Nairobi City County Government v Kenya Revenue Authority &Attorney; General [2017] KEHC 4419 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

JUDICIAL REVIEW NO.  176  OF 2017

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR LEAVE  TO APPLY  FOR JUDICIAL  REVIEW ORDERS OF CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND  MANDAMUS

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL  RIGHTS  PURSUANT  TO ARTICLES 21(1), 22(1) (2) & (4)  23, 25(c ), 27(1) , 40(1) & (3),41(1) & (2) ,43,47(1) & (2) , 50(2), 176 & 206  CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, 2010

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE LAW   REFORM ACT, SECTION  8 AND 9  CAP 26  LAWS  OF KENYA

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE INCOME TAX  ACT, CAP 470  OF THE LAWS OF KENYA

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE VALUE ADDED TAX ACT, 2013

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT ACT, 2012

BETWEEN

NAIROBI CITY COUNTY GOVERNMENT..................................APPLICANT

VERSUS

THE KENYA REVENUE AUTHORITY...............................1ST RESPONDENT

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.............................................2ND RESPONDENT

RULING

1. Before this court for determination  is chamber summons dated  10th April  2017  brought under the provisions of Section 3A of the Civil  Procedure Act, Section  8 and  9 of the Law Reform Act, Order  53  Rules  1(1),(2),(3) & (4)  of the Civil Procedure  Rules  and all other  enabling  provisions  of the law.

2. The application filed by the Nairobi City County Government seeks from this court leave to institute Judicial Review proceedings against the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) and the Attorney General and for orders.

1. Spent

2. That leave be granted  to apply for  Judicial Review  order  of Certiorari  to remove  into this  Honourable  Court  and quash the agency  notice dated  27th March  2017  issued by the  1st  respondent Kenya Revenue Authority  to the Principal Secretary  of the National  Treasury  in respect of funds  due and  payable  to the applicant  by the National Treasury;

3. That leave  be granted  to the applicant  to apply  for  Judicial  Review order of Prohibition to remove into this court and  prohibit  the  respondent  from issuing  any  other  or further  agency  notices  to the Principal  Secretary  of  the National Treasury in respect   of funds due  and  payable  to the  applicant  by the National  Treasury;

4. That pending hearing and  determination  of the notice of motion  application, the Honourable court do and hereby issue a temporary  order suspending  the  agency  notice dated  27th March  2017 issued  by the  1st respondent  to the Principal Secretary  of the National Treasury  in respect of  funds due  and  payable  to the applicant   by the National Treasury;

5. That  the  leave so granted do operate  as a stay of issuance of any other or further  agency notice(s)  to the Principal  Secretary of the National  Treasury by the 1st respondent  in respect  of  funds due and payable to the applicant by the National Treasury;

6. Any other  or further relief  which this  Honourable  court deems  fit and  just  to grant

7. Costs of and incidental to the application.

3. The chamber summons is supported by 9 detailed grounds on the face thereof and the unsigned “statutory statement” and verifying affidavit sworn by Gregory S. Mwakanongo on 10th April 2017.

4. The application  was  opposed  by the respondents who filed  a replying  affidavit  sworn by Asha  K. Salim, Manager  Debt  Enforcement  in the  1st  respondent’s Domestic  Department.

5. Before  delving  into the  applicant’s  complaint,  the  court notes that  the applicant’s “statutory  statement”   which is dated  10th April  2017 is not  signed and  I have marked the said page   25  of the application  bundle as  unsigned.

6. The question is whether failure to sign the statutory statement is fatal to the chamber summons.  Order  53 Rule  2  of the Civil Procedure Rules  provides that:

“ An  application for leave to commence Judicial Review  shall be  by way  of chamber summons  accompanied by a statement setting out the nature and description of the applicant, relief sought and  the grounds in which it is sought and  by an affidavit  or affidavits  verifying the facts  relied  on.”

