Mosisili and Others v Mokhehle and Others (CIV/APN 24 of 97) [1997] LSHC 20 (14 February 1997)

IN T HE H I GH C O U RT OF L E S O T HO C I V / A P N / 2 4 / 97 In the matter between: P A K A L I T HA M O S I S I LI L I RA M O T E TE N O T S I M O L O PO S H A K H A NE M O K H E H LE and D R. N T SU M O K H E H LE M O L A PO Q H O B E LA T S E L I SO M A K H A K HE N T S U K U N Y A NE M P H A N YA ' M O L O T S I K O L I S A NG R A T H A L A R A M O L A H L O A NE S E K O A LA T O L O A NE N T JA N C H O C H O BA M A L A J S A M A H O SI M O H A I LA M O H A LE L E B E N YA C H A K E LA Q O A NE P I T SO M A R T IN M O H O S HO K J H L A T L A NE M O L OI ' M A P O N T SO S E K H E SA T H U LO M A H L A K E NG B A S U T O L A ND C O N G R E SS P A R TY 10TH 1 ST A P P L I C A NT 2 ND A P P L I C A NT 3 RD A P P L I C A NT 4 TH A P P L I C A NT 1 ST R E S P O N D E NT 2 ND R E S P O N D E NT 3 RD R E S P O N D E NT 4 TH R E S P O N D E NT 5 TH R E S P O N D E NT 6 T H . R E S P O N D E NT 7 TH R E S P O N D E NT 8 TH R E S P O N D E NT 9 TH R E S P O N D E NT R E S P O N D E NT 1 1 TH R E S P O N D E NT 1 2 TH R E S P O N D E NT 1 3 TH R E S P O N D E NT 1 4 TH R E S P O N D E NT 1 5 TH R E S P O N D E NT 1 6 TH R E S P O N D E NT 1 7 TH R E S P O N D E NT - 2- J U D G M E NT D e l i v e r ed by the H o n o u r a b le M r. Justice G . N. M o f o lo on the 14th F e b r u a r y, 1 9 9 7. T h is application w as b r o u g ht to court by applicants on 23 J a n u a r y, 1 9 97 claiming an order as follows:- 1. T h at a R u le Nisi do h e r e by issue calling u p on r e s p o n d e n ts to s h ow c a u s e, if a n y, on a date to be d e t e r m i n ed by this H o n o u r a b le C o u rt w h y :- (a) (b) T he periods of notice required by the R u l es of C o u rt shall not be d i s p e n s ed with on a c c o u nt of the u r g e n cy of this matter; 2 n d, 3 rd 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 13th 14th a nd 16th r e s p o n d e n ts shall not be c o m m i t t ed for c o n t e m pt of court in respect of the order or Mofolo, J. of J a n u a ry 10th, 1 9 97 in C I V / A P N / 1 / 97 for s u ch period as this H o n o u r a b le C o u rt m ay d e t e r m i n e; © In v i ew of the fact that no necessary preparations h a ve b e en m a de by the o u t g o i ng National E x e c u t i ve C o m m i t t ee for the h o l d i ng of the 1 9 95 A n n u al C o n f e r e n c e, the holding of the 1 9 95 A n n u al C o n f e r e n ce on 2 4 th January, 1 9 97 shall n ot be cancelled; (d) T he alternative order of M o f o l o, J. in C I V / A P N / 1 / 97 directing the L e a d er of the Basutoland C o n g r e ss Party to m a ke n e c e s s a ry preparations for the c o n v e n i ng of s u ch c o n f e r e n ce for the - 3- w e e k e nd c o m m e n c i ng on 7th February, 1 9 97 shall not be invoked; (e) R e s p o n d e n ts shall not be directed to p ay the costs of this application only in the event of opposition; (f) Granting applicants s u ch further and/or alternative relief as this H o n o u r a b le C o u rt m ay d e em fit. Lehohla, J granted the application a d d i ng that respondents could anticipate the rule by giving 48 hours' notice to applicants if they so w i s h ed in terms of R u le 8 ( 1 8) of the rules of court but otherwise the rule nisi w as m a de returnable on 27th January, 1 9 97 at 9.30 a.m. or so s o on thereafter. R e s p o n d e n ts citing R u le 8(18) of rules of this Court, 1 9 80 anticipated the rule a nd m a de it returnable on 24 January, 1 9 9 7. W h e n, on 24 January, 1 9 97 the matter w as argued it w as M r. P h e k o 's a r g u m e nt for the applicants that in terms of the order of L e h o h l a, J. the order could only be anticipated within 48 h o u rs in t e r ms of the rules a nd that 48 h o u rs h a v i ng not expired f r om the time the order w as given a nd lodging of the application for anticipation in w o u ld not be said that the rule w as anticipated a nd accordingly the matter could not p r o c e ed a nd h ad to p r o c e ed on 27 January, 1 9 97 as ordered by L e h o h l a, J. On the other h a n d, it w as M r. K h a u o e 's submission that b e c a u se of the - 4- u r g e n cy of the application the court w as o b l i g ed to a l l ow anticipation of the rule notwithstanding provisions of R u le 8 ( ] 8) of the R u l es of this court T he court after l e n g t hy a r g u m e nt g r a n t ed application for anticipation a nd indicated its r e a s o ns w o u ld f o l l ow a nd the f o l l o w i ng are the court's r e a s o n s: - B e f o re giving its r e a s o ns this court will digress for a little w h i le to deal w i th M r. P h e k o 's application in a n o t h er area of the p r o c e e d i n g s. On 24 J a n u a r y, 1 9 97 it so turned out that f r om the b ar M r, K h a u oe s u b m i t t ed his a n s w e r i ng affidavit to court s a y i ng M r. P h e ko h ad refused earlier to r e c e i ve s a m e. M r. P h e ko strongly o b j e c t ed to t h e " p r o c e d u re saying court p a p e rs c o u ld n ot be s e r v ed u n l e ss t h ey h ad g o ne via the Registrar as this w as s t a n d a rd practice a nd if the court a c c e p t ed t h em as it did it w as necessary for h im to be g i v en t i me to reply a nd o n ce m o re he q u o t ed the 48 h o u rs rule referred to a b o v e. W h i le the court a g r e ed w i th M r. P h e ko that it w as his right to reply the court o r d e r ed that the application w o u ld in a ny e v e nt be p r o c e e d i ng on S a t u r d ay the 2 5 th J a n u a r y, 1 9 97 at 8.00 a.m. as c o n f e r e n ce w as sitting. M r, P h e ko then s u b m i t t ed that w h i le the court h ad rightly r e c o g n i s ed his right to reply t i me given w as too short a nd f l ew in the face of the 48 h o u rs rule a nd there - 5- w as no possibility of finding d e p o n e n ts to the affidavits he intended c o m p i l i n g. within s u ch a short s p a ce of time a nd as the application w as interlocutory he w as asking for leave to appeal a nd he stated his reasons for appeal. L e a ve to appeal w as not granted by the court. In the course of his address M r. P h e ko h ad repeatedly said that he w as a s t o u n d ed by the court's r e m a rk that the conference w as sitting. This court w as also a m a z ed by M r. P h e k o 's ability to