Musa Said Hassan & Abdulahi Musa Said v Cape Supplies Limited [2017] KEHC 5923 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

CIVIL APPEAL CASE NO.  132 “B” OF 2013

MUSA SAID HASSAN......................................1ST APPELLANT

ABDULAHI MUSA SAID.................................2ND APPELLANT

VERSUS

CAPE SUPPLIES LIMITED...................................RESPONDENT

(from the ruling and order of the Senior Resident Magistrate’s

Courtdated 18th  February  2013 in Nairobi CM CC 182 of 2013

delivered  by the Honourable  T.S. Nchoe).

JUDGMENT

1. This  appeal arises  from the ruling  and   order of  the Senior Resident  Magistrate’s Court  dated  18th  February  2013   in Nairobi  CM CC 182  of  2013  delivered  by the Honourable  T.S. Nchoe.

2. The  ruling  and  order herein being   challenged  arose from the application dated  21st  January  2013  by the plaintiff/applicant  wherein the  applicant  sought orders for:

a. …..

b. The defendants by themselves or though their authorized  servants, agents  and or employees be  restrained  from  in any way  interfering  with the plaintiffs  entrance  to LR NO.  36/IV/14(20 A) on Bahati area or from blocking the road thereto pending the hearing   and determination of this application.

c. Costs of the application.

3. In the ruling delivered on 25th July 2013 after an interpartes hearing of the above application, the trial magistrate made the following orders.

a. That the defendants  by themselves  or through  their authorized  agents and  or  employees be and  are hereby restrained  from in any  way  interfering  with the plaintiff’s  entrance  to LR  No. 36/IV/14(20A) in Bahati  area from  blocking the read thereto pending the hearing and  determination of this application.

b. That costs shall be in the cause.

4. Being dissatisfied with the above order, the defendants who were respondents in the application which restrained them from blocking the named road, filed this appeal on 12th March 2013    setting out 10 grounds of appeal namely:

1. That the  learned magistrate  erred  both in law  and  in fact in  failing  to appreciate  sufficiency  or at all  that the appellants  are the  proprietors of plot  No. 93  and  plot No. 94   which  property  is the subject  matter of  the dispute;

2. The learned  magistrate  erred in law  and  in fact  in failing  to appreciate  sufficiently  or at  al that the  respondent  never laid   any claim  of ownership over the said  plots No. 93 and 94.

3. The learned  magistrate  erred  in law   and  in fact  in failing to  appreciate  sufficiently or at all the evidence  that  was placed  before him   by the appellants;

4. The learned  magistrate erred in law and  in fact  in failing  to find on  a preliminary  view  or at all  whether  or not the property   in dispute  was an entrance  and  or road  reserve  as alleged   or at all.

5. The learned  magistrate erred  in law  and  fact in failing to appreciate  that the issue  in dispute   was not whether   the  parties    had documents  of ownership  of their respective  lands but  rather,  whether the  plots 93  and  94  were an access  road or private  property.

6. The learned   magistrate  erred in law and  fact in  failing to find and hold   that there  was  no evidence  of whatever  nature placed  before him to substantiate  the claim that   the plots  in issue  were  actually  an access  road;

7. The learned   magistrate  erred in law and  fact and or  in finding   and holding that  both parties  had documents  or ownership  while only  one party  had documents  of ownership of the specific  plots   in question being  plot No. 93  and  plot No. 94;

8. The learned  magistrate erred  in law  in failing to state and present  his  analysis  of the case  presented  by the parties   and   to give  comprehensive  reasons  for the decision  rendered;

9. The learned  magistrate  misdirected  himself  on the principles  governing  interlocutory  injunction  application  that  was before  him;

10. In view  of the circumstances  set out  herein  above, the learned magistrate  totally  misdirected  himself  in delivering  ruling and  orders in  favour of the respondent  by failing to  consider  and  appreciate  the evidence on record  tendered  on behalf  of the appellants.

