Unus Al-Hassan and Another v Republic of Ghana (ECW/CCJ/APP/04/23; ECW/CCJ/JUD/25/25) [2025] ECOWASCJ 21 (13 May 2025)

THE COMMUNITY COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS) In the Matter of MR. UNUS AL-HASSAN & 1 OR. V REPUBLIC OF GHANA Application No: ECW/CCJIAPP/04/23 Judgment NO. ECW/CCJIJUD/25/25 JUDGMENT ABUJA DATE: 13 th May, 2025. ll Page JUDGMENT NO. ECW/CCJ/JUD/25/25 1. MR. UNUS AL-HASSAN -APPLICANT 2. THE ESTATE OF AHMED HUSSEIN DIVELA V. REPUBLIC OF GHANA -RESPONDENT COMPOSITION OF THE COURT: Hon. Justice Ricardo Claudio Monteiro GON<;AL YES -Presiding Hon. Justice Sengu Mohamed KOROMA - Member/ Rapporteur Hon. Justice Dupe A TOKI - Member ASSISTED BY: Dr. Y aouza OURO-SAMA -Chief Registrar 2 1 Page REPRESENTATION OF PARTIES : Femi FALANA, Esq. SAN Marshall ABUBAKARR, Esq. - Counsel for the APPLICANT Dr. Sylvia ADUSU - Counsel for the RESPONDENT 3 I Page I. JUDGMENT l. This is the judgment of the Community Court of Justice, ECOWAS (hereinafter referred to as 'the Court') delivered virtually in open Court pursuant to Article 8(1) of the Practice Direction on Electronic Case Management and Virtual Court Session, 2020. II. DESCRIPTION OF THE PARTIES 2. The First Applicant is Mr. Unus Al-Hassan, a citizen of the Republic of Ghana. 3. The Second Applicant is the Estate of Ahmed Husein Divela, a Ghanaian citizen who was killed and for whom the claim is brought. 4. The Respondent is the Republic of Ghana, a Member State of the ECO WAS. III. INTRODUCTION 5. The claims herein border on the alleged breach of various human rights guarantees in respect of Ahmed Hussein Divela, deceased, which includes the right to life, dignity, equality, liberty, health, access to effective remedies, and freedom of expression. The Applicants are alleging that the breach of these guarantees have resulted in several human rights violations contrary to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the Respondent has ratified. IV. PROCEDURE BEFORE THE COURT 6. The Applicants filed an Initiating Application on 25 th January 2023, in the Registry of the Court. 7. On 10th November 2023, the Respondent filed its response/defence to the Initiating Application intituled "Respondent's Response in Answer to the Claim of the Applicants." 41 Page 8. The Cou1i held a v i1iual session on the 22 nd November 2024 in which the Applicants were absent and unrepresented, but the Respondent was represented by Counsel. The Court, in view of the pleadings already submitted by the Applicants, heard the Respondent on the merits and w ithdrew the case for judgment. V. APPLICANT'S CASE a) Summary of facts 9. The Applicants have broug ht this claim before the Court challenging the bruta l killing of Ahmed Divela, deceased, by armed assailants w ithin the Respondent's territory. The deceased was a Ghanaian national, an investigative journalist and a member of the T iger Eye Media Group that specializes in exposing corrupt officials within the Respondent's territory. 10. The Applicants have described themselves as fo llows: First Applicant is the brother to the deceased, and the Second Applicant (the Estate of the deceased) is made up of the parents, wife, 7 siblings, 3 daughters, and other numerous dependents. Together, they submit that the deceased, 31-year-old Ahmed Husein Divela, was shot dead by hired assassins near his home in Madina, Accra, on 16111 January 2019. They explain that the deceased was ambushed while returning from visiting a sick nephew . The Applicants also claim that eyewitnesses repo1ied that two gunmen attacked the car of the deceased, firing at close range, causing it to crash before delivering fatal shots to him. 11. The Applicants allege that the deceased was known for exposing corruption, including widespread judicial misconduct and witch doctor practices. Hence, they submit that his work garnered both admiration and enemies and a spokesperson of the Respondent's Police Force corro borated this when he told j ournalists that the assassination was related to the deceased's work. It !S the First SI Page Applicant's submission that in 2013 , the deceased co-produced Spirit Child, a documentary aired internationally on Al Jazeera. The said film exposed witch doctors involved in poisoning chi ldren- often those with disabilities-believed to be possessed by ev il spirits. Following this, in 201 5, the deceased led a second production, Ghana in the Eyes of God, which was a groundbreaking three-hour undercover documentary revealing widespread corruption in Ghana's judiciary. The First Applicant narrates that based on hundreds of hours of secret recordings, the second production exposed judges and court officials accepting bribes to influence cases, implicating over 30 judges and 170 judicial officers. Seven of the twelve High Court judges exposed by the Deceased were suspended. This documentary was screened to 6,500 attendees over four sessions at the Accra International Conference Centre, and caused significant public attention and brought gridlock to the streets of Accra. 