Nakato Rijcken Mubanda v Kajjansi Town Council and Wakiso District Local Government (Civil Suits No. 628 of 2019) [2025] UGHC 332 (16 May 2025)

### 5 **THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA**

#### **IN THE HIGH COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA**

#### **LAND DIVISION**

#### **CIVIL SUITS NO. 628 of 2019**

#### **NAKATO RIJCKEN MUBANDA :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: PLAINTIFF**

## 10 **VERSUS**

### **1. KAJJANSI TOWN COUNCIL**

#### **2. WAKISO DISTRICT LOCAL GOVERNMENT :::::::::::: DEFENDANTS**

# *Before: Hon Lady Justice Immaculate Busingye Byaruhanga* 15 **JUDGMENT**

The plaintiff brought this suit against the defendants jointly and severally for adequate compensation for the land used by the defendants to construct and expand Sanda Road, Wakiso District stretching from Nakawuka-Ssisa National Road to Sanda Trading Centre with an intention of replacing the existing earthen track which 20 was less than 2.5 meters totaling UGX 212, 979,000/= (Uganda shillings two hundred twelve millions nine hundred seventy-nine thousand shillings, general damages for trespass and destruction of the plaintiff's crops and trees, a declaration that the defendants trespassed on the suit land and costs of the suit.

In the facts constituting the plaintiffs' cause of action, the plaintiff contended that at 25 all material times, the land comprised in Busiro Block 489 plot 7 measuring approximately 28.5 acres land Sanda and all developments thereon have been the property of the plaintiff. It is the plaintiff's contention that on 4th, 8th and 9th of February 2019, the defendants while using earth moving machine Registration No.


- UG 1735W and on 15th 5 February of the same year, while using grader machine number UAU 585X trespassed on the plaintiff's land and commenced construction and expansion of the Sanda road without the express consent of the plaintiff and utilized her land measuring approximately 1.185 acres with compensating her for the same. - 10 On the other hand, the defendants jointly denied the plaintiffs' claims and proceeded to file a written statement of defence on 29th April 2019 and contended as follows; - 1. That the 1st defendant secured funds for maintenance of the roads within its jurisdiction including Nakawuka- Ssisa to Sanda Road. - 2. That before embarking on the said works, the 1st defendant engaged all the 15 people likely to be affected through a number of sensitization meetings, where members agreed to the works since it was for the entire public good. - 3. That the plaintiff acquiesced in the existence and maintenance of the road in issue from which she also benefits. - 4. That the plaintiff is estopped from denying acquiescing and benefitting from 20 the road works. - 5. That the plaintiff's land is subject to a road reserve and a public right of way.

# **Parties' Legal representation**

During trial, the plaintiff was represented by **Counsel Ssozi Stephen Galabuzi**, the defendants were jointly represented by **Counsel Katono James.**

In the joint scheduling memorandum filed on 24 25 th November 2023, the parties and their respective counsel agreed upon facts, documents and formulated issues for determination as follows;


## **Agreed upon facts**

1. That the plaintiff is the registered owner of land comprised in Busiro Block 489 Plot 7 measuring approximately 285 acres at Sanda.

## **Disagreed facts**

- 10 1. That whilst constructing and expanding Sanda road, the defendants trespassed on the suit land measuring 1.185 acres. - 2. That the defendants embarked on the construction and expansion of Sanda road on the suit land.

# **Issues for determination**

- 15 *1. Whether the defendants trespassed on the suit land.* - 2. *What remedies are available to the parties*

The parties also agreed to adduce evidence from several witness. The plaintiff adduced evidence from two witnesses the plaintiff herself Nakato Rijcken Mubanda **(Pw1), and** Boaz Tukahirwa **(Pw2),** while the defendants adduced evidence from 20 one witness Kyakuwade Robert **(Dw1).**

The parties also relied on documentary evidence which was marked and exhibited. The plaintiff produced and relied on the following documents;

- *1. Certificate of title for land comprised in Mengo Busiro Block 489 Plot 7 land at Mubaale Sanda marked PExh.1* - 25 *2. Photographs marked PExh.2* - *3. Valuation report from Bold Capital Limited marked PExh.3* - *4. Demand Notice from Kinobe Mutyaba Advocates, Solicitors and Legal Consultants marked PExh.4*


5 The defendants did not adduce any documentary evidence for marking and exhibiting hence there are no defence exhibits on record.

