Paul Etemesi & 11 others (suing of their own behalf and on behalf of the members of the Local Congregation of Buruburu Community Centre Church of God in East Africa (Kenya) v Executive Council Church of God in East Africa (Kenya), Byrum Makokha & Church Commission [2016] KEHC 228 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

CIVIL DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO.  1506 OF 2000

PAUL ETEMESI

SEPHANIA AKHONYA

JAMES MABINDA

ZAEBEDEE OSABWA

RODA ATANA

AURTHUR MUMANYI

MOSES NDENGU

DAVID ONG’ANYI

DANIEL AMOUNDO

JOSECK AWANI

MILKA MALENYA

BEN MUMANYI

(SUING OF THEIR OWN BEHALF AND ON BEHALF

OF THE MEMBERS   OF THE LOCALCONGREGATION

OF BURUBURU COMMUNITYCENTRE CHURCH OF GOD

IN EAST AFRICA (KENYA).................................PLAINTIFFS

VERSUS

1.  THE EXECUTIVE   COUNCIL CHURCH

OF GOD IN EAST AFRICA (KENYA)

2.  THE RT REV.  DR BYRUM MAKOKHA

3. THE CHURCH COMMISSION...................DEFENDANTS

RULING

1. This  matter  was  heard  by Honourable  Onyancha  J ( as he then  was)  on 4th May 2015 who set   the  date  for  ruling on  18th June  2015.  However, the Honourable  Judge( now retired)  was  transferred  to Kabarnet High Court  and  while  this matter   was pending  writing  of the ruling,  there   was also pending   in the High Court a suit wherein the learned Judge was challenging   his retirement   at the  age of  70  years.

2. During the hearing   of the said suit, the learned judge had been advised by the Office of the Chief Justice not to hear    any matters.  Accordingly, this matter remained in abeyance until the learned Judge formally retired is when the file among other files, were availed to the presiding Judge for distribution among Judges of the Civil Division   to conclude the Judicial process.

3. Regrettably, as soon as I received  this file  for writing   of a ruling in an  application that  I did not  have the opportunity   to hear or see the parties’  advocates  as they canvassed its merits   and  demerits, I  was  deployed to the Judicial Review  Division  of the  High Court.  I needed time to peruse and appreciate the material in the file hence the delay in delivering this ruling, coupled with the urgent voluminous work that has to be handled in the Judicial Review Division.

4. I have  unreservedly  tendered  my apologies  to the parties  on behalf of the court as  a whole as no one individual  is  responsible   for this delay, which   was not foreseen.

5. Back to the matter for determination is the notice of motion dated   23rd October 2014   seeking that :

1. Land Reference   No.  Nairobi/Block 79/820 (suit property) is delivered   to the defendants and any   person bound   by the decree who refuses   to vacate the land be forcefully evicted there from.

2. Geomatics Services Ltd, a licensed  surveyor  be ordered  to carry out  survey  work  and  establish   the boundaries  and/or  beacons   defining  property  to  wit, LR  Nairobi/Block  79/820 ( Church  of God  in East  Africa (K)  Registered  Trustees) and confirm  that the  same exists  and are in place as indicated  on the original  survey  plan for the area.

3. The   commanding officer, Buruburu Police Station does supervise and provide ample security for the two exercises.

4. Costs of the application are provided for.

6. The application   is predicated on the affidavit   sworn by Reverend Patrick Musungu Maina and the grounds that:

a. The court  has decreed  that  the defendants   are the rightful owners  of property, to wit, LR  Nairobi/Block   79/820 Church  of God  in East  Africa (K)  Registered  Trustees)

b. The defendants/applicants   are not in possession of the suit land.

c. The plaintiffs/respondents have refused to give vacant   possession.

d. The defendants/applicants are being   denied   the fruits of this judgment.

e. The   defendants/applicants are   unable   to use or   develop their property.

7. In the supporting affidavit sworn  by Reverend  Patrick Musungu Maina,  he deposes  that on 26th May  2014 the court dismissed  the plaintiff’s  suit for want of prosecution in essence  handing  back ownership  and control of  LR Nairobi/ Block 79/820  to the defendants.

8. That since that dismissal order as  per the  annexed  decree, the  defendants  have not  been able  to take possession and control  of their property  because the   plaintiffs/respondents and their agents are in occupation; that efforts by the respondents/applicants  to  take possession of the property  have  been thwarted  and  frustrated  by the plaintiff/respondents  or their agents  and  the police  are unwilling  to  assist  in their absence  of a court  order  in that behalf.