m a ke m o u n t a i ns out of m o l e- hills. T he court w as conscious of the fact that, f r om the papers before it it a p p e a r ed delegates w e re arriving on 23 January, 1 9 97 a nd on 24 January, 1 9 97 w e re gathered a nd expecting to hear f r om the court as to the progress of the application. If M r. P h e ko w as surmising that the court w as a w a re the conference w as p r o c e e d i ng he w as terribly mistaken for there is no w ay the court could c o me by this information. I n d e ed by proceeding post haste it w as the intention of, the court to relieve delegates' anxieties as to the fate of the conference. B a ck to my reasons for allowing anticipation. R u l e8 sub-rule (18) reads: A ny person against w h om an order is granted ex-parte m ay anticipate the return d ay u p on delivery of not less than 48 hours notice. -6- T he sub-rule p a r a p h r a s ed m e a ns that a ny p e r s on against w h om an o r d er is granted shall give 48 h o u rs to the o t h er party if he w i s h es to anticipate the rule a nd u n l e ss the said 48 h o u rs notice is g i v en the rule m ay not be anticipated. Substantially, this w as M r. P h e k o 's s u b m i s s i o n. B ut this sub-rule is to be r e ad with sub-rule 22(a) which reads:- In u r g e nt application the court or a j u d ge m ay d i s p e n se w i th the f o r ms of a nd service p r o v i d ed for in these rules a nd d i s p o se of s u ch m a t t er at s u ch t i me a nd p l a ce a nd in s u ch m a r i n er a nd in a c c o r d a n ce w i th s u ch p r o c e d u re as T he court or j u d ge m ay d e em fit. T h is sub-rule, also paraphrased, gives to the court or j u d ge discretion as to the t i me a nd place, m a n n er t h e r e of a nd p r o c e d u re to be a d o p t ed as the j u d ge m ay d e em fit of d i s p o s i ng of an u r g e nt m a t t er w h e t h er it be at night t i me or on w e e k - e n d s. In my ruling w h e r e in M r. P h e ko applied for matters that w e re n ot part of his application to be i n t r o d u c ed this court h ad the o c c a s i on to r e m a rk q u o t i ng c a se of Highfields Milling C o. (Pty) L td v. A . E. W o s m a ld v. S o n s, 1 9 66 ( 2) S . A. 4 63 ( E . C . D . ) a t p . 4 6 5 t h at "..... considerations of justice a nd fairness m u st be of p r i me i m p o r t a n ce w h en the court is c o n c e r n ed w i th the i m p l e m e n t a t i on of p r o c e d u r al R u l es a nd as w as said in Shill v. M i l n e r, 1 9 3 7 A . D. 1 01 at p l 0 5" . . . . . .. - 7- P l e a d i n gs are m a de for the court, not the court for p l e a d i n g s" so that it c an be said R u l es of C o u rt are d e s i g n ed for the court w h o se business is to s e c u re the c o n d u ct of litigation in a m a n n er calculated to serve the just r e q u i r e m e n ts of the parties. In the s a me Highfield c a se I did e x p r e ss the v i ew that O . H a g a n, J. a p p e a r ed to be of the v i ew that he c o u ld not justify an inference that rules of court (particularly R u le 8 w h i ch is the s a me as o ur R u le 8) c o n t e m p l a te the w i t h h o l d i ng f r om the court a discretionary p o w er w h i c h, o v er a period of m a ny years, h as b e en exercised in all courts of S o u th Africa a nd w h i ch h as its f o u n d a t i on in principles of c o n v e n i e n ce a nd fairness. T he essential point this court is m a k i ng is that w h i le rules of court are there to be o b s e r v ed a nd f o l l o w e d, consideration of e x t r e me u r g e n cy a nd exigencies* of c o n v e n i e n ce a nd fairness m ay require their relaxation other t h an unstinted o b s e r v a n c e. I n d e ed in s o me c a s es the u r g e n cy m ay be so great that no time is available to prepare d o c u m e n ts instead of w h i ch viva v o ce e v i d e n ce m ay be heard. In urgent matters it h as b e en held that the court is entitled to a d m it h e a r s ay e v i d e n ce in an affidavit p r o v i d ed the s o u r ce of the information a nd g r o u n ds for belief in its truth are stated - s ee G A L, v. T A N S E Y, N O. 1 9 66 (4) S. A. 5 55 © at p. 5 5 8H - 5 5 9 A; T O R I G A MI M A R I T I ME C O N S T R U C T I ON C o. L T D. v . N I S S A O - I W OI - 8- Co. L T D. 1977 (4) S. A. 682 ©at p. 692B; S O U T H E RN P R I DE F O O DS (Pty) L TD v. M O H T D I E N, 1982 in S. A. 1068 © S Y F R E TS M O R T G A GE N O U N N E ES Ltd v. C A PE St. FRANCIS H O T E LS (Pty)Ltd, 1991 (3) S. A. 276 ( S E) W h en M r. M da in reply to M r. P h e k o 's s u b m i s s i o ns raised the q u e s t i on of u r g e n c y, M r. P h e ko o b j e c t ed on the g r o u nd that u r g e n cy w as n ot c a n v a s s ed in r e s p o n d e n ts affidavits n or w as it p l a c ed in issue. M r. M da c o u n t e r e d, h o w e v e r, that this w as a question of l aw or as he p ut it a point of l a w. M r. P h e ko refuted this saying u r g e n cy w as a q u e s t i on of fact t h an l aw a nd that, in the c i r c u m s t a n ce it w as " imperative for the court to d e c i de the issue. S a l m o nd in his J u r i s p r u d e n ce (12th E d .) h as this to s ay at p . 66 T he t e rm q u e s t i on of l aw is u s ed in three distinct t h o u gh related senses. It m e a n s, in the first place, a question w h i ch the court is b o u nd to a n s w er in a c c o r d a n ce w i th a rule of l aw a q u e s t i on w h i ch the l aw itself h as authoritatively a n s w e r e d, to the exclusion of the right of the court to a n s w er the q u e s t i on as it thinks fit in a c c o r d a n ce w i th w h at is c o n s i d e r ed to be the truth a nd justice of the matter. All other q u e s t i o ns are q u e s t i o ns of fact - using the t e rm fact in its w i d e st possible s e n se to include everything that is n ot l a w ." - 9- It also appears that matters of fact are capable of p r o of a nd subjects of e v i d e n ce a d d u c ed for the p u r p o s e. In determining questions of fact the court is seeking to ascertain the truth of the matter; in determining questions of l aw the court s e e ks to discover the right or justice of the matter. I m ay interpose to say while questions of l aw are easily d e t e r m i n a te a nd identifiable, questions of fact t e nd to be elusive - h e n ce w hy the Shorter O x f o rd English