12. The Applicants allege that a Member of Parliament exposed by the Deceased, Kennedy Agyapong, publicly attacked the deceased and his team fo r exposing widespread corruption in Afri can Football revealing his identity and encouraging harm against him on live television. However, the Applicants state that though Agyapong denied responsibility for the killing, he expressed no regret in exposing the journalist's details. The Applicants therefore, submit before the Court that Kennedy Agyapong ought to be adequately investigated and prosecuted appropriately if found wanting and culpable in the deceased 's death. 13. The Applicants claim that the deceased ' s assassination violates press freedom, constitutes censorship, and breaches international human rights treaties. b) Applicants' Pleas in law 14. In support of their claims, Applicants plead the foll owing laws : • Article 33 of the Rules of the Community Court ofJustice.u GI Page ~ ' ~ • Article 10 of the Supplementary Protocol A/SP .1/01/05 amending the Protocol (A/Pl /7/91) relating to the Community Court of Justice. • Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 15 16 and 19 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. • Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, and 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. • Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. c) Reliefs sought 15. The Applicants are seeking for the fo llowing reliefs from the Court: 1. A declaration that the brutal killing of the First Applicant's brother and Second Appl icant's breadwinner, Ahmed Hussein Suale Divela, by armed murderers within the Respondent territory at Madina, Accra, Ghana in January 16, 20 19 is wrongful, oppressive and illegal as it violates the deceased's fundamental human right to life guaranteed by Article 4 of the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights and Article 3 of the Universal Declaration on Human and Peoples Rights and Article 13 of the Ghanaian Constitution, 1992 (as amended). 11. A declaration that the failure of the Respondent to investigate and prosecute the murderers of the deceased Hussein Suale Divela is a dereliction of the duty of the Respondent under Article 1 of the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights and Article 1 of the Universal Declaration on Human and Peoples Rights. u1. A declaration that the brutal killing of the deceased, Hussein Suale Di vela, by armed agents of the Respondent at Madina, Accra, Ghana, in January 16, 201 9, is wrongful, oppressive and illegal as it viplates 71 Page the deceased 's fundamental human right to the dignity of the human person guaranteed by Article 5 of the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights and Articles 4 and 5 of the Universal Declaration on Human and Peoples Rights. IV. A declaration that the brutal killing of the deceased, Hussein Suale Di vela, by armed agents of the Respondent at Madina, Accra, Ghana on January 16, 2019, is wrongful, oppressive and illegal as it violates the deceased 's fundamental human right to fair hearing and presumption of innocence Articles 7 ( I) (b) and (2) of the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights and Aiiicles 7 and 8 of the Universal Declaration on Human and Peoples Ri ghts. v. An order of this Honourable Court directing the Respondent, their agents, organs, privies, servants, or by whatsoever name called to pay over to the Applicants the sum of$ 200,000 000. 00 (Two Hundred Mill ion Dollars) only as general damages for the gruesome murder of their deceased breadwinner, Hussein Suale Divela, by armed agents of the Respondent at Madina, Accra, Ghana, on January 16, 2019. v1. An order of this Honourable Court compelling the Respondent, its agents, organs, servants, privies, or by whatsoever name called to pay over to the Applicant the sum of $2 000,000.00 (Two Million Dollars) only as aggravated and punitive damages that will serve as a deterrent to the Respondent. VII. An order of this Honourable Court directing the Respondent to pay over to the Applicants the sum of $500, 000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Do llars) only being the soli citors fees and other ihcidental cost. SI Page ~ f~ ¼2 VI. RESPONDENT'S CASE a) Summary of facts 16. The Respondent respectively submits the relevant facts of this matter which came to its notice in the course of conducting its investigation into the complaint of the killing of the Deceased. 