9. That the plaintiffs/respondents have  refused  to give vacant   possession of the land there by denying the defendant/applicants herein  lawful enjoyment of  their property, which  they lawfully  own,  as shown  by copies of certificate  of lease   and search certificate.

10. The  application  was opposed by the plaintiffs/respondents   who filed  a  replying   affidavit   sworn by Robert  Oyando   Omenya    on  10th November, 2014  deposing that  he   was  he Chairman  of the Centre Council BuruBuru Community Church of God, Nairobi.

11. According  to the plaintiffs/respondents, the defendant’s application is an abuse   of the court process  since the matter  is Resjudicata,  given  that parties  entered  and recorded  a consent   way back in 2000 after deliberations and  that the  said consent   was adopted  and  extracted  as a final  order of the court as shown  by  an  annexed  copy  recorded  before Honourable  Justice   Mr Visram, then Commissioner of Assize   on  1st December  2000, settling the suit.  That after  recording  the above  consent,  parties disagreed  and they returned  to court for terms of  implementing  the said   consent, which application was heard  and determined  by Honourable  Kasanga  Mulwa  J ( as he then was ), culminating  into the ruling   delivered  on 11th November  2004   annexed  to the affidavit  in reply.

12. That in view of the settlement  of the matter, parties  who are  aggrieved   can only  apply for  setting  aside of the consent  and not to seek to  relegate the matter  which is  in essence   seeking   this court  to sit   on its  own appeal.

13. That the purported decree dismissing   the suit for want of prosecution is a nullity.

14. That the defendants   have deliberately  misinterpreted   the said decree   to mean   that they  are the true   owners  of the  land  on which the church sits,  despite   the fact that   the ownership  and   title  thereof    was never  in dispute  in the instant  proceedings.

15. That such   a decree has no legal standing   or at all, the suit having been conclusively settled between the parties.

16. The defendant/applicant filed a further affidavit on 19th November   2015  sworn by Patrick  Musungu  Maina  on 17th  November  2014  contending that the  deponent  of the  replying  affidavit    had no capacity  to  swear  that affidavit  as  he   was not  a party to the suit.

17. The defendant/applicant maintained  that as  far as  they know, this  suit came  to conclusion  on  26th May  2014   when this suit was dismissed  for want  of  prosecution.

18. Further, that  the consent   of  1st December   2000  did not  close this matter  as the parties   continued   litigating  the matter  as shown  by copy of ruling   made on 2nd  January  2005  by Honourable   P. Kihara  Kariuki J  ( as he then   was ).

19. The defendants/ applicants denied   that they misled the court into issuing the decree dismissing   the matter for want of prosecution.

20. Further, that  even if  the suit  was  settled   in 2000, nothing  prevents   the  applicants from using     their property   since the  respondents   have not   exhibited  anything    to show that   they are the  registered   owners  of the suit property and  that they  have not   claimed  ownership  of the  suit  property hence they  should  not prevent   the defendants  from taking   possession of their  property.

21. Parties filed   written submissions to dispose   of the application. The defendants/applicants  filed   their submissions  dated  2nd February   2015 on 3rd  February  2015  whereas the  plaintiff’s/respondents filed  their submissions  on 19th March  2015.  It is   dated 11th February 2015.

22. The parties  advocates appeared   before Honourable  Onyancha  J  on  4th May 2015  for highlighting   of  their submissions  but  as explained  above, the learned Judge left  the station and  the bench  before  writing   this ruling.

23. The parties’ advocates   agreed that this court proceeds to write and deliver the ruling.  I have therefore   invoked the provisions of Order 18 Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Rules   which allows another Judge to continue with the case or application previously heard or evidence taken by another judge.

24. In their  written  submissions  as highlighted   by counsel, the  defendants/applicant’s  counsel submitted   that the  orders  made  or  issued  on  1st December  2000  were a temporary  injunction.  Further, that the original injunctive orders were for the opening   of gates    to the Church   on the suit   premises and not to interfere with the plaintiff’s worship and use of the Church.

