Njeru v Mukurweini Technical Training Institute [2025] KEHC 6326 (KLR)

Njeru v Mukurweini Technical Training Institute (Civil Appeal E002 of 2024) [2025] KEHC 6326 (KLR) (21 May 2025) (Judgment)

Neutral citation: [2025] KEHC 6326 (KLR)

Republic of Kenya

In the High Court at Nyeri

Civil Appeal E002 of 2024

DKN Magare, J

May 21, 2025

Between

David Mwabura Njeru

Appellant

and

Mukurweini Technical Training Institute

Respondent

Judgment

1. This is an Appeal from the Judgment and Decree of the Honourable I S Imolet given on .17. 07. 2024 Nyeri SCCCOMM E0131 0F 2024. The Appellant was the Respondent in the Small Claims Court.

2. The claimant filed a claim dated 09. 04. 2024 against the Appellant claiming a sum of Ksh. 1,000,000/= being general damages for loss of income and special damages. this arose out of a contract between the parties, in a form a memorandum of understanding doted 6th June 2023. The court heard the matter and dismissed the same since there was no contract for the year 2024. the contract had two termination dates. a specific one in clause 6, upon payment of Ksh43,200/= being 30 per centum. This was to be paid upon completion of the four months training as the students proceed for attachment in September 2023. The respondent stated that the contract was fully perfumed in 2023 and there was no contract for 2024. The court agreed with the Respondent and dismissed the claim, hence this appeal. the appellant filed 10 grounds of appeal. The same offends Order 42 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules provides are doth: -“Every appeal to the High Court shall be in the form of a memorandum of appeal signed in the same manner as a pleading. (2) The memorandum of appeal shall set forth concisely and under distinct heads the grounds of objection to the decree or order appealed against, without any argument or narrative, and such grounds shall be numbered consecutively."

3. The Court of Appeal had this to say about compliance with Rule 86[now rule 88] of the Court of Appeal Rules (which is pari materia with Order 42 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules) in the case of Robinson Kiplagat Tuwei v Felix Kipchoge Limo Langat [2020] eKLR: -“We are yet again confronted with an appeal founded on a memorandum of appeal that is drawn in total disregard of rule 86 of the Court of Appeal Rules. That rule demands that a memorandum of appeal must set forth concisely, without argument or narrative, the grounds upon which a judgment is impugned. What we have before us are some 18 grounds of appeal that lack focus and are repetitively tedious. It is certainly not edifying for counsel to present two dozen grounds of appeal, and end up arguing only two or three issues, on the myth that he has condensed the grounds of appeal. This Court has repeatedly stated that counsel must take time to draw the memoranda of appeal in strict compliance with the rules of the Court. (See Abdi Ali Dere v Firoz Hussein Tundal & 2 Others [2013] eKLR) and Nasri Ibrahim v IEBC & 2 Others [2018] eKLR. In the latter case, this Court lamented:“We must reiterate that counsel must strive to make drafting of grounds of appeal an art, not an exercise in verbosity, repetition, or empty rhetoric…A surfeit of prolixious grounds of appeal do not in anyway enhance the chances of success of an appeal. If they achieve anything, it is only to obfuscate the real issues in dispute, vex and irritate the opposite parties, waste valuable judicial time, and increase costs.” The 18 grounds of appeal presented by the appellant, Robinson Kiplagat Tuwei against the judgment of the Environment and Land Court at Eldoret (Odeny, J.) dated 19th September 2018 raise only two issues…”

4. The court abhors repetitiveness of grounds of appeal which tend to cloud the key issue in dispute for determination by the court. In the case of Kenya Ports Authority v Threeways Shipping Services (K) Limited [2019] eKLR, the court of appeal observed that: -“Our first observation is that the memorandum of appeal in this matter sets out repetitive grounds of appeal. The singular issue in this appeal is whether Section 62 of the Kenya Ports Authority Act ousts the jurisdiction of the High Court. We abhor repetitiveness of grounds of appeal which tend to cloud the key issue in dispute for determination by the Court. In William Koross v Hezekiah Kiptoo Kimue & 4 others, Civil Appeal No. 223 of 2013, this Court stated:“The memorandum of appeal contains some thirty-two grounds of appeal, too many by any measure and serving only to repeat and obscure. We have said it before and will repeat that memoranda of appeal need to be more carefully and efficiently crafted by counsel. In this regard, precise, concise and brief is wiser and better.”