## **Locus visit**

On the 21 st March 2025, while in the attendance of Counsel for the plaintiff and the defendants, the plaintiff, and the Town Clerk of the 1st defendant, Court visited locus

10 in quo pursuant to Order 18 rule 14 of the Civil Procedure Rules and **Practice Direction No. 1 of 2007** which stipulates that courts handling land matters should as so far as possible, *interest themselves in physically visiting properties under dispute before pronouncing themselves on the proprietary rights of the parties.*

## **Burden and standard of proof in Civil Cases**

## 15 **Section 101(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act Cap.8 (Revised) Laws of Uganda**,

"*Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts, which he or she asserts must prove that those facts exist."*

When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden 20 of proof lies on that person. **Section 102 of the Evidence Act** goes on to provide that;

*"The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side and Section 103 provides that "the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on* 25 *that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence unless it is provided by any law that proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person"*


5 These principles have been reiterated in so many judicial precedents where it has been decided that in civil matters just like the instant case, the burden of proof rests on whoever asserts a fact and the standard of proof is on a balance of probabilities. (See **Jovelyn Barugahare vs. Attorney General SCCA No. 28 of 1993)**

### **Background of the suit**

10 The plaintiff has at all material times been the registered proprietor of the suit land having been registered on the same on 5th October 2010 vide instrument number KLA472287 (**PExh.1).** The plaintiff claims that the defendants trespassed on her land by constructing and expanding a road being the Sanda Road running through her land without her consent and compensation **PExh.2 (a) and (b).**

## 15 **RESOLUTION OF ISSUES**

## **Issue No.1: Whether the defendants trespassed on the suit land**

Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that Courts of law have variously defined what amounts to trespass. Counsel cited the case of **Tayebwa Geoffrey & Anor vs. Kagimu Ngudde Mustafa** which cited with approval **Justine E M N Lutaaya vs.**

- 20 **Sterling; Supreme Court Civil Appeal No.11 of 2002** wherein the tenets of trespass were established to include 1) that the disputed land belonged to the plaintiff, 2) that the defendant had entered upon it and 3) that the entry was unlawful and that it was made without permission or that the defendant had no claim or right or interest in the disputed land. - 25 In applying this criteria, counsel for the plaintiff submitted that it is not a disputed fact that the plaintiff is the registered proprietor of the suit land or that the defendant entered the plaintiff's land to expand the Sanda road. Counsel further argued that the defendants compulsorily acquired the plaintiff's land without ever consulting the plaintiff or even compensating her for the purpose of expanding what was a foot path


5 into the Sanda Road which is contrary to the provisions of **Section 2-7 of the Land Acquisition Act** which is the governing Statutory authority in matters of this nature hence that the defendant flouted these procedural requirements.

In regards to the issue of estoppel, counsel for the plaintiff argued that trespass is a continuous tort/ wrong and with each passing day that it continues, it constitutes a 10 continuous tort, hence the plea of estoppel had no legal basis. It was counsel for the plaintiff's conclusion that the defendants acted illegally and irrationally in appropriating the plaintiff's land without due process hence the defendants' arguments that the Sanda Road has benefitted the plaintiff and the community as a whole as well as the fact that the suit land falls within the road reserve cannot cure 15 the aforementioned violations of the plaintiff's constitutional right to own property.

On the other hand, it was counsel for the defendants' submission that it is not disputed that the plaintiff is the registered proprietor of the suit land, however, what is disputed, is that the defendant trespassed upon the said land and constructed a road thereon. It is counsel's submission that it was the plaintiff's testimony that the road

20 in question started off as a foot path and was latter widened into a 7- (seven) meter road by the plaintiff during the construction of her house so as to aid the ferrying of construction materials to her site.

Furthermore, it was counsel's argument that the defendants merely maintained an already existing road created by the plaintiff as the same had deteriorated in bad 25 condition and had developed gullies and potholes, however, the defendants neither constructed nor expanded the same. In addition, counsel submitted that the plaintiff acquiesced to the use of this portion of her land as a public right of way when she expanded the same from a foot path to a now motor-able easement serving the entire neighboring community and public at large. Counsel argued that the plaintiff cannot

30 now renege or challenge the existence of this road.


