Nalule Gloria v Centenary Rural Development Bank Limited (Labour Dispute Claim 54 of 2017) [2022] UGIC 81 (21 January 2022)

Full Case Text

# **THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE INDUSTRIAL COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA LABOUR DISPUTE CLAIM NO.54 OF 2014 [ARISING FROM HCT-CS No.384/2013]**

# **BETWEEN**

**NALULE GLORIA CLAIMANT**

# **VERSUS**

#### **CENTENARY RURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK LTD RESPONDENT**

#### **BEFORE**

1. Hon. Head Judge Ruhinda Asaph Ntengye

### **PANELISTS**

- 1. Mr. Jimmy Musimbi - 2. Mr. Can Amos Lapenga - 3. Ms. Robina Kagoye

#### **AWARD**

#### **Brief facts**

The Claimant was employed by the respondent as a banking officer trainee in 2006. Eventually in 2007 she was confirmed in the position of Banking Officer. In 2013 it was alleged that she cleared for payment four cheques under numbers 1925,1927,1929 and 1931 which were forged on account No. 3010400009 without due regard to established procedures of the cheque clearing process. This according to the Respondent exposed it to potential and actual loss of certain amounts of money.

According to the Respondent an investigation showed that the claimant checked the accounts many times when the bank had no transaction with the owner of the accounts that were affected by the fraud. The claimant, on being interdicted, made a written explanation without being given any investigation report and on 31/7/2013 she was called by phone to attend a disciplinary hearing on the same

date. She attended another hearing on 2/10/2013 and on 14/10/2013 she was dismissed.

# Representations

The claimant was represented by Mr. Ogwang Sam of Kaggwa & Kaggwa Advocates while the respondent was represented by Mr. Ferdinand Musimenta of S & L Advocates (formerly Sebalu & Lule Advocates).

#### Issues

Agreed issues were:

- 1) Whether the Claimant's dismissal was unlawful? - 2) Whether the Claimant was entitled to the remedies sought.

### Evidence adduced

The Claimant adduced evidence from herself only while the respondent adduced evidence from 2 witnesses.

In her evidence via a written witness statement, the claimant testified that having worked with the respondent since 7/12/2006 she was on 3/7/2013 suspended with immediate effect and asked to make a written explanation on issues raised in the interdiction letter which she did on 5/7/2013. She testified that on 3/7/2013 she was called by phone to attend a hearing without being given any document showing the charge against her. She leant of a preliminary investigation report during the hearing which copy she was not given and therefore according to her she was not given chance to prepare for the hearing or to get a lawyer. She was asked to reappear for a hearing once again but still without a formal invitation and during this hearing she leant of a security investigation report which she was not given a copy of and therefore not able to effectively respond to what it alleged. She received a dismissal letter on 14/10/2013 and according to her the dismissal was unfair since it was without according her a proper hearing.

In cross examination, the claimant admitted having received and cleared two cheques of St. Joseph's girls in respect to two accounts. She admitted having been interviewed by the security team and having been aware of an investigation. She denied having checked the accounts when there was no transaction on the same accounts.

The first respondent witness, one Ronald Sekidde testified that in June 2013 the respondent got a complaint from St. Joseph's SSS, a customer, that some money had been withdrawn from the account by clearance of forged cheques. A preliminary investigation was carried out and it showed the cheques had been cleared by the claimant who was then on 3/7/2013 interdicted. She wrote an explanation about her involvement in the clearing but denied the infractions stated in the interdiction letter.

According to the witness, the claimant was on 31/7/2013 invited for a hearing and was informed of her right to come along with a person of her choice. She attended the hearing on 2/10/2013 alone. He testified that the claimant admitted not to have called the customer at the time of confirming the payments.

In cross examination, the witness confirmed two sittings of the disciplinary hearing although he did not attend any of the hearings. He confirmed that there was no formal invitation of the claimant to the hearing.

The 2nd Respondent witness was one Geoffrey Alot who informed court what he and his team discovered during investigations as detailed in his statement and because of the stated discoveries, he recommended disciplinary action against the claimant.

