Nyambari Traders & Welfare Association v County Government of Kiambu, Kiambu County Executive Committee Member Responsible for Administration & Public Service & Lari Sub-County Administrator [2016] KEHC 222 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

JUDICIAL REVIEW NO.  161 OF 2016

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 8 & 9 OF THE LAW REFORM, ACT CAP 26

AND

IN THE MATTER OF ORDER 53 OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES, 2010

AND

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY NYAMBARI TRADERS WELFARE ASSOCIATION FOR LEAVE TO APPLY FOR AN ORDER OF MANDAMUS

NYAMBARI TRADERS & WELFARE ASSOCIATION ……………….APPLICANT

VERSUS

THE COUNTY GOVERNMENT OF KIAMBU………...............…..1ST RESPONDENT

THE KIAMBU COUNTY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBER RESPONSIBLE FOR

ADMINISTRATION & PUBLIC SERVICE …….................……...2ND RESPONDENT

LARI SUB-COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR ………..............……...3RD RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

1. On  12th April 2016  the exparte  applicant  herein  Nyambari  Traders & Welfare Association  was granted  leave  of court  to  institute  Judicial Review proceedings of  Mandamus  and on the  21st  April  2016  vide notice  of motion dated  18th April  2016  the exparte applicant filed the substantive notice of motion  seeking  for:

1. An order  of mandamus   directed to the respondents the Kiambu County Government, the Lari County Administrator and the County Executive Committee  member responsible for Administration and Public Service, to do  the following  within  Nyambari  Shopping  Centre:

a. Install  security  lights

b. Improve   the drainage system.

c. Provide for ways and means in which the garbage   should be collected.

d. Issue  affordable  licences

e. The general maintenance of infrastructure and facilities   of public services in the sub county.

2. An order restraining the respondents from further demanding the licence fees from the applicant until the actions in (1) above are taken.

3. An order for costs

4. Such further and other relief   be granted to the applicant as this court deems fit.

2. The notice  of motion was  supported  by the grounds  set out  in the statutory  statement and  verifying  affidavit  of Paul K. Ngugi  sworn on  6th day of April 2016  accompanying  the application for leave to apply.

3. The exparte applicant’s case is that it is a Traders Welfare   Association registered on 12th April 2011 under the Societies Act Cap 108 Laws of Kenya and vide   Registration No. 34117.

4. That on  21st January  2015  a meeting was held  between the applicant  and the  respondents   with a view to addressing   the  issues   facing the applicant   in the course  of carrying  out their  business   within  Lari Sub county, and that  the traders  attended  the meeting   as shown by the  attached   minutes.

5. That in the said meeting, the issues discussed were that:

a. There was no security lights at the Nyambari Shopping Centre.  As a result, there has been an increase  in insecurity  in the centre;

b. Their drainage system was in bad shape and a health hazard to the community at large.

c. That there were no means and ways as to how garbage was to be collected within the Nyambari Shopping Centre.

d. The licences   fees was too high for the traders.

6. According to the applicant, the said   meeting agreed that

1. The County Administrator was to ensure that security  light had  been installed  at Nyambari Shopping Centre in less  than three(3) months  from the date  of the meeting;

2. In view of the poor drainage system, the County Administrator expressly stated that immediate action was   to be taken;

3. In the case of garbage collection, a lorry  for garbage   collection  was to be   provided for  Lari Sub County;

4. The County Administrator  further urged  the traders  to pay  licence  fees to  enhance  the services   rendered  to them  at the shopping centre  within  6 months  from the date of  the meeting.

7. That  following  the said agreement, the  applicant’s members  paid the   licence fees but that  the  respondents have  refused to comply with the agreement  as per the meeting  and have persisted  in their refusal to provide the said services to the applicant   traders.

8. In response  to the notice of  motion,  the respondents  filed a  replying affidavit  on 6th June  2016 sworn by Joseph  Wanyoike  who  is the  acting Chief  Officer, Administration and  Public Service  at the County Government  of Kiambu  who deposed  on 3rd June  2016  that in order for the  business to  operate, the applicant’s  members must   take out  a single  permit and or  a licence at  a fee prescribed by that year’s  Finance  Act and that  it is such fee  paid that enables  the County Government  to make  appropriate arrangements  to ensure  that it can deliver various  services  with the  resources   that it  collects  and  those  disbursed by the National Government.