17. It avers that the matter being one which is still under investigation, the aspects of the relevant facts will be geared towards answering the material facts of the Applicants' claim and will be limited to the outcome so far reached so as not to prejudice the ongoing investigations. The Respondent states that the facts relevant to the instant proceedings are that on 16th January 2019, one Ibrahim Kamilu Tahidu lodged a complaint at the Madina Branch of the Ghana Police Service, reporting the shooting of his cousin, Hussein Ahmed Suale, a 31-year old undercover journalist. The said Suale was reported to have been shot three times in the chest and ribs by unknown assailants and was pronounced dead on arrival at the Pentecost Hospital. 18. The Respondent avers that the deceased, Suale, was an undercover journalist with Tiger Eye PI, an outfit engaged in high-profile investigations including judiciary corruption, child killings in Bolgatanga, and the 'Number 12' expose on corruption within the Ghana Football Association (GF A), which led to the removal of GF A, President K wesi Nyantakyi. The Respondent claims that the complainant, Ibrahim Kamilu Tahidu repo11ed that the deceased confided in him that the airing of 'Number 12' led to threats from Nyantakyi and direct warnings of possible harm to Suale. The Respondent claims that the complainant fu11her informed the Police that additional threats were allegedly made by Abu Alhassan, a Northern Regional GF A Chairman who facilitated contact between Suale and Nyantakyi. It narrates further that the complainant rep011ed to Kave 9I Page received a call later on 16th January 2019, from one Yakubu informing him of the shooting incident involving the deceased and the eyewitness account. 19. The Respondent avers that according to the dairy of the Madina Police Station on 16th January 2019, a patrol team received information of a shooting incident. Upon their arrival at the scene, the police found Suale's vehicle, a black BMW crashed into a building with broken windows, bloodstains, and three empty shell casings at the scene. It was the police investigation at the hospital where the deceased had been taken to, that led to his discovery on a stretcher with gunshot wounds to his ribs, neck and abdomen. The body of the deceased later was taken to the Police Hospital mortuary for preservation and autopsy. 20. Fm1her investigations by the Police revealed a witness at the scene of the crime, who described the attackers as two men on a black-and-blue motorbike. Another witness provided detailed descriptions of the assailants, stating he had interacted with them earlier in the day: one of the assailants was dark, stocky, and about five feet, eight inches (5'8") tall , while the other was tall, slim, fair, and had a neat beard. The Police investigations also revealed information from the fam ily members of the deceased that Kennedy Agyapong, a Member of Parliament, had accused the deceased and his team of blackmail and publicized his photographs on national television, encouraging the public to assault him. The statements obtained by the Police from Agyapong saw the latter denying any involvement with the death of the deceased. While Agyapong admitted to publishing Suale's pictures, claiming he had been informed of Suale's alleged involvement in blackmail, it was in a bid to warn the public of the dubious activities of the deceased. 2 1. The Respondent fmiher states that the Pol ice had obtained statements from Mr. Kennedy Ohene Agyapong, Kwesi Nyantaki and M . Abdulai Alhassan. Nyantaki admitted to have met with the deceased in August of 201 7 through Alhas~an and 10 I Pa g e ~ u ~ subsequently travelled with him to Qatar. It is Nyantaki 's claim that the deceased had taken him to Qatar to meet with his boss, one Al Thani , to explore the possibility of sponsorship of the Premier League and investments in Ghana. The Respondent narrates further that Nyantakyi confirmed previous interactions with the deceased and admitted calling him in 20 l 7, warning him against deceitful practices. He denied involvement in the deceased's death but mentioned filing a lawsuit against him and his boss following the 'Niunber I 2 'expose. 22. The Respondent denies its failure or dereliction in investigation effo1ts and states that, among other measures, the Police collaborated with Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology and forensic expe1ts to create sketches of the suspects based on witness descriptions. It iterates efforts to identify the assailants through databases of national agencies, telecommunication companies, and the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Authority were unsuccessful. While seven suspects were apprehended, the eye-witnesses of the shooting incident could not identify them as the assailants of the deceased. 