ADAMTEY VRS THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION (J1/11/2024) [2025] GHASC 10 (16 February 2025)

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE IN THE SUPREME COURT ACCRA – AD. 2025 CORAM: SACKEY TORKORNOO CJ (PRESIDING) PWAMANG JSC LOVELACE – JOHNSON JSC AMADU JSC KULENDI JSC ASIEDU JSC DARKO ASARE JSC WRIT NO: J1/11/2024 NOAH EPHRAEM TETTEH ADAMTEY … PLAINTIFF VRS THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION … DEFENDANT JUDGMENT Page 1 of 28 19TH FEBRUARY, 2025 DARKO ASARE JSC: 1. On or about the 12th day of March 2024, the Plaintiff issued a writ invoking the original jurisdiction of this Court for the following reliefs: i) A declaration that upon a true and proper interpretation of Article 42 of the 1992 Constitution, every sound-minded Ghanaian of 18 years and above has the right to vote in public elections and referenda and is entitled to be registered by the Defendant for any public election and referenda that will occur immediately following their attainment of at least 18 years. ii) A declaration that upon a true and proper interpretation of Articles 42 and 45 of the 1992 Constitution, the Defendant is mandated to conduct its affairs in a way that ensures that all persons qualified to vote at the time of any public elections or referenda are registered and allowed to vote in said public elections or referenda. iii) A declaration that on a true and proper interpretation of Articles 42 and of the 1992 Constitution, the Defendant's failure to make provision to register all sound-minded Ghanaians who would be 18 years or above at the time of the Page 2 of 28 2024 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections is unconstitutional and an unjustified interference with their constitutionally guaranteed right. iv) A declaration that on a true and proper interpretation of Articles 42 and 45 of the 1992 Constitution, the Defendant's refusal, on the basis of the Provisions of the Public Elections (Registration of Voters) Regulations., 2016 (CI 19) as amended, to register all sound minded Ghanaians, who are to be registered as voters, and would be 18 years and above at the time of the 2024 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections is unconstitutional and an unjustified interference with their constitutionally guaranteed right v) A declaration that on a true and proper interpretation of Articles 42 and 45 of the 1992 Constitution, the Defendant's failure to make provisions to register all sound-minded Ghanaians who are willing to be registered as voters and would be 18 years and above at the time of the 2024 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections is unconstitutional and an unjustified interference with their constitutionally guaranteed right. vi) An order directed at the Defendant to reopen the voters registration process to enable the registration of persons who will be 18 years of age or and above at the time of the 2024 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections. Page 3 of 28 vii) An order for the payment of the Plaintiff’s legal fees and costs for the enforcement of the action viii) Any other orders this Honourable Court may deem fit and just in the circumstances. 2. By a statement of case that provided both the factual basis of the action and the applicable law on which the claim was anchored, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant, since its inception, has refused to register otherwise qualified sound-minded Ghanaians who attain the age of 18 years before the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections but after the Defendant has completed its Voter registration exercise. According to the Plaintiff, the Defendant announced a voter registration exercise in a press statement dated September 11th 2022, which was only open to Ghanaians who had turned 18 years by the time of the exercise. The Plaintiff claims that the Defendant failed to register Ghanaians who turned 18th after the exercise but before the 2024 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections. The Plaintiff further asserts that the Defendant's press release dated September 11th 2023, stated that individuals who were not 18 years old at the time of the voter registration exercise would be prosecuted if they attempted to register. The Plaintiff also complains that the Defendant's program for the 2024 elections, released on March 7th 2024, did not make provision for the registration of individuals who turned 18 years Page 4 of 28 after the May 27th 2024, registration deadline but before the elections on December 7th 2024. The Plaintiff argues that the Defendant's actions demonstrate an intention to deny registration to Ghanaians who turn 18 years after the registration deadline but before the elections. The Plaintiff, being aggrieved by the Defendant's decision, has instituted this action seeking enforcement and interpretation of Articles 42 and 45 of the 1992 Constitution, which relate to the right of Ghanaians 18 years and above to be registered to vote in public elections and referenda. 