5. The only issue was whether the court erred in law in dismissing the claim in the court below. The rest of the issues are ancillary, repetitive, prolixious and a waste of judicial time. I shall therefore dismiss in limine all questions of fact raised in appeal.

Analysis 6. This being an Appeal from the Small Claims Court, the duty of the court is circumscribed under 38 of the Small Claims Court Act which provides as doth:(1)A person aggrieved by the decision or an order Appeals. of the Court may appeal against that decision or order to the High Court on matters of law.(2)An appeal from any decision or order referred to in subsection (1) shall be final.

7. However, an Appeal of this nature is on matters of law. It can be pure points of law or mixed points of law but matters of law it is. An appeal on matters of law is akin to a second appeal to the Court of Appeal. The duty of a second Appeal was set out in the case of M/s Otieno, Ragot & Company Advocates v National Bank of Kenya Limited [2020] eKLR: -“This is a second appeal. I am alive to my duty as a second appellate court to determine matters of law only unless it is shown that the courts below-considered matters they should not have considered or failed to consider matters they should have considered or looking at the entire decision, it is perverse. (See: Stanley N. Muriithi & Another v Bernard Munene Ithiga [2016] eKLR).”

8. Then what constitutes a matter of law? In Twaher Abdulkarim Mohamed v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) & 2 others, [2014] eKLR, the court stated as doth: -“4. Although the phrase ‘a matter of law’ has not been defined by the Elections Act, it has been held in Timamy Issa Abdalla v Swaleh Salim Swaleh Imu & 3 Others, Malindi Civil Appeal No. 39 Of 2013 (Court Of Appeal), (Okwengu, Makhandia & Sichale, JJA) of 13. 01. 2014 that a decision is erroneous in law if it is one to which no court could reasonably come to, citing Bracegirdle v Oxney [1947] 1 All ER 126. See also Khatib Abdalla Mwashetani v Gedion Mwangangi Wambua & 3 Others, Malindi Civil Appeal No. 39 Of 2013 (Court Of Appeal), (Okwengu, M'inoti & Sichale, JJA) of 23. 01. 2014 following AG v David Marakaru [1960] EA 484. ”

9. In Peter Gichuki King'ara v IEBC& 2 Others, Nyeri Civil Appeal No. 31 Of 2013 (Court Of Appeal) (Visram, Koome & Odek, JJA) Of 13. 02. 2014, the court of Appeal held as follows: -“it was held that it is trite law that the exercise of judicial discretion is a point of law and that the trial court in denying a prayer of scrutiny is exercising judicial discretion. The Court concluded that it would not be feasible for the Court of Appeal to order for a recount and scrutiny as this would involve matters of fact that were within the jurisdiction of the trial court. The court further held that the question of whether the trial judge properly considered and evaluated the evidence and arrived at a correct determination that is supported by law and evidence – with the caveat that the appeal court did not see the witness demeanour – is an issue of law.”

10. The main issue for determination in this case is whether the Trial Court erred in law in dismissing the Appellant’s case. A matter of law is similar to a preliminary point of law but has a broader meaning. Justice prof J.B. Ojwang J (as he then was) succinctly addressed the issue of preliminary objection in the case of Oraro v Mbaja [2005] eKLR:“I think the principle is abundantly clear. A preliminary objection as correctly understood is now well settled. It is identified as, and declared to be the point of law which must not be blurred with factual details liable to be contested and in any event, to be proved through the processes of evidence. Any assertion which claims to be a preliminary objection, and yet it bears factual aspects calling for proof, or seeks to adduce evidence for its authentication, is not, as a matter of legal principle, a true preliminary objection which the court should allow to proceed. I am in agreement that where a court needs to investigate facts, a matter cannot be raised as a preliminary point.

