Orezone Mining and Exploration Limited v Attorney General and Ors (APPLICATION NO. 100/2025) [2023] ZMCA 445 (10 December 2023)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF ZAMBIA HOLDEN AT LUSAKA (Civil Jurisdiction) APPLICATION NO. 100/2025 IN THE MATTER OF: AND IN THE MATTER OF: AND IN THE MATTER OF: AND IN THE MATTER OF: AND Iti-JHE MATTER OF: r-·· 1 0 DEC 2025 . i IN THE MATTER OF: ORDER 53 OF THE RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1965, (WHITE BOOK), RSC,1999 EDITION, VOLUME 1 AND VOLUME 2 THE MINES AND MINERALS DEVELOPMENT ACT (GENERAL} REGULATIONS, STATUTORY INSTRUMENT NO. 7 OF 2016 SECTIONS15,16,25(1)(A){Il},30,31,32,52(1), 66 AND 72 OF THE MINES AND MINERALS DEVELOPMENT ACT NO. 11 OF 2015 REGULATION 49(1)(A)(IV) AND (B) OF THE MINES AND MINERALS DEVELOPMENT (GENERAL} STATUTORY REGULATION INSTRUMENT NO. 7 OF 2016 THE FAILURE OF THE MINING LICENSING COMMITTEE TO GRANT THE APPLICANT THE MINING RIGHT AT THE LAPSE OF 90 DAYS DESPITE THE APPLICATION MEETING ALL THE IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 32 OF THE MINES AND MINERALS DEVELOPMENT ACT,2015 REQUIREMENTS REQUISITE AN ORDER FOR MANDAMUS DIRECTED AT THE MINING LECENSING COMMITTEE TO GRANT THE APPLICANT THE MINING FOR 23009-HQ-LEL. CERTIORARI IN RESPECT OF OTHER DECISION APPLICANTS ON THE SAME AREA AND PROHIBITION IN RESPECT OF ANY PREJUDICIAL ACTIONS ENTERTAIN TO IN THE MATTER OF: ORDER 52 RULE 2 OF THE RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ENGLAND, 1965 (1999) EDITION AND IN THE MATTER OF: APPLICATION FOR CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS LEAVE TO ISSUE BETWEEN: OREZONE MINING AND EXPLORATION LIMITED APPLICANT R2 AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL RESPONDENT HUIOS MINING AND MINERAL EXPLORATION LIMITED INTENDED 2ND RESPONDENT ZIMASI RESOURCES LIMITED INTENDED 3Ro RESPONDENT LEAD WAY YOUTH MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE SOCIETY LIMITED ECOMINE EXPLORATION COMPANY LIMITED INTENDED 4™ RESPONDENT INTENDED 5™ RESPONDENT DES EXPORT ZAMBIA LIMITED INTENDED 6TH RESPONDENT WILLIAM HAMUDULU INTENDED 7TH RESPONDENT TWAWILWA MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE LIMITED LIBRA MINING MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE LIMITED INTENDED 8™ RESPONDENT INTENDED 9TH RESPONDENT KONIGE MINING AND EXPLORATION LIMITED INTENDED 10TH RESPONDENT OTHERS UNKNOWN INTENDED 11™ RESPONDENT CORAM: Majula, Muzenga and Chembe, JJA On 12th November 2025 and 10th December 2025 For the Applicant: For the Respondent: For the 10th intended Respondent: Mr. L. Zulu & Mr. A. Chumi - Equitas Legal Practitioners No-Appearance Mr. M. Mwenye SC, Mr. C. Kamelu - Mwenye & Mwitwa Advocates Mrs. S. Kalima Banda - J & M Advocates Mr. A. Akapelwa - Chibesakunda & Company RULING R3 Cases referred to: 1. Watson Nkandu Bowa (Suing as Administrator of the estate of the late Ruth Bowa} v Fred Mubiana and ZESCO Limited - Selected Judgment No. 21 of 2012. 2. Sonny Paul Mulenga and Others v Investrust Merchant Bank 3. Wilson v Church No. 2 (1879} 12 CHO 454. 4. Richard M Chizyuka and Another v Credit Bank Limited - SCZ Appeal No. 113 of 1999 5. Zambia Revenue Authority v Post News Papers Limited - SCZ 6. 7. 8. Appeal No. 36 of 2016 Law Association of Zambia v The Attorney General and Others - 2019/CCZ/0013 JCN Holdings Limited v Development Bank of Zambia - SCZ Judgment No. 22/2013 John Mumba, Danny Musetekea and others v Zambia Red Cross Society (2006} ZR 137 9. Chivasa v International Gaming Africa - CAZ/08/273/2017 10. Nyampala Safaris Limited and Others v Zambia Wildlife Authority (2004} ZR 49 11. Afritec Asset Management Company Limited and Another v The Gynae and Antenatal Clinic Limited and Another - SCZ Appeal No. 64 of 2015 12. Lapemba Trading Limited v Pemba Lapidaries and Another - SCZ Appeal No. 49 / 2024 13. Dean Mung'omba v Peter Machungwa and Others - SCZ 3 of 14. Gideon Mundanda v Timothy Mulwani, Agricultural Finance Co Limited and S. S. S. Mwiinga (1987} ZR 29 Statutes referred to: 1. The Court of Appeal Rules, Statutory Instrument No. 65 of 2016. 2. Court of Appeal Act No.7 of 2016. 3. Rules of the Supreme Court of England, 1999 Edition (White Book}. 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 This is the applicant's application for a stay of execution pending the determination of the motion to vary, reverse or discharge the R4 decision of the single Judge of this Court. The application is made pursuant to Section 9(b) of the Court of Appeal Act No. 7 of 2016 and Order 59/13/2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1999 Edition. 2.0 BACKGROUND 2.1 The background to this application is that the applicant and the respondent entered into a consent judgment in the High Court. The respondent, in breach of the terms of the said consent judgment, refused to implement the terms and proceeded to issue licenses to various intended respondents over the tenement subject of the court judgment which granted mining license over the same. The intended respondents thus proceeded to conduct mining operations on the area subject of the consent judgment. 2.2 The applicant sought to join the intended respondents to the proceedings in the court below and the consent judgment, which application was scheduled to come up on 17th October 2025. To restrain the intended respondents from carrying out mining operations pending determination of the joinder application, the applicant made another application for interim injunction which the court below granted ex-parte and gave the application a return date of 1st October 2025. When the matter came up for hearing, the • court adjourned it to 17th October 2025 to ensure effective service RS of all the parties cited in the proceedings. 2.3 It was at the hearing of p t October 2025 that the applicant was made aware that the 10th intended respondent made an ex-parte application to discharge the ex-parte order of interim injunction granted in favour of the applicant. 2.4 The High Court Judge dismissed the application to discharge the order of interim injunction on the basis that the 10th intended respondent had already filed an affidavit in opposition to the application for an order for interim injunction which basically contained the same issues raised in the affidavit in support of the application for discharge. 2.5 The 10th intended respondent proceeded to serve the applicant with an order made by a single Judge of this court, discharging the ex parte order of interim injunction granted by the High Court pending determination of the joinder application. 2.6 Dissatisfied with the decision of the single Judge of this Court, the applicant filed a motion before the full bench of this Court to vary, reverse or discharge the single Judge's decision and subsequently, this application for stay of execution, which order we granted ex parte. At the behest of the 10t h intended respondent, we abridged R6 the time for the inter parte hearing from 26th November to the 12th November 2025. We heard the parties, culminating into this ruling. 3.0 THIS APPLICATION 3.1 The application is supported by an affidavit and skeleton arguments. It is averred in the affidavit that an application to discharge an order of injunction is not an interlocutory relief which can merely be refreshed before a single Judge of this Court but rather, constitutes a final decision that should be heard by a full bench following a notice of appeal and memorandum of appeal filed before the court. 3.2 That there was no application by all the other intended respondents who were affected by the ex-parte order of interim injunction of the High Court when the single Judge decided to discharge the injunction in its entirety. It is averred that the order of the single Judge dated 7th October 2025 is irregular and must thus be reversed, varied and discharged and to this effect, a motion had been filed challenging the jurisdiction of the single Judge of this court. 3.3 The applicant deposed that the court grants the order of stay of execution as failure to do so will render the motion nugatory and an academic exercise. It is averred further that the applicant will suffer irreparable damage should the court not grant the order for stay as R7 eleven (11) different parties will continue to illegally mine on the tenement. 3.4 In the skeleton arguments in support of the application, reference was made to the case of Watson Nkandu Bowa (Suing as Administrator of the estate of the late Ruth Bowa) v. Fred Mubiana and ZESCO Limited 1 for the submission that an order for stay of execution is not granted as a matter of right but is subject to certain requirements being met by the applicant. 3.5 We were further referred to the cases of Sonny Paul Mulenga and Others v. Investrust Merchant Bank,2 Wilson v. Church,3 Richard M. Chizyuka and Another v. Credit Bank Limited4 and Zambia Revenue Authority v. Post News Papers Limited5 to bring home the point that to grant a stay of execution, the court must be satisfied that there are prospects of success in the appeal, in this case, the motion. It was submitted that the motion has demonstrated that the single Judge of this court lacked jurisdiction to grant an order discharging the interim injunction granted by the lower court. That from the arguments filed in support of the notice of motion, the applicant had also demonstrated that an application for a discharge of an injunction is quite distinct from an application for an injunction itself, therefore a R8 party dissatisfied by the outcome of such an application cannot merely renew the application before a single Judge of this court. 3.6 Counsel argued that what was also eminent from the highlighted authorities is that an application for stay of execution must demonstrate that irreparable injury would be caused if the stay is not granted. It was submitted that the application herein concerns an infringement being carried out by eleven (11) known parties and other unknown parties, and these parties, due to the order for the single Judge will continue to carry on illegal mining activities on the tenement unless that order is stayed and the ex-parte order of injunction restored pending determination of the motion before this court. It was argued further that the question of irreparable damage cannot be overemphasised if the order for stay of execution is not granted. 3. 7 We were urged to grant the order sought and restore the ex-parte order of interim injunction granted by the High Court until the notice of motion herein is heard and determined. 3.8 In opposing the application, the intended 10th respondent filed an affidavit in opposition and skeleton arguments. The gist of the affidavit is that it holds a valid Small-Scale Mining License Number 37891-HQ-SML valid for a period of ten (10) years commencing 12th R9 August 2024 and that there were no competing interests on the licence that were revealed either at the Ministry of Mines Cadastre Department or the Ministry of Mines Cadastre Portal, neither was the application for a mining right by the applicant over the area covered by the licence. 3. 9 It is averred that not being a party to the proceedings in the High Court, they or it applied to discharge the ex-parte order of interim injunction and when the court declined to discharge the injunction, they renewed the application before the single Judge of this Court who subsequently discharged the ex-parteorder of injunction. That they did not need leave of the High Court to bring the renewed application before a single Judge of this court. 3.10 That contrary to what the applicant alleges, this Court is under no obligation to issue a stay of execution just because it has filed a motion to reverse the decision of the single Judge. That there is further no evidence that has been presented before the Court to show the irreparable damage it will suffer. 3.11 It was the 10th intended respondent's averment that on the contrary, it is suffering irreparable damage as a result of the ex parte order for interim injunction which was re-instated by the ex parteorder for stay which was granted by the court. That it invested RlO over USD 15,000,000.00 for mobilisation and acquiring of plant and machinery and the ex-parte order of interim injunction has forced it to cease operations and is now incurring daily losses of approximately USD 24,454.25. 3.12 It is the 10th intended respondent's further averment that it has provided employment opportunities in the community by engaging over 250 employees to work on the site and invested money into various projects which were now on hold on account of the persisting injunction. In the premises, the 10th intended respondent continues to suffer significant daily losses and will not be able to sustain the over 250 employees if the stay is granted and the order of injunction persists. 3.13 The 10th intended respondent's arguments were three-fold. Firstly, relying on the case of Law Association of Zambia v. The Attorney General and Others, 6 the 10th intended respondent raised an issue that this court does not have jurisdiction to stay the order of the single Judge. The basis of this argument was that the applicable law in Section 9(b) of the Court of Appeal Act and rules regarding the court's power over decisions of a single Judge are explicitly the jurisdiction to vary, reverse or discharge decisions of the single Judge. It was submitted that the power of the court Rll on stays is restricted to issuing of stays pending appeals that are before it as is the import of Order 10 Rule 5 of CARs as well as Order 59/13/2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of England. 3.14 It was submitted that there is no appeal raised by any party to the proceedings that is pending before this court but only a motion to vary, reverse or discharge the decision of the single Judge. It was contended that it would serve no purpose in litigation if a party who has renewed an application from a lower court to a single Judge could easily have their relief from the single Judge rendered otiose by an order of the full Court without the single Judge's decision being fully interrogated by the full Court in accordance with the procedure embedded in the law. 3.15 We were referred to the case of JCN Holdings Limited v. Development Bank of Zambia7 for the contention that an application for stay is an improper application and the court lacked jurisdiction to grant it as any orders granted would be null and void. 3.16 In the second limb, the 10th intended respondent submitted that a stay cannot be granted even on the merits on the basis that there is nothing to be stayed as it is well established that a stay of execution will only be granted where there is something executable R12 for the court to stay. Reliance was placed on the case of John Mumba, Danny Musetekea and others v. Zambia Red Cross Society8 and Chivasa v. International Gaming Africa.9 That the case of Zambia Revenue Authority v. Post Newspapers supra, which is the locus c/assicus on the principles that govern stays of execution, makes it clear that when considering a stay application, there must be something executable about a judgment or order in order for there to be something to stay. 3.17 It was submitted that in casu, the effect of the order of the single Judge was to place the parties in the position that they had been prior to the ex-parte order for interim injunction being granted by the High Court. It was learned counsel's submission that the order of the single Judge did not grant any remedy to any of the parties, it only discharged the ex-parte order for injunction and thus not executable. 3.18 In the third limb, it was argued that the applicant has not met the threshold required to be granted a stay of execution based on the principles governing stays. The cases of Sonny Paul Mulenga supra, Nyampala Safaris Limited and Others v. Zambia Wildlife Authority10 to emphasise that the applicant has clearly failed to meet the threshold for the grant of a stay of execution in R13 that they have not demonstrated any good and convincing reasons as to why a stay of execution must be granted and neither have they demonstrated irreparable injury. 3.19 It was further submitted that the applicant has not demonstrated any prospects of success of their motion as a perusal of their affidavit in support of the motion and the skeleton arguments shows no evidence that the single Judge acted in a manner in blatant disregard of the law or that the order of the single Judge offends established law. It was argued that the mere fact that the applicant has raised jurisdictional questions in the notice of motion does not amount to demonstrating prospects of success. 3.20 It was contended that in any case, the established law is that a party may, on an interlocutory application which is not final in nature, such as an application to discharge an injunction, renew such an application before this Court as guided by the Apex Court in Afritec Asset Management Company Limited and Another v. The Gynae and Antenatal Clinic Limited and Another.11 That similarly, an application to discharge an injunction, an application for injunction or stay application are extremely urgent and can be renewed before this court rather than go on appeal. It was submitted that the view that the intended 10th respondent ought to R14 have appealed the ruling of the lower court is thus misconceived as the decision was not final and did not determine with finality the rights of the parties. 3.21 It was the 10th intended respondent's submission that the applicant having further failed to show irreparable injury, the application falls short of the requirement to be granted a stay of execution as in Lapemba Trading Limited v. Pemba Lapidaries and Another.12 3.22 The case of Dean Mung'omba v. Peter Machungwa and Others13 was cited for the submission that having emanated from judicial review proceedings, the rules of the High Court upon which the application for an injunction and joinder of parties was hinged are inapplicable in the present case, thus made without jurisdiction. 3.23 It was also highlighted that the joinder of the intended respondents to the proceedings was untenable in light of the fact that a consent order has already been entered into. 3.24 In reply, the applicant submitted that the 10th intended respondent's submission that the power of this Court in Section 9 of the Act is restricted to varying, reversing and discharging the order of the single Judge is devoid of logic as an application for an order for stay of execution is an interim application pending determination of an I application under Section 9 of the Court of Appeal Act. That R15 Order 59 rule 13 of the Rules of the Supreme Court clearly gives this court the power to grant an order for stay of execution and the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction should not be entertained. 3.25 To oppose the 10th intended respondent's argument that there is nothing before the court to be stayed, the applicant referred to John Mumba, Danny Museteka and Others suprato argue that the case was distinguishable from the current circumstances as the injunction in that case had been dismissed by the High Court after an inter-parte hearing and not by way of an order for discharge. It was argued that the plaintiff in that case is the one that made an application for review and applied to have the ruling stayed. 3.26 Learned counsel for the applicant argues that in casu/ the application for an interim injunction is yet to be heard. That as a matter of fact, the 10th intended respondent in this case is the one that made the application to discharge the order of injunction whose effect is that the intended respondents will be allowed to continue mining on the tenement subject of the consent judgment and further that the single Judge of this court went further to even grant R16 costs to the 10th intended respondent. It is contended that it is thus remiss to state that the order did not award anything. 3.27 Relying on ZRA v. Post Newspaper and Sonny Paul Mulenga supra, it was submitted that the grounds as presented in the notice of motion demonstrate that the motion has good prospects of success as the matter before the single Judge was not properly before her, depriving her of the necessary jurisdiction to make the order as she did. 3.28 It was contended that this was a fit and proper case in which the court should grant the applicant an order for stay of execution pending determination of the motion. 4.0 HEARING 4.1 At the hearing, counsel for respective parties relied on their affidavits in support and affidavit in opposition, as well as their skeleton arguments and list of authorities. Both parties made lengthy oral augmentations which we will not reproduce as we have already canvassed them above, suffice to state that we will refer to them, as, and when necessary. 5.0 DECISION OF THE COURT 5.1 We have carefully considered the application, the affidavits for and against, and the skeleton arguments relied on. The core issue in • R17 the application before us is whether it is desirable, necessary and just to grant an order for stay of execution of the single Judge's order discharging the ex-parte order of interim injunction granted by the High Court Judge on 17th September 2025 pending determination of the motion to vary, reverse or discharge the order of the single Judge. 5.2 Ancillary to the core issue are the questions raised by learned counsel for the 10th intended respondent firstly that we lack jurisdiction to stay a decision of the single Judge and secondly that a stay cannot be granted because there is nothing to stay. It is prudent for us to determine these issues first before we can delve into the merits of the application. 5.3 In arguing that we have no jurisdiction to stay a decision of the single Judge of the Court, learned counsel submitted that the power of this court to grant a stay is where there is an appeal pending before us. Reliance for this argument was placed on Order 10 Rule 5 of the CARs. Learned counsel for the applicant in opposing this submission argued that the argument is devoid of logic as an application for an order for stay of execution is an interim application pending determination of an application under Section 9 of the Court of Appeal Act. That Order 59 rule 13 of the Rules of R18 ' the Supreme Court clearly gives this court the power to grant an order for stay of execution. 5.4 This Court, being an appellate court can be approached mainly through two fronts. The first is by way of appeal from a decision of the High Court or any quasi-judicial body. The second way is by renewal of interlocutory applications, before a single Judge or in appropriate cases before the full court (as is the case in judicial review applications). The 10th intended respondent approached this Court through a single Judge, by way of renewal. These are interlocutory applications, largely governed by Order 7 of the CARs, which deals with interlocutory applications made where there is an appeal pending before the Court and where no appeal is pending before the Court. It is trite that when a single Judge of this Court renders a decision, it can be varied, discharged or reversed by the Court, where a party is dissatisfied with it. 5.5 We agree that the clear provision in our rules regarding stays is only where there is an appeal before us. However, this Court wields inherent jurisdiction to grant orders for stay, in instances where an interlocutory matter comes before us. We have considered and granted renewed applications for stay of proceeding in the High Court, where the application was declined. The interest of justice R19 cannot be achieved if we gave a narrow view of the powers of this Court. Therefore, we hold the view that implied in the power conferred by Section 9 to vary, discharge or reverse a decision of the single Judge is the power to also stay the single Judge's decision pending its variation, discharge or reverse. Order 7 Rule 1(2) CARs unfetters the power of this Court to make any decision which we consider just. It provides that: "All interlocutory application may be heard and determined by a single Judge, except that the direction or order made on an interlocutory application shall not operate so as to prejudice the Court from giving a decision on a case if the Court considers just." 5.6 We therefore have no hesitation to find that we have jurisdiction in interlocutory matters to make any order which we consider just, including an order for stay of a decision of a single Judge pending our decision. Any other holding would have the potential to defeat the course of justice. For avoidance of doubt, this court has power to stay a single Judge's decision, whether arising from an appeal or any interlocutory proceedings, pending its interrogation. We therefore find no merit in this argument and we dismiss it. • R20 5. 7 The second argument is that a stay is not tenable as there is nothing to stay, in that there is nothing executable for the court to stay. Learned counsel for the 10th respondent argued further that the discharge of the injunction reverted the parties to the position they were before the ex-parteinjunction was granted. We were referred to a number of authorities, key among them the Mumba case supra and the Post Newspapers case supra. 