7. In addition the provisions  of  Order  53  Rule (1) (2)  of the Civil Procedure Rules stipulate  that the  grounds   upon which the  Judicial Review  application will be  founded  will be in  the  statutory  statement.

8. Further, Order  53  Rule (4)  of the  said Rules  specifically expresses  that:

“4(1) Copies  of the statement  accompanying  the  application for leave shall be  served with the notice of motionand  copies  of any affidavits accompanying  the application for leave  shall be  supplied  on demand  and  no grounds shall, subject  as  hereafter in this rule  provided, be relied  upon or any relief  sought  at the hearing of the  motion  except  the  grounds  and  relief  set out  in the said  statement.”[Emphasis added].

9. In the instant  case, albeit there  is  a  “statutory  statement” and  verifying  affidavit  accompanying  the chamber summons  for leave, but the   “statutory statement”   is not  signed  by either  the  applicant or its  counsel  on record.

10. The question is whether an unsigned “statutory   statement”  or pleading   is a valid  pleading  and or whether the omission is a  mere  procedural technicality curable  by Article 159(2) of the Constitution.

11. In my  humble  view, an unsigned  “pleading’ is  no pleading  at all as it  is not owned  by the  party filing  it and  therefore  the  omission  cannot  be  a mere  procedural technicality curable by  application  of Article  159(2) (c ) of the  Constitution.

12. A statement  of facts, as seen  from the  provisions  of Order  53  Rules 1,2,3 and  4  of the  Civil Procedure  Rules  reproduced  above   is very critical  in an application for  judicial review  as  only grounds and reliefs set out  in the statement shall be  relied  upon at the hearing  of the substantive motion.

13. Further, it is the copy of the statement accompanying the application for leave that shall be served with the notice of motion and copies of any affidavits accompanying the application for leave.

14. The  law under which this  application  is premised  is Order  53  Rule  1,2,3 and  4 of the Civil  Procedure Rules  as  set  out  on  the face  of the application, among other  statutory  provisions and these  proceedings not being  civil  proceedings, Section 3A  of the Civil Procedure  Rules would  not necessarily be applicable particularly  with the legal bar at Section 8 of the  Law  Reform Act that these judicial review proceedings are neither civil nor criminal proceedings.

15.  In my humble view, therefore,  failure to  file a signed  statutory  statement   renders  the  application  for leave fatally  defective   ab initio and therefore  incompetent.  I say  so for reasons  that from the provisions  of Order  53 Rule  4  (1) of the  Civil Procedure Rule, it is clear that the  statutory statement  is such a  fundamental  pleading  in Judicial Review  proceedings  where orders of certiorari  prohibition and  mandamus  are sought  such that  without the statement, then leave would  not lie.

16. Order  53  of the Civil Procedure  Rules is  the only Rule that is a  Procedural Rule  implementing  Sections  8 and  9  of the Law Reform  Act on the  three Judicial  Review  orders.  Moreso,  not even   the  Fair Administrative  Action Act , 2015  amended  or repealed  the  said Order and neither were the provisions  of the Law Reform Act on the  3  Judicial Review  Remedies  amended or repealed. Section 12 of the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015 is clear that the Act recognizes common   law remedies and   rules of natural justice.

17. It is for  that reason that I find  that rules serve  to make  the process  of judicial  adjudication  and administration  fair, just, certain  and  even  handed.  As   was   held in NicholasKiptoo Arap Korir Salat v IEBC & others Civil Application 228/2013 Nairobi - Ouko, Kiage, and Mohamed JJA:

“ Courts  cannot  aid in the  bending or  circumventing   of rules  and   shifting  of goal posts for, while  it may  seem to  aid one  side, it unfairly  harms  the innocent party who  strives to abide by the  rules.  I apprehend  that it is the   even- handed  and  dispassionate  application  of the rules  that courts   give  assurance  that  there is clear method  in the manner  in which  things are  done so that   outcomes  can be   anticipated  with a measure  of confidence, certainty  and clarity  where issues of rules  and  their application  are concerned.”