23. Without relenting in its investigations, the Respondent avers that the police, acting on information from Kennedy Agyapong' s bodyguard, arrested another suspect: Abdul Rashid Meizongo. However, frnther details regarding Meizongo's invo lvement were not provided in the narration of facts by the Respondent. b) Pleas in law 24. Respondent pleads the following laws in suppmt of its defence : • All the Articles of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights were cited by the Applicants. #-- ' lll Page ~ ~ • Article 7 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001 ). • Cha ter Five of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. • CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMET V MAMADOU TANDJA & REPUBLIC OF NIGER (2011) CCJELR at page 27. • ALHAJI MUHAMMED IBRAHIM HASSAN V GOVERNOR OF GOMBE STATE & FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA (2012) at page 83. • STELLA IFEOMA & 20 ORS. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (201 5) CCJELR. • REV. FR. SOLOMON MF A & 11 ORS . V FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA & 4 ORS. JUDGMENT NO: ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/19 (UNREPORTED). • MRS. HELEN JOSHUA & ANOR. V FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA, JUDGMENT NO. ECW/CCJ/JUD/02/22 (Unreported). c) Reliefs sought 25. It is the Respondents conclusion that it has not violated the rights of the Applicants as claimed and entreats the Court to dismiss the suit in its entirety for lack of merit. VII. JURISDICTION 26. The Court has traditionally dispensed with establishing its competence before delving into deliberation of the allegations. It is trite that the Court vested with jurisdiction by way of the Protocol (A/P 1/7 /9 1) as amended _ by the 12 I Page Supplementary Protocol (A/SP.1/01/05) on the Community Court of Justice. The Court considers that competence is a fundamental requirement to be disposed of at the onset of its deliberations, as any decision or determination made without establishing the competence of the Court is void: (PROF. ETIM MOSES ESSIEN V REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA & ANOR, (2004-2009) at page 113). Consequently, even where no party raises the issue of jurisdiction, the Court must suo motu, ensure that it has jurisdiction in every case: WOMEN AGAINST VIOLENCE IN SOCIETY (WAVES) V . REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE, JUDGMENT: ECW/CCJ/JUD/37/19, at page 11. 27. The Court recalls that the claims of the Applicants border on the breach of several fundamental human rights treaties ratified by the Respondent resulting in the violation of the right to life, dignity, equality, liberty, health, access to effective remedies, and freedom of expression. These rights are enshrined in fundament human rights covenants ratified by the Respondent hence a breach of same will attract sanctions. A violation of human rights falls right under Article 9(4) of the Protocol (supra), which provides that "[T}he Court has jurisdiction to detennine cases of violation of human rights that occur in any Me,nber State. "In practice, the Cami has enunciated the import of this provision in its jurisprudence, more particularly in EL HADJI TIDJANI ABOUBAKAR V REPUBLIC OF NIGER (20 11) CCJELR at page 8 where it held that " . . . the mere citing of the facts connected ·with such description suffices to confer competence on the Court." This jurisprudence was reiterated in the case of FESTUS A. 0. OGWUCHE ESQ. & ANOR. V FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA, JUDGMENT NO: ECW/CCJ/JUD/31/18 (Unreported) at page 8, where the Court held that mere allegations of human rights violation is sufficient to trigger its jurisdiction. Thus, in the instant case where the obligations guaranteeing various human rig~ts are B l Page alleged to have been breached, occasioning violations, the Court has a mandate to determine the claim pursuant to Article 9 ( 4) of its Protocol (supra). 28. Consequently, the Court declares that it is has the competence to adjudicate the claims as they are in addition alleged to have occurred in a Member State. VIII. ADMISSIBILITY 29. As a matter of practice, the Comt determines the admiss ibility criteria which simply means that it assesses whether the claim may be granted access before it. The International Court of Justice has remarked that " ... even if the Court when seised finds that it has jurisdiction it is not compelled in every case to exercise that jurisdiction" (See: NORTHWERN CAMEROUN CASE (CAMEROUN V UNITED KINGDOM) PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS, JUDGMENT OF 2 nd December 1963, paragraph 29). For w hile it may have the competence to determine a claim, the question of whether the required procedures granting accessing to the claimant have been fu lfilled must be answered in the affirmative. It is only when the legal requirements of granting access have been fu lfilled that the Court can proceed to determine the claim on the merits. 