5.8 We agree that where there is nothing to stay, such an order is not tenable. However, the facts in the Mumba case are distinguishable from the within facts. In the Mumba case supra, the discharge of the injunction was granted after an inter parte hearing of the application for an order of interim injunction. After it was discharged, an application to review that decision was made. A stay was granted by the trial Court pending the hearing of the review. After the trial Court declined to review, the stay was discharged. The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court where a single Judge granted a stay pending appeal. Therefore, on the facts of this case there was indeed nothing to stay as the injunction, which the applicant sought was not granted. Further in the Post Newspaper case supra, the ruling or judgment declined to grant the remedy after an inter partes hearing and as aptly put by the • , R21 Court, it was a failed judgment or ruling which could not be stayed because it did not award anything. In casu, the effect of the discharge of the injunction by the single Judge was to cancel a subsisting interim injunction order which was pending inter parte hearing in the Court below. Therefore, the within discharge does not revert the parties to the position they were. A stay would in effect revert the parties to the subsisting position in the lower Court. The order by the single Judge had the effect of cancelling an interim injunction as such there was something to stay in order to preserve status of the parties until the single Judge's order is interrogated by the Court. We thus agree with learned counsel for the applicant that there is something to stay. This argument too must suffer the fate of its older brother above. It is thus equally dismissed. 5.9 Moving on to the core question regarding the stay of execution, the principles governing the exercise of a judge's discretion to stay the execution of a judgment have been enunciated in plethora of authorities including the case of Nyampala Safaris & 4 Others v. Zambia Wildlife Authority and 6 Others supra wherein the Supreme Court made it clear that a stay of execution is only granted on good and convincing reasons so as not to deprive a successful litigant of the fruit of litigation as a matter of course. , R2 2 5.10 The Supreme Court in giving guidance on what the courts should consider when determining applications for a stay of execution held inter alia in the case of Sonny Paul Mulenga & Others v Investment Merchant Bank Limited supra that: "In terms of our rules of court, an appeal does not automatically operate as a stay of execution and it is utterly pointless to ask for a stay solely because an appeal has been entered. More is required to be advanced to persuade the court below or this court that it is desirable, necessary and just to stay a The successful party judgment pending appeal. should be denied immediate enjoyment of a judgment only on good and sufficient grounds ... In exercising its discretion whether to grant a stay or not, the court is entitled to preview the prospects of success of the proposed appeal." 5.11 In similar vein, in Watson Nkandu Bowa v Fred Mubiana supra the Supreme Court stated that the case of Sonny Paul Mulenga supra governs the granting or non-granting of applications to stay execution of judgments pending appeal. The apex court went on to state that: "In an application for stay of execution pending appeal, the considerations are the prospect of the appeal succeeding and the irreparable damage if a stay is not granted and the appellants' appeal succeeds." R23 5.12 We have prudently considered the appellant's contention that its motion to vary or discharge the single Judge's decision has prospects of success and further that if the stay is not granted it will suffer irreparable injury as the intended respondents will continue to carry on illegal mining activities on the tenement. 5.13 The 10th intended respondent on the other hand argues that there is no obligation to issue a stay of execution merely for the reason that the applicant has filed a motion to reverse the decision of the single Judge. It was contended that there is no evidence presented by the applicant to show the irreparable damage they will suffer. That as a matter of fact, it is the 10th intended respondent incurring daily losses of approximately USD25,454.25 because it has been forced to seize operations. 5.14 Our judicious preview of the applicant's motion to vary or reverse the single Judge's decision, does not, prima facie/ reveal reasonable prospects of success of the application. This, in our view, is a very important consideration even before a court can consider irreparability of the damage. 5.15 Notwithstanding our finding that there was something to stay, we are however, not satisfied that special circumstances exist to R24 warrant the grant of a stay of the decision of the single Judge of this Court in light of what we have said in paragraph 5.14. 6.0 CONCLUSION 6.1 All in all, we find no merit in this application and it is accordingly dismissed. The ex-parte order of stay we granted dated the 15th October 2025 is hereby vacated. 6.2 Costs will be in the cause. l .......... ~ ...... . COURT OF APPEAL JUDGE ···············~ ················· K. MUZENGA COURT OF APPEAL JUDGE ·················fLo·!!:1·k ······· Y. CHEMBE COURT OF APPEAL JUDGE