5. The appellants  prayed  that this appeal  be allowed; the ruling  and  order of  the subordinate  court dated  18th February  2013  be and  is hereby  set aside; The respondent’s notice of motion application dated 4th February 2013 be and is hereby dismissed with costs to the applicants; costs of this appeal be  and are  hereby awarded  to the appellants; and for  any other  order as  the Honourable  court may deem fit.

6. This being  a first  appeal, this court  is obliged   by Section  78  of the Civil Procedure  Act to  re-evaluate, reassess  and  re-examine  the matter  as conducted  in the trial court and  arrive  at its  own independent  conclusion.  This is  the principle  espoused in the Sielle  Vs Associated  Motor Boat  Company Ltd [1968] EA 123 where Sir  Clement  De  le Stang  stated that:

“ This  court must  consider the evidence, evaluate  itself and draw its own conclusions  though in doing  so it should  always  bear in mind  that it neither  heard witnesses  and   should  make due allowance in this respect.  However, this court  is not bound necessarily  to follow  the trial judge’s   findings  of fact if it appears  either that   he had  clearly failed on some point to take account of particular  circumstances  or probabilities  materially  to estimate  the evidence  or if   the  impression bases as the demeanor of  a witness is inconsistent with the evidence in the case  generally ( Abdul Hammod Sarif  vs  Ali  Mohamed  Solan [1955] 22 EACA  270).”

7. In addition, as  an appellate court,  I will   not interfere  with the finding   of fact of  a trial court  unless it is  based on no evidence, or  on a misapprehension  of the evidence, or  the  judge/trial  magistrate is shown to have demonstrably  to  have acted  on wrong principles  in reaching   his conclusion.  This is the principle espoused in Mkube V Nyamuro [1983] KLR 403. Further, in Mbogo V Shah & Another [1968] EA 93 the Court of Appeal set out circumstances under which an appellate court may interfere with a decision of the trial court as follows:

“ I think  it is well  settled  that this court will not  interfere  with the exercise  of  discretion  by the inferior  court unless  it is satisfied  that the decision  is clearly wrong because it has  misdirected  itself or because  it has  failed to take  into consideration  matters  which  it should  have taken into account  and consideration and  in doing so  arrived at  a  wrong conclusion.”

9. Thus, the decision/order of the trial court involved exercise of judicial discretion, the appellate court ought not to interfere with  the discretion   of the trial  court save  where  the trial court  has misdirected  itself  on the law, or misapprehended the facts  or failed to take into consideration  relevant  matters or  otherwise  the decision  was plainly  wrong   was  held in Mrao Ltd vs  First  American  Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 Others [2003] KLR 125.

9. On the other hand, the case ofUnited India Insurance  Company Ltd  v EA Underwriters  (K) Ltd [1985] EA  898 Madan JA set out the circumstances under which  the  appellate court will interfere with the exercise  of discretion by the trial court, which circumstances are said  to be limited as follows:

“ The Court of Appeal  will not  interfere  with a discretionary decision of the judge  appealed  from simply on the ground that  its members, if  sitting at  first instance, would or  might have given different  weight  to that  given  by the judge  to the various  factors  in the case.

The Court of Appeal is only entitled to interfere if one   or more of the following matters are established: first, that the judge  misdirected  himself  or herself  in law; secondly, that he  misapprehended  the facts; thirdly that he  took account of  considerations of which he  should  have  taken  account, fourthly, that he failed  to take account  of considerations of which he  should have   taken account, or fifthly, that  his decision albeit  a discretionary one is  plainly  wrong.”

10. Applying  the above principles to this case, it is  worth  nothing  that the  order that  is appealed  from is in  an interlocutory proceeding  wherein  the respondent  had sought  an  interlocutory  injunction  under Order  40  rule  1,2 & 4  of the Civil Procedure  Rules   and  Section  63(e)  of the Civil Procedure Act,  seeking  to restrain  the  appellants, by themselves or through  their  authorized  servants, agents  and  or employees from in anyway interfering with the  plaintiff/respondent’s  entrance  to LR NO. 36/IV/14(20A) in Bahati Area  or from  blocking  the road thereto pending the hearing  and  determination of the application.