11. The timelines for small claims are punishing. It is therefore imperative that the case facing Parties be clear and succinct. Mere allegations will not count. Parties must know that it is a court of law and not a kangaroo court or a baraza. Pleadings are therefore paramount. In the case of Daniel Otieno Migore v South Nyanza Sugar Co. Ltd [2018] eKLR, A C Mrima stated as follows: -“It is by now well settled by precedent that parties are bound by their pleadings and that evidence which tends to be at variance with the pleadings is for rejection. Pleadings are the bedrock upon which all the proceedings derive from. It hence follows that any evidence adduced in a matter must be in consonance with the pleadings. Any evidence, however strong, that tends to be at variance with the pleadings must be disregarded. That settled position was re-affirmed by the Court of Appeal in the case of Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & Ano. v Stephen Mutinda Mule & 3 others [2014] eKLR which cited with approval the decision of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in Adetoun Oladeji (NIG) v Nigeria Breweries PLC SC 91/2002 where Adereji, JSC expressed himself thus on the importance and place of pleadings: -“…..it is now trite principle in law that parties are bound by their pleadings and that any evidence led by any of the parties which does not support the averments in the pleadings, or put in another way, which is at variance with the averments of the pleadings goes to no issue and must be disregarded………In fact, that parties are not allowed to depart from their pleadings is on the authorities basic as this enables parties to prepare their evidence on the issues as joined and avoid any surprises by which no opportunity is given to the other party to meet the new situation.”

12. The Supreme Court of Kenya in its ruling on inter alia scrutiny in the case of Raila Amolo Odinga & Another v IEBC & 2 others [2017] eKLR found and held as follows in respect to the essence of pleadings in an election petition: -“In absence of pleadings, evidence if any, produced by the parties, cannot be considered. It is also a settled legal proposition that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleadings and parties are bound to take all necessary and material facts in support of the case set up by them. Pleadings ensure that each side is fully alive to the questions that are likely to be raised and they may have an opportunity of placing the relevant evidence before the court for its consideration. The issues arise only when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by one party and denied by the other party. Therefore, it is neither desirable nor permissible for a court to frame an issue not arising on the pleadings…...’”

13. The court was duty bound to read the documents and interpret then as such. The documents filed by the Appellant support the Respondent’s case. The court cannot add evidence to documents. In Fidelity & Commercial Bank Ltd v Kenya Grange Vehicle Industries Ltd [2017] eKLR, the Court of Appeal, Ouko, Kiage and Murgor JJA held as doth;-“Courts adopt the objective theory of contract interpretation and profess to have overriding view sometimes called Four Corners of an Instrument, which insists that a documents meaning should be derived from the document itself, without reference to anything outside of the document, extrinsic reversed…”

14. The claim was for a contract to be executed in 2023. It was fully executed. The appellant wants the court to create another contract. In the case of National Bank of Kenya Ltd v Pipeplastic Samkolit (K) Ltd & another [2001] eKLR as follows: -“A Court of law cannot re-write a contract between the parties. The parties are bound by the terms of their contract, unless coercion, fraud or undue influence are pleaded and proved. There was not the remotest suggestion of coercion, fraud or undue influence in regard to the terms of the charge.As was stated by Shah JA in the case of Fina Bank Limited v Spares & Industries Limited (Civil Appeal No 51 of 2000) (unreported):“It is clear beyond peradventure that save for those special cases where equity might be prepared to relieve a party from a bad bargain, it is ordinarily no part of equity’s function to allow a party to escape from a bad bargain”.

15. The court is bound by section 32 of the evidence act on aspects of the case. the court was correct in all aspects herein. of curios interest was the claim for special damages, which had no grounding in contract. there was also a claim for general damages. In the case of David Bagine v Martin Bundi [1997] eKLR, the court of Appeal stated as follows: -“It has been held time and again by this Court that special damages must be pleaded and strictly proved. We refer to the remarks by this Court in the case of Mariam Maghema Ali v Jackson M. Nyambu t/a sisera store, Civil Appeal No. 5 of 1990 (unreported) and Idi Ayub Sahbani v City Council of Nairobi (1982-88) IKAR 681 at page 684: "....special damages in addition to being pleaded, must be strictly proved as was stated by Lord Goddard C.J. in Bonham Carter v Hyde Park Hotel Limited [1948] 64 TLR 177 thus:“Plaintiffs must understand that if they bring actions for damages it is for thm to prove damage, it is not enough to write down the particulars and, so to speak, throw them at the head of the court, saying, 'this is what I have lost, I ask you to give me these damages.' They have to prove it"

