Mulindwa v Abdul & 3 Others (HCT-01-CV-LD 17 of 2015) [2024] UGHC 932 (30 September 2024)

#### **THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA**

#### **IN THE HIGH COURT OF UGANDA AT FORT PORTAL**

#### **HCT-01-CV-LD-017 OF 2015**

**DR. MULINDWA RWABAINGI ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: PLAINTIFF**

#### **VERSUS**

#### **1. ABDUL KARIM MONDAY**

- **2. HARUNA KYALIGONZA** - **3. KABAROLE DISTRICT LAND BOARD**

**4. RUGUMAYO ROBERT ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::DEFENDANTS**

#### **BEFORE: HON. JUSTICE VINCENT EMMY MUGABO**

#### **JUDGMENT**

The Plaintiff brought this suit against the defendants jointly and severally in trespass to land, breach of contract, fraud, estoppel and costs. It was stated in his plaint that he bought the 1st defendant's plot described as 06-A-34 at Njara in Fort Portal in November 1996. The said plot shared a boundary with the State Lodge. Upon purchase, the plaintiff took possession of the entire plot. Between 1996 and 2012, the plaintiff leased out the said plot to various people who openly used it for cultivation. That sometime in 1997, the area Land Committee had inspected the land and found no ownership disputes.

In 2013 when the plaintiff had started the process of acquiring a freehold title to the land, the 1st defendant claimed in writing that the 1st defendant had sold to the plaintiff only a portion of the land described as 06-A-34 at Njara and not the whole of it. The 1st defendant claimed that the portion he had sold to the plaintiff had *Muko* trees as its upper boundary and not the boundary with the State Lodge. This then created a portion was allegedly not sold by the 1st defendant to the plaintiff but being part of the land formerly described as 06-A-34 at Njara. This purportedly unsold portion is what I will later on in this decision refer to as the suit land or the suit portion.

It is further gathered from the plaint that attempts were made by the area land committee in collaboration with the 2nd defendant to declare the suit portion belonged to the State Lodge, which ownership was refuted by the State Lodge itself. In September 2013, with full knowledge of the plaintiff's claim over the suit portion and acting in bad faith, the 3rd defendant under minute No. KDLB MIN NO 06/09/2013(B)(7) approved the 2nd defendant's application for conversion of the customary land to freehold for the portion purportedly unsold.

In February 2014, the plaintiff lodged a caveat to forbid the bringing of the suit portion under the operation of the Registration of Titles Act (RTA), but the 2nd defendant fraudulently acquired the freehold certificate of title over the same albeit the caveat. The certificate of title FRV HQT 662 Folio 16, Plot 21 at Njara was created and the 2nd defendant later transferred the same to the 4th defendant who was also aware of the dispute and the present suit. The plaintiff further avers that the 1st and 2nd defendants acquiesced to the plaintiff's occupation of the suit land for well over 15 years and they are therefore estopped from claiming any rights in the same. The actions of the 1st defendant are in breach of the land sale/purchase agreement that he executed with the plaintiff in 1997.

The 1st, 2nd and 4th defendants filed a joint written statement of defence and denied allegations of fraud, trespass, breach of contract and estoppel. They stated that the land described as 06-A-34 at Njara formerly belonged to the late Hawa Abdalla, mother of the 1st defendant. Prior to her death, she had sold parts of that land to many other people including the late Kabeya Gabriel, Jalia Tibasaaga, Ratib and others. The residue is what the 1st defendant inherited and placed under the care and supervision of the 2nd defendant. The residue is what the 1st defendant portioned and sold to the plaintiff and a portion later to the 4th defendant.

The 1st, 2nd and 4th defendants further aver that the land that was sold to the plaintiff did not share a boundary with the State Lodge. It had its upper boundary as *Muko* trees, leaving the suit portion which now shares a boundary with the State Lodge. That is to say, the suit portion neighbours the portion that was sold to the plaintiff and they are both formerly part of the land described as 06-A-34 at Njara. In 2013 when the plaintiff attempted to survey and include the suit land in his application for a freehold offer, the 2nd defendant objected to the same, which prompted the area Land Committee to convene a meeting to resolve the issue and the indeed, the upper boundary of the plaintiff's land was found to be *Muko* trees and did not extend to the suit portion. A freehold title was processed for the suit portion (FRV HQT662 Folio 16, Block (Road) Njara Road Plot 21 at Njara A, and later lawfully transferred to the 4th defendant.