11. The grounds  upon  which the  application  was predicated  are that  the respondent was the registered owner of LR No. 26/IV/14/(20A) which  consists  of  2 portions  divided by a river.  One portion is on Eastleigh Section IV  side while  the other  one is  on Bahati  Area; that the area  of the plaintiff’s  land on the  Bahati Area  could only  be accessed  from Bahati  side due to the river  passing through the land; that the respondent had been  using the area of his  land  on Bahati  Area   as a parking yard  for its lorries  since  2009; That  the  area is well  fenced with a gate; that the  defendants/appellants had threatened to block the entrance and the road to the  respondent’s land  on Bahati  area alleging  that he  was the owner of the road leading to the plaintiff’s land; that  investigations  by the plaintiff had proved  that there was  no plot next  to the entrance of the plaintiff’s  property  on Bahati  area  and  all the maps from survey  of Kenya support  that  position; That access road to the  plaintiff’s  land  from the Bahati  side consisted  of licences; easements and  or restrictive  covenants  subsisting  at the time of   purchase and which  the defendants  now not  empowered  by law or otherwise  to alter  or vitiate; That  the defendant  therefore has no capacity  to issue  the threats to block the plaintiff’s  entrance; and that the defendant  is likely to effect his oral threats  which may cause a breach  of the piece  and irreparable   loss and   damages   to the plaintiff.

12. The application  was also supported by a sworn  affidavit  of Patrick  Gitimu  Kibanya  annexing  copies  of conveyance;  a map; parking yard and some photographs alleged to be  of trenches  and  alleged way leave for  the power line.

13. It is also  worth noting  that the  application  was filed  simultaneous  with the plaint dated  21st January  2013   and  in the prayers  thereof  the  plaintiff/respondent  herein sought  for orders of a permanent injunction restraining the defendant  by himself  or through  his authorized  agents  servants  and  or employees  from interfering  with the plaintiff’s  entrance  to LR  No. 36/IV/14/20A on Bahati area or from blocking the road thereto; and a declaration that the plaintiff is entitled  to an access  road  to its property on LR No. 36/IV/14/(20A) the Bahati side; costs of the suit.

14. As expected, the appellants who were the defendants  opposed that application and filed a replying  affidavit sworn by  Musa Said  Hassan  the 1st appellant who clarified that  he is not  Addi Hassa Musa  and contending  that the suit  property  belongs  to him and his son Abdullahi  Musa Said.  Further that the supporting affidavit accompanying application for an injunction alluded to irrelevant matters, is slanderous, utterly false, and malicious and made in bad faith.  That he had never issued any threats to the respondent herein as alleged and that the alleged entrance or road on Bahati annex leading to the described land is nonexistent.  Instead it was contended that there are 2 plots No. 93 and 94 situated  in Bahati annex  belonging  to him  and  his son  Abdullahi  Musa Said vide transfer of  6th  August 1992 from M. Thumbi  & Mary  N. Njoki respectively as shown   by annexed  letters of  allotment  for plots  93  and  94  respectively.  That he consulted the land  surveyor  who identified  the original  boundaries  to the said  plots  and who also  issued  beacon certificates; that as owners  thereof, the defendant and his son paid  charges   to the city council;  He also attached  a map  showing that the two  plots are  adjacent  to each other; that the respondent  had in  2012   approached  the appellants  with a request to purchase  the  said property  and that  as he planned to improve  the said  plots,  the respondent  requested  for an access  to the latter’s  plot  LR 36/1V/14/20A as it  shared  a common boundary  with plots 93 and 94 which, in the spirit of good  neighbourliness, the appellants  granted  but the respondent  reneged  on his promise to buy the said plot from the appellants;  and that the  respondent had now turned  around to claim that  the  2 plots  are an access  road to  his plot  which  is not  true.  That the map attached to the notice of motion   does not assist the court know where the features are and it is misleading.