9. According to Wanyoike, the money collected  is used for both development  and recurrent  expenditure to cater for salaries  and  wages, fueling  of  vehicles   among  other forms  of recurrent  expenditure, and that  money  for development  is normally structured  during the  budgeting  process  hence it is not  automatic  that the money  collected  from  licences  is used for development  of the area during  that  financial  year.

10. In addition, it  was  deposed that Mandamus  cannot  issue for affordable licence fees since the money collected is in accordance  with the fees  prescribed  for the  licences  by law which is the Kiambu County Finance Act, 2015/2016  and which law is legally binding on the applicants since they   participated  in  the enactment  of the said Act  through   public participation forum organized by the County Government Executive and the County Assembly.

11. It was  therefore contended that the issue for  affordable   licences  can only   be considered  in the legislative making process  and not through mandamus proceedings which orders if issued by the court, would be  interfering  with  the  independence of the County Government  to make laws which independence is protected by the Constitution.

12. On the issue of garbage collection, it was contended that the County Government had provided trucks to collect and dispose off waste that is generated.  It was further deposed that waste   management was an obligation of the applicants.

13. Further, the respondents contended that security lights had been procured and delivered to the applicant’s business premises  but that  an attempt  to fix  or install the said security lights was inhibited by the applicant traders  who claimed  that they did not approve of the size  that had been  procured  and  demanded to be provided  with an  alternative   security light.

14. In addition, it was deposed by the respondents that the generalized maintenance of infrastructure and facilities within Lari Sub County may be untenable as some of the infrastructure functions fall under the jurisdiction of the National Government.

That the prayer for maintainance of infrastructure in the sub county is not specific hence the orders would be made in vain as it is not clear which infrastructure is   sought to be maintained, besides the fact that  the development of the county is guided by a philosophy that development is done progressively and within the law.

16. Further, that in this case it had not been shown that the respondent’s actions had been guided by an illegality or that they   were irrational to warrant the orders sought.

17. The respondents urged this court to dismiss the notice of motion.  The parties’ advocates filed written submissions which they highlighted by way of oral submissions on 11th October   2016.

18. The exparte  applicant filed  its submissions  on 5th September  2016  whereas  the respondent’s  submissions  were filed  on  26th September  2016.

19. According  to the exparte   applicant,  the respondents are  under  a statutory  duty to perform  their obligations under the law  and that parties  having met in  2015  and  agreed  to tackle   the  issues raised, subject matter of these proceedings, there has since been  no indication  that the respondents are ready  to perform their duties  hence the need to compel  them to  perform  their said  duties.

20. According to the exparte applicants, security lights were installed but are substandard and are not able to illuminate the whole trading area.

21. Further, that the respondents charge  hefty  trading licences   to  raise revenue  for the County Government  but that that  revenue is not  being used to  deliver effective  services, contrary to Section  75(b) of the Constitution.

22. The applicants therefore urged the court to grant the orders sought in the notice of motion, since the situation is dire on the ground.

23. They also relied on the provisions of   the Constitution  on the  functions  of the County Government  which include refuse   removal , refuse  dumps and  solid waste disposal; street lighting,   public  road, trade licences; and  water  and  sanitation   services.

24. The applicant also relied on Section 5 of the County Government Act on the functions of the County Government.

25. Reliance was placed on KNEC vs Republic  exparte  Geoffrey Gathenji & 9 Others CA 266/96 cited with approval in Republic vs Kenya Vision  2030  Delivery Board  & Another Exparte Engineer Judah  Abekah[2015]  e KLR  on the scope of the Judicial Review orders   of mandamus.

26. Further reliance was placed on Article 174(f) of the Constitution on the object of a devolved Government and Article175 (b) of the Constitution   on the principles that County Governments should reflect.

27. The case of Republicvs National Land Commission & 2 Others exparteGrove Development Ltd [2015] eKLR was also relied on in reference to the Judicial Review orders of prohibition.

28. On the other hand, the respondents filed submissions on 26th September 2016 and as highlighted by Mr Ranja   who is the Senior Legal Counsel   to the respondents, counsel submitted on three framed issued namely:

a. Whether an order of mandamus ought  to issue against  the respondents   in the present circumstances;

b. Whether the court ought to grant an order of prohibition as couched in prayer 2 of the notice of motion dated 18th April 2016.

c. Whether the applicant is entitled to the reliefs   sought.