By way of counterclaim, the 4th defendant claimed for a permanent injunction, special and general damages, interest and costs. He claimed that because of the caveat that was lodged by the plaintiff on the suit land, the 4th defendant was not able to obtain a loan from Bank of Africa in the sum of UGX 150,000,000/= and to use his land as collateral, which negatively affected the 4th defendant's business.

In its written statement of defence, the 3rd defendant denied any allegations of fraud on its part. It averred that it had never received any application from the plaintiff or recommendation from the area land committee to convert his customary land to freehold. Further that the approval of the conversion of the 2nd defendant's land to freehold (the suit portion) was from the recommendation of the area land committee.

# **Representation and hearing**

The plaintiff is represented by Mr. Luleti Robert of Mugabe-Luleti & Co. Advocates and Mr. Bwiruka Richard of Kaahwa, Kafuuzi, Bwiruka & Co. Advocates, jointly. The 1st, 2nd and 4th defendants are represented jointly by Mr. Businge A. Victor of Ngaruye Ruhindi, Spencer & Co. Advocates as well as Mr. Musinguzi Bernard of Kayonga, Musinguzi & Co. Advocates. Mr. Kawalya Ronald and Ms. Atumanyise Rachael of Attorney General's Chambers represented the 3rd defendant.

The hearing was by way of witness statements and cross examination. All parties filed written submissions.

At scheduling, the following issues were raised for determination by court:-

- *1. Who is the rightful owner of the suit land?* - *2. Whether the defendant are jointly and or severally liable for the fraud in obtaining the title over the suit land* - *3. Whether the 1st and 2nd defendants fraudulently sold the suit land to the 4th defendant*

# *4. Whether the 4th defendant fraudulently obtained an interest in the suit land*

*5. What remedies are available to the parties?*

# **Burden and Standard of proof**

The burden of proof is upon the Plaintiff to prove his case on a balance of probabilities. **Section 101, 102 and 103 of the Evidence Act** provide that he who asserts a fact must prove it. Whoever desires any court to give the judgment as to any legal rights or liability dependent on the existence of the fact which he or she asserts must prove that fact exists.

The court has to be satisfied that the Plaintiff has furnished evidence whose level of probity is such that a reasonable man might hold that, the more probable conclusion is that for which the Plaintiff contends, since the standards of proof is on the balance of probabilities /preponderance of evidence (see *Lancaster Vs Blackwell Colliery Co. Ltd 1982 WC Rep 345* and *Sebuliba Vs Cooperative Bank Ltd (1982) HCB130*)

# **Court's determination**

After carefully studying the parties' pleadings, evidence and submissions, it is my considered opinion that the questions to be determined are three. That is; who owns the suit land? Whether any of the defendants is guilty of fraud and What remedies are available to the parties? I under Order 15 rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Rules SI 282-1 amend the issues as such. All will be resolved together.

# The evidence

The plaintiff testified as **PW1**. He stated in his witness statement that he bought the land described as 06-A-34 at Njara from the 1st defendant by agreement dated 13/11/1996 (**Pexh1**). This land included the suit portion. In the said agreement, he was supposed to compensate Mrs. Lydia Nkojo/Nkoba who had been wrongly sold the land. He referred to minutes of the 1st defendant's family (**Pexh2**) that decided on the said compensation. Subsequent to the said sale, the 1st defendant through one called Ismail Hassan wrote (**Pexh3**) to the Town Clerk Fort Portal informing him that he had surrendered the interests he had in the plot described as 06-A-34 at Njara to the plaintiff. The plaintiff took possession of the entire plot which includes the suit land, fenced it off without any objection from anyone.

PW1 also referred to a tenancy agreement dated 13/09/1993 (**Pexh4a**) between Hawa the mother of the 1st defendant and Fort Portal Municipal Council which also described Hawa's land as 06-A-34 at Njara, which the plaintiff later bought. The plaintiff's brother permitted several people to utilise the land for cultivation. The land was later inspected by the area land committee and found no dispute over the same. In 2013, the plaintiff received communication from the 3rd Defendant (**Pexh7a** and **Pexh7b**) informing him that the suit land was government land under the control of the 3rd defendant. The plaintiff later received a letter from the 1st defendant dated 16/11/2013 (**Pexh11**) purporting to clarify that the land he sold to the plaintiff in 1996 did not extend up to the State Lodge but had its upper boundary as *Muko* trees/stumps. The area land committee had also sat in a meeting on 4/10/2013 (**Pexh9**), inspected the land and concluded that the plaintiff only bought part of the land described as 06-A-34 at Njara

and not the whole of it, which conclusion the plaintiff did not agree with.