Dictionary describes fact as: " s o m e t h i ng that is alleged to b e, or m i g ht be - the circumstances a nd incidents of a case as distinct f r om their legal bearing." It cannot be said that a will or testament or for that matter succession is s o m e t h i ng that is alleged to be for it is a nd w h a t 's m o r e, these legal c o n c e p ts are g o v e r n ed by a b o dy of rules recognised in a specified d e p a r t m e nt of action. T h is c a n n ot be said of " u r g e n c y" w h i ch is not g o v e r n ed by a b o dy of rules n or d o es it bear the s t a mp of certitude for w h at is d e e m ed urgent, w h en full facts are e x a m i n e d, m ay turn out, after all, not to be so urgent. A l so to give u r g e n cy a sting, it m u st be a c c o m p a n i ed or, as it w e r e, assisted by a certificate of urgency. T he obfuscation a nd uncertainty lies in the A n g l o - A m e r i c an legal s y s t em of jurisprudence w h i ch divides l aw a nd fact reserving the o ne to a J u d ge a nd the other to the Jury - a s y s t em w h i c h, to those w ho are u n u s ed to, further c o m p o u n ds - 1 0- individual c o m p r e h e n s i on of the c o n c e p ts a nd r e n d e rs t h em all the m o re t e n u o u s. U r g e n cy is n ot a nd c an n e v er be a q u e s t i on of l aw or as is said, a point of l aw a nd M r. M d a 's a r g u m e n ts in this r e g a rd w e re disregarded. M r. P h e ko h as also said points w h i ch w e re raised in applicants' f o u n d i ng affidavits w e re n ot effectively d e n i ed n or w e re issues therein raised in r e s p o n d e n t s' a n s w e r i ng affidavits a nd that this b e i ng the c a se the application w as to be g r a n t e d. M r. M da d i s a g r e es s a y i ng e v en w e re t he issues n ot raised in affidavits or p ut in issue or e v en w e re the issues not raised in affidavits or p ut in issue or e v en w e re the application n ot o p p o s e d, it w as no r e a s on for the court to g r a nt the application. I a g r ee for the rule is not invariable. T h us in a criminal c a se the fact that the a c c u s ed p e r s on is silent t h r o u g h o ut t he p r o c e e d i n gs d o es n ot necessarily attract a finding or verdict of guilty for for o ne thing there m ay be no e v i d e n ce against h im a nd for a n o t h er he m ay h a ve b e en c h a r g ed w i th a non-existent offence. E q u a l l y, in a civil c a se the fact that a d e f e n d a nt is silent is no r e a s on to find against h im for the p r i m a ry rule is that the plaintiff m u st first d i s c h a r ge the o n us cast u p on h im a nd failure to do so m ay result in the d e f e n d a nt b e i ng g i v en benefit of the d o u bt a n d. a b s o l v ed f r om the instance. - 1 1- M r. P h e k o 's susceptibilities b e i ng that despite the o r d er of L e h o h l a, J. it s e e m ed c o n f e r e n ce w as p r o c e e d i ng M r. K h a u oe w as a s k ed by the court to investigate a nd on his return told the court he w as not p r e p a r ed to c o m m it himself. M r. P h e ko t h en applied that in the light of prevailing c i r c u m s t a n c es he w i s h ed to m a ke an application relating to the c o n d u ct of c o n f e r e n c e. W h i le M r. K h a u oe did n ot o p p o se the application he intimated that it w as to be a substantial application. M r. P h e ko t h en l o d g ed an application intended to c a n v a ss p r o c e e d i n gs of the 24 J a n u a r y, 1 9 97 c o n f e r e n ce by a s k i ng that:- (1) M e m b e rs of the o u t g o i ng N a t i o n al E x e c u t i ve C o m m i t t ee or s u ch of t h em as c o u ld be f o u nd a p p e ar before court to explain w hy they p r o c e e d ed w i th c o n f e r e n ce despite the order of L e h o h l a, J. . ( 2) To introduce n ew matters. N ew matters w e re u n d e r s t o od by the court as:- (a) for r e s p o n d e n ts to s h ow c a u se w hy they c a n n ot be c o m m i t t ed to gaol for c o n t e m pt of L e h o h l a, J's order. (b) w hy the c o n f e r e n ce c a n n ot be annulled. T he court g r a n t ed the application t h o u g h, at this juncture, it is w o r th m e n t i o n i ng that M r. P h e ko m o v ed his application as he did for, a c c o r d i ng to h i m, matters raised in his substantive application w e re no longer relevant b e i n g, as he - 1 2- said, of a c a d e m ic interest as r e s p o n d e n ts h ad p r o c e e d ed w i th the c o n f e r e n ce in a ny event. It is also w o r th m e n t i o n i ng that it w as after the court granted the application that M r. K h a u oe i n f o r m ed the court that the c o n f e r e n ce h ad b e e n, after all, p r o c e e d ed w i th to its c o n c l u s i on so that the o n ly question w h i ch r e m a i n ed for determination w as n ew issues w h i ch M r. P h e ko introduced a nd this court m e a ns to confine itself to these. T he basis of M r. P h e k o 's a r g u m e nt w as that (a) R e s p o n d e n ts w e re to be c o m m i t t ed to goal for c o n t e m pt (b) C o n f e r e n ce w as to be annulled a nd the leader of the B a s u t o l a nd C o n g r e ss Party D r. N t su M o k h e h le c o n v e ne a nd run a freshly called c o n f e r e n c e; © C o n f e r e n ce to be r un on substantially the s a me t e r ms a nd conditions as the aborted c o n f e r e n ce of M a r c h, 1 9 9 6; R e g a r d i ng (a) a b o v e, the order of my brother L e h o h l a, J r e a d s, inter alia:- 1, A rule nisi do h e r e by issue calling u p on r e s p o n d e n ts to s h ow c a u s e, if a n y, on 2 7 th d ay of J a n u a r y, 1 9 97 at 9.30 a.m. in the f o r e n o on or so s o on thereafter as"the matter m ay be conveniently h e a rd w h y :- (a) T he periods of notice required by the R u l es of C o u rt shall n ot be d i s p e n s ed w i th on the a c c o u nt of the u r g e n cy of this matter; (b) 2 n d, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 13th, I4th a nd 16th R e s p o n d e n ts shall not b e. - 1 3- c o m m i t t ed for c o n t e m pt of court in respect of the o r d er of Mofolo, J. of J a n u a ry 10th, 1 9 97 in C I V / A P N / 1 / 97 for s u ch period as this H o n o u r a b le C o u rt m ay d e t e r m i n e; © ( d) In v i ew of the fact that no n e c e s s a ry preparations h a ve b e en m a de by the o u t g o i ng National