25. Further, that the defendant’s guards were also removed.  In addition, it  was  submitted  that the said injunctive  orders   were   obeyed since  2000 until the suit  was dismissed for  want of  prosecution on 26th May 2014, after  which the defendants   went back  to repossess  their suit property  measuring  4. 722  acres  but that the  plaintiffs  resisted,   as shown  by the letter  dated  22nd  October  2014  from the  plaintiff’s  advocates   to the defendants warning  the latter  not to  try  and  interfere    with the land, while  also  claiming  that they  have a tenant   on the land who should not be disturbed  by the defendants.

26. Counsel for   the defendant/applicant  further  submitted  that the land in issue    was at all material times  registered  in the name of the defendant   from  1977  and that  albeit  the plaintiffs   were aware that the  suit had been  dismissed, they still referred  to injunctive orders originally  obtained  by them  and   threatening  the  defendants   not to interfere  with them.

27. That the  plaintiffs  had never  taken  any steps  to reinstate  the suit or   to file an  appeal  and  that  they were   instead   arguing    that the injunctive orders comprised  the whole dispute  and the defendant’s  rights   on the land which  was  not the case; since  injunctive   orders  only held  during  the  existence of the suit.

28. The defendant’s  counsel further  submitted  that the suit   is the one that  would  settle  the dispute  and that since the hearing  of the suit   never took place, the dismissal  of the suit  for want   of prosecution  vacated all the interlocutory  orders of injunction.

29. The defendant’s counsel  also submitted  that even  after being  served with  an application for dismissal of the suit for  want  of prosecution, the  plaintiff’s  never defended  that application.

30. That the  plaintiffs  have never  claimed   ownership  of the suit  and on which  the Church stands  but that they only claim for  rights  as  members  of the Church  to use the  Church  for worship.

31. It  was  further submitted  that the  court has  jurisdiction  to determine  land  rights  and all that  pertains  to the  use of  the land.  Reliance was placed  on Section 34  of the Civil  Procedure Act   which gives this court  jurisdiction  by providing   that even  after  a decree   has been   passed  and  questions  arise   between the parties  relating  to  execution, the court   that passed  the decree   can determine   any matter  arising   without  the necessity of filing  a separate  suit.  Further, those proceedings in the suit   will enable the court to settle the effects (sic) of the dismissal of this suit.

32. Further reliance    was placed  on Sections  1A and  1B  of the Civil Procedure  Act which  allows the court to grant   the orders of  eviction because it arises directly  as a result  of the dismissal  of the suit   and the rights the   plaintiffs  had sought.

33. In response, the   plaintiffs/respondent’s  counsels   submitted opposing the application to the effect that both parties to this  suit are   worshippers of the same Church and that the  suit herein   was compromised by the consent of  1st December  2000 hence  this court   cannot  relitigate  matters  which are   settled  by mutual agreement.

34. Further, that  from the record, the  consent    entered into on 1st December  2000  is a judgment   which cannot  be set  aside other than  in the manner  provided for  setting aside  a  contract, where there  is fraud or mistake  as was  held din  Flora  Wasike  Vs  Jestimo Wamboko [1982-1988] 1 KLR  625  CA.

35. Counsel relied on Hiram  Vs Kassam [1952] 19 EACA 131 per Hancox JA, as  cited with approval  in Mrs  Charity  Kamana V East Africa  Building Society [2004] e KLRthat an order   made in the presence and  with the consent  of counsel  is binding   on all parties    to the proceedings   or action and  on those claiming  under them…….and cannot be varied  or discharged  unless obtained  by fraud  or collusion or by an agreement  contrary to the policy of the court…….or if the consent was given without sufficient material facts, or misapprehension or in ignorance of material  facts, or in  general  for  a reason  which would   enable  the court to set  aside an agreement.

36. The plaintiff’s/respondent’s  counsel submitted  that as far as  they were  concerned, the  suit herein   was fully settled and  that when the defendant  applied  for the dismissal  of the suit,  it must  have been  in error  since the   suit had long  been  fully  marked  as settled  and therefore the order arising   there from  cannot   have  any legal effect since it  amounts to a nullity.

37. Further, it was submitted that  any decree  emanating   from the dismissal  cannot have  any legal  effect   especially  when  the  dismissal  order  does not   even mention or refer  to the issue  of  title to the land.

38. It  was also  submitted by the plaintiff/ respondent’s counsel that the dismissal  order could not  create   rights  or title  to land  and that Section  34  of the  Civil Procedure Act   cannot provide  the remedy  to lack of jurisdiction  of this court to  handle  title  to land  issues  as that  issue  can only be  competently  handled  by  the Environment   and  Land  Court  as   contemplated  by Article  162(2) (b)  of the Constitution.