PW1 further stated that he lodged a caveat (**Pexh12a**) to forbid the bringing of the suit land under the operation of the RTA. He later realised that the 3rd defendant had passed a minute dated 27/09/2013 allowing the 2nd defendant to obtain a freehold title over the suit portion. The said minute was passed even before the meeting of the area land committee of 4/10/2013. The said portion was later registered and a certificate of title for FRV HQT662 Folio 16, Block (Road) Njara Road Plot 21 at Njara A was made in favour of the 2nd defendant in disregard of the plaintiff's caveat. The said portion was later sold to the 4th defendant in 2016 who also knew about the dispute over the land as well as the present suit.

During cross examination, the plaintiff stated that the Muko trees had been there for long but others were planted in 2013. In re-examination, he stated that some of the Muko trees were a boundary between him and the late Kabeya.

Smart Bwango (**PW2**) was the brother of the plaintiff who was responsible for most of the transactions with respect to the land in dispute on behalf of the plaintiff. Most of his evidence doesn't differ from that of PW1. He stated that the land that he bought in 1996 on behalf of the plaintiff, which land was described as 06-A-34 at Njara, was the whole land, the suit portion inclusive. In cross-examination, he stated that Charles Biingi was his witness at the execution of the purchase agreement (Pexh1) in 1996, but the said Charles Biingi stated in the 4th October 2013 meeting (Pexh9) that the land that the plaintiff bought did not extend to the State Lodge. He also stated that Kabeya had also bought land from the 1st defendant's late mother. He had been told that that land was formerly part of the plot described as 06-A-34 at Njara. He further stated that he knew the 2 Muko trees in the land but they did not form the boundary.

Zura Abdullah Nankya (**PW3**) is a sister to the 1st defendant and daughter of the late Hawa Abdulla. She stated that the plaintiff bought the entire residue of her late mother's land described as 06-A-34 at Njara and the plaintiff was given all the documentation in respect to the said land. The said land shared a boundary with the State Lodge. Initially, one Sulaim Abdallah had sold the land to Lydia Nkoba irregularly but the said Lydia was told to vacate the land. She emphasised that the entire land that used to belong to her mother was sold to the plaintiff and not only a portion. She was present and she signed on the sale agreement Pexh1.

Justine Basemera Kabeya (**PW4**) is a neighbour to the land in dispute. Her husband had also bought from the 1st defendant's late mother. She stated that the land that the plaintiff bought shared its upper boundary with the State Lodge. It was the last remaining part of the late Hawa family. That the plaintiff fenced the land off and allowed some people to cultivate it. She woke up some time (about 5 years before the day of her testimony) and found the plaintiff's land divided into two with barbed wire and poles. She later learnt that it was the 4th defendant who had bought the portion on the upper part neighbouring the State Lodge. In cross examination, she stated that the Muko trees were on the land but they did not form a boundary.

Kabahenda Margaret (**PW5**) stated that she was cultivating the land on the upper part that neighbours the State Lodge. Around 2011 or 2012, she learnt that the land belonged to the plaintiff's brother, Smart Bwango. She had entered the land with no one's permission because all the family members of the late Hawa had left it. She was stopped from cultivating by the chairperson LC1 around 2014 or 2015.

Waseni George (**PW6**) is a surveyor. He stated that he had instructed one called Kaboyo Lugard to do a preliminary survey of the plaintiff's land and the said survey indicated that the land shared the upper boundary with the State Lodge.

For the defence, the 2nd defendant, Haruna Kyaligonza testified as **DW1**. He stated that the land in dispute formerly belonged to his late sister, Hawa Abdalla. The said Hawa owned a big piece of land described as 06-A-34 at Njara, part of which she sold to Kabeya and others. Upon her death, the remaining portion was sold to the plaintiff by the 1st defendant and another to the 4th defendant. That the land that was sold to the plaintiff did not include the suit portion. That after purchasing the land neighbouring the suit land, the plaintiff successfully surveyed his portion leaving the suit land intact. When the plaintiff sought to include the suit land in his survey and application for freehold offer, the 2nd defendant objected which prompted the area land committee to convene the meeting of 4th October 2013 to resolve the impasse. In the said meeting, it was found that the land sold to the plaintiff by the 1st defendant stopped at the *Muko* trees and did not include the suit land which extended to the Presidential State Lodge boundary.

