Odong & Another v Uganda (Criminal Appeal 8 of 2017) [2018] UGSC 92 (17 December 2018)

Full Case Text

## THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

# IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA

# [CORAM: ARACH-AMOKO, MWANGUSYA OPIO-AWERI, MWONDHA AND TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA, JJSC]

### CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 08 OF 2017

#### **BETWEEN**

| ODONG MOSES | | |--------------------|--------------------------------| | | <table> OPIRA JULIUS </table> |

#### AND

...................................... UGANDA............

(An appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal (Bossa, 15 Kakuru, Mugamba; JJA) dated 6th May, 2016 in Criminal Appeal No.494 of 2014.)

## JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

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This is a second appeal against the judgment of the High Court at Kololo, (Tibulya, J.) dated 5th June, 2014 in Criminal Appeal No 2 of 2004. The appellants were jointly charged with 3 counts namely, (1) corruptly soliciting for gratification $c/s$ 2(a) and 26(1); (2) corruptly accepting a gratification $c/s$ 2(a) and 26(1) and (3) abuse of office 25 c/s 11(1). The learned trial Judge convicted them on all the counts and sentenced each of them to a fine of $200,000/$ = or 3 years imprisonment on count 1 and 2 respectively and a fine of $100,000/$ = or 2 years imprisonment on count 3. Their appeal to the Court of Appeal partially succeeded and the Court of Appeal 30

quashed the conviction in respect to count 1, set aside the sentence $\mathsf{S}$ and ordered the respondent to refund the fine of 200,000 shillings that each appellant had paid. The Court of Appeal however upheld the conviction and confirmed the sentence in respect of counts 2 and 3, hence this appeal.

#### **Background** $10$

The facts that were found by the High Court and the Court of Appeal are the following: The appellants were both serving Police Officers at the material time. The 1st appellant was contracted by an NGO called Society for Human Rights Initiative (SUHURU) to train paralegals at a workshop on sexual gender based violence that was 15 held in Kole District between 29th July, 2013 and 2nd August, 2013. The contract that he had signed with the said NGO indicated that he would be paid 300,000/= for the work. However, he later found out through a whistle blower that he was actually entitled to 1,000,000 shillings for the work and not 300,000 and that the 20 documents relating to his payment had been falsified to indicate that he had been paid the 1,000,000 shillings.

As a result of the above, the appellants confronted the Director of the said NGO one Jimmy Odoch (PW1) with the information who eventually paid the 1st appellant the extra 700,000 shillings, but contended that he had done so under duress.

In the meantime, the appellants had filed a complaint at Lira Police Station against PW1 over the alleged forgeries and opened up a case

$\overline{2}$

file against PW1 for forgery under Lira CRB 3096/2013. The $\mathsf{S}$ appellants are then alleged to have demanded an extra 1,000,000 shillings from PW1 so that they could drop the forgery case against him. PW1 reported the matter to the Police Special Investigations Unit (SIU) at Kampala, whereupon a trap was laid for the appellants. The appellants were arrested as they received 400,000 10 shillings from Mr. Odoch's wife (PW2) as part of the 1,000,000 shillings.

As stated earlier, they were charged of under the Anti-Corruption Act, 2007 with three counts namely; corruptly soliciting for gratification $c/s$ 2(a) and 26(1); corruptly accepting a gratification 15 $c/s$ 2(a) and 26(1), and abuse of office $c/s$ 11(1) respectively. The prosecution called 6 witnesses. Both appellants testified on oath and called 3 witnesses in their defence. The trial Judge rejected the opinion of the assessors and convicted them on all the counts and sentenced each of them to a fine of $200,000/$ = or 3 years 20 imprisonment for count 1 and 2 respectively and a fine of 100,000/= or 2 years imprisonment for count 3. Their appeal to the Court of Appeal partially succeeded and their conviction in respect of count one was quashed and sentence set aside. The conviction on count 2 and 3 were upheld. 25

According to the Memorandum of Appeal, their appeal to this Court was based on six grounds that:

1. The learned Justices of Appeal erred in law and fact when they upheld in part the decision of the High Court without

$\overline{3}$

taking into consideration the evidence of DW5 Slyvia $5$ Chelangat, the forensic document examiner or giving any reasons for not doing so.

