Mphanya v Mohaleroe, Sello and Co and others (CIV/APN 462 of 96) [1997] LSHC 53 (19 June 1997)

CIV/APN/462/96 IN T HE H I GH C O U RT OF L E S O T HO In the Application of: N T S U K U N Y A NE M P H A N YA : Applicant A nd M O H A L E R O E, S E L LO A ND C O .: 1st Respondent C H A B E LI S I M ON M O N Y A KE 2nd Respondent S H E R I FF OF T HE H I GH C O U RT A T T O R N E Y - G E N E R AL : 3rd Respondent : 4th Respondent J U D G M E NT Delivered by the H o n. M r. Justice B . K, M o l ai on the 19th Day of J u n e. 1 9 9 7. T he applicant herein seeks an order f r a m ed in the following terms: " 1. T he Rules of this Honourable Court pertaining to notice a nd service be dispensed with a nd the matter be heard as of urgency. 2. A Rule nisi be issued returnable oh a date a nd time to be determined by this H o n o u r a b le Court calling u p on the First R e s p o n d e n ts to s h ow cause w h y: (a) First a nd s e c o nd R e s p o n d e n ts shall n ot be c o m m i t t ed to prison for c o n t e m pt of court; ( b) First a nd s e c o nd R e s p o n d e n ts shall not be directed to p ay the costs of this application; (c) A p p l i c a nt shall n ot be granted s u ch further a n d / or alternative relief." It is significant to o b s e r ve that w h en it w as filed, w i th the Registrar of the H i gh C o u r t, the application w as a c c o m p a n i ed by a certificate of u r g e n c y, thus indicating that it w as to be m o v ed in t e r ms of the provisions of rule 8 ( 2 2) (c) of the H i gh C o u rt R u l e s. 1 9 8 0. I n d e e d, on 19th D e c e m b e r, 1 9 9 6, an a t t e m pt w as m a de to m o ve the application ex-parte w h en I ordered that the r e s p o n d e n ts be s e r v ed w i th the p a p e rs in the n o r m al m a n n er b e f o re the application c o u ld be entertained by the court. My r e a s o ns for the o r d er w e re that an application of this nature ( c o m m i t t al to p r i s o n) w as a drastic step against the r e s p o n d e n ts a nd c o u ld n ot be properly g r a n t ed b e f o re t h ey h ad b e en a f f o r d ed the opportunity to be h e a r d. It is, p e r h a p s, convenient, at this stage, to m e n t i o n, by w ay of a b a c k g r o u n d, that on 2 2 nd N o v e m b e r, 1 9 9 6, the 2 nd R e s p o n d e nt repaired to the h o me of the applicant at M a p o t e n g, in the district of B e r e a, w h e re he attached a nd r e m o v ed the applicant's property in execution. T he p r o p e r ty w as k e pt or stored on the p r e m i s es of the residential h o me of the first respondent's A t t o r n ey of record p e n d i ng disposal by auction sale. On 2 5 th N o v e m b e r, 1 9 9 6, the applicant w e nt to the office of the Registrar of the H i gh C o u rt a nd settled the j u d g m e nt d e bt reflected on the H i gh C o u rt writ issued u n d er C I V / A / 4 6 / 9 3. T he Registrar of the H i gh C o u rt s u b s e q u e n t ly c o n t a c t ed the first respondent's attorney of record a nd a d v i s ed h im that the applicant h ad settled the j u d g m e nt debt. T he attached p r o p e r ty s h o u l d, therefore, be released to h i m. A c c o r d i ng to the first a nd the s e c o nd r e s p o n d e n t s, the p r o p e r ty h ad b e en attached in respect of t wo writs, o ne b e i ng in relation to the H i gh C o u rt j u d g m e nt in C I V / A / 4 6 / 93 a nd the other in relation to a s u b o r d i n a te court j u d g m e nt in C C. 1 4 9 5 / 9 2. A l t h o u gh he h ad settled the j u d g m e nt d e bt in C I V / A / 4 6 / 9 3, the applicant still h ad the j u d g m e nt d e bt in C C. 1 4 9 5 / 92 to settle. In their contention, t he first r e s p o n d e n t 's attorney of r e c o rd a nd the s e c o nd r e s p o n d e nt c o u ld not, therefore, be required to release the