18. It is for the above  reasons  that I find and hold that  the  chamber summons  dated   10th April  2017  is not soundly   grounded in law  and  I would not hesitate  to strike  it  out for being a nullity.

19.  I add that there is good reason why the law regulating  pleadings  is that every pleading must be signed  by an  advocate or recognized  agent  or by the  party  if   he sues or  defends  in  person.  See CA  Nairobi  Nos 13 & 19  of  2001 consolidated Vipin Maganlal  Shah Alulkumar  Maganlal  Shah vs Investments  & Mortgage  Bank Ltd & 2  Others[2001]  where the issue   was  whether  a plaint which was filed  on  27th April  2000  unsigned was a  pleading  as  required  by law  and  therefore  whether it   could form  the   basis of a suit.  The court of Appeal   held, inter alia:

“….  The truth of the matter is that parties to litigation are entitled to go and peruse   court file……  “ Mr Regeru in his usually  learned  way  relied  on certain  English  and  Indian authorities   and  we think  we must examine  them first .  We shall start with the English authorities upon which Mr Regeru relied. First, of course   was  Halsbury’s Laws of England  4th Edition VOL.36  which  deals   with among  other things, “pleadings” and   under the heading: “ 2.  contents  of pleadings” at page  7 and  at paragraph  7 page  7 under sub heading  “signature “ is to be found  this statement:

“Pleadings need not be settled by counsel, but where a pleading is settled by counsel, it must be signed by him.

The only signature which is permitted to appear on pleadings is that of counsel or a solicitor or a litigant in person.  If  a pleading   has been   settled  otherwise   than by counsel, it must be signed by the solicitor   of the party  by whom  it is served, or by  the party  himself  if he sues  or defends  in person.”

So that,  it is obvious  from this  passage  that a  pleading  must be   signed either  by the advocate  or the party   himself   where he  sues or  defends  in person or by his recognized  agent.  The reason for this was settled in the ancient case of Great Australian  Gold Mining Company  V Martin  [1877] 5 ch  D.1 at  page 10  to be  a “voucher  that  the case  is not  a mere  fiction.” Several cases are quoted as illustration of the passage in Halsbury’s Laws of England. In France  v Dutton [1891] 2  QB 208, a  clerk  to a solicitor  signed  the Solicitor’s  bill of costs  on behalf  of  the solicitor.  Objection   was taken to the clerk’s  signature  but the objection   was  overruled  in the ground that the  clerk’s  signature   was sufficient.  The  issue  here  was not  that there was absolutely no signature.  The issue  was whether  the  clerk’s  signature   was sufficient   and  as the Solicitor  had authorized  the clerk to sign on his  behalf, the signature was really  that  of a recognized  agent  of the solicitor. But in the  earlier case  of the Queen  on the Prosecution of Harding  Rees  V Cowper  [1890] 24  QB D 533, it  was  held that:

“ In order  to entitle  the  plaintiff in an action in a county  court to  the costs of  entering  a plaint by a solicitor, the solicitor must sign the particulars, and a lithographed  statement of the solicitor’s name on the particulars is insufficient.”

In the  latter’s case, it  was held , in effect, that the  solicitor  had not signed  the plaint  and the plaintiff  was denied  his costs, even though  Lord Escher, MR dissented from the  decision.  Mr  Regeru  next relied  on the case  of Fick and  Fick Limited  vs  Assimakis  [1953]  3 ALL ER  182  where it  was held that:

“ as the writ  which was  issued  was properly  endorsed  with a signed  statement  of claim, the  absence  of  a signature  to the statement  of  claim on the copy served on  the defendant  was  cured  by the appearance  which the defendant  must  be taken  to have entered.”