2. The learned Justices of Appeal erred in law and fact when they held that the appellants received the 400,000/=(four hundred thousand shillings) from the complainants as an inducement to drop the case of forgery against Pw1.

3. The learned Justices of Appeal erred in law and fact when they upheld in part the decision of the High Court and held that the appellants had no intention of investigating the alleged forgeries and false accounting made against Pw1.

4. The learned Justices of Appeal erred in law and fact when they heavily relied on the prosecution's exhibits in which the $1st$ appellant' signature was severally forged.

5. The learned Justices of Appeal erred in law and fact when they concluded that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants corruptly solicited gratification and abused their offices without taking into consideration that the case for the prosecution was full of gaps, contradictions and inconsistencies.

6. The learned Justices of Appeal erred in law and fact when 25 they failed in their duty to subject the evidence to a fresh scrutiny, exhaustive re-evaluation, hence occasioning a great

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## miscarriage of justice thereby wrongly dismissing the appeal in $\mathsf{S}$ part.

Learned Counsel Patrick Kasumba represented the appellants on private brief, while Principal State Attorney Barbra Kavuma appeared for the State. Both parties filed written submissions. Mr. Kasumba abandoned grounds 3 and 5 of the appeal in his submissions. He argued ground 2, then grounds 1 and 4 together and lastly ground 6. Counsel for the respondent followed the same order in her response.

#### Submissions by the Appellants' Counsel 15

The complaint in ground 2 is that the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law and fact when they held that the appellants received the 400,000 shillings from the complainants as an inducement to drop the case of forgery against PW1 without sufficient evidence to support that holding.

Mr. Kasumba submitted that the various phone calls on which the lower Courts had based their decision to convict the appellants for receiving the $400,000/$ = as gratification were actually meant to notify PW1 to report to the Police Station to make statements 25 concerning the issue of forgery of the 1st appellant's signature. He submitted that the parties had also engaged in long conversations relating to services the 1st appellant had offered to PW1 and payments (token of appreciation) for the same. Therefore the evidence of telephone print outs exhibited by the prosecution did 30

$\mathsf{S}$

not prove that the appellants had received the money as an $\mathsf{S}$ inducement to drop charges of forgery against PW1 as alleged by the prosecution.

Mr. Kasumba also referred to section 9 of the Computer Misuse Act, No.2 of 2011 and contended that the corroborative evidence of PW3 10 and PW6 that the conversations were heard on loud speaker should have been proved by adducing such traffic data in court. He further argued that the appellants' voices should have been recorded and a voice expert should have been summoned before court to prove that indeed the appellants had demanded for the money in question. 15 According to the appellant's counsel therefore, merely presenting call data records without the traffic data left a gap in the prosecution case.

- Lastly, Mr. Kasumba contended that PW3 and PW6 had disabled the investigation of the forgery case against PW1, therefore, the 20 appellants were not given a chance to inform the S. I. U Police officers that the purpose of the 400,000 shillings was not a bribe but the money was received as exhibit in the forgery case against $PW1.$ - With regard to grounds 1 and 4, Mr. Kasumba contended that both 25 lower courts did not consider the evidence of DW5, the forensic document examiner, yet her findings were that the 1st appellant's signature was forged.

Relying on the case of Kifamunte Henry vs Uganda. No.10 of $\mathsf{S}$ 1997 (SC), counsel faulted the Court of Appeal for not re-evaluating this vital piece of evidence since the forged signatures are the root cause of this controversy. He argued that Court did not observe whether the 1st appellant's signature was forged or not yet DW5 had used certified documents from the NGO to prove that indeed the 1st 10 appellant's signature was forged and it was due to the forgeries that the appellants' superiors had given them a go ahead to receive the money from PW1 as an exhibit.