15. Further, the appellants contended that there  was no irreparable harm or injury  demonstrated  to be suffered  which cannot  be  compensated  by costs;  and that the  application did not  raise any  prima facie  case hence he urged  the court to  dismiss the application as it  was  him who  would stand  to  suffer irreparable  harm.

16. The appellants  also filed a defence on 8th March  2013   denying  the claim  by the respondent  wherein it is stated  that there is no  road  but instead  the  2 plots  are owned by the defendants/appellants.

17. The application for injunction  was argued  interpartes  on 11th February  2013  after the respondent   was  granted   leave to  amend  the application  to provide for  correct names   of defendants  and  in prayer   2 to  read plural.

18. In his  ruling  of  5  paragraphs  the Honourable  Nchoe  stated  interalia that  “ Both parties have  documents  of ownership and it is important  that status  quo be maintained  to ascertain their authenticity and legality.  Reason wherefore the application dated 21st January 2013 is allowed.”

19. It is that brief ruling that prompted this appeal to challenge the order thereof.

20. The appeal  herein  was  admitted  to hearing on  13th May 2014  by Honourable Waweru J  and  directions  were given  on  21st July  2014  by Honourable  Mutungi.  The appeal   was then fixed for hearing and on 18th May 2015 despite service of hearing of notice  upon the  respondent, there  was no appearance in court on its behalf  hence Honourable  Onyancha  J allowed the appellant’s  counsel  to proceed   and  argue the appeal orally.

221. After urging the appeal, Honourable Onyacha J was to deliver  a  judgment  on 29th June  2015  but the  learned judge   was transferred  to Kabarnet High Court and  later he retired  hence the reallocation of this  file to me  after the typing  of proceedings to enable  me continue   from where  the  learned judge  had left  the matter by  writing  this judgment.

22. In the brief  submissions  by Mr  Gichamba  on 18th  May 2015, he submitted  on behalf  of the appellants and stressed on grounds 1,2,3 and 5 that the lower court  restrained  the appellants from the respondent’s entrance to LR No. 36/IV/14/20A Bahati or from blocking road  to that plot.  That by doing so, the trial court was granting the respondent access through someone else’s land.  That earlier on, the appellant had just granted permission to the respondent to access to his land.  That the  appellants  never sold  land to the  respondent and that those who sold the land to the  respondent  must have  given it  an access road  which  the respondents  did not  want  to use for one reason  or another.  That the respondents had sought access from the appellants’ land with a  promise  to purchase  the appellant’s  land but that  when the deal failed to sail through, then the  dispute  arose.  However, that access  was only  given for  a year which did not  create  rights  since it  did  not last for  12 years.  That the documents including City Council letters established that there was no access road.

23. The appellants’ counsel urged this court to set aside the lower court order giving access road to the respondent over the appellants’ land and allow the appellants to enjoy their rights on their land.

24. I have carefully considered this appeal, the grounds as argued, and the entire record.  In my determination, I will first  determine  a preliminary  issue  of jurisdiction  since it is  not in  doubt that the dispute   relates  to access  or occupation  of land which, by dint of Article  162(2) (b)  and  165(5) (b)  of the Constitution, as well as  Section 13(1)  of the Environment   and Land Court Act is a dispute  that exclusively  falls  within the jurisdiction of the Environment  and  Land Court.

25. However, this court  proceeds to  write this  judgment  by invoking  the transitional  and  consequential  provisions  of Schedule  6 Section  22 on Administration of justice ( of  the Constitution) which  makes  it clear that  proceedings which  are pending  before this court  in the transitional  period  shall continue  to be heard and  determined  by the court until  the corresponding  court is  established   or  as may be directed  by the Chief Justice  or the Registrar of  the High Court.