29. On the  prayer for  mandamus, it  was submitted that albeit   the  4th schedule to the Constitution has given the respondents   functions as outlined  by the applicant, those functions  are to be  performed  by  discretion and that therefore the court cannot  command the respondents  on how to exercise  their discretion.

30. Mr Ranja submitted that the respondents provided security lights and   that there exist a drainage system.

31.  Further that the County Government plans on how to execute its duties   hence if mandamus issues, it will interfere with the manner of exercising   discretion by the respondent.

32. On the prayer for  prohibition, it was submitted on behalf of the respondents  that the prayer was  couched in an injunctive manner  to restrain demand  for  licence  fees  from the applicants.  That prohibition only stops future actions not   what is happening.  Further, that there is no prayer for certiorari to quash the decision to demand for licence fees.

33. It  was  submitted that   it is the   Kiambu County   Finance Act   which permits collection and or levy of licence fees in accordance with Article 210 of the Constitution and if prohibition issues, it will  quash  the Finance Act for  the County yet  there is  no challenge to  that Act  before this court, and that  in any event, the  applicant’s   traders participated  in the making  of the said Finance  Act.

34. Mr Ranja urged the court to dismiss the exparte applicant’s notice of motion with costs.

Determination.

35. I have carefully  considered  the exparte  applicant’s  notice of motion  which is  brought on behalf  of the Nyambari  Traders  & Welfare  Association.  I have  also considered  the  replying  affidavit in opposition to the said application and the submissions on behalf of both parties by their respective counsels on record, supported by constitutional  provisions    as  well as   case law  and  statutory  provisions.

36. Article 6(1) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 provides that the territory of Kenya is divided into the counties specified in the First Schedule.

37. The First Schedule establishes 47 Counties and County No. 22 under the First Schedule is Kiambu County.

38. The Constitution also stipulates  functions  for the counties  as  well as   those for the  National Government   under the Fourth  Schedule  pursuant  to  Articles  185(2), 186(1) and  187(2)  of the Constitution.

39. The functions of the County Governments include, and material to this case:

1.

2.  County health services including in particular:

(g) refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid   waste disposal.

3. Control of air pollution, noise pollution, public nuisances s and outdoor advertising.

5.  County transport including-

a. County roads;

b. Street lighting.

c. ……

d. Public road  transport

7.  Trade   development   and regulations   including:

a. Markets;

b. Trade  licences (excluding  regulation of  professionals)

c. Fair  trading licences

11.    County public works and services, including-

a. Storm water  management  systems  in built  up areas; and

b. Water  and  sanitation services

40. The Constitution, in creating Devolution also stipulated the objectives of Devolution and the principles of devolved government in Articles   174 and   175   respectively.

41. The objectives of Devolution are:

a. To promote democratic and accountable exercise  of power;

b. To foster   national    unity by recognizing diversity;

c. To give  powers  of self governance  to the people  and  enhance the participations  of the people  in the exercise of the powers  of the state and  in making decisions affecting them;

d. To recognize the right of communities   to manage their   own affairs and   to further their development.

e. To protect and promote the interests and rights of   minorities and marginalized   communities.

f. To promote social and economic development and the  provision of proximate easily accessible services   throughout  Kenya;

g. To ensure equitable  sharing  of national and  local  resources   throughout Kenya;

h. To facilitate the decentralization of state organs, their  functions and   services , from the capital  of  Kenya; and

i. To enhance checks and balances and the separation of powers.

42. The principles of devolved government are as stipulated in Article   175 of the Constitution:

a. County Governments shall be based on democratic   principles   and the separation of  powers;

b. County Governments shall have reliable sources of revenue  to enable  them govern  and  deliver services  effectively  and

c. No more than 2/3 of the members of   representative bodies in each county government   shall be of the same gender.

43. Besides  the above  constitutional  provisions  on the functions, powers and  principles  that govern county  governments, the County  Governments  Act No.  17 of  2012 also provides   for  additional  functions   of the County Government, in addition to the  powers, functions  and  responsibilities  granted or bestowed  by the Constitution  on the County Governments.  Among those statutory functions are:

I. County legislation in accordance with Article 185 of the Constitution;

II. Exercising executive functions in accordance with Article   183   of the Constitution;

III. Functions provided for in Article 186 and assigned in the Fourth Schedule of the Constitution.

44. From the above  constitutional  and  statutory  provisions, it is clear as correctly  submitted by the exparte  applicant’s  counsel that the installation of security  lights, improvement  of drainage  system, provision of water ways and  garbage  collection as well as issuance  of licences  and  regulation thereof  and the  county roads, public  transport, regulation of markets  and  fair   trading  practices are functions of county governments.