39. Further, that the dispute never   concerned title to land but access to the Church for worship purposes.

40. on the  whole, the  plaintiff’s counsel  urged  the court  to dismiss  the  defendant’s application  with costs  as  Section 1A of the  Civil  Procedure  Act are  inapplicable  since  the defendants  are seeking  to reach  title to land  of the suit  plot through the backdoor.

Determination

41. I have carefully considered the application herein dated   23rd October 2014, the grounds, supporting affidavit, further affidavit   and all the annextures thereto.  I have given equal consideration to the plaintiff’s/respondents’ replying affidavit and annextures.  I have also  considered  the  parties’  advocates  rival submissions  and  authorities   and  legal and  constitutional  provisions  relied on.  In my humble view, the following   issues flow for determination.

1. Whether this court has any jurisdiction to hear and determine   any dispute   relating  to title to  land

2. Whether   this court has any jurisdiction   to determine the application herein.

3. Whether the suit herein was settled    by the consent   of 1st December   2000 and therefore whether there was any suit capable of being dismissed for want of prosecution

4. Whether dismissal of a suit   for   want of   prosecution gives rise to   a decree   capable   of being executed   and therefore whether Section 34 of the Civil Procedure   Act is   applicable.

5. What orders should this court make?

6. Who should bear costs of this application?

42. The first two issues are preliminary points of objection   which must   be dealt with first as they go to the jurisdiction of the court.

43. On the first issue  of  whether  this court has  jurisdiction  to hear and determine disputes relating to title to land   or occupation of land, the Constitution  of Kenya 2010   in Article  162(2) (b)   contemplates  the establishment  of  the specialized   court, which is the  Environment and  Land  Court to hear  and  determine  disputes   relating to the  environment   and the use   and  occupation of, and title  to, land.

44. Sub Article   3 thereof   empowers Parliament   to determine the jurisdiction and functions   of the courts contemplated   in Article   162(2) (a) and (b).

45. In 2011, Parliament enacted the Environment and   Land Court   Act and Section 13(1) therefore confers jurisdiction on the court   to hear disputes   referred to in Article   162(2) (b)   of the Constitution.

46. In addition, Article 165(5) of the Constitution expressly bars the High Court from hearing and determining disputes relating to matters falling within the jurisdiction of the courts contemplated in Article 162(2).

47. With the above clear   provisions of   the law, it is trite that  the High Court   has no jurisdiction, with effect  from 27th  August    2010, to hear and  determine  disputes   reserved   for the courts   contemplated  in Article   162(2)  of the Constitution   and  these are   the Employment  and   Labour Relations   Court  and  the Environment  and   Land Court.

48. The other    issue is whether    this court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this application. To answer that issue, there are ancillary questions.  But first, I must revert to the application as framed.  The application dated  23rd October  2014   seeks   the orders that:

1. This Honourable  court may  be pleased  to issue an   order that   property  to wit,  LR Nairobi/Block 79/820   Church of God in East Africa (K) registered Trustees decreed to the defendants/applicants  be delivered  to them and   any person  bound  by the  decree   herein   who refuses   to vacate  the property  be removed/evicted.

2. That Geomatic Services  Ltd, a licensed  Surveyor  be offered  to carry out  survey  work  and establish the boundaries and or beacons defining property on LR  Nairobi/Block 79/820 (Church of God in East Africa (K) registered  trustees) and  confirm that the  same exists  and  are  in place as indicated   in the original   survey  plan  for the area.

3. That the Commanding Officer Buruburu Police Station does supervise and provide ample security for the two (2) exercises.

4. That costs of this   application be provided for.

49. No doubt, the prayer  No. 1  presupposes  that there is   a decree  issued by   this court  to the defendants/applicants to  be delivered  to them the suit property and  that any person  bound  by the  decree   herein   who refuses   to vacate  the property  be removed/evicted.

50. And if there is   any decree  issued by  this court,  nothing  prevents   this court from   executing  its own  decree   since where  there is a   decree, then the issues   in the dispute  are settled   and therefore  there  would be  no issue   for determination relating to  title to land  or occupation  of land.