3. The Defendant disputes the Plaintiff's claims from three main angles. First, the Plaintiff didn't provide evidence of making any attempts to register, and being turned away. Second, previous Supreme Court decisions have already settled the issue of citizens' right to register and vote, making this case unnecessary. Third, the Defendant argues it has mechanisms in place for eligible citizens to register. The Defendant further submits that the Supreme Court's jurisdiction hasn't been properly invoked, as the Constitution's language is clear as far as the Electoral Commission’s responsibilities are concerned and does not require any interpretation. Defendant cites previous cases and argues that the Plaintiff's complaints are unfounded, as the Defendant has always complied with its constitutional obligations. The Defendant also emphasizes that it's not feasible to undertake voter registration continuously, as it needs to finalize the Page 5 of 28 register before elections. It points out that its activities are guided by law, and the Plaintiff's concerns are addressed through existing regulations. JURISDICTION 4. The suit seeks to invoke the original jurisdiction of this Court under the provisions of Article 2(1) and 130(1) of the 1992 Constitution, which states as follows: - “A person who alleges that— (a) an enactment or anything contained in or done under the authority of that or any other enactment; or (b) any act or omission of any person is inconsistent with, or in contravention of a provision of this Constitution, may bring an action in the Supreme Court for a declaration to that effect.” Article 130(1) of the constitution also provides as follows: "Subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court in the enforcement of the Fundamental Human rights and Freedoms as provided in Page 6 of 28 article 33 of this Constitution, the Supreme court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in— (a) all matters relating to the enforcement or interpretation of this Constitution; and (b) all matters arising whether an enactment was made in excess of the powers conferred on Parliament or any other authority or person by law or under this Constitution." 5. The exclusive original jurisdiction of this Court is a special one and must be upheld as such. Like any issue of jurisdiction, it is basic, fundamental and lies at the core of the competence of every action invoking this Court’s mandate to inquire into any matter brought before it. 6. That being the case, and as a matter of primacy, we need to satisfy ourselves as to whether our jurisdiction has been properly invoked. This is so because jurisdiction goes to the root of every court proceedings and even when the Parties themselves do not raise any jurisdictional issue, the duty lies on the Court first and foremost to satisfy itself that it has been vested with appropriate jurisdiction over the case. Page 7 of 28 7. The above principle of the law has been explained by Acquah JSC (as he then was) in the case of Attorney General (No. 2) vs. Tsatsu Tsikata (No. 2) [2001- 2002] SCGLR 620, at page 646 as follows: - “It is therefore trite knowledge that the first duty of every judge in any proceedings is to satisfy himself that he has jurisdiction in the matter before him. For the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any time, even after judgment. Thus, whether the parties raise the issue of jurisdiction or not, the court is duty bound to consider it.” 8. It bears emphasis that this Court’s special original jurisdiction extends to both enforcement as well as interpretative matters as established in authoritative decisions like Sumaila Bielbiel v Adamu Dramani [2011] 1 SCGLR 132, and also Emmanuel Noble Kor v Attorney-General and Another, Suit No. J1/16/2015 dated 10th March 2016 (unreported) 9. For the purpose of disposing of the jurisdictional question, the primary issue is whether the matter at stake raises a fair case of interpretation or enforcement and the Court at this stage is not required to make a determination on the substantive merits of the case. Endorsing the above proposition of the law, Gbadegbe JSC in the recent case of Abu Ramadan v Electoral Commission Page 8 of 28 [2015-2016] 1 SCGLR 1 at page 25, cited with approval the statement by this Court in its previous decision of Sumaila Bielbiel v Adamu Dramani [2011] 1 SCGLR 144, where it was observed on the jurisdictional point at page 144 thus: “At this point we need not inquire into whether or not the case of the plaintiff is weak or one that is likely to succeed. It is sufficient if it raises a case though weak, that might proceed to trial.” 10. In light of the precedents established in the aforementioned cases, the pivotal issue for our determination at this juncture is whether, pursuant to Articles 42 and 45 of the Constitution, the Defendant bears a constitutional obligation to establish mechanisms and provide opportunities enabling every Ghanaian who turns eighteen years by the date fixed for any election, to exercise his franchise, and if it has failed to do so, whether this Court’s enforcement jurisdiction could be invoked to remedy the default. 