45. It is not in dispute  that the  respondent  did have  a meeting with the  exparte  applicants  traders  and in that   meeting  of  21st  January 2015  it was  mutually agreed that  the  applicants herein   would pay licences in return  for adequate  services  within six months; the respondents to take action  on drainage ; to provide  a lorry for garbage collection, the County Surveyor  and  Planner to clear pathways; install security light within the shopping centre within three months; the applicant to consider the reduction  of farm produce  tax and report  to the Sub County  administrator  of Lari Sub County; provide  a market  place; and  to consult  the necessary departments  for action on stage  management and earmarking of highway where there is junctions.

46. The only question in this matter  therefore, it whether  the  exparte  applicants   are entitled  to the  Judicial  Review orders sought  in the notice of  motion dated  21st April  2016.

47. In the said notice of  motion,  the exparte  applicants seek for  Judicial Review  orders of Mandamus  directed  to the respondents   to perform  their constitutional  and statutory  functions/powers   and  responsibilities  as reproduced  herein above  in this  judgment  and  an order  restraining the respondents  from further  demanding   the  license   fees from  the applicants  until the actions as stipulated  are taken.

48. The respondents have resisted   this application  and  the prayers  sought on the grounds that  they cannot  be  restrained  from levying  licence fees  as it is their  constitutional  and  statutory mandate  to levy such fees  and  secondly, that licence  fee is as  stipulated  in the County   Finance Act  which is  binding  on the applicants  as they participated  in its   enactment   through  public participation  fora  and  that as  the applicants  have not  sought to  have that  Act declared unconstitutional, then they  cannot ask for  a  reduction or  injunction or even  a prohibition in the enforcement  of that Act   which is  enacted  annually  and that what is  currently  in force  is the Act for  the 2016/2017  financial year.

49. Secondly that  mandamus  cannot issue  as it is   a discretionary  remedy and that  the County Government of Kiambu is exercising its powers   and  functions  in a discretionary  manner  hence it  cannot be  compelled  to perform  those functions   or to exercise  those powers in a certain  way, or at once  since resources  are meant for  other  purposes such  as  recurrent  expenditure  and  development   which is based  on  planning   hence an  order of mandamus   would not  be an effective   remedy.

50. In addition  it  was contended  by the respondent that  it has  performed  some of the functions  like installing street lights  which the  applicant claim  is not sufficient, and  that the applicants   are expected  to contribute  to the performance  of some  of the functions  such as garbage collection where the applicants  are to pay those  garbage  collectors licensed by the respondents

51. The respondents  further contended  that  prohibition cannot be  granted as  couched  and that as  the decision  to levy licence  fees had already been taken, there can be no prohibition   without  first  quashing that decision  yet the  applicant has not  sought to  quash  that decision.

52. On whether mandamus is available to the applicants in the circumstances of this case, it is critical to analyse circumstances under which mandamus would issue.  In other words, the court must set out the scope of the Judicial Review order of mandamus in order to establish whether mandamus lies.  The case of Republic Vs Kenya National Examinations Council Exparte Gathenji CA 266/1996 instructive. In the above case, the Court of Appeal stated:

“….The  order of mandamus is the most  extensive  remedial  nature, and  is  in form a command  issuing  from the High Court of Justice, directed to any person, corporation or inferior tribunal, requiring him or them  to do some  particular thing  therein  specified  which appertains to his or their  office  and is in the nature  of a public  duty.  Its  purpose  is to remedy  the defects of  justice  and  accordingly  it  will  issue, to the end  that justice may be  done,  in all  cases where  there is a specific legal right  or no specific legal remedy for  enforcing that right; and it may issue in cases where, although there is   an alternative  legal remedy, yet that mode of redress is less convenient, beneficial and  effectual.  The order   must command no more than the party against whom the application is legally bound to perform where a general duty is imposed, a mandamus cannot require it to be done at once.  Where a statute, which  imposes a duty, leaves discretion as to the  mode  of  performing  the duty in the  hands of the party  on whom  the obligation is laid, a mandamus  cannot  command  the duty  in question  to be  carried  out in a specific way.  These principles mean that an order of  mandamus compels  the performance of a public  duty   which is  imposed   on a person  or body  of persons  by a  statute  and where   that person or body  of person   has failed  to perform  the duty  to the detriment  of a party  who has  a legal  right to  expect  the duty to be performed  the duty.  An order of mandamus  compels  the performance  of a duty imposed by statute where the  person or body on  whom the duty  is imposed  fails or refuses to perform  the same  but if  the  complaint  is  that the duty  has been wrongly  performed  according  to the law; then mandamus  is wrong  remedy  to apply for  because, like an   order of prohibition, mandamus cannot quash what has  already  been done, only an order of certiorari can quash  a decision  already  made and  an order  of certiorari  will issue  if the decision is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or  where the rules of  natural  justice  are not  complied with or  for  such  like reasons. In the present  appeal the respondents did not apply for an order of  certiorari  and that is all the courts wants to say on that aspect of this matter.”