45. I say so without  hesitating  and I am  fortified  by the transitional  provisions of the Constitution as stipulated  in Schedule  six   pursuant  to Article   262  of the Constitution.  The relevant   provisions   of the Transitional  and  consequential  provisions  are Section  22 on judicial  proceedings and  pending   matters which  stipulates:

“ All  judicial proceedings   pending before  any court  shall continue  to be  heard and  shall be determined   by the same   court or a corresponding court established under this  constitution or as directed by the Chief  Justice   or the Registrar  of the High Court.”

51. Section 30 of the Environment and Land Court Act, 2011 also echoes the above for Constitutional transitional and consequential provisions relating to administration of justice.

52. This court observes that this case was instituted in court in the year 2000 before the effective   date of the   Constitution.  The suit   was not instituted post 27th August   2010.  That being   the case, and the matters  being litigated  upon being those that   arose prior to the promulgation of Articles  162(2) (b)  and  165(5) b of the Constitution  and therefore   this court  was   under a constitutional duty to conclude  any pending   matter in order     to ensure   effective  administration of  justice as  contemplated   by the principles espoused   in Articles  159  of the Constitution  as well as   Article 10 of  the Constitution among   others, that   in exercising  judicial authority, the  courts and  tribunals   shall be   guided   by the following   principles.

a.Justice  shall be  done to all, irrespective  of  status;

b.Justice shall   not be delayed.

c.……..

d.Justice shall be administered without undue regard to   procedural technicalities.

e.The purpose and principles of this Constitution shall be protected and promoted.

53. Under Article  10 of the Constitution, the National Values  and  principles   of  governance   which include  the rule of  law, human rights  among others   bind the courts    as a state organ   and all persons  whenever  any of them  applies or interprets   any law,  or makes  or implements    public policy decisions.

54. Access   to justice   is one of the fundamental   human rights   and freedoms;  as stipulated  in  Article  48  of the Constitution; and  as  contemplated  by Article  159  of the Constitution, justice shall not be delayed.  It is for that reason that the transitional   and  consequential  provisions  of the Constitution  as contemplated in the Sixth Schedule   Section  22  on proceedings pending  before court,   does permit   continuance  and conclusion  of those proceedings  so as not to   delay or   obstruct access  to justice.

55. Those transitional and consequential provisions   of the Constitution are not subsidiary provisions to the Constitution.  They  were   enacted   together   with the substantive  Articles of  Constitution  and  with full   knowledge  of  Articles  162(2)  and  165(5)  (b)  of   the Constitution  that vests    in different   court’s jurisdiction   to hear and determine  disputes   relating   to Employment  and   Labour  Relations  and material  to this matter, Environment  and the use of and   occupation of land   and  title  of land.

56. Therefore, noting that this application   is  part of the  suit that  arose prior to  27th August    2010,  I have no doubt in my  mind that  this court   retained the   residual jurisdiction by  dint  of the transitional and consequential provisions  of the Constitution   to conclude   any pending   issues, if at  all, between the parties.

57. On the third   issue of   whether  the suit herein as instituted    was settled  by the consent   of  1st December   2000, and therefore whether there was any suit capable of being dismissed for want of prosecution,  this issue   will be    resolved   together  with issue  No. 4  on whether   dismissal  of a suit  for want of   prosecution  gives rise to  a decree  capable  of  being  executed  and therefore   whether Section  34 of the Civil Procedure  Act is  applicable.

58. On the first limb, the defendant/   applicant  claims that   the consent of 1st December 2000 only determined  the interlocutory  application for   injunction and  that in  any case, the matter continued   being  litigated  upon even   after that very consent   of  1st December  2000 hence the   suit  remained  alive until  it  was dismissed.

59. On the other hand, the plaintiff  contends that   the suit  was fully   compromised  with the endorsement   of  the consent   of  1st December 2000  and that  therefore  this court has no jurisdiction  to reopen the suit.  It  was  further  contended by the plaintiffs/ respondents that the parties   having  consented to a settlement, the court  can only set aside   that consent by another   consent  or if the consent   was laced   with fraud   or mistake.  In addition, it was contended by the plaintiffs/respondents that the application herein is therefore Resjudicata.

60. I must   however   note that there is no application before me for setting aside   the consent of    1st December   2000 which is not   denied by the defendants/applicants.

61. Further, issues of Resjudicata  can only be raised  in a suit  where there   was  another (separate)  suit  similar  to the present   proceedings and which was  determined   on merits.