26. This court observes that  the dispute was initiated  in the lower court  in February  2013  just at the  time when  the judges  of the Environment and  Land  Court   had been  appointed  and the   court  was not yet  fully  operationalised  hence the filing of  the appeal  on the interlocutory orders of injunction  on 12th March  2013 before the High Court which had the jurisdiction.

27. Accordingly, I find that in the  transitional  period  the High Court  had the power to hear  and  conclude  matters  filed in the court  hence this appeal.

28. Proceeding on the substantive issues for determination, the issues for determination are:

a. Whether the trial court erred in granting an injunction restraining the appellants from his own land on which they had allegedly only granted temporary permission to the respondent to use as an access to the respondent’s plot.

b. What orders should this court make; and

c. Who should bear costs of the appeal.

29. On whether the trial court erred in granting restraining   injunction, the court notes that the ruling of the trial  magistrate was simply that both parties had documents  claiming ownership  and that  it  was important  that the status quo be maintained to ascertain their  authenticity  and  legality and it is for that reason that he allowed the  application for  an injunction.

30. Nonetheless, what the trial magistrate did not state is documents  of ownership  to which  particular  plot or  land, since  whereas  the plaintiff/respondent  was   claiming  for an entitlement  to an access  road to its property  on LR No. 36/IV/14 (20A)  from Bahati  side  and  not ownership  of the access  road, the  appellants  claimed  to own   the said   access  road.  According to the plaintiff/respondent, it    has no other way of accessing his land an unless the defendants/appellants are restrained, then it  will be subjected to irreparable loss and damages.

31. My appreciation of the competing claims  is that whereas  the respondent was claiming  for the right  to access  his plot through  the disputed  entrance, the appellants were claiming   that the access  was their  plots  No. 93 and  94  and  that they had only  permitted  the respondent  temporary  access though  plots 93 and 94, which permission did not give the respondent  the  right to  permanently  use the said   plots as an  entry  to the respondent’s  plots.  The appellants also denied that there were any easements through plots 93 and 94.

32. The grant of an injunction is a discretionary power of the court, which discretion, must nonetheless be exercised judiciously and on   sound principles and not capriciously.

33. In law, a person who alleges  has the  primary  duty  to prove that which he  alleges  and  in civil  cases, the standard  of proof  is on a balance  of probabilities.

34. In determining whether or not to grant a temporary  retraining  or prohibitory  injunction  like the one  which  was  sought in  this case the trial court  exercised  discretionary   power  and as  stated  earlier, an appellate  court  can only  interfere with that discretion  by the trial  court where  the trial  court  had  misdirected  itself  on the law, or  misapprehended  the facts, or failed to  take into  account  relevant   considerations, or take into account irrelevant considerations or otherwise  the  decision is plainly wrong, as  was espoused  in Mrao Ltd V First American  Bank of Kenya  Ltd & 2 Others(supra), and United India Insurance Company Ltd V EA  Underwriters  K Ltd(supra).

35. In  exercising that discretion  to grant  or  refuse a temporary restraining injunction, the court  must be  guided by the established legal  principles  espoused  in the Giella Vs Cassman  Brown  case-namely, that the applicant must satisfy the court that it has a prima facie case with  the probability  of success;  that an award  of damages  would not  be an adequate  remedy  in the  circumstances; and  that where   the court is  in doubt, then it  would decide   the case  on a balance  of convenience.

36. In an interlocutory appeal  like this,  however this court  must  refrain  from making any conclusive  views  on the matters  in  dispute  to avoid  prejudging  or prejudicing  the pending  suit since the interlocutory  injunction  granted by the trial  court did not  determine the entire  dispute ( see David  Kamau  Gakuru V National Industrial Credit Bank Ltd CA  84/2001).