#### **SUBMISSIONS**

In his Submission counsel for the Claimant contended that the claimant was not granted a fair hearing contrary to **Article28 of the Constitution** and the principle enunciated in the cases of **Grace Tibihikirra Makoko Vs Standard Chartered Bank (U) LTD, LDR 315/2015** and **Bakaluba Peter Mukasa Vs Nambooze Betty Bakireke, Election Petition Appeal No. 004/2009.** Counsel argued that the respondent breached the tenets of a fair hearing as spelt out in the case of **Ebiju James Vs Umeme HCCS 133 /2012** by Hon Lady Justice Elizabeth Musoke. Counsel strongly contended that by calling the claimant on phone to attend a hearing, the Respondent did not offer the claimant time to prepare contrary to

**Section 66 (3) of the Employment Act.** Counsel argued that the claimant was not given notice of the allegations before the hearing having earlier been given an interdiction letter that did not particularize the details of the charges. It was his view that the claimant should have been formally invited by letter detailing the accusations with a copy of an investigation report attached and detailing her rights at the hearing which included being accompanied.

According to counsel, the failure by the respondent to avail the Audit and the investigation reports to the claimant amounted to "trial by ambush"since both reports were the basis of the allegations against her. Counsel submitted that the failure of the respondent to avail the complainant during the hearing to testify against the Claimant and be cross examined did not grant a fair hearing to her.

According to counsel, there was no evidence that the claimant cleared forged cheques between 5th and 10th June 2013 amounting to 116,575,000/= in favor of Media constructions Ltd the said evidence having been said to be contained in a preliminary investigation report which was not availed to court. Counsel argued that no such evidence was contained in the audit report (Exhibit R13). Counsel submitted that there was no evidence that the claimant cleared forged cheques IFO media construction and Kwamum Millers between 8th and 7th June 2013 amounting to 176,451, 000/=. He argued that the charge of failure to use UV light could not stand since the claimant was not availed the same and she would only use internal control methods like phone calls to clients. Counsel contended that none of the six charges mentioned in the interdiction letter was proved in evidence against the claimant including the fact that the respondent was exposed to actual loss of Uganda Shillings 175,344,000/= since on appeal the Managing Director of the respondent as he dismissed the appeal stated that the Bank did not suffer loss.

In response to the above submissions, counsel for the respondent submitted that the duty of this court in determining the lawfulness of dismissal under **Section 68 (2) of the Employment Act** was to evaluate only the evidence and material available and considered by the employer before making a decision to dismiss an employee.

According to counsel, an employee cannot challenge the termination of their employment before this court using evidence which was not adduced to the

**4**

employer when they were given an opportunity to defend themselves. It was the submission of counsel that this court cannot reconstitute itself into a court of first instance and give an employee another disciplinary hearing to adduce evidence in support of his or her case but rather to evaluate the lawfulness or fairness of the evidence at the time.

Counsel argued vehemently that the cause of dismissal of the claimant was her conduct of checking a customer's account and clearing forged cheques on those accounts which led to fraud being committed. Counsel argued that the evidence available to the respondent was sufficient to establish lack of integrity by the claimant therebyjustifying her dismissal. In his view, the claimant fundamentally breached her contract by deliberately checking the targeted accounts when there were no transactions on the said accounts and by clearing forged cheques. Counsel relied on the evidence of RW2 that the claimant did not verify the signature with those in the system, she did not use UV light, she called one of the directors of the customer of the bank for only 18 seconds which was insufficient to verify the cheques and that she checked the accounts for 89 times on days when there was no transaction on the accounts. Counsel also relied on the evidence of RW1 as to the disciplinary hearing which the claimant attended. It was his submission that the claimant's actions were inconsistent with the expectations placed on banking officers, fell short of a respondent banker with no fraudulent intent and as such put the claimant's integrity in issue which was sufficient to dismiss her.

It was counsel's strong submission that following a preliminary investigation, the claimant was interdicted, asked to write an explanation which she did, was called for a disciplinary hearing which she attended thereby being given a chance to make verbal responses to the allegations. According to counsel she did not raise any objections to the conduct of the hearing and based on the representations by the claimant and the evidence adduced, the procedure to terminate the claimant was in accordance with **Section 66 of the Employment Act, Article 28 and 42 of the Constitution.**

### **Decision of Court**

**Section 8 of the Labour Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Act,** as amended by **Act No. 4 of 2021** provides for the mandate of this Court as: to arbitrate on

labour disputes referred to it and to adjudicate upon questions of law and fact arising from references to the court by any other Law. Amendment Act 4/2021 provides further that this court has powers of the High Court particularly to summon witnesses and administer oaths and affirmations.