62. Resjudicata doctrine   cannot be   raised   in the same suit or proceedings.  That   is why the  wordings   of Section  7 of the Civil Procedure  Act are  clear that:

“ No  court shall  try any suit in which the matter   directly  and  substantially   in issue  in  a former suit  between the same parties,or between  parties  under whom  they or any  of them  claim, litigating under  the same title, in a court of competent   to try such   subsequent    suit or   the suit in which  such issue   has been   subsequently  raised, and had been  heard and finally  decided   by such court.”[Emphasis added].

63. The said   Section in  the  explanatory  note   makes it   clear that:

“ Former  suit” means  a suit  which has  been decided  before the suit in  question  whether  or not   it  was instituted   before it.”

64. Accordingly, issue   of Resjudicata is inapplicable in this matter.

65. Back  to the question of whether  the consent  on   1st  December   2000  settled   this suit   fully  or not, I must  revert   to the consent   in question  which  was  recorded  by and signed  by both  parties’  advocates   on 30th November  2000  and  adopted   by the  court in the  following terms  on 1st December   2000:

“In chambers on the 1st December 2000 before   justice Mr Visram   Commissioner of Assize:

Order- This matter  coming up for mention   on 1st  December  2000 before Justice  Mr Visram,  Commissioner of Assize  and  upon reading   consent    letter   dated  30th  November   2000;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED BY CONSENT

1. THAT this suit   be and is hereby  marked as   settled  in the following terms;

a.That the parties to this suit be and are hereby   agreed that the church premises for Buruburu church be re-opened   for normal church activities.

b.That the defendants do make appropriate   arrangements   with the relevant   government authorities to re-open for normal activities as soon as   possible.

c.That once the  Buruburu  church is   reopened   for normal church activities, the plaintiffs and other members  of the  Church of God   wanting to  worship thereat be allowed  access to, and   use of, the church   subject however to adherence  to the code   of conduct  enshrined  in the constitution of the Church of God  in East Africa.

d.That  the plaintiffs for themselves  and  on behalf   of the other persons   whom they  represent   in this suit   hereby   undertake   not to cause  or participate   in any acts  of the church intended   to, or which may  cause violence, the description   of church activities   and  a breach   of peace.

e.That  the plaintiff   for themselves   and  on behalf   of the other persons  whom they  represent  in this suit  hereby  acknowledge  and undertake  to  respect the lawful  authority and  power bestowed upon  the General  Assembly  and the  Executive  Council of the Church of God in East Africa  by the Constitution of the said Church.

f.That  parties  to this suit  hereby   acknowledge   the existence of appropriate  provisions in the said Constitution  for the resolution  of conflict, and other church matters, and will  adhere  to the same at   all times.

g.That  the General Assembly  and  Executive  Council of Church   of God   in East Africa   being mindful   of the need   to facilitate  reconciliation and in order to promote a fresh start at the   Buruburu  church, hereby  undertake   to  exercise  their constitutional power to re-deploy the pastor currently  ministering  at the Buruburu   Church elsewhere  and  to identity and to deploy  to the said church a suitable  replacement   as soon   as possible.”

GIVEN UNDER my hand and seal of this court on the 1st day of December   2000.

ISSUED at Nairobi   this 15th day of December,

M.J. BHATI

DEPUTY REGISTRAR

HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI”

66. That particular   consent   order which   was adopting  the parties’  advocates  consent   letter  to court dated   30th November   2000  was also  served and  received  by all parties’  advocates     on 18th December   2000 and  also served upon the  Church  at Buruburu   Community Centre   on 19th December    2000.

67. The record   clearly shows that after the above consent    was recorded, a dispute   arose  as to its   interpretation  and implementation   and   that dispute prompted   the parties to    return to court vide  an application dated   22nd January   2001   as the church   had not   been reopened despite  the consent entered   into  on  1st December  2000.

68. By  a ruling delivered on  29th March  2001  at 2. 30 pm, Honourable  Justice Kasanga   Mulwa (as he then was) ordered that:

1. The Church will open as agreed by the parties   without further   delay in any event before 15th April 2001.

2. The registration of members by the defendants is hereby stopped  until the Church   has reopened  and thereafter  the  registration can be   carried out     by the consent   of all the  parties   and  if such consent  is not   arrived at  either party  will be at  liberty to apply  to the court  for further   orders   on the issues;

3. A cleansing  ceremony  can take   place before   reopening   of the church  provided   that the parties   agree on how    it shall be done, if no  agreement    it shall not  be carried  out;

4. The other conclusions in the   consent   order shall be complied with and in particular   paragraph 8 of the Order.

5. Each party   shall bear its costs   for this application.”

69. After the above  orders   were made   by Honourable  Justice  Kasanga  Mulwa, the said orders were allegedly   never   complied   with and  so an   application   for contempt  of court   was made  to court   but  when  parties   appeared   in court on   17th July  2001  they agreed  on a conciliator as per   their   consent order signed by  the advocates  dated 11th July  2000, which  conciliators   would facilitate   the implementation   of the court orders.

70. The record shows that court then  proceeded to record and adopt   the consent order   as  follows:

“ The matter will  be referred  to Bishop   Horace   Etemesi  of the Anglican Church   of Kenya and   Reverend   Dr Jesee Kamau, Moderator  of the General Assembly  of PCEA  as joint conciliators  to facilitate  compliance   by the parties of the consent order of  1st  December 2000 and thereby  normalize   activities   at Buruburu  Church.  There will be    a mention to assess   progress    on 1st October   2001. ”

71. At one point, Reverend   Patrick   Musungu Maina    appeared in court in   person on 4th January   2002   before Honourable     Justice   R. Kuloba (as he then was) seeking for orders which the learned judge did not   grant.  The reconciliation report  was  however   finally  filed in court   and  on   18th February  2002   Honourable  Justice Githinji  (as he then was) recorded  as  follows:

“Reconciliators   have filed the report.  It suggests that the parties be given one or 2 months   to resolve remaining   issues.  The file is   closed as the suit   was already   been marked as settled.  It has taken….to have the consent judgment complied with.  There is no need for a further mention.  Any party should be given liberty to execute the consent judgment in the manner they deem fit.  If the consent judgment is not executed   within 30 days.  If the consent    judgment is not  (sic) entered   on  15th January  2001  is not  complied with   within  30 days s  any party is at liberty  to apply for  execution of the consent  judgment.”

72. At this point  I must pause  and  remark that   the  dispute  herein   has been  handled   by so many   judges- more than  10 probably  including   myself.  At one  point on 13th February  2003  Honourable Justice Hayanga  (as he then was) committed one  of the parties for  contempt  on the face of the  court due  to the  physical  fights   that  occurred   in the court room between  Mr Asiba  and Mr Moses.  Mr Asiba  was given  suspended sentence  of  3  months  for engaging  in physical  fight  during the  hearing of contempt of court proceedings,  following   violence that   broke out   in the Church  premises  leading  to destruction of Church property  and  ejecting  of pastors   staying within the Church   compound.

73. After Honourable   Justice Hayanga completed  the hearing  of  contempt   of the court proceedings  and setting  the matter for  ruling on  2nd December   2003, another  judge   Ransley  J (as he then was) and  F.A. Ochieng  J  took over the  conduct  of the matter.  Ransley  J then  on  16th November  2004  directed  that the matter  be placed before Honourable   P.K. Kihara (as he then was)  for directions on the working  of a ruling   which  was   eventually delivered  on 21st January  2005 dismissing  the application for   contempt  of court   filed on  11th September   2002   with no orders as to costs.  In the   said ruling , Honourable  Justice        P. Kariuki (as he then was)  reproduced   the consent of   1st December  2000 and  stated that  “ those   were the   terms of the consent order  on the basis of this suit   was  settled. Further, the learned judge recorded that “As the subsequent events    were to prove, the consent   order became   the subject    of fresh disputes between   the parties   with each accused the other of breaching the terms of the settlement.”

74. The learned judge in dismissing the said application  for contempt  of  court observed that  “ in the present case, however, the applicants  have proved  only that the parties cannot  agree on the interpretation  of the terms of the   consent order.  Such inability, and the consequent   disagreement, cannot, in my judgment, constitute   disobedience   of the order.”

75. From the above   analysis  of the proceedings   and  record, it  is clear to me  mind that what  was   settled by    the consent  of  1st  December  2000  between the parties  was  the whole suit    herein and therefore although there were subsequent   proceedings in the  matter, the same   related to the implementation or enforcement  of the  said consent    and that is why  contempt   proceedings    were initiated  to enforce  compliance  with the consent.

76. The first order in the consent   clearly states that     “1.  THAT   this suit be and is   hereby marked as   settled in the following terms.”