In ground 6 Mr. Kasumba submitted that the lower courts had convicted the appellants for abuse of office on the basis that the 15 appellants had irregularly opened up the Police file on the forgery under Case No. Lira CRB 3096 yet there is no laid out procedure on how a Police investigation should be done and neither did the learned Justices give any recommendations nor show the standard to be followed. 20

Secondly, counsel submitted that the lower courts did not show how the actions of the appellants were arbitrary or had caused prejudice to their employer. He argued that the appellants had simply acted under the authorization and guidance of their superiors namely, DW1 and DW4 in investigating the forgery case, 25 and the superiors told Court that the procedure to open the file was normal and proper. Counsel therefore faulted the Court of Appeal for not re-evaluating such evidence and thereby coming to the

wrong conclusion which occasioned a miscarriage of justice to the $\mathsf{S}$ appellants.

Counsel prayed that the appeal should be allowed, the conviction on counts 2 and 3 be quashed and the sentence set aside as well.

# The response by Counsel for the Respondent

- Ms. Kavuma supported the decision of the Court of Appeal. In 10 specific response to ground 2, she contended that evidence of phone calls was mainly in respect of soliciting a bribe and that conviction was quashed by the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal. The conviction for receiving a gratification was not mainly based on the phone calls as alleged by counsel for the appellants. It was based - 15 on the evidence of PW1 the complainant, together with that of PW2 his wife, who handed over the money to the appellants and PW3 who helped Police to set up the trap. The learned Justices therefore properly evaluated the evidence in respect of this ground and arrived at the correct decision. 20

Regarding the Computer Misuse Act No. 2 of 2011, Ms. Kavuma contended that the prosecution did not adduce any evidence or intended to use any voice recordings. The provisions of the said Act are therefore irrelevant to this case.

In response to the appellants' complaints in grounds 1 and 4, Ms. 25 Kavuma submitted that it is not true that the learned Justices did not evaluate the evidence of PW5 as alleged by counsel for the appellants. She argued that the evidence of forgery was actually for totally a different case from the matter before this Court. Therefore, $\mathsf{S}$ the evidence of DW5 had no evidential value or bearing on counts 2 and 3 of corruptly receiving gratification and abuse of office respectively.

On ground 6, Ms. Kavuma submitted that this ground was too general and ought to be struck out. Nevertheless she contended 10 that the learned Justices generally evaluated the evidence on record and rightly observed that the appellants being Police Officers had abused their office when they irregularly opened up a Police file on account of false accounting and forgery as a basis for threatening PW1 with prosecution in order to cause him to pay a bribe. The 15 learned Justices cannot therefore be faulted on this ground.

Ms. Kavuma prayed that the appeal is dismissed for the above reasons.

## Rejoinder by appellants' Counsel

In a brief rejoinder, Mr. Kasumba reiterated his earlier submissions. 20 On ground 2 he maintained that the 1st appellant had received the 400,000 shillings as an exhibit in the presence of the $2nd$ appellant and with the knowledge of their superiors DW1 and DW4. He argued that had the appellants been corruptly receiving gratification as alleged, they would not have informed their superiors.

On grounds 1 and 4, Mr. Kasumba contended that the trial Judge had relied on the forged exhibits in arriving at her conclusion. He further reiterated his argument that the evidence of DW5 has a

bearing on count 2 and 3 since it goes to the root of the prosecution $\mathsf{S}$ case but it was never analysed by both courts. Had it been analysed, Court would have found that the whole prosecution case had been tainted with forgeries.

Further on this point, Mr. Kasumba argued that since the Court of Appeal had found no evidence of solicitation of gratification then 10 they could not uphold a conviction of receipt of gratification since the two actions go hand in hand.

Lastly on ground 6, Mr. Kasumba emphasised that the duty of the first appellate court to subject the evidence to a fresh scrutiny was exhaustively explained by the Court of Appeal in the Registered 15 Trustee of Kampala Archdiocese & Anor vs. Asaba, No.83 of 2011. Therefore, the use of phrases such as "it appears to us", by the Court of Appeal indicates that there was no evaluation of evidence of the lower court. In his view, the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal just drew adverse inferences out of speculation and 20 supposition, which was wrong.

## **Consideration of the Court**

We have carefully considered the submissions of counsel together with their authorities.