The court is further governed by the **Labour Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement Act) Industrial Court Procedure Rules, 2012, SI No. 8,** which under **rule 5** provides that commencement of proceedings is kick started by filing a memorandum which sets out the nature and particulars of each item in the claim on the part of the Claimant and a memorandum in reply to each of the items in the claim filed by the respondent.

It follows therefore, that although this court is a reference court, in entertaining a labour dispute it has to look at ail the evidence adduced by the employer in rebutted of the claim that the termination was unlawful. This duty of the court cannot be limited to evidence adduced at the time of the dismissal but includes evaluation of such evidence to determine whether it was sufficient and if necessary point out the gaps since at the time of dismissal the burden is on the employer to prove the charges against the employee.

If it appears that evidence that ought to have implicated the claimant at the time of dismissal was not adduced during the disciplinary hearing, this court would not be precluded from pointing out this fact. Whereas it is correct to assert that under **Section 68 (2)** of the **Employment Act** the duty of the court is to evaluate the reasons as to why the employer made the decision to dismiss the employee, **it** is also true to say that those reasons must be connected to the wrong or breach of duty by the employee.

Unlike in an appeal against the decision of a Labour Officer, where this court in determining the appeal looks at evidence available to the Labour officer, in determining a memorandum of claim, this court looks at all the pleadings which include the disciplinary hearing. The Court determines the claim basing on the pleadings in both the memorandum of claim and the memorandum in reply. It is not an evaluation of the evidence only available to the employer at the time of dismissal, but a look at the whole case as the first trial court. Thus in **Industrial Court Promotion Services Vs Nelson Kasingye Agaba and Leather Industries of Uganda, Misc. Appln. 001/2021,** this court held that pleadings are entertained

as fresh pleadings and the Court is not restricted to the exact complaint or reference of the labour officer, given the provisions of **rule 5 of the rules of this court in the Labour Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) (Industrial Court Procedure Rules).**

It seems to us that the first issue was argued on two fronts;

- a) Whether charges were proved on the evidence available - b) Whether the Claimant was granted a fair hearing.

The charges as indicated in the interdiction letter were;

- "In the month of June 2013 you received different cheques from BOU clearing house IFO Media Constructions and Kwamum Millers to be cleared off St. Joseph's Girls S. S. S Ac. No. 3010400009 and 3010609829. - ii. You cleared forged cheques IFO Media Constructions during the period 5th - 10th June amounting to Ugx. 116,575,000 against Ac. 3010609829. - iii. You also cleared forged cheques IFO media Constructions and Kwamum Millers between 8th Jun- 17th June 13 amounting to Ugx. 176,451,000 against Ac. 3010400009 contrary to the Bank clearing procedures. - iv. You did not use the UV light during verification process neither did you consult your immediate supervisor on the authenticity of the cheques before clearing them. - v. You also did not verify signatures on the cheques presented for clearing as they were different from the account signatories in the system - vi. During the preliminary investigations the account signatories also confirmed that they did not receive any call from the Bank on the said payments, the last call received from the Bank was in February 2013. - vii. In your statement, you indicated that as part of your routine you first call the account signatories before clearing cheques and that you were given ago ahead."

The standard of proof of a wrong committed by an employee is in our considered opinion lower that in ordinary civil cases although it is on balance of probability. Thus in **Bwengye Herbert Vs Eco Bank (U) LTD, LDC 132/2015** this court held that the employer need not prove a case against the employee beyond reasonable doubt but that it was enough for the employer based on the facts of

the case to show that he or she was convinced that the employee had committed a wrong. The claimant in this case had persistently restructured a client's loan facility and recommended the same client to be given additional funding despite having failed to clear outstanding obligations. When the same client was given a performance guarantee on the recommendation of the claimant and the mature dates were changed by him from authority of Junior Officers with the knowledge of the claimant and the bank lost money, the claimant was dismissed and the court upheld the dismissal. On the facts the argument that the claimant had been authorised to change the dates was rejected.