37. Turning to the merits  of the appeal, I am in agreement with the appellants  that  on the facts of the case, the  respondent  was not  entitled  to benefit  from the provisions  of Order  40 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure  Rules as  there  was no single  allegation that the property ( access)  area  was in danger of  being  wasted, damaged, alienated  or wrongfully  sold or that the appellants  were threatening  or intending  to dispose  it off  so as to  prejudice the outcome of the  case in the lower court.

38. Although the respondent filed in court very many documents  showing that it owned  plot No.  LR No. 36/IV/14(20A) which he  purchased in  2008,  and  produced sketches  and  conveyances  and   maps,  it did not  at all attempt to  claim that the appellants  had or in  any way interfered  with the respondent’s use of the said land.

39. In addition, although the respondent   alleged that  it had been  threatened  with closure  of the use of the  access  road to its  said land as described  above, when the appellants  filed their  replying affidavit   and  defence  and  deposed that the alleged  access  road  was not an easement  but two plots  93 and  94  which the appellants  had allowed the respondent  to use temporarily pending negotiations for the respondent to purchase  from the appellants; and with the  appellants even annexing  evidence of  the  existence  and  ownership of the said plots  No. 93  and  94  through allotment  letters  dated  23rd March  2009  and, a map  ( at page  68(b)  of the record  of appeal showing the location of the said plots; the respondent never filed any affidavit to counter those depositions.

40. Additionally, the appellants even annexed  approved  building  plans for  development  of the said  plots  and  still, there  was no rejoinder to those   allegations of the appellants by  the respondent.

41. The respondent filed documents showing   its ownership of plot No. 36/IV/14/20A and which no one was claiming ownership of.  It did not demonstrate that the plots No. 93 and 94 were its lawful access road to it named   plot by way of easement.  To that extend, it is my  humble  view  that   the trial  magistrate  erred  in law  and  fact in granting  an injunction  to the respondent  who had  not on a balance  of probabilities  proved that  it had established  a prima facie  case  with a  probability  of success.

42. Furthermore, the respondent did not even demonstrate that unless the injunction was granted, it would suffer irreparable loss which could not be adequately compensated by an award of damages.

43. In finding  that both  parties  had ownership  documents, I find  that the trial  court fell  into  an error of fact  since there   was  no evidence  that the  appellants  were claiming ownership  of the respondent’s  land  or that  the appellants   had  sold  any  plot  or land  to the respondent and refused to grant/provide it with an  access road.  The appellants  were clear  in their defence  and  replying  affidavits  that as they  had not  sold any  land to the  respondent, they were  not duty  bound to  grant  it an access  road as  demanded in its plaint.  Indeed, whoever sold  the respondent  the  land  must have  provided it with an  access road  which  is not even  clear from the many  convoluted maps  which the  respondent  annexed  to its  supporting  affidavit  with no  highlights  to indicate  to court where  the  respondent’s  plot is on the map and where its lawful access  road is.

44. When plots are surveyed, access  roads  are provided  as a matter  of course  as no man can live  as an island. With the  unrebutted depositions  that the alleged access road were part of the plots  Nos 93 and 94 belonging to the appellants, the learned  trial magistrate  erred in  granting  an injunction  without  assessing  the affidavit  evidence  on record  to establish  whether  the respondent  had on a balance   of probabilities  established  that it had  a prima facie claim  against  the appellants with the  probability  of success.

45. In Nguruman Ltd v Jan Bonde  Nielsen  & 2 Others, CA  77/2012 the Court of Appeal  restated the principles on which the courts will grant an  injunction  that:

“In an interlocutory injunction application, the applicant has to satisfy the triple requirements to:

a. Establish his case only at a prima facie level;

b. Demonstrate irreparable injury if a temporary injunction is not granted; and

a. Allay any doubts as to (b) above by showing that the balance of convenience is in his favour.

These are the three pillars on which rests the foundation of any order of injunction, interlocutory or permanent.  It is established that all the  above  three  conditions   and  stages  are  to be applied as  separate, distinct  and  logical  hurdles which  the applicant  is expected  to  surmount  sequentially.  See Kenya Commercial Financial Company Ltd V Afraha EducationsSociety [2001] VOL 1 EA 86.