We note that the appeal is against both conviction and sentence. In 25 this appeal, Counsel for the appellants faults the learned Justices for failing to properly re-evaluate the evidence before it and is indirectly inviting this Court to re-evaluate the evidence afresh. We

have had occasion to state that this Court being a second appellate $\mathsf{S}$ Court is not required to re-evaluate the whole evidence unless it is found that the first appellate Court did not sufficiently re-evaluate the evidence to draw its own conclusion. See: Kifamunte vs Uganda (supra), Kazarwa Henry vs Uganda No. 17 of 2015 and Obwalatum vs Uganda No.30 of 2015. 10

We have perused the judgment of the Court of Appeal. We note that the Court of Appeal was alive to its duty as a first appellate court under Rule 30 of the Court of Appeal Rules as well as the principles stated in Kifamunte (supra) before reaching its own conclusion. The issue therefore is whether the Court of Appeal properly carried out its duty as a first appellate Court. We shall follow the same order of the grounds in considering the appeal.

## Ground 2

Mr. Kasumba faults the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal for holding that the appellants had received $400,000/$ = as an 20 inducement to drop the forgery case against PW1 basing their decision mainly on various telephone calls yet that evidence does not prove that the appellants received the money as an inducement. He strongly maintained the position that the appellants did not receive the $400,000/$ = as a gratification but as an exhibit in the 25 forgery case against PW1.

He also submitted that if the Court of Appeal found no evidence of $\mathsf{S}$ solicitation then they could not uphold a conviction of receipt of gratification since the two actions go hand in hand.

Ms. Kavuma in her submissions supported the decision of the Court of Appeal. Her main contention is that the evidence of the telephone conversations did not form the basis of the decision of the Court of Appeal. That decision was based on the evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW3.

We accept Ms. Kavuma's submissions. The learned Justices of the Court of Appeal in re-evaluating the evidence of accepting a gratification stated as follows in their judgment:

"... the appellants conceded to receiving the 400,000/= however they contend that the money was received as an exhibit in the case of forgery against PW1...we are satisfied that the prosecution evidence in particular evidence of PW1 and PW2, clearly indicates that the purpose for which the money shs. $400,000/$ = was sought was to induce the appellants to drop the forgery case against PW1. The evidence is corroborated with evidence of PW3 who helped to set up a trap.

Court further held 25

> "... that the appellant irregularly opened up a police file as a basis of causing PW1 to pay them the 700,000/= he had earlier refused to pay yet they were entitled.

However, having succeeded in obtaining that payment, the appellants became greedy and wanted more money. They threatened PW1 with prosecution on account of false accounting and forgery. PW1 felt threatened and black mailed and reported the matter to SIU police unit which then set a trap and as a result the appellants were arrested."

From the analysis of the learned Justices' findings quoted above, it is clear that the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal did not base their decision mainly on the telephone calls as alleged by counsel for the appellants. They based their decision on the evidence of 15 PW1 and his wife, PW2 as well as PW3, which clearly shows that the 400,000 shillings was received as an inducement to drop the charges of forgery against PW1. The evidence shows the appellants, after receiving the 700,000 shillings that the 1st appellant was entitled to under the contract, still demanded for more money and 20 threatened PW1 with prosecution for forgery if he did not pay. PW1 acted upon this blackmail and reported the matter to the Special Investigations Unit which in turn set a trap using PW2 and the appellants were netted.

Counsel for the appellants argued that the appellants were engaged 25 in long conversations with PW1 and that some of the phone calls included conversations relating to services offered to PW1 by the appellant, payments for the services and calling him to make a statement of forgeries which in our view is an indicator that

through their communications the $400,000/$ = was received for $\mathsf{S}$ purposes of dropping the forgery case. PW1 could not have acted on their demands and blackmail if he was not threatened.

The appellants also contend that the money was received for exhibit and that they acted under the guidance of their superiors. However we find that the manner in which the money was received is 10 questionable as to whether it was indeed for exhibit. It was received under a mango tree at the Police Station and PW2 who gave the appellants the money did not even record a statement concerning the exhibit. This conduct of the appellants was definitely unprofessional and clearly reflected a corrupt practice indicating 15 that the payment was done corruptly for purposes of dropping the forgery case against PW1. In our view, all these actions point to the guilt of the appellants.