Mr Regeru contended that as the appellant entered  unconditional  appearance  the Bank’s  suit, even if  there  had been  no signature   on the plaint, in the file, these  unconditional  appearance  cured   that defect.  We do not  think  Mr Regeru  is right  on this aspect  of the matter.  In the Ficks’  case,  the writ  which was  issued  was  properly  endorsed  with a  SIGNED  statement  of claim.  What   was not  signed   was  a copy of the  statement  of claim served  upon the defendant  and  as the defendant had  entered  an unconditional  appearance  to the claim, the  defect  in the unsigned  copy served  on him was  cured.  We doubt very  much  if the  position  would have been the same   if the original writ issued   was not  endorsed  with a signed  statement   of claim.  The position in  England, at least, according  to those authorities  appear  to be that a pleading  must be  signed  either  by counsel   or the  party  in person or the party’s  recognized  agent.  Whether  a pleading  which has not  been signed  can be   struck out  or  dismissed  is not  clear  from these  authorities.

Here in Kenya, this court dealt  with  the case of Samaki Industries  (Nairobi) Ltd V Samaki Industries (K)  Ltd,  Civil Appeal  No. 203  of  1995 unreported.  There, a suspended advocate  filed  an appeal   on behalf of a party,  signing   the memorandum  of appeal  and  the other  relevant  documents.  This  court had  no difficulty in holding, indeed, it  was  conceded, that the appeal  having been filed  by an  unqualified  advocate on behalf  of an appellant,  was incurably  defective  and  was  struck out.  The court  did not   call upon the appellant  to sign the memorandum of appeal  and  this validate it.”

20. The Court of Appeal in the above Vipin Maganlal  Shah Alulkumar  Maganlal  Shah vs Investments  & Mortgage  Bank Ltd & 2  Others case after referring  to the Indian  position  stipulated  in Mulla on Civil Procedure,  where it   was stated that failure  to sign a plaint   was not fatal  to the  case  nonetheless went  ahead  to hold that:

“……There  is  of  course  the object  the  legislature  had  in mind in  requiring  that  a plaint be  signed  either by  counsel or party  suing.  The object must clearly  be to  make the  party  suing or filing any other pleading take ownership and  responsibility  for the contents of the   plaint  or pleading  or as  was said in the Australian case  of Great  Australian Gold Mining  Company case,  supra, to be:

“ a  voucher  that the case is not a  mere fiction.”

Again, in Kenya Order VII Rule 1(e) now requires that a plaint shall contain……….

“ If  a  plaint is not  signed  either by the   plaintiff  in person or his  recognized  agent or  his advocate,  what is the   use of  requiring  that it contains  an averment by the plaintiff  that there  is no  other suit pending  and  so  on? If the plaint is not  signed  a  required  by order  VI Rule  14, these  other requirements  clearly  become  meaningless.

Whatever may be  the  position in India or even  in England, the position  in Kenya  seems  to be  that a  party who  files unsigned  plaint  runs  a very grave risk of having  that plaint  struck  out  as not  complying  with the law.  We shall go no further  than that  because  as we said  earlier, we must  deal  with the issue of whether  or not   there  was  on record  a copy of the  signed plaint  when  the  summons to  strike out  was lodged  in the  superior  court.”

21. In ELRC case  No. 269/2014  Anthony  Simiyu  Kisiangani  & another  V Nzoia Out Growers  Company Ltd  &  2 Others [2015]  e KLR  citing  Regina  Kavenya  Mutuku & 3 Others  v United  Insurance Company Ltd Nairobi Milimani  HCC  No. 1994/2000 [2002]  1 KLR 250  Ringera  J ( as he then was ) held and I agree though persuasively:

“An  unsigned  pleading  had no  validity in law  as it is the  signature of  the appropriate  person on the pleading which authenticates  the same  and  an unauthenticated  document  is  not a pleading  of anybody.  It is a nullity.”