Further, DW1 stated that in November 2013, the 1st defendant came and clarified the boundaries of the land he had sold to the plaintiff in writing. There being no further dispute, the 2nd defendant went ahead and processed the certificate of title for the suit portion FRV HQT662 Folio 16, Block (Road) Njara Road Plot 21 at Njara A, which he later transferred to the 4th defendant. He noted that the description of the land as 06-A-34 at Njara was a description of the whole land of the late Hawa Abdalla, including the pieces she had sold to Kabeya, Ratib and Jalia Tibasaga and not just the land that was sold to the plaintiff by the 1st defendant. Also, the plaintiff's caveat was never brought to the 2nd defendant's attention and that the 1st and 2nd defendants have been in occupation of the suit land until the same was sold to the 4th defendant.

In cross examination, DW1 stated that the land sale agreement (Pexh1) was not clear on the boundaries but it's not true that that entire land was sold to the plaintiff. The land that was sold to the plaintiff ended at the *Muko* trees and did not extend to the suit land.

Birungi Charles (**DW2**) stated that the suit land neighbours the plaintiff's portion on the lower end and the State Lodge on the upper boundary. He was present when the plaintiff purchased land neighbouring the suit land. They inspected it before the purchase. The suit portion and the plaintiff's portion are separated by Muko trees. DW2 was also present in the meeting of 4th October 2013 and he confirmed to the area land committee that the plaintiff's land did not extend to the boundary with the State Lodge. The suit portion now belongs to the 4th defendant. Gumisiriza Adolf (**DW3**) stated that as the Chairperson LC1 in 2013, he attended the 4th October 2013 meeting in which the people who had been present when the sale transaction between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant took place confirmed that the suit land was not sold to the plaintiff. It was later sold to the 4th defendant who now owns it.

Robert Rugumayo, the 4th defendant testified as **DW4** that he lawfully purchased the suit land after inspecting it and there was no occupant or development on the same. He also made inquiries from the neighbours. There was no dispute at all and therefore he had no notice of any impediment to his purchase of the suit land. He is now the registered proprietor of the land FRV HQT662 Folio 16, Block (Road) Njara Road Plot 21 at Njara A.

Alinda Peter testified for the 3rd defendant as (**DW5**) that he attended the civic meeting of 4th October 2013 as the District Land Officer. The boundaries of the disputed land were ascertained. That the land purchase agreement (Pexh1) was defective in as far as it did not have the boundaries and geographical description of the land sold to the plaintiff. That the description of the land as 06-A-34 was akin to the numerical method used by Urban Councils to describe unplanned and unmanned community accesses or passages in Grade II pieces of land from the 60s to around 1994. This would explain why the tenancy agreement the late Hawa signed with Fort Portal Municipal Council in 1993 described the land as such. That the use of 06-A-34 as claimed by the plaintiff would mean he bought the entire estate of the late Hawa including the parcels she had sold to the other people including Kabeya, Nkoba, Kyamulesire and others.

**DW5** further stated that after the civic meeting, the 2nd defendant went ahead to register the suit land and there was no dispute as the application had been cleared by the area land committee.

At the close of the defence case, court conducted locus on 17/11/2023 and made several observations which have also been considered in this judgment. Advocates for all parties filed written submissions which I need not reproduce but note that they have been considered herein.

## **Submissions**

Counsel for the plaintiff argued that the 1st defendant himself did not testify because he knew well that he had sold all his land to the plaintiff and there was nothing more to claim. The 2nd defendant was not related to the 1st defendant by blood and the 2nd defendant was never appointed a caretaker or the Administrator of the late Hawa's estate and therefore had no basis upon which he could claim the suit land. He could not transfer what he did not have to the 4th defendant. Counsel further argued that the land purchase agreement (Pexh1) did not allude to any boundaries meaning that all the reminder of the land contained in Njara 06-A-34 had been sold to the plaintiff. They cannot now turn around and purport to amend the agreement after more than 15 years.

Counsel also argued that the entire land including the undisputed portion as well as the disputed land has Muko trees in it as observed at locus. These would not form a boundary apart from the fact that they were not mentioned in the purchase agreement. Further that even if the land the late Hawa sold to other people including Kabeya was part of 06-A-34, there has never been a boundary dispute between the plaintiff and those other people because everyone knew their respective boundaries.

On the question of fraud, counsel for the plaintiff argued that the 2nd defendant obtained approval from the 3rd defendant without recommendation from the area land committee. Further that the officials of 3rd defendant were present in the civic meeting of 4th October 2013 but did not disclose that they had already passed the minute in September 2013 approving the 2nd defendant's application.

In response, counsel for the 1st, 2nd and 4th defendants argued that the 4th defendant is the registered proprietor of the suit land. Counsel referred to Section 59 of the RTA. Counsel also noted that the 1st defendant rectified the anomaly in the purchase agreement by clarifying in writing on the boundaries of the land that he sold to the plaintiff. Counsel further argued that PW2 Smart Bwango did not have a power of attorney allowing him to purchase the land on behalf of the plaintiff which invalidates the purchase agreement for want of authority.

On the question of fraud, counsel for the 1st, 2nd and 4th defendants argued that the lack of public notice and inspection of the land as well as all the fraud allegations against the 3rd defendant, these were mere irregularities that could not be used to impeach a certificate of title. Further that the 4th defendant's title can only be impeached by fraud if proved against him, which was not.

Counsel for the 3rd defendant argued that the 3rd defendant received a letter from the area land committee (Pexh7) notifying the 3rd defendant of the dispute with respect to the suit land and the intention to call for a civic meeting to resolve the same. The 3rd defendant also received a letter form the 1st defendant (Pexh11) clarifying on the boundaries of the land he had sold to the plaintiff which did not include the suit land.

## **Resolution**

On careful consideration of all the parties' pleadings, evidence and submissions, I realise that the dispute between the parties is one that ought to be looked at in terms of the boundaries of the land that the 1st defendant sold to the plaintiff in 1996. I take note that there are allegations and counter-accusations by the parties that transactions with respect to the suit land were made in the absence of proper authority. I note that the 1st defendant did not have letters of administration to sell land to the plaintiff in 1996. The 2nd defendant did not also have proper authority to sell land to the 4th defendant in the absence of letters of administration or a power of attorney. These are not the real questions for determination before the court. It is not in dispute that the 1st defendant sold land to the plaintiff. It is also not disputed that the 2nd defendant sold the suit land to the 4th defendant. The only question is whether the suit land belongs to the plaintiff or the 4th defendant.

To begin with, the land sale/purchase agreement between the 1st defendant as vendor and the plaintiff as purchaser (**Pexh1**) states that the plaintiff purchased the land described as 06-A-34 at Njara. The said land formerly belonged to the late Hawa Abdalla. It is also generally agreed that the late Hawa had sold land to other people prior to her death, including Kabeya. The agreement (Pexh1) made no mention of the boundaries of the land that was being sold. It just described the land as 06-A-34 at Njara. The plaintiff and his witnesses stated that the only remaining land of the late Hawa was the land the plaintiff bought. The defendants' witnesses stated that the only remaining part of the land belonging to the late Hawa was divided into two, selling a portion to the plaintiff in 1996 and another portion to the 4th defendant in 2016. About 20 years separating the two transactions.

The 1st and 2nd defendants as well as the plaintiff claim to have been in possession of the land in dispute all through. It however appears from the respective evidence that neither of them was in possession of the suit land until around 2011 or 2012. From the evidence of Kabahenda Margaret (**PW5**), she had entered the suit land and cultivated it with no one's permission because the family of the late Hawa had all left. It was until 2011 or 2012 that she discovered that the plaintiff's brother Smart Bwango was the owner. Both parties had left it unattended. This state of affairs could have several explanations. It is possible that the 1st and 2nd defendants left the suit land unattended well knowing that it belonged to the plaintiff. It is also possible that the plaintiff left it unattended well knowing that it did not form part of the land that he purchased from the 1st defendant.

I am more inclined to believe the latter explanation. The fact that the plaintiff did not get into possession of the suit portion until around 2011 or 2012 is consistent with the evidence that the plaintiff might have bought only a part of the land described as 06-A-34 and not the whole. He acquired a certificate of title over his portion. The plaintiff has not led sufficient evidence to indicate that there was a serious dispute that could have prevented him from registering his interest over the suit portion. If there was such a dispute, we could have the present suit earlier than it was filed.