We also disagree with counsel for the appellant's argument that the fact that the Court of Appeal found no evidence of solicitation of the 20 gratification then the conviction of accepting gratification could not be upheld. On the contrary, we find that the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal had a sound basis for upholding the conviction by the trial judge on receiving a gratification because they found that the appellants, having received their entitlement became greedy and 25 demanded for more by irregularly opening up a file for purpose for obtaining money from PW1 upon which the $400,000/$ = was received as gratification.

We wish to add, with due respect to Counsel for the appellants, that $\mathsf{S}$ the two actions are distinct and may not necessarily go hand in hand. Section 2 (a) of the Anti Corruption Act, 2009 under which the appellants were charged and convicted reads:

> "A person commits the offence of corruption if he or she does any of the following acts-

> (a) the solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, by a public official, of any goods of monetary value, or benefits, such as a gift, favour, promise, advantage or any other form of gratification for himself or herself or for another person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of his or her public functions;

The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English defines 'or' as a word "used to introduce another possibility"

The operative words in Section 2 (a) are "Solicitation "or" 20 acceptance."

The criteria therefore of what constitutes corruptly accepting a gratification as deduced from the section includes the following:

i)The accused must have been an officer of a public body at the time of the offence;

ii)The accused must have received a gratification at the material time; and

## iii)The act must have been done corruptly in exchange for any act to bring about some given results in a matter concerning that public body.

In our view, both actions may require proof of additional facts separate from each other. It is possible for a person to corruptly receive gratification without soliciting for it especially where the 10 inducement comes from the giver. Such a giver will be committing an offence under Section 2 (b) of the Act, which is not in issue in this case. It is also possible for someone to solicit for gratification and he does not receive it, if the giver declines to give. It is also possible for someone to solicit and corruptly agree to receive. 15

We are further persuaded by the holding in the case of Mugizi Leonard v Uganda, No.1 of 2014. (HC) where the Court in deciding a similar issue held:

"It is therefore inconsequential whether one solicited for or accepted any goods of monetary value or any other form of gratification for himself or herself in exchange for an act or omission in the performance of his or her public functions. The prosecution does not need to prove solicitation or acceptance jointly to prove the ingredients of this offence. One of those ingredients can stand alone. and I respectively disagree with the holding in Uganda Vs Muwonge Cr, case No.738 of 2009 that once there is receiving, then soliciting is subsumed in the act of receiving.

$\mathsf{S}$ To subsume is to include something under a large classification or group. The two words Soliciting and accepting or receiving have distinct meanings and therefore one of those words cannot be subsumed in another. But as I had stated earlier it is inconsequential how one receives a gratification as a public official to perform his or her public functions, whether it was due to Solicitation or without, the consequence is the same."

(the underlining is for emphasis)

We therefore find that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses was cogent enough to establish the act of corruptly accepting a 15 gratification to drop the case of forgery against PW1. The learned Justices of the Court of Appeal properly and critically analysed the evidence and we cannot fault them on this ground.

This ground therefore fails.

Ground 1 and 4 20

> These grounds fault the learned Justices for not re-evaluating the evidence of DW5 the forensic expert whose findings show that the 1st appellant's signature was forged.

With due respect to counsel for the appellants, the issue whether the 1st appellant's signature was forged or not does not arise in the 25 circumstances of this case and has no evidential bearing on counts 2 and 3. As Ms. Kavuma rightly pointed out in her submissions on this point, the issue of forged signatures would rightly arise in the

$\mathsf{S}$

forgery case against PW1 under No. Lira CRB 3096 to prove that the $\mathsf{S}$ 1st appellant's signature was forged by PW1 to falsely account for funds to the donors who were funding their NGO. In the circumstances, we cannot fault the learned Justices since it was not an issue for determination in the trial Court. This ground fails for this reason. 10

Ground 6

This ground is general and offends Rule 62(2) of the Supreme Court Rules and qualifies to be struck out. The Rule requires a memorandum of appeal to:

## " set forth concisely and under distinct heads ... the ground of 15 objection to the decision appealed against ..."

Be that as it may, we find that it is majorly centered on count 3.

Mr. Kasumba argued that the lower courts convicted the appellants for abuse of office on the basis that the appellants had irregularly opened up the police file on forgery yet there is no procedure on how a police investigation should be done. In his view, the appellants' actions were not arbitrary and did not cause any prejudice to their employer since they were acting under the authorization and guidance of their superiors.