If the applicant  established a prima facie  case that alone is not  sufficient   basis to  grant  an  interlocutory  injunction, the court must  further be  satisfied that the injury  the respondent will suffer, in the event  the injunction  is not  granted, will be irreparable.  In other words, if damages recoverable in law is an adequate remedy and the respondent is capable of paying, no interlocutory  order  of injunction  should  normally  be granted, however  strong  the applicant’s   claim may  appear  at that stage.  If a prima  facie  case is not  established, then irreparable  injury  and balance  of convenience need no consideration.  The  existence of a prima  facie  case does  not permit  “ leap – frogging” by  the  applicant to  injunction  directly  without  crossing the other hurdles  in between.”

46. In this  appeal, this court notes  that the  learned  trial  magistrate  did not  even address  his mind  to  the above  principles   applicable  in  interlocutory   injunctions.  He did not   even mention  whether   the  respondent  had established that  it had a prima facie case with the  probability  of success;  or that  the  respondent   would suffer   irreparable  harm which  cannot be  adequately  be compensated  by an award  of damages; or that  because he   was in doubt  then the balance  of probabilities  tilted  in favour  of the respondent before granting  the  interlocutory  injunction or considering  whether  or not the  interlocutory  injunction sought   was merited.

47. As a result, I  find that the trial magistrate  made   an error  of principle   by failing  to take into consideration factors  that he ought  to have taken into account when granting  or  refusing to grant an  interlocutory  injunction.

48. In Dalpat  Kumar  & Another V Prahlad  Singh  & Others  AIR  1993 SC  276, Ramaswamy J  of the Supreme Court of  India stated that:

“ the phrases “ prima facie  case”, “ irreparable loss”  and  “ balance  of convenience” are not  mere rhetoric phrases for incantation; they are important factors to be carefully weighed  and considered  in each and every case where an  application for an injunction is applied  for”

49. I respectively agree with the above   established principles and persuasive opinions of courts in similar jurisdiction of the Common wealth.

50. Further, where it  was clear that to  grant  an injunction  in the circumstances  of this case would, in effect  be granting  to the respondent  the right to  trespass upon the appellant’s  land, the  trial magistrate  ought to  have carefully  analysed  the  affidavit  evidence, before granting  an interlocutory   injunction if, as  was submitted  in the lower  court,  there  was no land for   allocation  and that  the access  ‘road’  was a  way leave, then it   was encumbent  upon the respondent  to prove  by way of evidence that  indeed the   land  was  under power line   and not  to merely  conclude  that the  allocation  of plots  93 and  94   to the appellants  were  void  ab initio  or that  construction on the way leave  by other people   does not  legalise  the obstruction  of the respondent’s  premises.

51. Besides, the respondent  did not  enjoin  the Nairobi  City Council  which had  allocated  the  appellants  the plots  which the  respondent   was  claiming  were in  the path  of  way leaves.  Neither  did it  get Kenya  Power and  Lighting  officials  to swear  an affidavit  to the effect  that the plots  No.  93 and 94 were on the way leaves.  It neither appeared to oppose this appeal.

52. In the end, I find that in the  circumstances  of this case, the trial  magistrate ought  to have declined  an injunction  and  directed for the  hearing of the main  suit as  there was no sufficient   material upon which he  granted  the respondent /plaintiff  an injunction.  I would therefore  interfere  with his discretion which I find  was not exercised judiciously and  allow this appeal, dismissing  the   respondent’s application  in the lower court dated  4th February  2013  and  substituting  the ruling  and  order of  8th February  2013  with an order  dismissing   the  application  dated  4th February  2013  with costs  to the appellants.  I also award costs of this appeal  to the appellants.

Dated, signed and delivered in open court at Nairobi this 27th day of February 2017.

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE