Pamela Mthunzi Zulu v Peter Zulu (Sr) and Ors (APPEAL NO. 218/2012; SCZ/8/342/2012) [2017] ZMSC 307 (1 March 2017)

• IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR ZAMBIA APPEAL NQ, 218/2012 HOLDEN AT LUSAKA SCZ/8/34212012 {Civil Jurisdiction) BETWEEN: PAMELA MTHUNZI ZULU APPELLANT AND PETER ZULU (SR) IDAH CHULU ZULU PETER ZULU (JR) 1 ST RESPONDENT 2ND RESPONDENT 3 • 0 RESPONDE NT CORAM: Mwanamwambwa D. C. J., Muyovwe and Kaoma, J. J. S., On 22nd July, 2015 and 1" March, 2017 For the Appellant: i'vfr. M. Chibiya, of Messrs. lusitu Chambers For the 1st Respondent: For the 2"d Respondent: For the 3rd Respondent: In person In person In person JUDGMENT Mwanamwambwa D. C. J., delivered the Judgment of the Court. Legislation Referred to: 1. The Intestate Succession Act, Chapter 59 of the Laws of Zambia 2. The Lands and Deeds Registry Act, Chapter 187 of the Laws of Zambia 3. The Wills and Administration of Testate Estates Act, Chapter 60 of the Laws of2ambla 4. The Births and Deaths Registration Act, Chapter 51 of the Laws of Zambia Cases Referred to: 1. Rosemary Chlbwe v Austine Chlbwe (2000) ZR 1 2 . Watchtel v Watchtel (1973) 1 ALL ER 113 3. Wesley Mulungushl v Catherine Bwale Mlzl Chomba (2004) ZR 96 SBII • - J2 - 4. Wilson Masauso Zulu v Avondale Housing Project Ltd (1982) ZR 172 5. Lfndlwe Kate Chlnyanta v Doreen Chiwele and Judith Tembo (2007) ZR 246 This appeal is from a Judgment of the High Court, in which the learned trial Judge revoked the appointment of the appellant as co-administratrix for the estate of the late Peter Paul Zulu. Brief facts a re that the late Peter Paul Zulu, died intestate in a road traffic accident on 16' h December 2004. The deceased was survived by a wife, who is the appellant in this appeal He married her on 28'h December 2002, at Lusaka Civic Centre. He had one child with her, called Monase Zulu. The l •• respondent is the father to the deceased. The 2 nd respondent is the mother. And the 3 rd respondent is the brother. Evidence was led by the respondents in the court below, that the deceased also had a relationship with another w01nan by the name of Claudina Sakala. That relationship resulted in the birth of a child called Belita Zulu , who was also being referred to as Bertha Zulu in the Court below. The respondents testified that the deceased left Claudina Sakala pregnant at the time h e died. Betita Zulu was born on 15,h May 2005, five n1onths after he had died . In SBII • . )3. terms of property, the deceased left house No. 10375, Nyu1nba Yanga, Lusaka. It was registered in his name. There is a letter on record which was purportedly writte n by the deceased to his mother, giving her th e said house. The appelJant a nd the 3 rd respondent were appointed by the Local Court as co-administratrix and co-administrator, respectively, on 21" December 2004. A dispute arose between the appellant and the respondents, over the administration of the estate. The appellant filed an Originating Summons against the 3,d respondent, seeking an order from the Court that House No. 10375, Nyumba Yanga, Lusaka, was property of the late Peter Paul Zulu and that the house should devolve upon her as the surviving spouse, and Monase Zulu, as the deceased 's only child. She wanted the house sold so that the proceeds could be used to purchase another house for Monase Zulu or in the alternative, that ownership of the house be transferred to Monase Zulu to be held in trust for her by the appellant. On the other hand , the respondents wanted the appellant removed as co-ad1ninistratri..'X of her late husband's estate on grounds that she had mismanaged the estate. They made an application for SBII • • - 14 - an order for the appellant to render an account of the money she had collected in her capacity as co-administratrix. Before the matter could be heard, on 271h May 2008, the appellant applied for the proceedings to be continued as if the matter was conunenced by Writ of Summons. The lower court granted the application and ordered that the appellant's action be prosecu ted as a counterclaim to the respondents' claims. Thereafter, a trial was conducted at which the parties adduced evidence to support their respective cases. On 201h September 2012, the learned trial Judge rendered his judg1nent on the matter. He addressed his mjnd to the issue of whether house No. 10375, Nyumba Yanga was family property or matrimonial property of the deceased and the appellant as his surviving spouse. He reviewed the evidence and found that at the time the deceased bought the house in dispute, the appellant was not yet married to him and she never even lived in that h ouse . He took the view that the deceased bought the house for the bene fit of his family SBII - )5 - members. And as such, the learned tria l Judge found that the house belonged to the deceased's parents and siblings. The learned trial Judge used Section 3 of the Intestate Succession Act and the cases of Rosemary Chibwe v Austine Chibwe111 and Watchtel v Watchtel121 , to determine what constitutes family property. He was of the opinion that property acquired before mru·nage could only become matrimonial property if the party who buys it makes it clear and known to the spouse that such property was intended to be matrimonial p roperty. He observed that in this case, the appellant had admitted that she never knew ru1ything about the said house and that her late husband never told her about it. The learned trial Judge found that house No. 10375, Nyumba Yanga, Lusaka was not matrimonial property but that it was lhe property of respondents' fruni ly, to which the Intestate Succession Act did not apply. He was of the view that the house did not form part of the estate of the deceased. I-le ordered that it should vest in the deceased 's n1other, in accordance with h is wish as expressed in a letter that was produced in court. SBII - )6 - The learned trial Judge went on to consider the issue of whether the appellant had properly executed her duties as co administratrix in accordance with the law. He found that the appellant squandered the estate of her husband and it had suffered massive waste at h er hands as co-administratrix. He observed that the appellant had admitted the various allegations which the respondents made against her but she offered flimsy explanations to justify her conduct. He found as a fact that the appellant largely kept the deceased's family out of the administration of the estate and that she had displayed extreme selfishness, greed and lack of accountability. He stated that the evidence on record proved that the appellant was guilty of property grabbing and looting with no accountability of any kind to anyone. He formed the view that the appellant committed offences for which she could be investigated, prosecuted and punished under the Intestate Succession Act. He came to the conclusion that that the appellant's conduct was contrary to the Jaw. SBII -17 - For this reason, he revoked the a ppellant's appointment as co-administratrix and ordered her to provide an inven tory and to rende r an account of all the money she h ad collected, to the exclusion of her co-adminis trator . The learned trial Judge ordered that the 3 rd respondent should continue as sole a dministrator for the remaining portion of the estate. He further ordered that adequate and equal provisions should be made in the estate to provide for the deceased's biological children, Monase Zulu and Betita Zulu and that the remainder of the estate be strictly administered in accordance with the provisions of the Intestate Succession Act. He held that since the appellant squandered a substantial portion of th e state, she would be at the 1nercy of the sole adminjstrator of the estate only if and when she had rendered a satisfactory accoun t of how s h e used the money, documents and properties that she single handedly collected and used. He upheld the respondents' claims and dismissed the appellant's counterclaim. Dissatisfied with the judgment of the lower court, the a ppellant appealed to this Court advancing four grounds of appeal. These read as follows: - SBII - )8 - 1. That the learned High Court Judge erred both in fact and law when he held that house 10375, Nyumba Yanga should vest in ldah Chulu Zulu and that It does not form part of the estate of the late Peter Paul Zulu; 2. That the learned High Court Judge erred In both law and fact when he held that the appellant had squandered monies In the estate of her late husband late Peter Paul Zulu; 3. That the learned High Court Judge erred both In law and fact when he revoked the letters of administration held by the appellant In the estate of the late husband Peter Paul Zulu; 4 . That the leamed High Court Judge erred In fact when he ordered that Bellta Zulu was Peter Paul Zulu's child. Based on these grounds of appeal, the parties filed written heads of arguinent which they reljed on at the hearing of this appeal. For convenience's sake, we will start by addressing ground one and then will move to ground four. Thereafter, we shall deal with grounds two and three together because they are interrelated . Jn fact, counsel for the appellant argued lhe two grounds together. Submitting on behalf of the appellant on ground one, Mr. Chibiya argued that the fact that the deceased bought house No. 10375, Nyuinba Yanga and it was registered in his nan1e at the time of his death, automatically made it part of his estate. He contended thal there wai; no valid legal document which SBII . )9 - had transferred the property to someone else. He referred us to Section 9 of the Intestate Succe ssion Act, which provides that where the estate includes a house, the surviving spouse or child or both, shall be entitled to that house. He argued that there is no requirement that the family should have lived in the said house for the surviving spouse or child to be entitled to it. Counsel submitted that the letter which the trial Judge said expressed the deceased's wish to give the house to his mother did not satisfy the requirements under the Statute of Frauds because it did not nru11e the person it was addressed to or the full names of the author. He relied on the case of Wesley Mulungushi v Catherine Bwale Mizi Chomba131 for this submission. He argued that the said letter was not a legally binding document; th at it was void and unenforceable because it was not registered as required by Section 4 of the Lands and Deeds Registry Act. He contended that the said letter does not qualify to be a '\¥ill' because it does not meet the requirements stipulated in Section 6 of the Wills and Administration of Testate Estates Act. SBII -)10- He submitted that there was no proof that the l $l and 2 nd respondents gave money to the deceased as top up towards the purchase of the house in issue. He stated that there was no evidence that the house belonged to the respondents' family as a whole. He pointed out that the fact that the deceased was helping his family 1nembers once in a while after receiving some rentals from the house, d id not qualify the house to be fami ly property. He further argued that the case of Rosemary Chibwe v Austine Chibwe111 and that of Watchtel v Watchte1121 , which the trial Judge used in arriving at his decision, arc authorities in divorce matters. They do not apply to a case such as this, where a person dies intestate. He submitted that in the cases of death, property forms part of the estate for as long as the property belongs to the deceased. He drew our attention to the definition of "estate" under Section 3 of the Intestate Succession Act where it is defined as "all the assets and liabilit.ies of the deceased including those accruing to him by virtue of death or after his death and for the purposes of administration of the estate, including personal chattels". SBII - 111 - The respondents opposed ground one of this appeal. They jointly submitted that the appellant was not married to the deceased at the time the fami ly bought the house and that she did not know anything about it. The appellaJ1ts stated that the family registered the house in the name of the deceased, because he was the oldest son to the 1 st and 2nd respondents and he substantially contributed towards the purchase of the house through the loan he obtained from the Public Service Pension Board. It was their sub111ission that the house belonged to the respondents' fan1ily as a whole and it was not part of the estate. The respondents stressed that the appellant did not contribute anything towards the purchase of the house and that the appellant and her late husband never even lived in the said house. They pointed out that it was not their claim that the letter which was written by the deceased to his mother was a \1/ill. The real issue as we see it in ground one of this appeal is whether house No. 10375, Nyumba Yanga, Lusaka, formed part of the estate of the late Paul Peter Zulu and whether the appellant is entitled to it under Section 9 of the Intestate SBII - )12 - Succession Act or it is family property for the respondents anc;I the provisions of the Intestate Succession Act do not apply to it. It is abundantly clear that the appellant's claim to the house in dispute is anchored on S ection 9 of the Intestate Succession Act, which provides that where an estate includes a house the surviving spouse or child or both, shall be entitled to that house. Jn deciding whether the appellant was entitled to the house, the learned trial Judge used the case of Rosemary Chibwe v Austine Chibwe111 and the case of Watchtel v Watchtel121 to define what constitutes family property. As rightly observed by Mr. Chibiya, the ~vo cases are leading authorities on what constitutes matrimonial property in divorce matters. We agree with him that it was wrong in principle for the learned trial Judge to have used the two cases in deciding this 1natter because the issue that was before him was not whether the house in dispute was matrimonial property. The issue was whether the house formed part of the estate and the appellant was entitled to it under Section 9 of the Intestate Succession Act . A perusal of Section 9 of the Inte state SBII - 113- Succession Act will reveal that a house which a surviving spouse or child is entitled to under that provision, does not necessarily need to be matrimonial property as defined by the two cases. It can be any house provided it fonns part of the deceased's estate where the estate includes a h ou se. Such a house can be, but it ought not to be, matrimonial property . However, if a house happens to be fan1ily p roperty, then the Intestate Succession Act cannot apply to it and the u ltimate result is that it would not form part of an intestate estate and a surviving spouse or child would not be entitled to it. We say this because Section 2(2)(c) o f the Intestate Succession Act expressly provides that the Intestate Succession Act does not apply to fami ly property. It does n ot matter whether such family property is registered in the name o f the deceased, as happe ned in this case. We cannot, therefore, accept Mr. Chibiya's argument that simply because the house in dispute was registered in the deceased's name at the time of his death, then it automatically formed part of his estate and th e surviving spouse is entitled to it. SBII • - )14 - The respondents' claim in this case is that house No. 10375, Nyumba Yanga, Lusaka is their family property and the Intestate Succession Act does not apply to i t; and the appellant is not entitled to it. Family property is defined by Section 3 of the Intestate Succession Act as: "'family property' means any property, whether movable or immovable, which belongs to the members collectively of a particular family or Is held for the benefit of such members and any receipts or proceeds from such property." It does not matter in whose name the property is registered, provided property falls within this d efinition of family property as defined by Section 3 of the Intestate Succession Act, a surviving spouse or child cannot be entitled to it. Family property can be registered in the names of any member of the family as it is impracticable for each and every men1ber of the fam.ily to be registered as joint owner. The question of whether a particular property is family property, is usually a question of mixed law and fact which has to be decided by the court based on tl1e evidence before it. In tl1is case, there is evidence on record that the late Paul Peter Zulu bought the house in dispute for the benefit of his family. The respondents testified that they agreed as a family , SBII - 115 - to the deceased's decision to obtain a loan to buy a family house in order to supplement his father's pension who had just retired as a police officer. That the deceased bought the house in dispute on 10th Decen1ber 2002, using the money he got fron1 the loan he obtained from his employers, the Public Service Pensions Fund , as well as from his father's pension. That the deceased had a shortfall of KS million which his parents topped up. That he allowed his father and his brother to occupy it immediately after he bought the house. The h ouse was later leased out to the Drug Enforcement Commission and the rentals were being used to educate the deceased's siblings. The respondents testified that the deceased married the appellant on 28•h December, 2002, after he had already bought the house. It was U1eir evidence that the deceased h ad opted to live in a rented h ouse in Kamwala with his wife so that the house he bought could continue assisting his family. On the other hand, the appellant's evidence was that her late husband never told her anything a bout the house . She conceded that her late husband bought the house before he married h er and that she was not aware that the respondents SBII - 116 - had a family meeting before the deceased bought the house. The learned trial Judge who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses, accep ted the respondents' evidence and found as a fact that the house in d ispute is family property. In Wilson Masauso Zulu v Avondale Housing Project Ltd141 we held that: "Before this court can reverse findings of fact made by a trial Judge, we would have to be satisfied that the findings In question were either perverse or made In the absence of any relevant evidence or upon a misapprehension of the facts or that they were findings which, on a proper view of the evidence, no trlal court acting correctly could reasonably make." As we have already shown, there is s u fficient evidence on record to support the learned trial Judge's finding that house No. 10375, Nyurnba Yanga, Lusaka is family property. \Ve are satisfied, from the evidence, that the house falls within the definition of family property as defined by Section 3 of the Intestate Succession Act and the Intestate Succession Act does not apply to the house. It follows, therefore, that the said house does not form part of the estate of the late Peter Paul Zulu and Lhe appellant is not entitled to it. Although counsel for the appellant advanced arguments concerning the letter which the appellant purportedly wrote to SBII - 11 7 - his mother, we see no dispute a bout it because the respondents in their submissions conceded th at the letter is not a Will. As such, the letter has no force of law. A Will must meet the requirements of Section 6 of the Wills and Administration of Testate Estates Act to qualify to be a Will. V-Je take the view that the said Jetter served no useful purpose other than to buttress the respondents' evidence that the deceased bought the house in dispute for the benefit of his parents and siblings. There bein g no dispute about its legal effect, we shall say no more. The net result is that ground one lacks merit. We accordingly dismiss it. \11/e shall move to ground four. In support of the fourth ground of a ppeal, Mr. Chibiya subn1itted that the 3 rd respondent swore an affidavit on 11 th January, 2006, in which he h ad indicated that Monase ZuJu was the deceased's only daughter. Counsel pointed out that the fiJ·st n1ention of another ch ild only came up in an affidavit of August, 2006. He argued that the evidence of Claudina Saka.la that the deceased was taken to court for impregnating her was unreliable in that there was no evidence to prove that indeed SBII - 118 - there were proceedings in the Local Court concerning the matter. He pointed out that the Birth Certificate of Belita Zulu indicates that the deceased is the father of the child. In this regard, he drew our attention to Section 15 of the Births and Deaths Registration Act which provides that "no person shall be bound as a father to give notice of the birth of an illegitimate child, and no person shall be registered as the father of such child except on the joint request of the mother and himself and upon his acknowledgement in writing to be the father of the child." He submitted that in this case there was no evidence on record to show that the deceased acknowledged in writing to be the father of Belita Zulu. It was counsel's contention that the court below misdirected itself to have found that Belita Zulu was the deceased's child, who should rank as a beneficiary under Section 5 of the Intestate Succession Act. He quoted from P. M. Bromley's book on Family Law without giving a full citation, saying: " ... entry of a man's name as that of the father on the registration of a child's birth will be prima. facie evidence of paternity; if the child is illegitimate, however, this can be done SBII -119- only with his consent unless an affiliation order has been made against him." He submitted that an application should have been made under the Affiliation and Maintenance of Children Act in the Subordinate Court but this was not done in this case. He stated that since there were no affiliation proceedings taken in this matter, the arguments by the respondents that the child was the deceased's child, were not justified and not supported in law, as to proof of paternity. The respondents countered ground four of this appeal. The gist of their submissions was that there was evidence to support the finding by the trial Judge that the deceased had another daughter called Belita Zulu. They stated that Claudina Sakala, the mother of that child, had testified in the court below how she met the deceased and became pregnant. The respondents pointed out that Claudina Sakata had produced the child's Birth Certificate to prove that the deceased had another child. They stated that as parents to the deceased, the 1s1 and 2 11d respondents knew about the pregnancy and they accepted the baby. The respondents stated that the matter was even taken to the Local Court where it was resolved. They SBII -)20- contended that Belita Zulu was born after the deceased had died and he could not have possibly s igned any documents relating to the ch ild . They submitted that the appellant denied the child because of greed. The question that lies at the centre of ground four, in our view, is whether the late Paul Peter Zulu was the father of Belita Zulu. As rightly pointed by Mr. Chibiya, Section 15 of the Births and Deaths Registration Act stipulates that no person should be registered as a father of an illegitimate child except on the joint request of the mother and himself and upon his acknowledgement in writing to be the father of the child. However, we are of the consid ered view that on the facts of this case, it would be unreasonable to insist on the strict application of Section 15 of the Births and Deaths Registration Act to this matter. The late Paul Peter Zulu died in a road traffic accident five months before Belita Zulu was born. It ,vas, therefore, practically impossible for h i1n to acknowledge, in writing, that he was the father of Betita Zulu . The mother to the child, Claudina Sakala, appeared before the court below and testified how she knew the late Paul Peter SBII -122 - never had any other child other than Monase Zulu . Based on the facts in this case, the appellant could not have known the existence of the child when her husband was alive since her late husband died before the child was born. We have not found any basis on which to overturn the learned trial Judge's decision. Ground four of this appeal has n o merit. Accordingly, we dismiss it. \1/e shall now a ddress grounds two and three. In support of grounds two and three, which h e argued together, learned counsel for the appellant referred us to Section 15 of the Intestate Succession Act , which provides that where the deceased has died intestate, the Court may, on application of any interested person, grant letters of a dministration of the estate to th at interested person. He pointed out that Paragraph (b) of Section 15 of the Intestate Succession Act stipulates that the court s h all take into account greater and immediate interests in the deceased's estate in priority to lesser or remote interests. His submission was that maintain ing the appellant as co-administratrix would SBII • - }23 - ensure that her interest as surviving spouse and the interest of their only child is taken into consideration. Regarding the learned trial Judge's finding that the appellant never accepted Belita Zulu as the deceased's child, Mr. Chibiya sub1nitted that this issue remains in dispute and the appellant does not believe that the child exists and if it does, the appellant does not believe that she is the child of the deceased. He therefore argued that money could not be extended to the child. \1/hen it came to the allegations that the appellant had ex-communicated her co-administrator, counsel pointed out that the 3 rd respondent had ad1nitted in his affidavit evidence that he was unavailable most of the tin1e. He sub1nitted that rentals could not be shared because the appellant believed that it was only her and her child who were entitled and there was no other child. He stated that the appellant believed that she was entitled to the money she had used. The respondents opposed grounds two and three of this appeal. They argued that there was evidence on record that the SBII • - 124 - appellant collected money from the estate of the late Peter Paul Zulu , without the knowledge and consent of the co administrator and that she did not distribute the money to the beneficiaries. The gist of their s u bmissions was that the appellant breached the provisions of the Intestate Succession Act. The respondents s u pported the decision of the learned trial Judge to revoke the appointment of the appellant as co administratrix and argued that the appellant did not rebut the evidence that she squandered the estate of the late Paul Peter Zulu. They submitted that the appellant had failed to account for the money that she had collected. It is clear to us that in grounds t\"10 a nd three, the appellant is challenging the learned trial Judge's decision to revoke the appointment of the appellant as co-administratrix, on the basis that she squandered the money from her late husband's estate and the estate had suffered rnassive waste at her hands. The issue therefore, is whether sufficient gr ou nds existed on which the learned trial Judge found that the appellant mismanaged the estate and revoked her appointment. SBII • - 125 - In a case such as this one, where there are two administrators appointed to manage an estate, it is in the interest of justice that those co-ad1ninistrator s should co operate and exercise their powers unanimously, unless the letters of administration provide otherwise. Where there are several adn1inistrators, their powers s hould be exercised by the majority of them. This is in line with Section 20 of the Intestate Succession Act, which provides that: - "Where there are several administrators, their powers may, in the absence of any direction to the contrary contained in the letters of administration, be exercised by the majority of them." When it comes to the relationship between the appellant and the 3 rd respondent, it is clear that there was no cooperation and unanimity as co-administrators. There is evidence that the appellant ex-cominunicated the 3rd respondent. She single handedly went to various institutions and collected 1noney belonging to the estate, for her own use, without his knowledge and a u thority. She single handedly: (a) collected arrears of rent from the Drug Enforcement Commission for the house which was on rent; (b)collected the deceased's social security cont1ibutions from National Provident Fund; SBII • : -126 - (c) collected money from Standard Chartered Bank where the deceased used to receive his salary; (d)collected money from the deceased's account at Madison Life Insurance; (e) collected money to the deceased's credit at National Pension Service Scheme (NAPSA); (f) collected money from Zambia Education Publishing House where the deceased was once working; (g) removed the tenants from the house and put up a poster which indicated that it was available for e ither sale or rent. That she then attempted to obtain authority from the co-adn1inistrator to execute a Deed of Assent, which would have vested the house in her and when he r efused, she sued. All these allegations were not denied by the appellant. She in fact admitted the1n in h er evidence and claimed that she used the money for her upkeep and that of the child since she was not working. Sadly, she neve r distributed a n y of the money she had collected, as required by the law. An adm inistrator or administratrix has a duty under Section SBII • -127 - 19(l)(b) of the Intestate Succession Act to effect distribution of an estate in accordance with the rights of the persons interested in the estate under the Intestate Succession Act. Failure to do so is a breach of the law. And the cou rt is entitled to intervene, by calljng upon an admin istrator to render an account for the administration of an estate or, to revoke his or her appointment. Trus is what we said in Lindiwe Kate Chinyanta v Doreen Chiwele and Judith Tembo151 , where we held that: ~An Administrator has legal duties to the beneficiaries and other Interested parties Including creditors; an Administrator may be called upon by a court to account for the administration of the estate or for default. There are many cases where Administrators have been found liable for conduct In breach of the law. Even en Administrator who Is a surviving spouse can also be required to account for the distribution of the estate by any Interested person ... We wish to make it clear that courts will Intervene In matters of administration of deceased's estates where there Is sufficient evidence of breach of provisions of the law ... courts would Intervene where sufficient reasons exist and would remove an Administrator, nullify or revoke a grant under the Intestate Succession Act.. ."" We have no doubt that the appellant breached the law when she singlehandedly, collected money without the authority of the co-administrator and used it without distributing some of it to all those who were entitled under the law. We agree with the learned trial Judge that the appellant displayed extreme selfishness. Everything was just centred around her and her child, Monase Zulu. She consistently refused to accept Belita Zulu as the deceased's child, even at SBII . ' - )28 - the time we heard this appeal, because she did not want to share the money with this child. We are satisfied that sufficient reasons existed upon which the learned trial Judge intervened and revoked the appointment of the appellant as co administratrix and ordered her to provide an inventory and to render an account of all the 1noney she had collected to the exclusion of her co-administrator. ll is our considered view that grounds t:\vo and three have no merit. We hereby dismiss them. Since all the four grounds of appeal in this appeal have failed, this appeal stands dismissed for lack of merit. We hereby uphold the decision of the learned trial Judge in this matter. We shall, in the circumstances, order the parties to bear their respective costs . .. ........ ......... .. .. .. ......... .. E. N. C. MUYOVWE SUPREME COURT JUDGE SBII