There is no doubt that employees of the banks who deal directly with authorising payments or who are in direct payments to customers are in position of responsibility to detect and prevent fraud. However, such employees are only personally liable once they have failed to take the greatest care in the circumstances to detect and to prevent the fraud. This means that clearing a forged cheque or paying on such a cheque parse does not make an employee liable. The employer has a burden to prove that the employee in the circumstances should have detected the forgery and prevented the fraud. The claimant in her written response to the allegations in the interdiction letter denied clearing the alleged forged cheques without following standard bank procedures. The standard bank procedures that the claimant was alleged to have failed to apply were:

- 1) Using the UV light - 2) Verifying signatures on the cheques with the bank system - 3) Calling the account signatories before passing the cheques for payment.

The disciplinary committee relied on a preliminary and an investigation/audit report. The preliminary investigation report that precipitated the first hearing of 31/07/2013 was not adduced in evidence. The minutes of the hearing indicate that it showed that the claimant cleared forged cheque in favour of media construction on $5^{th}$ – $10^{th}$ June amounting to 11,575,000/= against A/c. 3010609829. It also shows that she on $8^{th} - 13^{th}$ June cleared forged cheques amounting to 176,451,000/ $=$ against A/c. 3010400009 and that she did not verify the signatures. After hearing the claimant on 31/07/2013, the disciplinary committee noticed gaps in the preliminary investigation and asked for a further investigation in particular areas. The investigation report shows that the claimant on 19/6/2013 cleared 3 cheques on A/c. 3010609829 for the sum of 58,405,000/= in favour of media construction. On 20/6/2013 she cleared cheques on A/c. 3010400009 for a sum of 38,940,000/- in favour of Kwamum Millers but these were dishonoured. Other cheques that were dishonoured were drawn on 26/6/2013 in the sum of 77,905,000/- in favour of Kwamum Millers. As we analyse findings in the investigation report compared to the allegations in the interdiction letter, we discover that

- 1) The claimant did not clear any cheques on 5th -10th June as alleged in the interdiction letter. - June 2) The claimant did not clear cheques between 8th June and 13th amounting to 176,451,000/= as alleged in the interdiction letter.

Although the claimant admitted in her statement having received cheques on 12th June from the clearing house, she stated that they were cleared on 13th June 2013 after being endorsed by her manager and that she cleared the cheques following the standard procedures.

Although she was blamed for not using UV light to detect the forgery, she categorically stated during the hearing on 31/7/2013 that the equipment for UV light was lacking in the bank. The investigation report was silent about the use of UV light. In the hearing of 23//08/2013, the minutes show that the claimant mentioned one of the challenges as absence of UV light at the bank. It could therefore not be conceivable that the claimant would be faulted for failure to use the UV light in detecting forgery when the same equipment was not availed to her by the respondent.

In her written explanation the claimant stated that she verified the signature on the cheques presented to her by comparing the signature on the cheque leaf to that in the equinox banking system. She stated in the same explanation **"the fraud was realised after a staff from RTGS communicated to us that she was in possession of a cheque whose serial number had already been passed through our ordinary clearing system. When we checked the archived cheques, we**

realised that the cheque we had already passed through the system was the forged cheque and she had the genuine cheque."

There is no doubt that the claimant cleared the cheque that later turned out to have been a forged cheque. Did she take greatest care expected of a banker in her position to detect the forgery? In the hearing of 31/7/2013 she is reported to have said that she would verify the cheques with her naked eyes to ascertain their genuine nature and she talked to the signatories before clearing the cheques.

The investigation report confirmed that the claimant talked to the signatories before she cleared the cheques but blamed her for talking to them for a shorter period which in the view of the investigation was suspicious. We do not accept the contention that the time spent in talking to a customer in an attempt to confirm a transaction will depend on the amount of the transaction. We hold the view that once a banker calls the customer the confirmation of the transaction by the customer is sufficient. Nothing on the evidence suggests that the signatory on being called did not confirm the transaction, the reason the disciplinary committee in its observation during the hearing of 23/08/2013 at page 11 of the minutes suggested that the sister who was a signatory to the account be pursued further by the police.

Given the evidence of the claimant that she verified the signature by comparison of the one on the cheque and the one in the bank system, given the evidence from her that the cheques were cleared only after her superior had also checked the same using naked eyes, and given that she called the signatories for confirmation, it is only safer to conclude that in the circumstances she did not offend the bank procedure of verification of the cheques as alleged in the interdiction letter. The forgery, in our view, was such that it could not be reasonably detected by any person in the position of the claimant who did everything possible in the circumstances.