16. It is noteworthy that in James Maranya v South Nyanza Sugar Co. Ltd [2017] the court addressed the question of general damages for breach of contract as hereunder:where the court stated that:16…It is well settled in law that general damages cannot be awarded on a claim anchored on a breach of contract. In affirming that position, the Court of Appeal in the case of Joseph Urigadi Kedeva v Ebby Kangishal Kavai Kisumu Civil Appeal No. 239 of 1997 (UR) emphatically expressed itself thus:“.....As to the award of Kshs. 250,000/= as general damages, Mr. Adere submitted that there can be no award of general damages for breach of contract......We respectfully agree. There can be no general damages for breach of contract......"he reason as to why general damages cannot be awarded in cases of breach of a contract was explained in the case of Consolata Anyango Ouma v South Nyanza Sugar Co. Ltd [2015] eKLR as follows:The next question is whether the appellant was entitled to damages as a result of the breach. As a general principle, the purpose of damages for breach of contract is, subject to mitigation of loss, the claimant is to be put as far as possible in the same position he would have been if the breach complained of had not occurred. This principle is encapsulated in the Latin phrase restitution in integrum (see Kenya Industrial Estates Ltd v Lee Enterprises Ltd NRB CA Civil Appeal No. 54 of 2004 [2009] eKLR, Kenya Breweries Ltd v Natex Distributors Ltd Milimani HCCC No. 704 of 2000 [2004] eKLR). The measure of damages is in accordance with the rule established in the case of Hadley v Baxendale [1854] 9. Exch. 341 that the measure of damages is such as may be fairly and reasonably be considered arising naturally from the breach itself or such as may be reasonably contemplated by the parties at the time the contract was made and a probable result of such breach (see Standard Chartered Bank Limited v Intercom Services Ltd & Others NRB CA Civil Appeal No. 37 of 2003 [2004] eKLR). Such damages are not damages at large or general damages but are in the nature of special damages and they must be pleaded and proved (see Coast Bus Service Ltd v Sisco Murunga Ndanyi & 2 others, NRB CA Civil Appeal No. 192 of 92 (UR) and Charles C. Sande v Kenya Co-operative Creameries Ltd, NRB CA Civil Appeal No. 154 of 1992 (UR))”.

17. The case was doomed to fail from the word go. It lacks inherent meri and so is the appeal. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.

18. The issue of costs is governed by Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act, which provides as follows:(1)Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, and to the provisions of any law for the time being in force, the costs of and incidental to all suits shall be in the discretion of the court or judge, and the court or judge shall have full power to determine by whom and out of what property and to what extent such costs are to be paid, and to give all necessary directions for the purposes aforesaid; and the fact that the court or judge has no jurisdiction to try the suit shall be no bar to the exercise of those powers: Provided that the costs of any action, cause or other matter or issue shall follow the event unless the court or judge shall for good reason otherwise order.(2)The court or judge may give interest on costs at any rate not exceeding fourteen per cent per annum, and such interest shall be added to the costs and shall be recoverable as such.

19. They are discretionally. The Supreme Court has set forth guiding principles applicable in the exercise of that discretion in the case of Jasbir Singh Rai & 3 others v Tarlochan Singh Rai & 4 others, SC Petition No. 4 of 2012; [2014] eKLR, as follows: -“(18)It emerges that the award of costs would normally be guided by the principle that “costs follow the event”: the effect being that the party who calls forth the event by instituting suit, will bear the costs if the suit fails; but if this party shows legitimate occasion, by successful suit, then the defendant or respondent will bear the costs. However, the vital factor in setting the preference is the judiciously-exercised discretion of the Court, accommodating the special circumstances of the case, while being guided by ends of justice. The claims of the public interest will be a relevant factor, in the exercise of such discretion, as will also be the motivations and conduct of the parties, before, during, and subsequent to the actual process of litigation…. Although there is eminent good sense in the basic rule of costs– that costs follow the event – it is not an invariable rule and, indeed, the ultimate factor on award or non-award of costs is the judicial discretion. It follows, therefore, that costs do not, in law, constitute an unchanging consequence of legal proceedings – a position well illustrated by the considered opinions of this Court in other cases.

20. Since costs follow the event, the Respondents are entitled to costs of the Appeal. A sum of Ksh 65,000/= will be right and just.

Determination 21. In the upshot, I make the following Orders:i.The Appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissedii.The Respondent shall have the cost of this Appeal of Ksh. 65,000/=.iii.30 days stay of execution.ivThe file is closed.

DELIVERED, DATED AND SIGNED AT MOMBASA ON THIS 21ST DAY OF MAY, 2025. JUDGMENT DELIVERED THROUGH MICROSOFT TEAMS ONLINE PLATFORM.KIZITO MAGAREJUDGEIn the presence of:Mr Kaburu for the AppellantMr Kibe for the RespondentCourt Assistant MichaelM.D. KIZITO, J.