attached p r o p e r ty to the applicant until the j u d g m e nt d e bt in C C. 1 4 9 5 / 92 h ad b e en settled. T he Registrar of the H i gh C o u rt t h en instituted a nd m o v e d, e x - p a r te urgent application n u m b er C I V / A P N / 4 3 8 / 96 in w h i ch s he obtained, against the first respondent's attorney of r e c o rd a nd the s e c o nd r e s p o n d e n t, an interim order, inter alia, directing t h em to release the attached p r o p e r ty to her. B e f o re C I V / A P N / 4 3 8 / 96 c o u ld be finalized, the applicant h i m s e lf instituted urgent application N o. C I V / A P N / 4 6 2 / 96 in w h i ch he m o v e d, ex-parte, the court for, a nd obtained, an interim order, inter alia, directing the first a nd the s e c o nd r e s p o n d e n ts to release the attached property to h i m. A g a i n, b e f o re C I V / A P N / 4 6 2 / 96 c o u ld be finalised, the applicant h as n ow instituted the present p r o c e e d i n gs in w h i ch he p r a ys for relief as aforesaid. It is, p e r h a p s, n e c e s s a ry to m e n t i on that I h a ve n ot b e en able to find, in the p a p e rs p l a c ed b e f o re m e, notice of intention to o p p o se filed by a ny of the r e s p o n d e n t s. T he first a nd the s e c o nd r e s p o n d e n ts h a v e, h o w e v e r, d e p o s ed to a n s w e r i ng affidavits. T he third a nd the fourth r e s p o n d e n ts h a ve not. I c an o n ly a s s u m e, therefore, that the first a nd the s e c o nd r e s p o n d e n ts intended to o p p o se the application. T he third a nd the fourth r e s p o n d e n ts did not a nd w e r e, therefore, p r e p a r ed to a b i de by w h a t e v er decision w o u ld be arrived at by the court. It is not in dispute, B om the affidavits, that on 11th D e c e m b e r, 1 9 9 6, first a nd s e c o nd r e s p o n d e n ts w e re s e r v ed w i th the o r d er of this court directing t h em to release to the applicant, the property w h i ch h ad b e en attached a nd r e m o v e d, on 2 2 nd N o v e m b e r, 1 9 9 6. T he r e s p o n d e n t s, w i th full k n o w l e d ge of the order, failed to c o m p l y. T h ey w e re c o n s e q u e n t ly in c o n t e m pt of the court order. In the contention of the applicant, the first a nd the s e c o nd r e s p o n d e n ts o u g h t, therefore, to be c o m m i t t ed to prison. T he applicant's contention w a s, h o w e v e r, d e n i ed by the first a nd the s e c o nd r e s p o n d e n ts w ho a v e r r ed that, to the applicant's o wn k n o w l e d g e, the o r d er admittedly s e r v ed u p on t h em on 1 1 th D e c e m b e r, 1 9 9 6, w as i m p o s s i b le of p e r f o r m a n ce by t h e m. T h e ir failure to c o m p ly w i th the o r d er did not, therefore, constitute c o n t e m pt of court. C o n s e q u e n t l y, the first a nd the s e c o nd r e s p o n d e nt p r a y ed that the application be d i s m i s s ed w i th costs. T h e re c an be no d o u b t, in my v i e w, that in failing to release the attached property, as they admittedly did, the first a nd the s e c o nd r e s p o n d e n ts w e re in b r e a ch of the court order w h i ch h ad b e en s e r v ed u p on t h em on 11th D e c e m b e r, 1 9 9 6 . I am fortified in this v i ew by the decision in W i c k ee v. W i c k ee 1 9 29 W . L . D 1 45 w h e re Tindall, J. h ad this to s ay at p. 1 4 8: "In S w a n e p o el v. B o v ey ( 1 9 2 6, T . P . D . 