Although the investigation Report indicated that she checked the said account many times when there was no transaction on the said account raising suspicion that she was in the know of the fraud, she explained that the "Purpose was to run the POD prior to Equinox clos or random check of accounts to confirm if she made the right transactions." She denied having checked "the second

account 29 times **between 7th and** 18th **without any transactions."** We form the opinion that even if it was established that the claimant checked the account several times, it would not be sufficient on its own to conclude that she had not complied with bank procedures as alleged in the interdiction letter.

Consequently, it is our finding that on the evidence the charges as indicated in the interdiction letter ware not proved.

# Was the claimant accorded **a** fair hearing?

The claimant was interdicted on 03/07/2013 and she wrote an explanation about the charges as indicated in the interdiction letter on 05/07/2013. She was called for a hearing on 31/07/2013 by phone. Although she was aware of the charges as indicated in the interdiction letter, she was entitled under **Section** 66 of the Employment **Act** to be given time to prepare for the hearing. We agree with counsel for the claimant that being called by phone to attend a hearing on the same date tantamounted to a denial of the claimant time to prepare her defence which was a derogation of a right to a fair hearing contrary to **Article 28** of **the Constitution** and the decisions in **Bakaluba Peter** Mukasa vs Nambooze Betty Bakireke, Election **Petition** Appeal No. 04/2009.

Consequently, we reject the submission of counsel for the respondent that merely giving an employee an opportunity to appear and defend the allegation without considering the time allowed within which to prepare a defence was sufficient. In our view both opportunities must be accorded to an employee. The same applies to the right of an employee to be accompanied at the hearing by a person of his/her choice and the right to cross-examine the witnesses of the employer.

The hearing of 31/07/2013 which was not exhaustive, does not show any opportunity given to the claimant to state whether she was ready to give her defence. Having been summoned for hearing suddenly on the same date, the disciplinary committee had the obligation to explain to the claimant her rights under **Section 66 of the Employment Act.** Therefore, the submission of counsel for the respondent that the claimant did not raise any objection at the hearing regarding her rights or how the hearing was being conducted is not acceptable to us. We do not accept the evidence of RW1 that the claimant was informed of her right to come along with a person of her choice because there was no other evidence to support this claim and he himself in cross-examination told court that he did not attend the disciplinary meeting and that there was no formal invitation to the hearing. Without evidence of the method through which the claimant was informed of these rights, we can only conclude that the rights were not communicated to her. The second hearing of 2/10/2013 was adjourned to clarify on issues raised by the committee on 31/07/2013 and it was based on an investigation that was carried out on 23/08/2013 after the first hearing.

It was the submission of counsel for the claimant that failure to avail the claimant both the investigation report and the preliminary report during or before the hearing tantamounted to **"trial by ambush"** and was against the tenets of a fair hearing since they were the basis of the allegations. We agree that investigation reports and persons involved in the investigation which is a basis of termination of an employee's employment should be available during the hearing and the claimant should be privy to them for purposes of crossexamination. However, in the case of Namyalo Dorothy Vs Stanbic Bank LDC No. 166/2014 this court rejected the assertion of the claimant that failure to avail her an investigation report derailed the fair hearing of the matter. This was because the claimant had been availed the full facts in the notification of hearing and the same facts were in the investigation report. Accordingly, in employment matters, when an investigation report constitutes matters or questions or facts that were originally either in the interdiction letter or in the notification for hearing, and the employee is given an opportunity to respond to the same in writing before the hearing, failure of the employer to avail the investigation report to the employee may not constitute a denial of defence to the employee. In such a scenario an employee cannot plead that the investigation report was **"a trial by ambush."**

**In** the instant case, although the interdiction was based on a preliminary report, no such report was availed in evidence.

**Section 63 of the employment Act** provides

**"63 suspension.**

**(') Whenever an employer is conducting an inquiry which he/or she has reason to believe may reveal a cause of dismissal of an**

# **employee, the employer may suspend that employee with half pay."**

The above section of the law does not prescribe the nature or type of inquiry required of an employer. It does not show at what stage of an inquiry the suspension or interdiction is expected to be. We form the opinion that even if it is at the beginning of the inquiry, as long as in the opinion of the employer such inquiry is likely to justify dismissal of an employee whether the inquiry is oral or written, the employer is entitled to suspend the employee for the purpose of either beginning or completing the inquiry.