11. In our view, from the above standpoint, the Plaintiff ‘s action seeks to give teeth and effectuate the provisions of Articles 42 and 45 of the Constitution by ensuring that names of eligible persons are captured in the Voters Register to enable them exercise their franchise. Seen in this light therefore we are satisfied that a justiciable issue for enforcement of a constitutional provision arises for our determination and in consequence thereof, we are unable to Page 9 of 28 acquiesce in the objection to jurisdiction raised by the Defendant, which is hereby dismissed. MEMORANDUM OF ISSUES 12. The issues set out in the Joint Memorandum filed by the Parties read as follows: - (a) Whether upon a true and proper interpretation of Article 42 of the 1992Constitution, all persons who turn 18 years on or before the day of any public elections have the right to vote in said election and are entitled to be registered as voters for that purpose. (b) Whether upon a true and proper interpretation of Articles 42 and 45 of the 1992 Constitution, the Defendant's refusal to register all persons who turn 18 years on or before the day of any public elections to enable them to vote in said election or referenda is unconstitutional. (c) Whether upon a true and proper interpretation of Article 42 of the 1992 Constitution Rule 9(4) of CI 91 is unconstitutional and is to that extent void and of no effect whatsoever. Page 10 of 28 (d) Whether or not the issues listed above issues (a) (b) and (c) have already been dealt with in previous decisions of the Supreme Court. PRELIMINARY ISSUES 13. Preliminary to considering the substantive merits of the issues presented, this Court must resolve two threshold issues, first the competency of certain reliefs sought by the Plaintiff and second the question of whether the Plaintiff's claim has been rendered moot by the conclusion of the 2024 elections. i) Competency of Reliefs 14. From a cursory reading of reliefs (i) and (ii) there is no allegation of any breach or threatened breach of any constitutional provision. It is a bare, arid relief which no more than merely refers to what the Constitution generally provides for, without more. In the celebrated case of Blackburn v Attorney General [1971] 2 ALL ER 1380, it was said per Stamp LJ at page 1383 that it was no part of the Court’s function to make declarations in general terms regarding the powers of Parliament, particularly where the circumstances in which the court was asked to intervene were hypothetical. Page 11 of 28 15. Adade JSC in the case of Bilson v. Attorney-General [1993-94] 1 GLR 104 at page 105, cautioned against parties coming to court to pray for sterile declarations in the following words: - "Take, for instance, the declaration sought under paragraph (b) of the writ. The Plaintiff wants the court to declare that: '(i) all persons in Ghana are equal before the law' and he himself says that that statement is in Article 17(1) of the Constitution. I agree with him that Article 17(1) says so. But does the Court have to declare that the article says so? In any case where will such a declaration take the Plaintiff or anyone else? Again, has any person impeded the plaintiff’s access to the law? In the absence of an allegation to that effect, what is the point in merely repeating the second limb of Article 23 in the form of a declaration? 16. By merely seeking a confirmatory declaration on certain provisions of the Constitution, reliefs (i) and (ii) endorsed on the Plaintiff’s writ can hardly form a valid foundation for invoking the special jurisdiction of this Court under Article 2(1) of the Constitution. It is incompetent, gives rise to no cause of action, and are hereby struck out. See also the views of Sophia Akufo in Sam v Attorney-General [2000] SCGLR 102. Page 12 of 28 ii) Mootness of instant action 17. Given the fact that a number of the reliefs prayed for by the Plaintiff herein rest principally on the ability of eligible voters to be registered to vote in the 2024 elections, and in light of the conclusion of the 2024 elections, the question arises whether the Plaintiff’s claims regarding voter registration have become moot. 18. The question of mootness has been addressed in a plethora of decisions by this Court and the clear principle discernable from these authorities is that the courts will not waste their time to determine questions and issues which are not likely to re-occur but are dead and buried forever. This principle was decidedly settled by this Court in the case of J. H. Mensah v Attorney-General [1996-97] SCGLR 320, at page 359, as follows: - “The principle guiding the court in refusing to decide the moot questions is quite settled. If the question, though moot, is certainly not likely to re- occur, the courts will not waste their time to determine questions and issues which are dead and buried forever. But where it is not so established, the courts would go into the questions to forestall a multiplicity of suits. Thus for a court to decline deciding a moot question, it must be established or shown that: Page 13 of 28 'Subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrong behaviour could not reasonably be expected to recur'." 19. Despite the 2024 elections having been held, the issues raised in this action are not moot, as they involve matters of ongoing public interest and concern, which necessitate a judicial determination. The Court must therefore provide a definitive ruling on those issues, as they are likely to arise again in future elections, and their resolution will provide essential guidance for the Electoral Commission and the public at large. ANALYSIS 20. In our considered view, the central issue for determination can be succinctly framed as follows: Does the Electoral Commission (EC) have a constitutional obligation to ensure the continuous update of the voter register, accurately reflecting daily changes in voter eligibility due to age, up until the scheduled election date, thereby guaranteeing citizens' voting rights? 21. The issue before us is not unprecedented, as this Court has a long history of exercising its original jurisdiction in similar matters, informed by a robust body of case law that has consistently safeguarded the electoral rights of Page 14 of 28 citizens See cases like Ahumah Ocansey v Electoral Commission [2010] SCGLR 575; Apaloo v Electoral Commission [2001-2002] 2 GLR 372, [2001-2002] SCGLR 1; Abu Ramadan & Nimako (No. 1) v. Electoral commission & Attorney-General & Ors, (consolidated) (2013–2014) 2 SCGLR 1654. 22. While asserting the constitutional rights of citizens to register and vote, the authorities have also aimed to maintain a delicate balance with the Electoral Commission's independence in the discharge of its duties under the Constitution, and in furtherance of which Article 51 empowers the Commission to make laws regulating the electoral process. See the case of Apaloo v Electoral Commission (supra) per Bamford-Addo JSC, and Amegatcher v Attorney-General [2012] 2 SCGLR 933 23. As a corollary to the Electoral Commission's constitutional independence, it follows that decisions made within the scope of its constitutional mandate are considered discretionary and insulated from external intervention or control. This is how Gbadegbe JSC described this aspect of the EC’s independence in the Abu Ramadan case (supra) at pages 37-38: - “We think that the independence of the Commission is crucial for the success of any election. If the Commission is perceived otherwise, there is little prospect of the electoral administration on Election Day being Page 15 of 28 perceived as transparent and fair. If we are to consolidate our democracy, it is incumbent on us all to defend and protect its independence as provided for in the constitution. We think that in the circumstances when a specific complaint is made regarding the performance of any of the functions of the Commission, it is our duty to inquire into it and ask if there is by any provision of the constitution or any other law which detracts from the presumption of independence that article 46 bestows on it. If there is no such constitutional or statutory provision then what it means is that the matter is entirely within its discretion and not subject to the control of any other authority including the court.” 24. Informed by the above principles, we would now proceed to answer the pivotal question raised for our consideration in these proceedings as to whether the complaints lodged against the EC in this case give rise to acts that can be characterized as unconstitutional, illegal, or unreasonable. 25. From the facts on record, there is no doubt that this Court is tasked with balancing the competing demands of citizens’ voting rights and the Electoral Commission’s constitutional responsibilities to actualize those rights. 26. Opportunely, the present issue is not unique, as this Court has previously considered analogous situations, and has consistently applied a delicately Page 16 of 28 balanced approach, weighing the citizens’ right to participate in the electoral process against the Electoral Commission’s constitutional mandate to facilitate that participation. This approach is what is commonly referred to as the balancing doctrine in constitutional interpretation. 27. The doctrine of balancing, a cornerstone of constitutional interpretation, dictates that constitutional provisions be construed in a manner that harmonizes competing interests, rights, and obligations, thereby achieving a proportionate and balanced outcome. 28. Prior to examining the applicability of the balancing concept to the instant case, a brief excursion into its previous applications in relevant case law may provide valuable insight. 29. In the unreported case of Dr Kwame Amoako Tuffuor & 2 Ors v Electoral Commission & Anor Writ No J1/1/2017; 14th November 2016, the Plaintiff sought a declaration that special votes cast in the 2016 presidential and parliamentary elections should be counted and announced on the date of special voting at each polling station, pursuant to Article 49 of the Constitution and Regulation 23 of the Public Elections Regulations, 2016. The Supreme Court however rejected this idea of fractional declaration of results and reasoned that Article 49(2) contemplates results declaration only after polls Page 17 of 28 have closed in all polling stations, not just some of them. Consequently, special vote results, which are only a portion of the total results from a constituency, cannot be declared separately under Article 49(2) 30. The importance of this case to the issues raised for our determination in the present action lies in the fact that in rejecting the Plaintiff’s claim, the Supreme Court accepted that the Electoral Commission had well discharged its constitutional mandate by working out a proper balance between the “…. competing electoral rights and other relevant electoral provisions of the Constitution….”, through the application of subsidiary legislations like Regulations 23 and 24 of C. I. 94. The Court further reasoned that the practical consequences of this arrangement resonated well with the letter and spirit of the Constitution and thereby rendered the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff in that suit unsustainable. This is how Atuguba JSC expressed himself: - “In the present case, however, the Electoral Commission is confronted with the dilemma of having election officers fully available for the performance of their electoral