Ms. Kavuma disagreed with this submission and supported the 25 decision of the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal on the ground that their lordships had properly evaluated the evidence on this point and had reached the correct decision as well.

We have considered submissions of both Counsel on this ground $\overline{5}$ very carefully. We accept Ms. Kavuma's submissions that the appellants are not only public officers but they are officers of the Police Force established under Article 211 of the Constitution to be "nationalistic, professional, disciplined, competent and productive; and its members shall be citizens of Uganda of 10 good character."

Further, under Article 212 of the Constitution, the functions of the Uganda Police Force includes the following:

$(a)$ ...

## (b) to preserve law and order; 15

## $(d)..."$

However, the evidence shows that the appellants first of all used their office to intimidate and coerce PW1 to pay them the 700,000 out of the contract. Then they also opened a file of forgery against 20 PW1 where they were both the complainants and the investigating officers. This was not only irregular but it was illegal as well. In our view, this misconduct was highly prejudicial to their employer as it tainted the image of the Uganda Police Force obliged under the Constitution to be a professional and disciplined force which is 25 supposed to fight and prevent corruption not to encourage it. Consequently, we find that the learned Justices of the Court of

Appeal sufficiently re-evaluated this evidence and cannot be faulted $\mathsf{S}$ on their findings on count 3.

Regarding the criticism by Mr. Kasumba on the style and language of evaluation of the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal, particularly the use of the phrase "*it appears to us*", we wish to state that this is a question of style. As this Court has stated in the case of **Uganda Breweries Limited vs. Uganda Railways** Corporation. No.6 of 2001. SC following the principle stated in Francis Sembuva vs Alport Services Ltd. Civil Appeal No. 6 of 1999 SC and Ephraim Orgoru Odongo & Another vs Francis Benega Bonge, No. 10 of 1987 SCU, Oder, JSC (as he then was) held that;

"There is no set format to which a revaluation of evidence by a first appellate court should conform. The extent and manner in which re-evaluation may be done depends on the circumstances of each case and the style used by the first appellate court. In this regard, I shall refer to what this Court said in two cases. In - Francis Sembuya -vs-Alport Services Ltd. Civil Appeal No. 6 of 1999 (SCU) (unreported), Tsekooko, JSC said at page 11:

"I would accept Mr. Byenkya's submission if he meant to 25 say that the Court of Appeal did not go into details of the evidence, but that is really a question of style. There is really no set format to which the re-evaluation should conform. A first appellate Court is expected to scrutinise

and make an assessment of the evidence but this does not mean that the Court of Appeal should write a judgment similar to that of the (trial)."

In Ephraim Orgoru Odongo & Another vs Francis Benega Bonge, Civil Appeal No. 10 of 1987 (SCU) (unreported), Odoki JSC (as he then was) said: $\frac{1}{2}$

"While the length of the analysis may be indicative of $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$ comprehensive evaluation of evidence, nevertheless the test of adequacy remains a question of substance."

I have no doubt that the Court of Appeal, as the first 15 appellate court lived up to its task as set out in rule $29(1)$ of the Court of Appeal Rules and as explained in cases such as Kifamunte Henry -vs- Uganda (supra)"

In this appeal therefore, we hold that this was a question of style that cannot be a sound basis for the argument that the Court of 20 Appeal did not rehear the case or that it amounted to an error leading to miscarriage of justice.

This ground therefore fails.

In conclusion, we are satisfied that the Court of Appeal properly reevaluated the evidence and as a result we find no reason for this 25 Court to interfere or depart from the findings and decision of the Court of Appeal. This appeal is accordingly dismissed.

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December $\ldots$ day of $\ldots$ 2018 Dated this....

$\mathsf{S}$

HON. JUSTICE STELLA ARACH-AMOKO, JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

$\sim \sim$

HON. UUSTICE ELDAD MWANGUSYA JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

**HON. JUSTICE OPIO-AWERI** JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT $20$

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Thuradere

**HON. JUSTICE MWONDHA** JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

Tusatenwe HON. JUSTICE TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT