trial; and (c) any other matter that the court considers relevant. The court must be satisfied that the reasons for granting leave clearly outweigh the disruption to the trial. - [26] In the instant case the applicant seeks leave to appeal a decision that dismissed an application to set aside a consent judgment between the 1st and 2nd respondents. It is not a question the resolution of which could materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation and neither is dispositive of the counterclaim. It does not involve any difficult legal issues of significant importance that deserve appellate consideration before the conclusion of the trial. The grounds upon which a consent judgment may be set aside are the subject of settled law. The order sought to be appealed does not have the practical effect of finally determining the rights of the parties since it concerned issues only between the 1st and 2nd respondents. It is not a point that would be barred if an appeal is delayed until after a final trial or one likely to be rendered a pointless academic exercise by

reason of such delay. It is not a point that would not be considered on appeal upon a final determination of the counterclaim yet the applicants will not suffer any significant consequences if the decision not to set aside the consent judgment were wrong.

- [27] Besides that, under Rule 40 (2) (a) of *The Judicature (Court of Appeal Rules) Directions*, where an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal with leave of the High Court, the application for leave is made by notice of motion within fourteen (14) days of the decision. The order in respect of which leave is now being sought was made on 10th November, 2023. The time within which leave ought to have bene sought elapsed on 24th November, 2023 yet this application was filed on 21st March, 2024. It is the applicant's case that they filed a notice of appeal and requested for a record of proceedings on 13th November, 2023. The record was availed to them on 21st March, 2024 and the application was then filed on 21st March, 2024. They seek to have the period between 10th November, 2023 and 21st March, 2024 excluded from the computation. - [28] Although section 79 (2) of *The Civil Procedure Act*, provides that in computing the period of limitation of thirty days from the date of the decree or order of the court, the time taken by the court or the Registrar in making a copy of the decree or order appealed against and of the proceedings upon which it is founded, has to be excluded, the provision applies to situations where there is a direct or automatic right of appeal. It is inapplicable to orders or decrees that require leave of the High Court before an appeal can be filed. While a copy of the decree or order appealed against and of the proceedings upon which it is founded is necessary for a direct or automatic appeal, that is not so with regard to applications for leave to appeal. It is the more reason why according to Rule 40 (2) (a) of *The Judicature (Court of Appeal Rules) Directions*, such applications may be made informally at the time when the decision against which it is desired to appeal is given. The rules do not envisage the need for obtaining a copy of the order or the record of proceedings before applications for leave to appeal can be filed.

- [29] Instead, Rule 5 of *The Judicature (Court of Appeal Rules) Directions* empowers the Court, for sufficient reason, to extend the time limited by those Rules for the doing of any act authorised or required by the Rules. Grant of extension of time is discretionary and depends on proof of "sufficient reason" showing that the justice of the matter warrants such an extension. The court is required to carefully scrutinize the application to determine whether it presents proper grounds justifying the grant of such enlargement. "Sufficient reason" that justifies the grant of applications of this nature has been the subject of several decisions of courts and the examples include; *Mugo v. Wanjiri [1970] EA 481* and *Pinnacle Projects Limited v. Business in Motion Consultants Limited, H. C. Misc. Appl. No 362 of 2010,* where it was held that the sufficient reason must relate to the inability or failure to take a particular step in time. That the applicants requested for a record of proceedings on 13th November, 2023 which record was availed to them on 21st March, 2024 does not qualify as "sufficient reason" for the four-month delay in seeking leave to appeal. It has not been shown that without a copy of the order or the record of proceedings they were handicapped in any way in seeking leave. The intended grounds of appeal relating to the dismissal of the application for review of the consent judgment, are not founded on any proffered misdirection of law or fact ascertainable only from any specific part of the order or record. The four months' wait therefore has not been justified. The application appears more or less to be an afterthought. - [30] As regards the prayer to validate Civil Appeal No. 0234 of 2024 filed in the Court of Appeal in respect of the grounds challenging the dismissal of the applicants' application to review and set aside the consent judgement, this court does not have the jurisdiction to validate processes and proceedings pending before the Court of Appeal. Where court process is predicated on certain prescribed steps being taken but there is non-compliance with those prescribed steps, the power to validate such process rests with the Court before which the proceeding is pending. It is only that Court, which if satisfied that the irregularity does not cause substantial injustice

which cannot be remedied by its order, and that the party concerned in the contravention or failure acted honestly, that may validate the process.

[31] All in all, the applicants have not demonstrated how they would suffer substantial harm by awaiting final judgment before taking this point on appeal. It seems to me that to grant the application in this case would defeat the whole object and purview of the order or rule itself for surely if its purpose is intended as a check to unnecessary or frivolous appeals, it becomes absolutely illusory if one can appeal from such a decision. Consequently, the application is dismissed with costs to the respondents.

| Delivered electronically this 5th day of June, 2024 | | ……Stephen Mubiru………… | |-----------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------| | | | Stephen Mubiru<br>Judge,<br>5th June, 2024. | | Appearances | | | | For the applicants | : M/s Muwema & Co Advocates and Solicitors. | | | For the 1st respondent | : M/s MMAKS Advocates. | | | For the 3rd to 5th respondents | :<br>M/s AF Mpanga and Co. Advocates. | |