duties on the polling day of an election, without prejudice to their rights to vote as well as the excusable absence of registered voters on polling day, without prejudice to their voting rights. As is well known, the special vote is fixed for 1/12/2016 whilst the general election is fixed for 7/12/2016. In order to do so effectively under Page 18 of 28 article 51 of the constitution the Electoral commission has sought, inter, alia in regulations 23 and 24 to work out a balance between the competing electoral rights and the other relevant electoral provisions of the constitution. The resultant practical scenario of it’s[sic] efforts is captured at p. 3 of it’s[sic] publication, “GUIDE TO ELECTION OFFICIALS 2016” as follows: X x x x x We believe that this actualization of the powers of the 1st defendant, the Electoral Commission under article 51 of the constitution with regard to the need for special voting, resonates well with, inter alia, articles 42, 49, 23, 296 and 297 (c) of the constitution in terms of, letter coupled with spirit, and that the relief sought by the plaintiffs is inconsistent therewith, see Tuffuor v. Attorney-General (1980) GLR 634 C. A. (sitting as the Supreme Court). (emphasis) 31. The above dicta reinforces two very significant principles of constitutional interpretation, first (i) the doctrine of balancing diverging rights and interests; second (ii) the canon of interpretation that requires a practical and realistic outcome. Page 19 of 28 32. In the case of Republic v Thommy Thompson Books Ltd [ 1996-97] 2 SCGLR 804 at page 846, Kpegah JSC highlighted the importance of balancing freedom of expression with the need to protect the rights of others. This is what the eminent jurist said: - “The denial of the balancing doctrine will place the individual outside society and make an island of him. There is the need for a meeting point between individual and societal rights for harmony. For while an unbridled insistence on and enforcement of personal rights have the grave potential of leading to anarchy, so also has a similar insistence and enforcement of societal rights the potential of undermining the democratic values of a society …… the main justification for the “balancing concept” is that it is not intended to directly control free speech, but rather to protect from evil and injurious consequences those interests which are lawfully within the sphere of governmental concern in any democratic society.” 33. As will become apparent in the ensuing analysis, the facts of this present case lend themselves readily to the balancing approach in constitutional interpretation, which is indispensable to resolving the constitutional issues raised in this litigation. Page 20 of 28 34. The next important aspect of Atuguba JSC’s approach in the Dr Kwame Amoako Tuffuor & 2 Ors v Electoral Commission case (supra), that has a direct bearing on the issues raised in this present case, is that it prioritizes a pragmatic and realistic interpretation of the Electoral Commission's constitutional functions, ensuring consistency with the Constitution's letter and spirit. This approach aligns with established interpretive principles and sound judicial policy, emphasizing practicality over idealism or the utopian. 35. Authorities which endorse the above interpretive approach abound both locally and in foreign jurisdictions. See for instance the views of Date Bah JSC in the case of Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice v. Attorney-General & Baba Kamara [2011] SCGLR 746 at 765, and also the case of Agyei Twum v Attorney-General and Anor [2005-2006] SCGLR 732 36. Consistent with this interpretive approach, Archer CJ (as he then was) astutely made the following observation in his dissenting opinion in New Patriotic Party v Attorney-General [1993-94] 2 GLR 35 at page 51, while rejecting the practicality of enforcing the reliefs sought in that suit: - “I must confess that the more I ponder over the reliefs sought, the more I become convinced of the futility of the orders being sought. I think this is Page 21 of 28 a case which requires realism, pragmatism and foresight on the part of this court.” 37. The same proposition of the law is articulated by Halsbury’s laws of England (3rd Ed) vol. 36 para. 617, where it is stated that an interpretation must be avoided which leads to: - ‘……manifest public mischief, or great inconvenience, or repugnance, inconsistency, unreasonableness, or absurdity or great harshness or injustice” 38. In the case of Richard Thomas v Cummings [1955] 1 All E. R. 285 at 290, the House of Lords laid it down that the fact that the Factories Act 1937, was a remedial statute and was therefore subject to a wide interpretation, did not however justify an interpretation that leads to unreasonable results. See also Kimpton v Steel [1960] 2 All E. R. 274 at 276. 39. Lord Reid in Cramas Properties Ltd. v. Connaught Fur Trimmings Ltd. [1965] 1 W. L. R. 892 at p. 899, H. L succinctly put it thus. "The canons of construction are not so rigid as to prevent a realistic solution." Page 22 of 28 40. We will now apply the interpretive principles above discussed to the facts of this instant case, to determine if the Plaintiff's allegations against the Electoral Commission are justified. Specifically, we will examine whether the Commission's alleged failure to provide a daily mechanism for managing and updating the electoral register up to the election date constitutes a violation of its constitutional duties. 41. In his Statement of Case, learned Counsel for the Electoral Commission sets out to identify a number of practical problems associated with a reading of the Plaintiff’s view of the law. He poses the following poignant question: - “My Lords, the question to ask is this; is it feasible in any democratic dispensation for the Defendant to undertake the registration exercise, remove duplicate names from register, settle disputes that may arise from the registration exercise as a result of removal of names from the register, undertake exhibition exercise for registrants to confirm their details in the register before finalizing the register to make them available to the political parties all year round? “ 42. My Lords, it does not take much probing, from even a casual consideration of the above question, to realize how untenable and how unrealistic it will be to Page 23 of 28 hold the Electoral Commission to the standards set for it, by the Plaintiff’s expansive interpretation of its constitutional duties in this case. 43. The potential for disputes, delays and disenfranchisement of eligible voters, which would be exacerbated by problems of insufficient resources, ill- equipped manpower, as well as the lack of technological sophistication and infrastructure required to implement and maintain the Plaintiff’s proposed system, have all been well articulated by the Electoral Commission in its Statement of Case. 44. We think those submissions are well founded, and we agree that the Plaintiff’s reading of the Electoral Commission’s responsibilities in actualizing the rights of citizens to register and vote in this country, is not grounded in reality and lacks practical feasibility. 45. This is more so since, as learned Counsel submits, the Electoral Commission has consistently provided a mechanism for individuals eighteen years and above to register and vote in elections and referenda through both Continuing Registration, available year-round, and Limited Registration, conducted as needed, a practice that is not only sanctioned by appropriate constitutional instruments enacted under the force of the Constitution, but also in consonance with agreements reached by all political parties at IPAC meetings. Page 24 of 28 46. It is our considered opinion that, given the nature of the claim presented by the Plaintiff, he bore the formidable burden of demonstrating that the Electoral Commission's exercise of discretion in establishing the systems for voter registration and voting was unlawful. Specifically, the Plaintiff was obligated to show that these systems were unreasonable, illegal or inconsistent with the Constitution's provisions. Having failed to discharge this burden, his case was doomed to fail. 47. To the extent therefore that the Plaintiff’s case does not successfully assert any specific acts of unconstitutionality, illegality or unreasonableness against the Electoral Commission, but instead yields impracticable and unfeasible consequences, it must be rejected by this Court 48. The Plaintiff’s case simply requires this Court to embrace a utopian vision of constitutional law, rendering it an unsuitable basis for judicial decision- making. 49. As Dotse JSC aptly remarked in the seminal case of Rep. v Dexter Johnson [2011] 2 SCGLR 601 at 692. Page 25 of 28 “Laws must then not be measured in abstract terms or against non- existent or utopian principles which have no basis to a people’s chosen way of life but to practical realities of human endeavor”. 50. Again, as forcefully reinforced by this Court in Abu Ramadan & Nimako (No. 1) v. Electoral Commission & Attorney-General & Ors, (consolidated) (2013– 2014) 2 SCGLR 1654 Holding (2) of the head-note: “…. A perfect electoral system was obviously utopian….” 51. Upon careful consideration of the record and submissions, we find that the Plaintiff has failed to establish any grounds for intervention, such as illegality, irregularity, or unfairness in relation to any conduct charged against the Electoral commission in this suit. In the result, his allegations do not disclose any vitiating circumstances required to trigger our intervention under Article 2(1) of the Constitution. CONCLUSION 52. In conclusion, and for all the reasons afore-stated, this Court cannot countenance the Plaintiff's interpretation, which is rooted in an unrealistic Page 26 of 28 vision of constitutional governance, rather than a nuanced understanding of its practical implications. 53. The end result is that the Plaintiff has failed to successfully invoke the intervention of this Court to enforce the reliefs he seeks against the Defendant and his action must fail. We proceed to dismiss in entirety all the reliefs endorsed on his writ. (SGD.) Y. DARKO ASARE (JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT) (SGD.) G. SACKEY TORKORNOO (MRS.) (CHIEF JUSTICE) (SGD.) (SGD. ) G. PWAMANG (JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT) A. LOVELACE-JOHNSON (MS.) (JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT) (SGD.) I. O. TANKO AMADU Page 27 of 28 (JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT) (SGD.) E. YONNY KULENDI (JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT) (SGD.) S. K. A. ASIEDU (JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT) COUNSEL BENEDICT NII ADJEI NII-KRAKU ESQ. FOR THE PLAINTIFF JUSTIN A. AMENUVOR ESQ. FOR THE DEFENDANT Page 28 of 28