Page **6** of **17**

- 5 Counsel for the defendants also submitted that among the functions of the defendants as bodies of the Local Government is the rehabilitation and maintenance of roads under the second schedule, part 2, paragraph 4 of the Local Governments Act Cap 243 and the road in question having acquired the status of a public right of way, did actually require a road reserve as provided for under **Regulation 2 of The Roads** - 10 **(Road Reserves) (Declaration) Instrument (SI 358-1).** Counsel submitted that under **Statutory Instrument 358-1 item 1 (b) of the first schedule**, all roads maintained by the local governments of Kampala and Wakiso must have road reserves bounded by imaginary lines parallel to and distant fifty feet from the Centre line. - 15 Counsel cited several authorities to support his arguments including **James Senyange vs. KCCA H. C. C. S No. 710 of 2017, Herbert Musoke Salongo vs. Makindye Ssabagabo Municipal Council HCCS No. 458 of 2018, Godmanchester Town Council vs. Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (2007) UKHL 28** among others.

20 *Resolution*

Trespass to land is premised upon interference with possession to land. The concept of trespass to land has been defined and discussed in a plethora of cases. In the case of **Justine E M N Lutaaya vs. Sterling; Civil Eng. Appeal No.11 of 2002***; the Supreme Court held that;*

25 *"Trespass to land occurs when a person makes an unauthorized entry upon another's land and thereby interfering with another's person lawful possession of the land".*

In the case of **Adrabo Stanley vs. Madira Jimmy H. C. C. S No. 24 of 2013, the** Hon. Justice Stephen Mubiru stated that;


- 5 "*Trespass is an unlawful interference with possession of property. It is an invasion of the interest in the exclusive possession of land, as by entry upon it. It is an invasion affecting an interest in the exclusive possession of property.*

*The cause of action for trespass is designed to protect possessory, not* 10 *necessarily ownership, interests in land from unlawful interference. Therefore, only one whose right to possession has been violated may technically maintain an action for trespass".*

The gist of an action for trespass to land is violation of possession, and not a challenge to title. The possession ought to be actual or constructive and the plaintiff 15 must demonstrate his or her exclusive possession and control of the land.

In the case of **Sheikh Mohammed Lubowa vs. Kitara Enterprises Ltd C. A. C. A No. 4 of 1987,** the Court of Appeal laid out the conditions to be satisfied in order to successfully prove trespass to land. These include;

*i. That the disputed land belonged to the appellant*

20 *ii. That the respondent entered upon the disputed land*

*iii. That the entry was unlawful or that the respondent had no claim or right or interest in the disputed land.*

# *That the disputed land belongs to the plaintiff*

25 In the instant case, it is an agreed fact that the plaintiff is the registered proprietor of the suit land as evidenced by **PExh.1.** In her evidence, the plaintiff adduced evidence of a valuation report of the suit land by Bold Capital (**PExh.3**) compiled by a valuation surveyor Pw2 (Boaz Tukahirwa) which in part states that:


- 5 *"The property is traversed by a proposed/ new road which was originally 2.25metres private track but now it is widened to approximately 12 meters. The total area taken of plot 7 by the new/proposed road is approximately 1.185 acres. Destroyed improvements include fruit trees, timber trees, ornamental trees, crops, bush trees and barbed wire fence on poles…"* - 10 The defendants did not refute the plaintiff's evidence that the road in question encroaches on the plaintiff's land, however, the defendants contest any claims of trespass as the road in question has at all material times been in existence since the plaintiff willingly expanded what was originally a foot path as presented on her certificate of title (**PExh.1**) into a 7-meter road and as such is subject to a public - 15 right of way. The defendants further contend that the plaintiff acquiesced in the existence of the road in issue from which she also benefits.

During cross examination, it was the plaintiff's testimony that she acquired the suit land comprised in Busiro Block 489 Plot 7 Sanda in 1967, however, she started living on the same in 2010. Pw1(plaintiff) further testified that as of 2008, it was a

- 20 foot path, however, the same was widened upon the instructions of the plaintiff from a 1-metere (footpath) to 7-meters when her home was being constructed so as to ferry construction materials. During the locus in quo proceedings, Pw1 testified that she opened up the road to the public. Pw1 also admitted that the said road is used by herself and equally serves the neighbours. Pw2 (the Valuation survey), also testified - 25 that while going to survey the suit land, he used the said access road.