53. From  the above decision which has  gained  public  notoriety  as far as  the scope  of Judicial Review  orders as far as  the three traditional remedies of mandamus, certiorari and  prohibition are concerned, it is clear that an order of mandamus cannot  be sought in  order  to quash  a decision.  It cannot also be sought to compel the exercise of a decision in a certain manner.  And where a decision has already been made, unless that decision is quashed, mandamus would not be an efficacious remedy.

54. In other words, where  a decision  has been made and  that decision is  being challenged, in the absence  of a prayer  for  certiorari to quash  that decision, mandamus  cannot stand  alone  without  certiorari.

55. Therefore, a party ought not to seek for a mandamus order in such a manner as to achieve what ought to have been sought by way of certiorari.

56. In the instant case, both the applicant’s side and respondent’s side have relied on the above notorious case of Republic V KNEC Exparte Geoffrey Gathenji.  However, the exparte applicants have  only selected  a portion  of the decision  on the scope of  Judicial Review  remedies and pasted  it in their written  submissions, while   highlighting  favourable  portions thereof  and  leaving   out the  entire  substance  of that decision  that is relevant  to the entire  case  herein.

57. This court  acknowledges that  Judicial Review  remedies   have now  a wider  scope  in view of the  provisions of Articles 23 and  47  of the Constitution and the Fair Administrative Action  No. 4 of 2015 at Section 4  thereof  which later sets out  what remedies  the court  exercising  Judicial Review  jurisdiction can grant.

58. However, for this  court to  grant any  of those  Judicial Review  orders as expanded by  the Constitution  and as  implemented  by the enactment  of the Fair  Administrative   Action Act  No. 4 of  2015, a party  must  specifically seek for those  orders.

59. The court cannot grant Judicial Review Orders which are not sought, even  in the upholding  and  enforcing the  Bill of Rights  as stipulated  in Articles 22  and  23  of the Constitution.

60. Some of the functions of the County Governments relate to enforcement of the Bill of Rights such as the duty to ensure   that every person has a right to a clean and healthy environment which includes the right:

a. To have the environment protected for the benefit of present  and  future  generations  through  legislative and  other measures  particularly  those contemplated  in Article  69(obligations in respect  of the environment);

b. To have obligations relating to the environment under Article 70 of the Constitution.

61. Article 43 of the Constitution also stipulates that Every person   has the right:

a. To the highest attainable standard of health, which  includes the right to health care services, including  reproductive  health care;

b. To accessible and adequate housing and to reasonable standards of   sanitation.

62. I have  carefully  examined the applicant’s  notice of motion, from the citation to the statutory   statement and  supporting  and  further affidavits.   I have not  seen any  citation  of breach of  any of the  constitutional provisions  that  I have set out in this  judgment.

63. Breach of a constitutional mandate must be specifically set out and not generally pleaded or submitted upon.  In addition, failure to perform  a specific   statutory   duty which is   a public duty  must also be clearly spelt out in the grounds  and  not generally  pleaded   the way the  exparte applicant  has pleaded, and only mentioned provisions of the Constitution and the County Government  Act  in their submissions.

64. In such circumstances, the court is  not obliged  to grant  Judicial  Review  orders which  are discretionary  and  which must  be, in the case of mandamus, directed at the act of compelling  performance of a specific  public duty  which the respondents  herein are   alleged  to have failed to perform.

65. In my humble view, it is not sufficient for the applicants to claim that because they were paying for licences then the respondents were under a duty to perform those named   acts.

66. The performance of those  acts  must and  should have  been linked to specific statutory duties because judicial review    orders   are not issued   generally  but  are directed  at a specific  pleaded  action pursuant  to  a specific  duty imposed  by statute.