4 5 7) Stratford, J, in referring to the effect of previous decisions, said that the court w o u ld treat n o n- p e r f o r m a n ce of the o r d er as a c o n t e m pt of court." T he salient question that i m m e d i a t e ly arises for the determination of the court is, h o w e v e r, w h e t h er or n ot the first a nd the s e c o nd r e s p o n d e n ts s h o u l d, in the c i r c u m s t a n c e s, be c o m m i t t ed to prison for the c o n t e m pt of court. In H a d d ow v. H a d d ow 1 9 7 4 ( 2) S. A. 181 at p. 1 83 G o l d i n, J. h ad this to s ay on t he issue: w h e n e v er an applicant p r o v es that the r e s p o n d e nt h as d i s o b e y ed " an order of court w h i ch w as b r o u g ht to his notice, t h en b o th wilfulness a nd mala fides will be inferred. T he onus is then on the r e s p o n d e nt to rebut the inference of mala fides or wilfulness on a b a l a n ce of probabilities. T h u s, if a r e s p o n d e nt p r o v es that w h i le he w as in b r e a ch of the o r d er his c o n d u ct w as bona fides, he will not be h e ld to h a ve b e en in c o n t e m pt of court b e c a u se d i s o b e d i e n ce m u st n ot o n ly be wilful b ut also mala fide." In the instant case, it w as a r g u e d, on their behalf, that since the property, the subject m a t t er of this dispute, w as attached a nd r e m o v ed in e x e c u t i on of the writs in C C. 1 4 9 5 / 92 a nd C I V / A / 4 6 / 93 a nd the applicant h ad o n ly settled the j u d g m e nt d e bt in relation to the writ in C I V / A / 4 6 / 93 b ut not the writ in relation to C C. 1 4 9 5 / 9 2, the first a nd the s e c o nd r e s p o n d e n ts c o u ld not release it (property) to the applicant. To do so w o u ld i m p ly that the m e s s e n g er w o u ld h a ve to return to applicant's h o me at M a p o t e ng to re-execute the writ in respect of C C. 1 4 9 5 / 9 2 , w i th the resultant u n n e c e s s a ry costs to the applicant. S e c o n d l y, the first a nd the s e c o nd r e s p o n d e n ts w e re required, in t e r ms of the interim o r d er in C I V / A P N / 4 3 8 / 9 6, to release the property, the subject m a t t er of this dispute, to the Registrar of the H i gh C o u r t. If, in t e r ms of the interim order in C I V / A P N / 4 6 2 / 96 they w e re to release the a t t a c h ed p r o p e r ty to the applicant a nd n ot to the Registrar of the H i gh C o u r t, the first a nd the s e c o nd r e s p o n d e n ts w o u ld o b v i o u s ly be d i s o b e y i ng the interim o r d er in C I V / A P N / 4 3 8 / 9 6. T he a r g u m e nt c o n c l u d e d, therefore, that the interim o r d er in C I V / A P N / 4 6 2 / 96 w as impossible of p e r f o r m a n c e. T h e re is, in my finding, s e n se in this a r g u m e n t. A s s u m i ng the correctness of my finding that the first a nd the s e c o nd r e s p o n d e n ts h a ve successfully a r g u ed that the interim o r d er in C I V / A P N / 4 6 2 / 96 is impossible of p e r f o r m a n ce it s e e ms that they h a ve satisfactorily d i s c h a r g ed the onus that vests w i th t h em viz. to rebut, on a b a l a n ce of probabilities, the inference of m a l a . f i d es or wilfulness. T h at b e i ng s o, a c o m m i t t al for c o n t e m pt c a n n ot be g r a n t ed against the first a nd the s e c o nd r e s p o n d e n t s. I am fortified in this r e g a rd by H e r b s t e in a nd V an W i n s en in their invaluable w o rk T he Civil Practice of the S u p e r i or C o u r ts in S o u th A f r i ca ( 3 rd E d .) w h e r e, at p a ge 6 5 8, t he learned a u t h o rs h a ve this to say: " W h e re a p e r s o n 's failure to c o m p ly is d ue to inability to do s o, or f l o ws f r om a m i s t a ke as to w h at w as required of h i m, or if he b o na fide believed that he w as n ot required to c o m p ly w i th t he C o u r t 's O r d e r, a c o m m i t t al for c o n t e m pt will n ot be granted." In t he result, I am of the o p i n i on that this application o u g ht n ot to s u c c e e d. It is a c c o r d i n g ly d i s m i s s ed w i th costs. BK Molai J U D GE F o r: Applicant: M r. M a h l a k e ng F or 1st & 2 nd R e s p o n d e n t s: M r. Sello.