Therefore, it is an admitted fact that the plaintiff widened the easement from a mere foot path into a road connecting with Sanda Trading Centre in 2008 hence the same has been in existence now for 17 (seventeen) years. The law on admissions is provided in the Evidence Act. **Section 16 of the Evidence Act** defines **an admission** 30 as; *"a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact and which is made by any of the persons and in the*

 5 *circumstances, hereinafter mentioned."* I am alive to the fact that an admission is not conclusive of the matters admitted but it may operate as estoppel. (See **Section 28 of the Evidence Act).**

In light of these facts, the question for determination is whether the plaintiff can sustain the claim that road encroaches on her land? I am persuaded by the findings

10 of my Learned Brother Hon. Justice Bernard Namanya in the case of **Herbert Musoke Salongo vs. Makindye Ssabagabo Municipal Council HCCS No. 458 of 2018** as cited by counsel for the defendants. His Lordship cited with authority the case of **Fairey vs. Southampton County Council [1956]2 ALL ER 853,** where it was held that the legal burden is on a landowner to rebut the presumption of a public 15 right of way. It was further held that;

*"The plaintiff must prove that he challenged the existence of a public right of way in so open and notorious fashion that it was clear to not strangers but also to local residents that a public right of way did not exist. The plaintiff could have done so by for instance, putting a barrier a barrier across the path* 20 *or putting up a notice forbidding the public to sue the path. If so much time has passed without the land owner challenging the existence of a public right of way. The use of the public right of way for a continuous period of is enough to raise the presumption of a public right of way".*

His Lordship also noted in **Herbert Musoke Salongo vs. Makindye Ssabagabo**

- 25 **Municipal Council (**supra) that at common law, a landowner does not need to give express permission to path of public right of way. He is deemed to have accepted if the public is acting under the belief that the landowner has acquiesced to the use of a public right of way for so long, and there are no steps taken by the land owner to disabuse the public of that belief. - 30 In the **Fairey case(supra)** Lord Denning LJ, held that:


5 *"In my opinion, a land owner cannot escape the effect of twenty years 'prescription by saying that, locked in his own mind, he had no intention [to dedicate] [to grant public right of way]; or by telling a stranger to the locality (who had no reason to dispute it) that he had no intention to dedicate. In order for there to be "sufficient evidence* 10 *that there was no intention" to dedicate the way, there must be evidence of some overt acts on the part of the land owner such as to show the public at large-, the public who used the path, in this case the villagers-that he had no intention to dedicate. He must, in Blackburn's words, take steps to disabuse those persons of any belief* 15 *that there was public right. Such evidence may consist, … of notices or a barrier, or the common method of closing the way one day in a year".*

In the instant case, the plaintiff admitted to having opened the road to the community and no cogent evidence has been adduced by the former to prove that she manifestly 20 prohibited the use of this road by the public. Instead the evidence adduced by the plaintiff (Pw1) is that in 2008 she widened the originally marked 1-meter foot path to 7 meters' motor-able standard road connecting from Nakawuuka to Sanda Trading Centre. It would mean that after the construction of the plaintiff's road, she allowed the general public to continue using the said road and has never denied access to the 25 community. She dedicated the road which she widened to public as indicated in her

evidence in court.

Whereas, the Sanda road usage has not quite hit the 20-years mark as presented by **Lord Denning** in the *Fairey case*, the facts of this case are peculiar and should be given due consideration. What makes the instant case different from the **Herbert**

30 **Musoke Salongo case** and the **Fairey case,** is that the plaintiff in the instant case, admitted to opening up the Sanda-Nakawuka Road to the public and has never contested its usage by the general public. This court observed during the locus in quo proceedings that this road serves all the plaintiff's neighbours as well as the public going to Sanda Trading center in addition to those going back to Nakawuuka.


5 Therefore, the plaintiff is estopped from denying the existence of a public right of way. During the locus proceedings, the width of the said road was measured and it was the court's finding that the same measured 6(six) meters in terms of width. Therefore, following the plaintiff's admission that she widened the road to 7 (seven) meters coupled with the court's finding at locus, it is evident that the defendants did 10 not encroach on any extra land as was presented in the valuation report (PExh.3) by

Pw2). The Road in question is not twelve meters wide as presented by Pw3 in PExh.3.

As earlier determined admissions are not conclusive of admitted facts, however, the same can operate as estoppel. The **Blacks' Law Dictionary 8th Edition, page 1662,**

- 15 defines **estoppel** as a bar that prevents one from asserting a claim of right that contradicts what one has said or done before or what one has said or done before, or what has been legally established as true. In the instant case, the plaintiff cannot claim encroachment over land that she personally and willingly offered for the widening and the creation of a road to serve herself and the community at large. - 20 Therefore, I find that suit land (1.18 acres forming part of the Sanda road) ceased to belong to the plaintiff once the same was offered by the latter as a public right of way or easement.

## *That the defendant entered upon the disputed land*

The defendants do not contest the fact that they entered the suit land to maintain the 25 road in question as the same is their statutory obligation. **Sections 30 and 31 of the Local Government Act,** stipulate that a district council may delegate construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of roads to a lower local government, in the instant case, the 1st defendant (Kajjansi Town Council). The same is reiterated in **Part 2, (item 4) of the Second Schedule to the Local Government Act.**


- 5 In his testimony, Dw1 (a civil engineer with Kajjansi Town Council) testified that the 1st defendant entered the road in question for the purpose of maintaining the 7 meters of the road following a public demand after the 1st defendant took over the management of the roads in their jurisdiction. During re-examination, Dw1 further told court that prior to the maintenance, the state of the road in question was poor as 10 it was covered by a bush on wither side, gullies and potholes. In their written statement of defence, the defendants contended that bushes in question has eaten up - two meters of the 7 meters of road, hence there was need to clear the said bushes during the maintenance process.

Reference is made to my resolution above; it is my finding that the defendants are

15 legally obligated to enter the road in question so as to rehabilitate the same and maintain its motor-able standard hence fulfilling its statutory mandate of road maintenance. In the premises, it is my finding that the defendants entered upon the said land legally.

# *That the entry was unlawful or that the defendant had no claim of right or interest* 20 *in the disputed land*

It must be reiterated that when determining trespass action, it is vital that the plaintiff prove that he or she has been in possession of the suit land. In the case of **Kaggwa Micheal vs. Apire John HCCA No. 126 of 2019,** the Hon. Justice Stephen Mubiru stated that;

25 *"Possession confers a possessory title upon a holder of land and a recognizable enforceable right to exclude all others but persons with a better title. Possession of land is in itself a good title against anyone who cannot show a prior and therefore better right to possession (see Asher v. Whitlock (1865) LR 1 QB 1). Possessory title is not based on a documentary title but on the* 30 *exclusive occupation of the land (or receipt of rent from the land) for a period of time".*


5 I am persuaded by Justice Mubiru's findings in **Adrabo Stanley vs. Madira Jimmy HCCS No. 24 of 2013, Justice Mubiru** where he stated that,

> "*Trespass when pleaded as part of a suit for recovery of land, requires the plaintiff to prove either actual physical possession or constructive possession, usually through holding legal title.*

10 *There must have been either an actual possession by the plaintiff at the time when the trespass was committed, either by himself or by his authorized representative, or a constructive possession with the lands unoccupied and no adverse possession. In essence, an action for recovery of land is founded on trespass involving a wrongful* 15 *dispossession".*

This issue has already been partially resolved. In the instant case, according to PExh.3, it was contended that the plaintiff's trees, crops, and barbed wire fence were destroyed by the defendants during the rehabilitation of the Sanda-Nakawuuka road. It is upon this basis that the plaintiff claimed compensation of 212,979,000 (two

20 hundred twelve million, nine hundred and nighty-seven thousand shillings and general damages.

It is counsel for the defendants' submission that the said trees, crops and fence that were destroyed were encroaching into the road reserve of the road in question hence the plaintiff is not entitled to any compensation.

25 In **Musoke Ssalongo case (supra),** Justice Namanya noted that;

**"***Once a public right of way is presumed to exist as a result of continuous use over a long period of time, the planning authorities are at liberty to put the public right of way in their planning documents and develop the road for common use by the public. ... If* 30 *a property owner claims compensation … he or she has a legal burden to prove that such buildings were erected outside the road reserve and in compliance with any applicable laws …"*


- 5 It should be noted that at the commencement of the instant despite (plaint filed on 16th April 2025), the relevant legal regime was the Roads Act of 2019, having commenced on 25th September 2019. **Section 16 (1) of the Roads Act,** states that a road reserve under Section 15 shall be used exclusively for the development and expansion of public roads or for other related activities. - 10 This court takes judicial notice of the fact that the road in issue is located in Wakiso district. **Item 1(b) of the First Schedule of the Roads (Road reserves) (Declaration) Instrument (SI 358-1)** stipulates that all roads maintained by the local governments of Kampala and Wakiso shall have road reserves bounded by imaginary lines parallel to and distant fifty feet from the central line (which is 15 approximately 15 meters from the central line). It should equally be noted that the cited Statutory Instrument is still in force by virtue of section 12 of the Interpretation

Act Cap 2, which provides as follows: -

*"Where any Act or part of an Act is repealed and re-enacted, with or without modification, statutory instruments made under it shall, unless* 20 *a contrary intention appears, remain in force, so far as they are not inconsistent with the repealing Act, until they have been revoked or replaced by statutory instruments made under the repealing Act, and until that revocation or repeal, shall be deemed to have been made under the repealing Act".*

25 The above provision shows the impact of repealing the substantive legislation on subsidiary legislation.

In the instant case, the plaintiff stated that she did not provide for a road reserve when widening the road in 2008 as she did not know whether the same was necessary. **Section 16 (8) of the Roads Act** stipulates that;

30 *"A person who constructs any structure in or on the road reserve or uses a road reserve without authorization under this section is not entitled to any compensation for the structure or use and shall remove the structure or cease the use of the road reserve at his or her cost".*


5 Furthermore, **Section 65 (1) (b) of the same Act,** criminalizes the use of the road reserve for cultivation. It states as follows;

*"A person commits an offence who-*

*(b) plants or permits any tree or permanent crop to grow within a road reserve in contravention of this act, or which interferes in anyway with the proper* 10 *function of any cutting, ditch or culvert constructed in connection with a public road."*

As earlier stated, it was this court's observation at locus that post the rehabilitation the road in question by the defendants amounted to 6 meters, which can only translate into the fact that the fence, crops and trees that were uprooted during the 15 maintenance of the Sanda road were within the road its self and its reserve, contrary to the aforementioned provisions.

Having acquired the status of a public right of way, the Sanda-Nakawuuka road is subject to management in accordance with the Roads Act and the Regulations thereunder. Whereas, I take cognizance of the fact that the plaintiff enjoys a right to

- 20 property as enshrined in **Article 26 of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda**, it is my considered opinion that the plaintiff lacks ownership of the approximately 1.18acres of her land through which the Sanda-Nakawuka road passes being the status quo for the past 17 years, therefore, the plaintiff cannot claim infringement of her proprietary rights under Article 26 (supra). In the premises, the 25 plaintiff is not entitled to any compensation. - In the final result, I have come to the conclusion that there is no proof of trespass to the plaintiff's land because a public right of way exists over 1.18 acres of her land. The plaintiffs' crops, trees and barbed wire fence were all illegally planted in the road reserve hence the defendants were justified to uproot the same hence the 30 plaintiff is not entitled to any compensation.

#### 5 **Issue No.2**

### **What remedies are available to the parties**

The plaintiff prayed for several remedies including i) adequate compensation for the land used by the defendants to construct and expand Sanda Road Wakiso District stretching from Nakawuka-Ssisa National Road to Sanda Trading Centre with an

- 10 intention of replacing the existing earthen track which was less than 2.5 meters totaling UGX 212, 979,000/= (Uganda shillings two hundred twelve millions nine hundred seventy-nine thousand shillings, ii) general damages for trespass and destruction of the plaintiff's crops and trees, iii) a declaration that the defendants trespassed on the suit land and iv) costs of the suit. - 15 However, having resolved issue 1 in the negative, it is my finding that the plaintiff is not entitled to any of these remedies hence I order as follows; - 1. The suit is dismissed. - 2. Costs are issued to the defendants.

## **I SO ORDER**.

Judgment delivered via ECCMIS this **16th** 20 day of **May** 2025.

**Immaculate Busingye Byaruhanga Judge**