67. Furthermore, as  correctly submitted by  Mr Ranja   counsel for the respondents, the issue of licencing of traders is a constitutional mandate/function of the respondents  and this court  cannot be  called  upon to issue  a restraining order to  injunct  the  respondents from performing   a constitutional   and  statutory function.  The court can only prohibit the performance   of an illegal act.  It is not demonstrated here that the act of collecting licence   fees from the applicant is an illegal Act.

68. The licence  fees  are stipulated or  prescribed  in the County Finance Act which  is enacted  through  public  participation. That  Act is not  before this court  for consideration  with a  view  to declaring it  unconstitutional  as no prayers  have  been sought  challenging  its constitutionality.

69.  Equally, it is not alleged that the respondents   are acting illegally by receiving licence fees.  This court would therefore be acting   ultra vires   if it  attempted to restrain  the respondents  from collecting  trade  licence  fees  which is prescribed by County Assembly  legislation, where  that  legislation is not under  any legal  challenge before the court.

70. Charging specific licence fees is not a discretionary power of the respondents.  It is a  statutory  duty  and unless  it is shown  that the respondents are acting  illegally, irregularly  and  irrationally  or with   impropriety, this court  would not interfere with the statutory  functioning  of the respondents.

71. Furthermore, the applicant  sought for  injunctive relief  and not  prohibition which are two different judicial review  orders/remedies under Section 4 of the Fair Administrative  Action Act  No. 4  of  2015.

72. In the absence of any prayer  for prohibition orders  and  without  laying a legal foundation  for it,  this court  cannot  grant orders   which are   not sought  in the notice  of motion.

73. With regard  to restraining   orders from  further demanding   the licence fees  from the   applicants  until the actions  in prayer 1  are taken, this court  finds that  as the levying   of licence  fees  is a statutory and  constitutional  mandate, the court cannot   injunct  the  performance of that which the  law  commands  should be  performed by a public  body or  authority   or person.

74. As to whether   the  order of mandamus  sought is  available  to the exparte  applicants, and based  on the Republic vs  KNEC  exparte Geoffrey Gathenji (supra)  case,  this court  notes  that what the exparte applicant seeks to be  performed  are functions  of the County  Government vested by the Constitution  and  the County Government Act.  That being the case, this court   cannot compel the County Government  to perform its  functions   or duties  in a particular  way, as  the County Governments  plan   and  execute  their  functions  and duties in the manner  that they  determine, based on many factors including  financial  and each of the functions  have financial  implications.  If this court were to grant mandamus, regrettably, it would not enforce the implementations thereof.

75. And since  some if not  most of the  functions  enumerated  also form part of  the constitutional  rights   under the Bill of  rights, such as  the right to clean  and healthy environment  as  well as the  social  economic  rights, the exparte  applicants  have an  alternative remedy of approaching the court by way of  constitutional petition for enforcement  of those  constitutional rights.

76. Mandamus will in the circumstances of this case not be an effective remedy and therefore granting it will be   making or issuing orders in vain.

77. On the  other hand, the court  was  informed  that the respondent   installed lighting  at the shopping  centre which the  exparte  applicants   consider to be  dim as  it does not   adequately  illuminate  the area.  That being  the case, the  order of mandamus  is being sought to compel   the installation of lights of  particular  brightness  which is not  within the  purview  of this court.

78. Equally, this court would not compel the improvement   of drainage system as that is too generalized a function which is not quantifiable and too subjective.

79. In addition, this court cannot compel issuance of affordable   licences as the licence fee is prescribed in the respective County Finance Acts, which legislation is not being challenged   before this court.

80. The same position applies to the demand for the general maintainance of infrastructure and facilities   of public service.  To issue mandamus to compel performance   of such generalized functions is to make orders in vain.

81.  There was no evidence that the respondents are, generally speaking, not performing any of their functions as enumerated which functions are not only   statutory but also constitutional.

82. In my humble view, the court has no  power to grant  mandamus to compel  the respondents  to perform  an  executive  discretion  just as  the legislature or executive cannot interfere  with judicial  discretion.  And it would be an express violation of the Constitution which declares  upon its  face the  establishment   of three  separate  interdependent arms of  Government if this court   was to grant mandamus in such circumstances thereby  exercising   power that belongs  to the county executives.

83. In other words, the exercise of such power would be a   unwarrantable interference with the action of the executive within its appropriate   sphere of duty.