It is also clear from the evidence of the plaintiff that the late Hawa Abdallah who is the former owner of the land described as 06-A-34 at Njara had sold some parts of it to several other people. It is clear then that the use of the same description in the sale agreement executed between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant did not refer to the entire land originally described as such. This would include the land occupied by the persons that previously bought portions of the same from the late Hawa. **Section 91 of the Evidence Act, Cap 8** excludes the admissibility of other evidence to prove the contents of a document other than the document itself. This could be said of the purchase agreement between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant. It however appears that all circumstances point to the fact that their agreement was incomplete without a description of the boundaries of the land they were transacting with. A description of boundaries is the most common way of identifying unregistered land. Without it, the transaction would loosely be considered ambiguous.

I am alive to the fact that allowing the 1st and 2nd defendants to impute existence of boundaries that were not described in the agreement would be to open up a limitless point at which they could say was the boundary. This case is about an ambiguity for which the plaintiff and the 1st defendant are responsible. I however note that the witnesses of the 1st defendant were consistent in the description of where the boundary was when the 1st defendant sold land to the plaintiff. They noted that the land that was sold to the plaintiff ended at the Muko trees. This is followed by the conduct of the plaintiff not to occupy the suit portion from the time he purchased it until around 2012.

From **Pexh5(a),** the plaintiff applied for the grant of the land that he bought to be inspected, surveyed and titled in 1997 after purchasing the same in 1996. The same was inspected and no disputes found on the same. There is no sufficient explanation from the plaintiff however why the same was not concluded by the time the dispute in this case arose around 2013.

It is my opinion that looking at all the case circumstances, it is more probable that the land that the plaintiff purchased from the 1st defendant in 1996 did not include the suit land. The suit land belongs to the present registered proprietor, the 4th defendant who acquired the same from the 2nd defendant. I will not delve into the submissions about the lack of capacity by the 2nd defendant to sell and transfer the suit land to the 4th defendant. Smart Bwango did not also have the requisite power of attorney to purchase land for the plaintiff in 1996 either. To delve into these would be to open up a new line of dispute which is not very useful in settling the present dispute presented by the parties.

Turning to the counterclaim, the 4th defendant prayed permanent injunction, special and general damages, interest and costs. He claimed that because of the caveat that was lodged by the plaintiff on the suit land, the 4th defendant was not able to obtain a loan from Bank of Africa in the sum of UGX 150,000,000/= and to use his land as collateral, which negatively affected the 4th defendant's business.

The 4th defendant stated that he applied for the loan in 2012 and sought to use the suit land as collateral. It is however seen that he purchased the suit land in November 2013 as seen in **Dexh1**. It is not possible that he intended to mortgage property that he had not yet acquired. Besides, **Pexh12(d)** indicates that the plaintiff's caveat was received at the land registry in February 2014. If it is indeed true that the 4th defendant applied for his loan in 2012, it was less likely that the plaintiff's caveat was an issue. Besides, the plaintiff's caveat was meant to protect an interest that the plaintiff could have possibly and bona fide thought he had in the suit land. The 4th defendant's counterclaim is without merit.

I need to mention that the 3rd defendant did not handle the parties' dispute over the suit land well. They began by claiming that the land belonged to the government in **Pexh7(a)**. Then the meeting of 4th October 2013 took place to try and get to the bottom of the boundary issue. The said meeting was held with the knowledge of the 3rd defendant and the chairperson of the 3rd defendant refers to the same meeting in **Pexh13(i).** However, even before the conduct of the said meeting, as indicated in **Pexh14(b)**, the 3rd defendant had already passed the minute granting the suit land to the 2nd defendant in September 2013. This falls short of good faith.

I also note that the 2nd defendant went ahead to obtain registration of the suit land in 2015, despite the plaintiff's caveat forbidding the said registration. This however may be the fault of the Registrar of Lands. The 4th defendant was the ultimate beneficiary to this registration as he had already purchased the suit land from the 2nd defendant in 2013. As such, the registration of the suit land by the 2nd defendant was for the sole purpose of transferring it to the 4th defendant.

In the ultimate result, I make the following orders;

- a. The suit land, which is now registered as FRV HQT 662 Folio 16, Plot 21 at Njara belongs to the 4th defendant. - b. A permanent injunction is hereby issued restraining the plaintiff or anyone claiming under him from dealing with the suit land in any way. - c. Each Party shall meet its own costs of the suit.

It is so ordered

Dated at Fort Portal this 30th day of September 2024.

**\_\_\_\_\_\_**

**Vincent Emmy Mugabo Judge**