22. The above case also  cited the   Court of Appeal  decision  in CA 13  & 19/2001 Vipin  Maganlal Shah  vs  Investment  & Mortgages  Bank  Ltd  & 2  Others [supra] with approval  on the effect  of an unsigned  pleading  and  stated:

“Where  a pleading  is not  signed  the same would be  struck out  rather  than  being  dismissed……”

23. From the above authorities among others Cheraik Management Ltd v National Social Security Services Fund Board of Trustees   & Another [2012] eKLR it is clear to me that  whereas  procedural  lapses  should not be  elevated  to fetish  in order to  override  substantive justice, I am unable to accept  as being  validly  on record  such a  substantive  pleading as  statutory statement  in Judicial Review  proceedings, which   pleading  is not signed by either the applicant or its advocate on record and therefore I have no hesitation in declaring the unsigned statutory statement on record a  nullity  for want  of  signature   or ownership or  authentication thereof.

24. In my view, authentication or ownership of pleadings by the pleader  is not a  mere procedural  technicality  curable  by application  of  Article  159(2)  (d) of  the Constitution.  As stated in Cheraik Management  Ltd  vs  NSSF  (supra)  case, the  tenets  of the Constitution is that  parties  must be  treated  equally in the eyes  of the law   and  none  of the parties  should  be accorded  undue  advantage  in legal  proceedings.

25. There are, indeed, good reasons why the law world over requires that pleadings be signed by the pleader or   their legal representatives as it is a “voucher that the case is  not a mere fiction.”  Therefore, Article 159  2(d)  of the Constitution and even  the  inherent  jurisdiction  of the court or  the  overriding   objectives  of the law  cannot  be resorted  to by a party whose act  is declared  a nullity under the law.  See HunkerTrading Company Ltd vs Elf Oil Kenya Limited Civil Application No.  Nairobi 6 of 2010.

26. This, in my view, is not a case where the court can excuse a party for the mistakes of its counsel and as  was  stated in  John Ongeri Mariaria  & 2  Others  vs Paul  Matundura  Civil  Application No.  Nairobi 301 of 2003 [2004] 2 EA 163.

“Legal business can no longer be handled in such sloppy and careless manner.  Some clients  must learn  at their own costs  that the consequences of careless and  leisurely approach to work by their advocates must fall on their  shoulders….whenever a solicitor by his inexcusable delay/mistake  deprives  a client of  his cause  of  action, his client  can claim  damages against him…whereas  it is true that  the court has  unfettered discretion, like  all  judicial  discretion must be  exercised  upon reason not  capriciously  or sympathy alone …..  justice must  look  both  ways  as the rules of  procedure  are  meant to  regulate  administration of justice  and they  are not  meant to  assist the indolent.”

27. It is  for the foregoing  reasons that I find and hold without sympathy to the  applicant  and without  delving  into  the merits of the application  which  was  argued quite  vigorously  by both  sides that a pleading /statutory statement  accompanying the chamber summons for leave  which statement  is not  signed is incapable  of  being  verified  by an affidavit as it is a nullity  ab initio, is  incompetent  and is liable to be struck out.

28. In the end, I strike out the chamber summons dated 10th April 2017. Costs are in the discretion of the court.  In this case, as the issue of unsigned  statutory  statement   was discovered  by the court  in the course of   writing of this  ruling  and  as no party alluded  to it; and  as the court  is deemed  to know the  law, which law I have applied to strike out  a pleading  which is a nullity  ab initio, I make no orders  as to costs  of the application for   leave  which is  hereby  struck out and the temporary  stay  earlier on granted  is hereby vacated.

29. Orders accordingly.

Dated, signed and delivered at Nairobi this 16th day of May, 2017.

R. E. ABURILI

JUDGE

In the presence of:

Miss Otieno h/b for Mr Makokha for the exparte applicant

Mr Ado for the 1st Respondent

Mr Odhiambo for the 2nd Respondent

CA: George