E x e c u t i ve C o m m i t t ee for the h o l d i ng of the 1 9 95 A n n u al C o n f e r e n c e, the h o l d i ng of the 1 9 95 A n n ul C o n f e r e n ce on 2 4 th J a n u a r y, 1 9 97 shall not be cancelled; T he alternative o r d er of M o f o lo J in C I V / A P N / 1 / 97 directing the L e a d er of the B a s u t o l a nd C o n g r e ss Party to m a ke n e c e s s a ry preparations for the c o n v e n i ng of s u ch c o n f e r e n ce for the w e e k e nd c o m m e n c i ng on 7th F e b r u a r y, 1 9 97 shall n ot be i n v o k e d; It is c o m m on c a u se that r e s p o n d e n ts p r o c e e d ed w i th the c o n f e r e n ce despite this order a nd w h a t 's subject of c o n t e m pt p r o c e e d i n gs e m e r g es f r om a nd is related to L e h o h la J's o r d er © a b o v e. It is on this basis M r. P h e ko w o u ld h a ve this court c o m m it r e s p o n d e n ts for c o n t e m p t; I am to m e n t i on that so far as ( b) a b o ve is c o n c e r n e d, e v en if this event c a n n ot be said to h a ve b e en o v e r t a k en by t i m e, the prayer b e i ng b a s ed on p r e m a t u r e, p r e - e m p t i ve a nd rather anticipatory allegations there is no w ay this court c o u ld h a ve f o u nd r e s p o n d e n ts guilty of c o n t e m pt considering that it is alleged r e s p o n d e n ts defied the court's o r d er in C I V / A P N / 1 / 97 by not holding a conference w h e n, in fact, such a conference w as held a nd h e n ce the application for c o n t e m pt of L e h o h l a, J's order. - 1 4- M r. P h e ko d o es also s e em to h a ve b e en of the v i ew that the o r d er of 10 January, 1 9 97 in C I V / A P N / 1 / 97 w as defied a nd disregarded a m o u n t i ng to c o n t e m pt in that:- (i) in t e r ms of the order the Provincial delegation w as as it s h o u ld h a ve b e en at the M a r c h, 1 9 96 c o n f e r e n c e; a l t h o u gh this court did n ot d e c i de the issue, it w as a l w a ys u n d e r s t o od that in a ny future c o n f e r e n ce the delegation w o u ld be the s a m e; that the c o n f e r e n ce deviated f r om this is hardly c o n t e m p t u o us - it is just that r e s p o n d e n ts m i s u n d e r s t o od the tenor of the order. but be this as it m a y, the court m a de no specific o r d er relying, rather, on the g o od c o m m o n s e n se of the r e s p o n d e n t s. N o t i c e a b l y, in this regard M r. P h e ko h as said r e s p o n d e n ts p r o c e e d ed as they did to benefit t h e m s e l v es at the e x p e n se of the applicants; I a g r e e. (ii) A n ew Credentials C o m m i t t ee w as elected; (iii) A n ew Elections c o m m i t t ee w as elected; (iv) O b s e r v e rs w e re restricted; (v) T h e re w e re r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s / r e s o l u t i o ns f r o m. constituencies; (vi) Interested delegates w e re n ot invited s o me of w h om w e re m e m b e rs of the Credentials C o m m i t t e e. To this c o u rt these acts are n o t h i ng but errors of j u d g m e nt a nd s u ch as are w o r t hy of considetation in deciding w h e t h er or n ot to a n n ul the c o n f e r e n ce instead of c o m m i t t i ng r e s p o n d e n ts for their c o n t e m p t: - 1 5- M r. P h e ko h as also s u b m i t t ed that in d e f i a n ce of the court's o r d er in C I V / A P N / l / 97 of 10 J a n u a r y, 1 9 97 apart f r om the court o r d e r i ng r e s p o n d e n ts to hold c o n f e r e n ce on 24 J a n u a r y, 1 9 97 there w as an a c c o m p a n y i ng o r d er f o r b i d d i ng r e s p o n d e n ts f r om a d m i n i s t e r i ng affairs of the B . C . P, s a ve h o l d i ng a c o n f e r e n c e. A nd yet, in d e f i a n ce a nd disregard of this court's o r d er r e s p o n d e n ts w e nt to c o u rt claiming to publish M a k a t o l le N e w s p a p er a nd did publich s a m e. To this c h a r ge M r. M da h as r e a c t ed by s a y i ng his clients w e re not s e r v ed w i th the o r d er a nd it d o es a p p e ar o r d e rs issued by the court w e re conflicting the court n ot h a v i ng said its reasons w o u ld follw in court b ut issuing t h em thereafter. Effectively M r. M da w as submitting that r e s p o n d e n ts w e re n ot a w a re of the court's o r d er in this regard. W h a t 's of material i m p o r t a n ce in c o n t e m pt p r o c e e d i n gs t h o u g h; is the q u e s t i on of m a l i c e. B e f o re reciting the l aw as to c o n t e m p t, this court w o u ld like to o b s e r ve that in p r a y er © n o w h e re are r e s p o n d e n ts s t o p p ed f r om p r o c e e d i ng w i th c o n f e r e n c e, a fact w h i ch c a n n ot be implied. B e s i d e s, if it w as i n t e n d ed that the application be a full b l o wn interdict, there s h o u ld h a ve b e en allegations that applicants h ad no other r e m e dy (unless no other alternative' stands for this); but certainly there s h o u ld h a ve b e en an allegation that applicants will suffer irreparable h a rm if the c o n f e r e n ce is p r o c e e d ed with.. - 1 6- In H A D K I N S ON v. H A D K I N S O N, 1 9 52 (2) A . E . R. 5 6 7, R o m e r, L. J. giving j u d g m e nt in a c o n t e m pt c a se said: "It is the plain a nd unqualified obligation of every p e r s on against or in respect of w h om an order is m a de by a court of c o m p e t e nt jurisdiction to o b ey it, unless a nd until that o r d er is discharged." Further, T he first is that a n y o ne w ho d i s o b e ys an o r d er of court is in c o n t e m pt a nd m ay be p u n i s h ed by c o m m i t al or a t t a c h m e nt or otherwise. T he s e c o nd is that no application to court by s u ch p e r s on will be entertained unless he h as p u r g ed h i m s e lf of this c o n t e m p t. In K O T ZE v. K O T Z E, 1 9 53 (2) S . A. 1 84 © at p . 