Consequently, we do not think that the **preliminary report** in the instant case was necessarily an inquiry required by the law to be availed to the claimant for purposes of defending herself. The charges as mentioned in the interdiction letter were sufficient for this purpose.

The **investigation report,** however was meant to clarify what the disciplinary committee observed were gaps in the evidence of the claimant. The gaps concerned whether the claimant called the queried account signatories or anybody else and if so how long did the calls take, and whether the claimant or anybody else checked the queried accounts on dates when there were no transactions on the said accounts. In our view this would constitute evidence as to whether the claimant cleared the queried cheques without following the clearing Bank procedure, which was the charge in the interdiction letter. Therefore, to the extent that the investigation report was about establishing whether or not the claimant committed infractions already mentioned in the interdiction letter, none availability of the same to her before hearing did not constitute **"trial by ambush"** or unfair hearing. We must say, however, that calling the claimant by phone for the second hearing on the same date, was just like the first hearing, devoid of giving hear sufficient time for defence. She had last appeared before the committee on 31/07/2021 and the record does not show whether she was informed of the fact that the hearing was adjourned to a certain future date. The minutes of 31/07/2013 are silent on whether the claimant ws in the know of what was to come at a future date after the hearing. Therefore, the testimony of RW1, in cross-examination, only confirmed that the claimant was called on phone to attend the hearing on the same date which as

we nave already noted was devoid of giving her sufficient time to prepare for defence. In the final analysis it is our finding that the claimant was not accorded a fair hearing.

It is worthwhile to note that the claimant was dismissed for **"contravening the Bank core value of integrity."** We form the opinion that the reason for dismissal as contained in the dismissal letter was too amorphous to fit in the charges for which the claimant was called for hearing. The Dictionary meaning of the word integrity is **"the quality of being honest and having strong moral principles."** It is a state of honesty and uprightness. Article 4 of the Termination of Employment convention 1982 (No. 158 - International Labour Organisation) provides

**"The employment of a worker shall not be terminated unless there is a valid reason for such termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service."**

**Section 68 of the Employment Act** provides

**"In any claim arising out of termination the employer shall prove the reason or reasons for the dismissal, and where the employer fails to do the dismissal shall be deemed to have been unfair."**

It is our strong opinion that the reasons envisaged under the above section of the law must be reasons connected with the capacity or conduct of the employee in relation to his or her description of work or must be connected to what is required of him or her in doing his or her work. In other words, it has got to do with the employee's failure to perform his duty as required of him or her in doing his or her work. We are not convinced that **"Contravening the bank core value of integrity"** without proof of negligence or dishonesty on the part of the claimant, had anything to do with her capacity or her conduct at her work.

Consequently, it is our finding on the first issue that the claimant's dismissal was unlawful.

The second and last issue is **whetherthe claimant was entitled to the remedies sought.**

(a) Declaration that the defendant wrongfully and unlawfully dismissed the plaintiff from its employment.

Having found that the claimant was dismissed unlawfully, we hereby declare that she was unfairly, wrongfully and unlawfully dismissed.

## (b) General damages

The claimant was employed by the respondent for over eight years. We agree with the submission of her counsel that this court disapproves of the suspension of the claimant for more than 4 weeks contrary to Section 63 of the Employment Act. By the time she was unlawfully terminated she earned 1,577,669/=. Given that she was deprived of her earnings for survival of herself and family and considering the respondent's breach of Section 63 of the Employment Act which illegally kept the claimant on suspension, we hereby Award her 30,000,000/= as general damages. This amount shall earn interest at 15% per annum from the date of the Award until payment in full.

## (c) Aggregated damages

We have not found any circumstances to warrant grant of aggravated damages. This prayer is therefore denied.

(d) Costs

Each party shall bear own costs.

In the final analysis, we enter an Award in favour of the claimant in the above terms.

### Delivered & signed by:

1. Hon. Head Judge Ruhinda Asaph Ntengye

### PANELISTS

- 1. Mr. Jimmy Musimbi - 2. Mr. Can Amos Lapenga - 3. Ms. Robina Kagoye

Dated: 21/01/2022