84. I hasten  to add that where the County  Government  fails  in its  mandate to  render  services  to its  inhabitants, the applicants   have the power to petition  for impeachment  of the Governor  for  misdemeanor  in office and  not to seek  mandamus  for  performance  of constitutional  functions or exercise of statutory duties in a particular specific couched manner.

85. This is  not to say  that the court  cannot  compel  performance   of statutory duties by the respondent but that it can only  compel the performance of statutory duties where  there is no  discretion  in the performance  of such duties.

86. In  making such finding this court  is alive  to the fact that  many Kenyans had very  high expectations  of the devolved   system of  governance in terms  of service delivery  and therefore  when that system appears  not to be  delivering  to their   expectations,  the people get  disillusioned and  start oscillating  from ectacy  to apathy and their only hope is in the  courts which they believe can compel performance of those constitutional  and statutory  duties.

87. However, the County Governments have a social contract with the people they serve and therefore through public participation and with proper budgeting, the County Governments in consultation with the residents prioritize the services that are needed by the citizens.

88. The Chief Executive   of the County Government  is the Governor, who  is the Chief Administrator  of the County through his  officers   and  various departments  and the Governor’s  liability  to impeachment  and  removal from office is declared  in the Constitution under Article 186 and it is obvious that the framers of the Constitution intended  that, that alone  to be  the remedy  for violation of duty  by the Chief Executive.

89. I am Fortified by the many decisions of this court among others, Joccinta Wanjiru RaphaelV William Nangulu & Others [2014] e KLR that:

“……it must always be remembered that Judicial Review   orders being discretionary are not  guaranteed  and hence a court  may refuse to grant them even where the requisite  grounds exist   since the  court has to weigh  one thing  against  another  and  see whether  or not the  remedy  is the most  efficacious  in the circumstances  obtaining   and  since  the discretion  of the court is  a  judicial one, it must be exercised on the evidence  of sound legal  principles.  The court does not issue orders in vain even where it has jurisdiction to issue the prayed orders.  Since the court exercises a discretionary  jurisdiction in granting Judicial Review orders, it can withhold  the gravity  of the order  where  among other  reasons, it  there has been  delay  and  where a public  body has  done all that it can  be expected  to do to fulfill  its   duty  or where   the   remedy  is not necessary  or where   its   path is strewn with blockage or where it would cause administrative  chaos and public  inconvenience  or where the  object   for which the  application is  made  has already  been realized, even if  merited.  The court would refuse to grant Judicial Review remedy when it is no longer necessary; or has been overtaken by events; or where issues have become academic exercise; or serves no useful or practical significance.”

90. And in Republic vs Director General of East African Railways Corporation exparte Kaggwa [1997] KLR 194 Chesoni J captured it well when he said:

“ Mandamus  is neither  a write of  course neither  a writ  of  right  but a  discretionary  remedy  which the court  will grant    only if  there is no  more appropriate  remedy.  In other words, if there is a satisfactory alternative remedy available to the applicant the court will not grant mandamus.  Adequate alternative remedy is an important limitation to the availability of an order of mandamus.  The purpose of mandamus  is to compel  the performance  of a public  duty or as  act  contrary  to, or  evasive  of, the law; and  it does not  lie against  a public  officer   as  a matter  of course   and  where one   or more, of  the bars or  limitation  exists, the court will, usually  not  exercise  its discretion  in favour   of the applicant.  These  bars  are: that  there is  an alternative   specific   remedy   at law; that there  is no possibility  of  effective enforcement, or  performance  will  be impossible   by  reason of  the circumstances, like lack of power or  means to obey  on the part  of the respondent;  and that  it  will result   in interference  by the judicial  department  with the  executive  arm of  government.  All in  all these   bars  are discretionary; but  there has to be a good  reason  for  them not to  apply to  a  particular   case where  they exist.”(Emphasis added).

91. I can’t agree more with the above decisions   as highlighted.

92. In the end, and for  all the above  reasons, the only  order  that  commends  itself  in the circumstances of this case is that  I decline  to grant  the  Judicial Review  orders  sought in the notice  of motion  dated  18th April  2016  and for  want of merit, I dismiss  it with  no orders  as to costs.

Dated, signed and delivered at Nairobi this 6th day of December 2016.

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE

In the presence of:

Mr Ranja for the respondents

N/A for applicant( Harriet pupil attending for Kibugi

CA: Lorna