1 87 C H e r b e s t e i n, J. m a de it clear " D i s r e g a rd of an order of court is a m a t t er of sufficient gravity, w h a t e v er the o r d er m ay b e ." It will be recalled that these are precise t e r ms in w h i ch M r. P h e ko a d d r e s s ed this court in s e e k i ng r e s p o n d e n t s' c o m m i t t al to gaol for c o n t e m p t. B ut apparently for there to be c o n t e m pt the question is w h e t h er the order of the court w as ad f a c t um p r a e s t a n d u m, i.e., directing the r e s p o n d e n ts to do certain things. G o i ng b a ck to L e h o h l a, J's o r d er a nd particularly prayer © w h i ch s e e ms relevant it (sic) reads:- - 1 7- In v i ew of the fact that no necessary preparations h a ve b e en m a de by the o u t g o i ng National E x e c u t i ve C o m m i t t ee for the h o l d i ng of the 1 9 95 A n n u al . C o n f e r e n c e, the holding of the 1 9 95 A n n u al C o n f e r e n ce on 2 4 th January, 1 9 95 shall not be cancelled. A case w h i ch a n s w e rs g r a ve s h o r t c o m i n gs in the a b o ve order a nd d r a ws attention to the implications of the rule ad f a c t um p r a e s t a n d um is M K H I ZE v. S W E M M ER a nd O T H E R S, 1 9 67 (1) S. A. 1 86 ( D ., C . L . D .) w h e r e, as to a R u le Nisi F a n n i n, J. said at p. 1 92 H. "It is true as p o i n t ed out by C a n e y, J. in M a h a r aj B r o t h e rs v. Pieterse B r o s. Construction (Pty) L td a nd A n o t h e r, 1 9 60 ( 2) S. A. 2 32 ( N .) at p . 2 3 6 H ,. that the l a n g u a ge of the section is w i de a nd e m b r a c es a ny rule nisi w h i ch h as the effect of an interim interdict: but it c a n n o t, in my v i e w, be said that a rule nisi d o es h a ve that effect unless it prevents the d o i ng of s o me act by the r e s p o n d e n ts p e n d i ng the return date. H e ld the rule nisi h ad no s u ch effect. (I h a ve underlined). T he order I h a ve referred to a b o ve d o es not h a ve the effect of p r e v e n t i ng the d o i ng of s o me act by r e s p o n d e n ts p e n d i ng the return date a nd is therefore n ot ad f a c t um p r a e s t a n d u m. P U B L IC M O T O RS (Pty) Ltd. 1 9 71 (2) S. A. 5 16 ( R .) (a c a se I will hopefully c o me b a ck to later) s p e a ks of t e m p o r a ry curial intervention' w h i ch m e a n s, in the v i ew of this court in relation to the present inquiry, s t o p p i ng the - 1 8- r e s p o n d e n ts f r om p r o c e e d i ng w i th the c o n f e r e n ce p e n d i ng the result of the application.' a n e c e s s a ry assertion lacking in the court o r d er referred to s u p r a. In Public M o t o rs a b o ve this is w h at B e c k, J said r e g a r d i ng a p r o c e e d i ng E x- P a r t e a t p. 5 1 8 F - H: T he p r o c e d u re of a p p r o a c h i ng the court ex-parte for relief that affects the rights of other p e r s o ns is o ne w h i c h, in my o p i n i o n, is s o m e w h at t oo lightly e m p l o y e d. A l t h o u gh the relief that is s o u g ht w h en this p r o c e d u re is resorted to is o n ly t e m p o r a ry in nature it necessarily i n v a d e s, for t he t i me b e i n g, the f r e e d om of action of a p e r s on or p e r s o ns w ho h a ve n ot b e en h e a rd a nd it is, to that extent, a n e g a t i on of the f u n d a m e n t al p r e c e pt of a u di a l t e r am p a r t e m. It is a p r o c e d u re that s h o u ld be sparingly e m p l o y ed a nd carefully disciplined by the existence of factors s u ch as u r g e n c y, or w e l l - g r o u n d ed a p p r e h e n s i on of p e r v e r se c o n d u ct on the part of a r e s p o n d e nt w ho is i n f o r m ed b e f o r e h a nd that resort will be h ad to t he assistance of the court,that the c o u r se of justice, stands in d a n g er of of frustration unless t e m p o r a ry curial intervention c an be unilaterally o b t a i n e d ." T h is court h o l ds that these sort of applications ( E x - P a r te applications) are to be resorted to sparingly a nd that in appropriate c a s es r e s p o n d e n ts a re to be notified in a d v a n ce that unless t h ey desist f r om their t h r e a t e n ed w r o n gs or action t e m p o r a ry curial intervention will be unilaterally s o u g h t. - 1 9- A nd again B e c k, J. p r o c e e d ed on p . 5 1 9E T he fear that, if this w e re to be d o ne (giving r e s p o n d e nt notice that an application w o u ld be m a de to c o u r t) the r e s p o n d e nt c o m p a ny w o u ld act perversely in frustration of the applicant's legitimate interest w as an inference that rested u p on n o t h i ng said or d o ne by a ny p e r s on in control of the m a n a g e m e nt of the r e s p o n d e nt c o m p a ny ". N or i n d e ed that on 23 J a n u a r y, 1 9 97 r e s p o n d e n ts w e re in a state of unreadiness to hold the c o n f e r e n ce rested u p on a n y t h i ng said or d o ne by t h e m. B ut M r. P h e k o 's contention rested m o re on the fact that the r e s p o n d e n ts h a d, contrary to the court's order, a l l o w ed o n ly the Provincial C o m m i t t ee to represent the P r o v i n c e s. M r. P h e ko a p p e a rs to h a ve inputted that this w as d e r o g a t i on of the court's order. I h a ve discussed Provincial delegation a b o ve b ut I think the q u e s t i on m u st be p ut in its p r o p er perspective. In C 1 V / A P N / 8 4 / 96 the question of Provincial delegation w as a r g u ed at length a nd respondent's counsel - especially M r. K h a u oe p l e a d ed w i th the court to d e c i de the issue. B ut b e c a u se it w as n ot part of the application a nd there h a v i ng b e en no application to m a ke it part of the relief p r a y ed for a nd m o re importantly b e c a u se this court considered it apolitical question w h i ch c o u ld be better r e s o l v ed by the B . C . P. itself the court m a de no decision"in this r e g a rd a nd left the q u e s t i on w i de o p e n. - 2 0- Significantly, M r. K h a u oe u r g ed the court's decision on the question b e c a u se he u n d e r s t o od the Provincial delegation as n ot only controversial but also u n d e c i d e d. H ow the respondents in the c o n f e r e n ce of 24 January, 1 9 97 d e c i d ed in f a v o ur of the Provincial delegation as restricted to the Provincial C o m m i t t ee baffles this court for M r. R a m o l a h l o a ne h ad h i m s e lf in the M a r c h, 1 9 96 c o n f e r e n ce in no w ay restricted Provincial delegation to the Provincial C o m m i t t e e. W h a t 's m o r e, the c o n f e r e n ce of 24 January, 1 9 97 w as a re-run of the c o n f e r e n ce of M a r c h, 1 9 96 a nd no n ew i t e ms w e re e x p e c t ed to be i n t r o d u c ed n or c o u ld there be a departure f r om the c o n d u ct of the M a r c h, 1 9 96 conference e x c e pt in respect of a f e w , e x c e p t i o ns d i s c u s s ed intra.. - In A L I S O N, N . O. v. N I C H O L S O N, 1 9 70 ( 1) S. A. 1 21 ( R .) M a c a u l e y, J's v i ew s e e ms to h a ve b e en that in an application for c o n t e m pt of court, whilst the order grants the applicant the right to a s s u me c u s t o dy a nd control of t he c o m p a n y, it d o es no m o re t h an to define rights, a nd decides, in his v i e w, no rights of the applicant vis-a-vis the r e s p o n d e n t. T h at e v en if the o r d er i m p o r t ed all the rights of a judicial m a n a g e r, t he situation w o u ld not h a ve m a de it o ne ad f a c t um p r a e s t a n d u m. A nd then the learned J u d ge continued at p . 