30. It is therefore a settled practice that all claims before the Court are assessed on the basis of the admissibility criteria laid down in Article 10 of the Protocol (supra), which denotes how claimants can access the Court. However, in the instance of a claim for human rights, the admissibility requirements outlined in Article 10( d) of the Court's Protocol also admits individuals and corporate bodies before the Comt to seek for redress, suffices . This provision requires that (i) the application is not anonymous and (ii) the same matter has not been instituted before another international court for adjudication. 31. Before delving into its assessment of admissibility, the Court recalls, on the one hand, that the Applicant expressly relies on Article 10 (d) of the Protocol (supra) 14 I Pa g e ~ ~ ~ in gaining access before it and on the other hand, the Respondent' s challenge of the Applicants' locus standi. 32. The Court notes the Respondent's impassioned challenge of the locus standi of the Applicants, and cited the case of REV SOLOMON MFA & OTHERS v. NIGERIA, JUDGMENT NO: ECW /CCJ/JUD/06/19 (Unreported) at page 15 to suppo11 same. Its contention is that the F irst Applicant, who describes himself as the brother of the deceased, is suing jointly and severally w ith the Second Applicant: the Estate of Ahmed Hussein Suale Divela. The particulars of the Initiating Application include a numerical list of persons comprising the Second Applicant, to wit " ... the parent, wife, 7 siblings, 3 daughters, and other numerous dependents ... " (sic). The nature of the list prompted the contention of the Respondent who relies on the Court's decision in MRS. HELEN JOSHUA & ANOR v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA, JUDGMENT NO: ECW/CCJ/JUD/02/22 (Unrepo11ed), where it was held that:"Whilst international law has established that a victim can be direct or indirect by way of legal authority, the said legal authority should be established .. . It is noteworthy to state here that when a claim is brought by an entity that claims to possess the ability to enjoy rights and be bound by obligations (which is a legal p ersonality), that entity must have gained its legal personality by law." In HELEN JOSHUA the Second Applicant referred to itself as the Estate of the deceased, Solomon Andy, but failed to produce any authority establishing its identity as a victim. The Court held that the Second Applicant had not demonstrated that it had the capacity to act. Thus, the Respondent in the present case is seeking that the Com1 follows the ratio in HELEN JOSHUA (supra) and consequently, declare that the Second Applicant lacks locus standi in the action. 33. The Court finds it imperative to instruct that all claims brought before it must be attributed to the Applicant, i.e. they must demonstrate that they are linked to the 15 I Pa g e ~ ~ claims either directly or indirectly . This link, locus standi, has been articu lated by the Court in FED RATION OF AFRICAN JOURNALISTS & 4 ORS. V REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA, JUDGMENT NO : ECW/CCJJUD/04/18 at page 17. The Court state that "[T}he term 'locus standi' denotes the interest to institute proceedings in a Court of law or to be heard in a given cause. In other words, the strict application of locus standi denotes that an Applicant wishing to sue must have sufficient interest in the subject matter in order to have a standing to litigate same. " 34. It is against this backdrop and the contention raised by the Respondent that the Court will consider the admissibility criteria of both the First and Second Applicants pursuant to A rticle 10 (d) of the Protocol (supra). It is uncontroverted that all claims should pass the test in AZIAGBEDE KOKOU & OTHERS V REPUBLIC OF TOGO (2013]) CCJELR page 167, paragraph 18, clarifi ed that even when the jurisdiction of the Court is established, an appli cation alleging a human rights v iolation is admissible only if three criteria are satisfi ed: l . n. The applicant's status as a victim is demonstrated,· The application is not anonymous, and ut. The matter is not pending before another international court or tribunal. 35. However, even before considering all the requirements for adm issibility laid down in the erudite ratio above, the Comt is wo nt to focus on the first criteria as a matter of precedence. Being mindful , that generally an applicant must establish an interest in th e claim, i.e. capacity to institute the claim, the Court's focu s on the first criteria is not misplaced. It intends to unravel the Applicants' status as victims separately as they have claimed jointly and severally making it imperative that the admissibility of both claims are clearly determined ~y the Court. 16 I Page ~ ~ ~ First Applicant 36. The facts show that the First Applicant has described himself as the brother of the deceased A11med Hussein Divela w ho passed on after a gun attack. 37. The Comi is mindf·ul that the Applicant must be a victim with the capacity to institute the claim. T herefore, it is guided by the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Rights to Remedy and Reparation for Survivors of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law GA RES. NO. 60/147 Preamble See IX UN Doc A/RES/60/147 March 2!51 2006 to w it "[A] victim is anyone who siiffers individual or collective harm (or pain) such as physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or generally any impairment of human right as a result of acts or omissions that constitutes gross violation of humanitarian norms." This piece of soft law impresses the importance of evidence iterating a claimant's status as a victim. 38. Thus, the Comi is mindful of the categorisation of a v ictim i. e. as direct or indirect victim/s; the former being those who have directly borne the impact of a violation, whilst the latter category are those who are linked to the former but who suffer transference harm. This was elucidated in STELLA IFEOMA & 20 ORS. V FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2015) CJELR at page 7 where the Comi said that "[WJ hen it becomes impossible for him whose right is violated to insist on the right or to seek redress either because he is deceased or prevented in one way or the other fi·om doing so, it is pe,fectly normal that the right to bring his case before the Court should fall on another person." In a nutshell, the Court acknowledged the two categories of victims, and in the process, ensured that access can be gained before it by either category. It should be noted that while a victim may be admitted because the facts establish him/her as such ( direct victim), an indirect v ictim must show proof of relationship to the victim. In REV. 171 Page ~ ~ ~ FR. SOLOMON MFA & 11 ORS. V FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA & 4 ORS. JUDGMENT NO: ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/ 19 (Unreported) at pages 16 & 17, the Court held that as a matter of law, proof of a relationship between an Applicants claiming on behalf of a victim must be adduced to maintain an action before it. Fu11hermore, in MR. MAMADOU MOU CT AR BALDE V REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA, JUDGMENT NO : ECW/CCJ/JUD/53/23 (Unreported) at paragraph 31-33 the Court held that by adduc ing the Birth Certificate establishing a relationship with the deceased, the Applicant made evident his locus standi as a direct v ictim. 39. Thus in the present case, the Court, where the First Applicant is claiming on behalf of the deceased, considers his claim as that of an indirect victim. This requires that the First Applicant must establish a relationship, by way of evidence, the deceased (direct v ictim) for him to successfully claim as an indirect victim. However, the description by way of nomenclature of the First Applicant in the Initiating Application as Unus Al-Hassan bears no similarity to the deceased's, Ahmed Husein Divela. While the Court is mindful that such difference in nomenclature does not debunk a relationship, it takes judicial notice of it given the First Applicant's burden of establishing a relationship. 40. Having perused the facts before it, the Court finds no evidence establishing the description of the First Applicant as a brother to the victim. In HELEN JOSHUA (supra), the Court held that by adducing the birth certificate of the deceased, the First Applicant therein proved that she had the requisite locus standi. However, in the present case, the Comi finds the First Applicant's description as the brother to the deceased a mere statement of fact. Such an assertion should have been suffi ciently proved before the Court either by sworn testimony or by a Bii:th Certificate corroborating at least one shared parent. 18 I Page 41. It is evident to the Court that the First Applicant has failed to adduce evidence of a relationship with the deceased but has only submitted a momentary description as the deceased's brother. In this wise, the Court find s that the First Appli cant lacks locus standi as he has failed to submit proof of relationship. Consequently, the Comi declares the First Applicant inadmissible. Second Applicant 42. The Second Applicant, who describes itself as the Estate of Ahmed Husein Divela, is claiming j ointly w ith the First Applicant herein. It states that it is made up of the parent of the deceased, his wife, his seven siblings, his three daughters and other numerous dependents. 43. The requirement that the Applicant establ ishes locus standi, i.e. a legal ri ght or a protectable interest that has been adversely affected or injured by the conduct of the Respondent is what is under determination by the Court. Therefore, the Cou1i having laid down the two categories of victims for human ri ghts violations, is inclined to classify the Second Applicant into one of the two categories. 44. In view of the facts before the Court, and its analysis of the facts before it, it is evident that the Second Applicant is claiming as an indirect victim, albeit as the deceased is not the claimant herein. It has long been settled in STELLA IFEOMA & 20 ORS. V FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2015) CCJELR at page 7 where the Court had this to say: "[W]hen it becomes impossible for him, whose right is violated to insist on that right or to seek redress either because he is deceased or prevented in one way or the other . Fom doing so, it is pe,fectly normal that the right to bring his case before the law Court should fall on another person close to him." Hence the Comi in the present case, firmly concludes that the Second Applicant is claiming as an indirect victim. Notwithstanding this 19 I Page conclusion, the Court sti II has the task of determining whether the Second Applicant has the requisite locus standi to be granted access before the Court. 45. Based on the Court's determination regarding the admissibility of the First Applicant, it finds it necessary to iterate that where the direct victim is deceased or otherwise unable to bring the claim, the rule is relaxed to allow access to individuals with a close personal relationship to the direct v ictim-such as spouses, children, parents, guardians, or other immediate family members- may institute proceedings as 'indirect victims': KEHINDE ENAGAMEH v. THE GAMBIA, ECW/CCJ/JUD/3 4/23, para. 30. However, the Court in ATTIPOE KUAKU v. REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE, ECW/CCJ/JUD/07/23, paras. 44- 45 held that a person who brings a claim on behalf of a direct victim must demonstrate their family or close relationship with the victim to establish their locus standi as an indirect victim. In establishing locus standi in this instance, the Second Applicant has the onus of proving its legal personality which would in turn denote the persons form ing the Estate. 46. The Court needs to ascertain the legal personality of the Second Respondent as it is a body corporate as described in Article IO (d) of the Protocol (supra) and not a human being or individual/s.it is the legal personality that will establish the link between the Second Applicant and the claim it has brought together with the first Applicant. This is in line with its decision in HELEN JOSHUA (supra) where it held that "[J]t is noteworthy to state here that when a claim is brought by an entity that claims to possess the ability to enjoy rights and be bound by obligations (which is a Legal personality), that entity must have gained its legal personality by law." 47. In the present claim, the Court notes that the Second Applicant has failed to adduce evidence that establishes its legal personality. Such legal personality would be evinced by Letters of Administration or Probate, that would be drawn ' 20 1 Page ~ ~ ~ up and sealed under law, and would more especially denote the persons forming the Estate. The Court considers that the random listing of persons and a reference to numerous unlisted names are synonymous to simple facts before it. Only a legally obtained document, vesting legal personality to act as the Estate of a deceased, would suffice. Seeing as the Second App licant failed to submit evidence of its legal personality, the Court conclusively finds that it lacks locus standi and declares it inadmissible. 48. Having exhaustively analysed the facts and evidence before it, the Court is inclined to close its deli beration on admissibility pursuant to Article 10( d) of the Protocol (supra). The Court declares the application inadmissible and consequently, dismisses the claims in its entirety. IX. COSTS 49. The Court is mandated to award costs at the end of its decision. Under Article 66 (2) of the Rules of the Community Court of Justice, "[T]he unsuccessful party shall be ordered to pay costs if they have been applied for in the successful party 's pleadings. " However, the Court notes that the Respondent has not prayed for costs therefore, it will resort to Article 66 (11) to wit: [I]f costs are not claimed, the parties shall bear their own costs." Consequent upon the lack of a prayer for costs from the Respondent and guided by the law, the Court orders that the parties are to bear their own costs. X. OPERATIVE CLAUSE For the reasons stated above the Cow1 sitting in public after hearing both parties : As to jurisdiction: 1. Declares that it has jurisdiction. 21 I P a g e As to admissibility 11. Declares the application inadmissible. ___ _,._ ii- D-ismisses...all-claims~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - t COSTS: 1. Orders that the parties bear their own costs. Hon. Justice Ricardo Claudio Monteiro GON<;AL YES Hon, Justice Sengu Mohamed KOROMA/Judge Rapporteur Hon. Justice Dupe A TOKI Dr. Yaouza OURO-SAMA - Chief Registrar Done in Abuja, this 13 1 h day of May, 2025 in English and translated into French and Portuguese. 22 I Page