1 2 4 E: "It follows that the r e s p o n d e n t 's refusal to h a nd o v er control to the applicant unconditionally or to v a c a te the p r e m i s es is not o ne in derogation of the authority - 2 1- of the court, b ut s i m p ly a denial that the p o w e rs a nd rights w h i ch this c o u rt g a ve the applicant entitle h im to act as he p u r p o r t ed to d o. S u ch d e r o g a t i on as there w as a r o se in dispute of the applicant's rights as c o n f e r r ed by the order. R e s p o n d e n ts h a s, therefore, n ot d i s o b e y ed a ny o r d er directed at h i m ." It also a p p e a rs that r e s p o n d e n t s' case w as a simple denial that the p o w e rs a nd rights w h i ch the court g a ve the applicants entitled t h em therein for the d e r o g a t i on arose in dispute of applicant's rights (if a n y) conferred by the court. M a c a u l e y, J. t h en c o n t i n u ed at p. 1 25 "I c o n c l u d e, therefore, that the present p r o c e e d i n gs do n ot s e ek c o m m i t t a l, of the r e s p o n d e nt on the footing that he c o m m i t t ed a c o n t e m pt of a criminal character. H ad t h ey a s s u m ed this character the fact that the o r d er of 7th A u g u st 1 9 69 is n ot ad f a c t um p r a e s t a n d um w o u ld n ot be crucial. T he e s s e n ce of the c o m p l a i nt w o u ld in that c a se h a ve b e en a deliberate setting the court at defiance by treating its order, w h a t e v er its character, as u n w o r t hy of notice." R e s p o n d e n ts w e r e, in the like m a n n e r, c o n c e r n ed w i th u p h o l d i ng a nd o b s e r v i ng the order to h o ld the conference as against treating the o r d er as u n w o r t hy of notice. On behalf of the respondents, it w as also r e p r e s e n t ed that the o r d er w as u n d e r s t o od as h a v i ng a s k ed r e s p o n d e n ts to s h ow c a u se w hy the c o n f e r e n ce c o u ld not be cancelled. - 2 2- Herbstein a nd v an W i n s en (Civil Practice of S u p e r i or C o u r ts in S o u th A f r i ca ( p . 3 3 )) s a ys c o n t e m pt of court c an t a ke the f o rm c o m m i t t ed in facie curiae or a wilful refusal or failure to c o m p ly w i th an order of court - b e i ng w h at we are c o n c e r n ed with in these proceedings. He s a ys o ne of the requisites is that the o r d er s h o u ld h a ve b e en s e r v ed on the r e s p o n d e nt personally or to h a ve c o me to his personal notice. M r. M da for the r e s p o n d e n ts h as a r g u ed that particularly relating to the o r d er in C I V / A P N / 1 / 97 to c o n v e ne c o n f e r e n ce of 24 J a n u a r y, 1 9 97 the court's n o t es do n ot s h ow that there w as an o r d er prohibiting r e s p o n d e n ts f r om administering the affairs of the B . C . P. vis-a-vis Makatolle. He s a ys the courts n o t es do n ot reveal this. M r. P h e ko h as c o u n t e r ed a nd rightly so in the v i ew of this court that court's notes are n ot exhaustive. To this M r. M da h as said in the e v e nt there d o es a p p e ar to be t wo o r d e r s; o ne c o n t a i n ed in the court's n o t es a nd a n o t h er in the courts r e a s o ns for j u d g m e n t. C o n c e r n i ng the latter, M r. M da h as submitted,that in court the court n e v er said it's r e a s o ns w o u ld follow as t h ey did a nd c o n s e q u e n t ly respondents w e re n ot s e r v ed w i th the order. T h is court finds M r. M d a 's a r g u m e nt peculiar in that his address to court reveals that he w as a w a re of the court's r e a s o ns - 2 3- for j u d g m e nt a nd it c a n, necessarily, be d e d u c ed f r om this that if he w as a w a re of the reasons for j u d g m e n t, it c an be safely inferred that his clients ( r e s p o n d e n t s) are a w a re of the courts r e a s o ns for j u d g m e n t. Authorities s e em to be agreed that if the failure to c o m p ly w as d ue to inability to do so, or f l o ws f r om a m i s t a ke as to w h at w as required of t h e m, or he b o na fide believed that he w as not required to c o m p ly with the court's order, then a c o m m i t t al for c o n t e m pt will n ot be granted - s ee B r i nk v. Brink. 9 C . T . R. 6: M c K i n n on v, M c K i n n o n. 19 C . T . R. 1 0 6: R e id v. R e i d, 1911 E. D. L. 1 5 7; T u r n er v. L l e w e l l yn a nd W i g g i n t o n. 22 S. C. l 5 3 : R o l l o - W i l ke v. M c M i l l a n. 1 9 28 W . L . D. 4 7. Snasball v. Snasball. 1 9 30 G . W . L. 1 9. A l s o, d e p e n d i ng on the c i r c u m s t a n c e s, a nd w h e t h er or not the court g r a n t ed c o m m i t t a l, the court h as either o r d e r ed costs or refrained f r om d o i ng so. B ut apparently to m a rk its displeasure for not c o m p l y i ng with an order of court the court h as granted costs. In C l e m e nt v. C l e m e n t. 1 9 61 ( 3 ) S . A. 8 61 in it w as held it w as possible that the appellant ( w ho refused to release a child despite the courts o r d e r ), m i g ht h a ve believed that in d o i ng so he w as acting in the best interests of the child. T h a t, - 2 4- therefore, his d i s o b e d i e n ce of the order of court h ad not b e en s h o wn to be m a la fide. It c an be said r e s p o n d e n ts b e l i e v ed t h ey w e re acting in the best interest of justice a nd Che party to p r o c e ed w i th the c o n f e r e n c e. C o n s o l i d a t ed F i sh Distribution (Pty) L td v. Zivic, 1 9 68 in S . A. 5 17 © highlights i m p o r t a nt a s p e c ts of c o n t e m p t. It divides c o n t e m pt into t wo classes, n a m e l y: " c o n s t r u c t i v e" a nd " d i r e c t " c o n t e m p t. It w as h e ld in this c a se that in limited class of cases referred to as constructive' c o n t e m pt applicant for c o m m i t t al of the r e s p o n d e nt for c o n t e m pt of court h as to allege a nd p r o ve m a la fides; that in the m o re usual c a se of a direct' c o n t e m p t, s u ch as a deliberate d i s o b e d i e n ce of an existing o r d er of court, all that n e ed to be p r o v ed is wilfulness m a la fides b e i ng inferred. T h is c a se falls u n d er direct c o n t e m pt requiring wilfulness to be p r o v e d. B ut t h en again a c c o r d i ng to Pollock (Jurisprudence a nd L e g al E s s a y s) m a l i ce is s y n o n y m o us w i th ' w r o ng m o t i v e' a nd it a p p e a rs a ny indirect m o t i ve o t h er t h an a s e n se of d u ty is w h at the l aw calls m a l i c e. R e s p o n d e n ts in w h at t h ey did w e re m o t i v a t ed by a sense of d u ty albeit the w r o ng w a y. It is also to be u n d e r s t o od that m a l i ce is d e e m ed to be t he equivalent of a n i m us injuriandi a nd c an n e v er m e an ill will or spite but the i m p r u d e nt a nd indiscreet m a n n er of acting. Jurists, t h o u g h, s e em a g r e ed that fraud is o p p o s ed to m a l i ce in its p o p u l ar s e n se in that o ne acts - 2 5- fraudulently w h en the m o t i ve of w r o n g d o i ng is to d e r i v e , s o me material gain or benefit for o n e s e lf w h a t e v er s c h e me is e m p l o y e d. B ut o ne acts maliciously w h en the m o t i ve is the pleasure of d o i ng h a rm to another rather than the acquisition of a ny material benefit for o n e s e lf T h us to steal p r o p e r ty is fraudulent but to d a m a ge it is malicious. R e s p o n d e n ts d id n ot p r o c e ed w i th the c o n f e r e n ce to its c o n c l u s i on for the sheer pleasure of it b ut to obtain an a d v a n t a ge for t h e m s e l v es a nd this c an h a r d ly be d e e m ed malicious. R e s p o n d e n ts h a ve also s h o wn that they w e re d e s i r o us of . o b e y i ng the o r d er in C I V / A P N / 1 / 97 b ut in the p r o c e ss m i s u n d e r s t o od or m i s c o n s t r u ed the o r d er of L e h o h l a, J.; further, as I h a ve already said, r e s p o n d e n ts p r o c e e d ed w i th c o n f e r e n ce to benefit t h e m s e l v e s. On the other h a n d, o ne really d o u b ts w h e t h e r, h ad L e h o h l a, J. h ad full benefits of the facts he w o u ld h a ve g r a n t ed the order. In the result the rule is d i s c h a r g ed b ut o n ly to the e x t e nd that the application to h a ve r e s p o n d e n ts c o m m i t t ed to prison for c o n t e m pt of L e h o h l a, J's o r d er d o es n ot s u c c e ed a nd r e s p o n d e n ts are f o u nd not guilty of c o n t e m pt or at all a nd are liberated. As the c o n f e r e n ce w as p r o c e e d ed w i th to its conclusion, the question of cancellation of the c o n f e r e n ce b e i ng n ow a c a d e m i c, to this e x t e nd the rule is also d i s c h a r g e d. - 2 6- I n ow c o me to the consideration w h e t h er in the light of r e s p o n d e n t s' h a n d l i ng of the c o n f e r e n ce it c an be said that c o n f e r e n ce p r o c e e d i n gs w e re regular or w h e t h e r, being irregular, the c o n f e r e n ce of 24 January, 1 9 97 s h o u ld be annulled a nd held invalid a nd S o w i ng f r om this the alternative o r d er of this court as c o n t a i n ed in C I V / A P N / 1 / 97 take effect. T he o u t g o i ng N a t i o n al E x e c u t i ve C o m m i t t ee a nd the r e s p o n d e n ts in this application h a ve in s o me areas n ot b e en h o n e st to t h e m s e l v es a nd in the c o u r se of this j u d g m e nt I h a ve referred to their t e n d e n cy to hit b e l ow the belt. W h en the M a r c h, 1 9 96 c o n f e r e n ce w as nullified a nd the holding of a fresh c o n f e r e n ce w as ordered, it w as certainly u n d e r s t o od (hat w i th but a f ew e x c e p t i o ns the c o n f e r e n ce w o u ld be a blue print a nd p h o t o c o py of the aborted c o n f e r e n c e. T he notable e x c e p t i o ns w e r e :- ( 1) T a u ng delegation. (2) W o m en a nd Y o u th delegation. ( 3) T he Elections C o m m i t t e e. T h is h ad to be for a m o n g st other things r e s p o n d e n ts a nd others h ad c o m p l a i n ed that a g e n da i t e ms w e re shelved a nd it w as desirable to deal w i th t h e m; - 2 7- i t e ms c o m p l a i n ed of c o u ld o n ly be t h o se c o n t a i n ed in the a g e n da of M a r c h, 1 9 96 a nd it is p u re m e n d a c i n ty to say n ew items c an f o rm part of the M a r c h, 1 9 96 a g e n d a. A p p l i c a n ts w e re s a y i ng in C I V / A P N / 8 4 / 96 w h en the D e p u ty L e a d er w as elected Provincial votes w e re set aside a nd w a n t ed these v o t es to be included. T he court h a v i ng a g r e ed w i th the applicants a s ks itself w h o, a nd by w h at authority did the M a r c h, 1 9 96 format c h a n g e? R e s p o n d e n ts are n ow saying the court o r d e r ed that the conference be run constitutionally. I a g r ee but it w as no authority to c h a n ge the M a r c h, - 1 9 96 c o n f e r e n ce f o r m at e x c e pt in instances I h a ve listed a b o v e. R e s p o n d e n ts effort is n o, m o re than pulling w o ol o v er the e y es of the court. R e s p o n d e n ts in the c o n d u ct of 24 J a n u a r y, 1 9 97 c o n f e r e n ce are guilty of g r o ss m a n i p u l a t i on of political craft a nd the entire p r o c e e d i ng is a s o r r o w f ul a nd pitiful catalogue of u n e n f o r c ed errors of j u d g m e n t. C o n s i d er not inviting n e c e s s a ry . participants to the c o n f e r e n ce including s o me m e m b e rs of the Credentials C o m m i t t ee of M a r c h, 1 9 9 6? G e n e r a l l y, the court believed that its j u d g m e nt in C I V / A P N / 8 4 / 96 w as understood - a nd r e s p o n d e n ts w o u ld n ot take a d v a n t a ge of it. As I h a ve said a g a in - 2 8- a nd again, short of c o n t e m pt of the court's order, it a p p e a rs that r e s p o n d e n ts are w o n 't to twist facts a nd act in a partisan m a n n er a nd s u ch as benefits t h em at the e x p e n se of their rivals. S u ch a state of affairs c a n n ot be tolerated by this court. T h is c o u rt is n ot s a y i ng that r e s p o n d e n ts are pervidious b ut certainly it d o es n ot b e h o ve t h em to h a ve acted as t h ey did. R e s p o n d e n ts h a ve n ot g o ne a b o ut the 24 J a n u a r y, 1 9 97 c o n f e r e n ce the right w a y, b ut t h ey h a ve s h o wn their willingness to a b i de the o r d er of court to h o ld c o n f e r e n ce t h o u g h, as I h a ve said; in a w r o ng a nd m i s g u i d ed w a y. T h is court h as g i v en serious t h o u g ht to the s u b m i s s i on that the courts alternative, o r d er in C I V / A P N / 1 / 97 c o me into p l ay in v i ew of r e s p o n d e n ts n ot h a v i ng a b i d ed by the court's o r d er a nd particularly as n e c e s s a ry preparations w e re n ot m a de to h o ld c o n f e r e n c e. I h a ve said this is n ot the right state of affairs in this r e g a rd a nd that the application w as in a ny event p r e m a t u r e. T he court h as also b e en u r g ed that the r e s p o n d e n ts c an no l o n g er be trusted a nd the alternative p r a y er operate. T h e se are s o u nd s u b m i s s i o ns w o r t hy of c o m m e n s u r a te attention by court. . N e v e r t h e l e s s, the court t a k es the L e a d er of the B a s u t o l a nd C o n g r e ss P a r ty as part a nd parcel of the N a t i o n al E x e c u t i ve C o m m i t t ee e v en s h o u ld s u ch a c o m m i t t ee be be a c a r e t a k er c o m m i t t ee a nd for the t i me b e i ng as r e s p o n d e n ts are. To a l l ow the - 2 9- l e a d er to act a l o ne w o u ld be to d i v o r ce h im f r om his constitutional leadership as e n s h r i n ed in the B . C . P. Constitution. T h is court- is n ot p r e p a r ed to arrogate to itself p o w e rs lying outside its p r o v i n ce a nd to cut the constitutional umbilical c o rd b e t w e en the leader of the B a s u t o l a nd C o n g r e ss P a r ty a nd its N a t i o n al E x e c u t i ve C o m m i t t ee e v en s h o u ld the latter be s u ch for the t i me b e i n g. S u ch a p r e c e d e nt in the s c h e me of things w o u ld be disastrous for constitutionality in this country. T he leader c an act or w o u ld act as s u g g e s t ed o n ly if the existing N a t i o n al E x e c u t i ve C o m m i t t ee for the t i me b e i ng is unwilling to p e r f o rm its functions a nd this court h as n ot f o u nd that it is u n w i l l i ng to p e r f o rm s u ch functions as are o r d e r ed by this court s a ve h a v i ng g o ne a b o ut t h em in the w r o ng w a y; m o r e o v e r, operation of the alternative p r a y er as p l e a d ed c an o n ly c o me into its o wn as a crisis option a nd in these p r o c e e d i n gs this court h as n ot b e e n. told that s u ch a crisis h as b e en r e a c h ed requiring drastic action as s u g g e s t ed by c o u n s el for the applicants. A c c o r d i n g l y, the c o n f e r e n ce of 24 January, 1 9 97 is h e r e by a n n u l l ed a nd h e ld invalid a nd the p r o c e e d i n gs of the said conference are set aside. It is further o r d e r ed that the o u t g o i ng N a t i o n al E x e c u t i ve C o m m i t t ee of the B a s u t o l a nd C o n g r e ss Party a nd r e s p o n d e n ts herein c o n v e ne a nd h o ld a fresh c o n f e r e n ce on 2 8 th d ay of - 3 0- February, 1 9 97 failing w h i ch the L e a d er of the B a s u t o l a nd C o n g r e ss Party to h o ld s u ch a c o n f e r e n ce on a date a nd t i me to be fixed by h im a nd in d o i ng so enlist on s u ch assistance as m ay be n e c e s s a ry to the c o n v e n i ng a nd holding of s u ch a conference. F or the benefit of the o u t g o i ng National Eexecutive C o m m i t t ee a nd r e s p o n d e n ts herein the f o l l o w i ng are the guidelines: 1. All delegates including the Provincial delegation as at M a r c h, 1 9 96 c o n f e r e n ce is to be invited; 2. T he a g e n da to be as it w as at M a r c h, 1 9 96 c o n f e r e n c e; 3. T h is court c o m m e n t ed adversely in C I V / A P N / 8 4 / 96 a b o ut the propriety of candidates to the National E x e c u t i ve C o m m i t t ee also serving on the Elections C o m m i t t ee a nd this is o ne of the r e a s o ns w hy the C o n f e r e n ce of M a r c h, 1 9 96 w as set aside. T he p r o c e d u re is n ot to be repeated a nd candidates to the N a t i o n al E x e c u t i ve C o m m i t t ee are not to serve on the Elections C o m m i t t ee a nd s u ch candidates as w e re elected to the Elections C o m m i t t ee are to be replaced. 4. T a u ng constituency is to be represented by 13 delegates. 5. W o m en a nd Y o u th L e a g ue is to be represented by 6 D e l e g a t es e a c h; 6. Invitation to delegates be in writing. 7. O b s e r v e rs to e n j oy the s a me status as at M a r c h, 1 9 96 c o n f e r e n ce - 3 1- As to costs, it is true that applicants a nd r e s p o n d e n ts h a ve partially s u c c e e d ed a nd failed m a k i ng it u n n e c e s s a ry to a w a rd costs. H o w e v e r, to s h ow its displeasure in the m a n n er the r e s p o n d e n ts h a ve g o ne a b o ut the c o n f e r e n ce of 24 J a n u a r y, 1 9 97 this court w as inclined to o r d er costs. B ut t h en the court is r e m i n d ed that costs are punitive. T he w ay these p r o c e e d i n gs w e re c o n d u c t ed a nd the v e ry serious repercussions f l o w i ng t h e r e f r om disincline the court to a w a rd costs a nd a c c o r d i n g ly there will be no o r d er as to costs. I c o me n ow to a m o st disturbing feature of these p r o c e e d i n g s. T h r o u g h o ut the p r o c e e d i n gs a c a c o p h o ny of intolerance a nd r o w d i n e ss a m o u n t i ng to invasion of the dignity of this court p e r v a d ed the court's a t m o s p h e r e. C o u n s el c o n t i n u o u s ly interfered w i th a nd interrupted the courts ruling ad infinitum a nd ad n a u s e a m. T h e re w e re t i m es w h en c o u n s el w o u ld n ot be called to o r d er a nd literally u s u r p ed the functions of the court.. T h is is to give notice that in future a ny counsel w ho d o es n ot h e ed the court's ruling or w a r n i ng or will n ot t a ke his seat w h en so o r d e r ed by the court will be severely p u n i s h e d. J U D GE 13th F e b r u a ry 1 9 9 6. F or the Applicants: M r. P h e ko F or the R e s p o n d e n t s: M e s s rs K h a u oe a nd M da