77. The consent never talked of settling the interlocutory injunctive   application filed by the   plaintiff, as alleged by the defendant/applicant herein.   And as   correctly   pointed out   by Justice P.K. Kariuki (as he then was) in his ruling in the contempt proceedings, it had  taken so much time  and consultation between the parties  before they   arrived at that consent.  In  addition, Honourable   Justice Githinji  also marked the  file as closed  as the suit   was  already  marked as settled  and that  there  was no need  for a further  mention  and that any  party  was at liberty to execute  the consent  judgment  in the  manner  they deemed  fit.

78. In my humble view, if the above observations  by the two   learned judges  who  handled   this matter  quite  competently  were in error, then nothing  prevented the defendants/applicants herein from  appealing  against the decisions thereof   to get a  different   view of this matter  as far as the consent order of 1st December, 2000 was concerned at that stage.

79. Accordingly, I have  no doubt  and I do  not hesitate  in finding that  the   suit   herein    was settled   by the consent     of  1st December  2000  and that the  subsequent   proceedings  were enforcement proceedings since  the issues  in the suit   had been reduced  into the consent   of  1st December  2000   which was   and  has never  been set aside.

80. Having so  found that the consent  of  1st December  2000  settled this suit  as between the disputing   parties, the other  question  and  issue is whether  there remained  any suit   capable  of dismissal for  want of  prosecution and whether   dismissal of  a suit  for  want  of prosecution  gives rise to a decree   capable of  being  executed   and  therefore  whether Section  34 of the Civil  Procedure Act is applicable in  this case.

81. First  and  foremost   is that the  suit having   been settled by   consent of  the parties  on 1st December  2000 there  was no suit   or issue left   for determination on merit   as regards the dispute, other than  implementing   or enforcement   of the consent, and  therefore, to that  extend,  there  was absolutely  no suit   capable  of  being   dismissed for  want of prosecution.

82. Although the  applicant/defendant  claims that  the  plaintiffs/respondents  was   served with the application  for   dismissal of the  suit for  want  of prosecution, and that  they did  not appear   in court or even oppose   that application, and although the  plaintiffs   have not   come to court  to unsettle  that  order of dismissal  of the suit   for  want of prosecution, in my  humble  view, that  order of dismissal of a nonexistent   suit for want of  prosecution   was made  by Honourable Justice Waweru per incuriam.

83. A decision given per incuriam means that the decision was given through ignorance of or forgetfulness   of certain    relevant   facts.

84. In my humble view, had the learned  judge,   Honourable  Waweru  J had   the benefit    of the best arguments  that both   parties  to this case   could provide  at an  interpartes   hearing of the application for dismissal of the suit for want of prosecution, the learned judge could not have arrived at such a  demonstrably wrong decision of dismissing  a suit  which  was  long settled.

85. On the other hand, I have no doubt in my mind that the defendants were very mean with information leading to the dismissal of the suit   that had been settled   between the parties for want of prosecution. I say   ‘mean’ because I have examined the notice of motion that sought   for the dismissal   of the suit   for want of prosecution.  It is dated 15th November 2013   and  supported  by   8 skeletal   grounds  and  a supporting   affidavit  sworn by  George  Kirumba  Mbiyu  on  3rd  November, 2013 which affidavit   makes no  disclosure of the  consent order of   1st  December   2000 and  which affidavit   simply states  in paragraph 3 that  “ this suit    was last  fixed  for hearing  on  24th January  2004and in paragraph  4 that “ on that date  the matter  was not  heard, it   was adjourned  generally” and  paragraph  5 that “ since   then the  plaintiffs  have never   set  down the suit  for another hearing.”

86. In my humble view, the learned   judge, in dismissing the ‘suit’  for want  of prosecution  must have been  influenced by the  skeletal   grounds  and   supporting  affidavit of the defendants, in my  humble  view, were misleading.  Had the Honourable Judge  perused the file  he would have seen the consent   made on  1st December  2000  which  was  a relevant  factor, and he would  not have made the order dismissing  the suit for  want  of prosecution  since there was no pending suit  but proceedings for implementation of the consent made  on 1st December  2000 are   the ones that   had led to the  last date  of  24th January  2004.

87. Where a   suit in the  execution process, it   cannot be  dismissed for  want  of prosecution, unless there is a specific  application pending  in the execution  proceedings which is not  prosecuted  and  which the court would be  right in dismissing  for  want of  prosecution.

88. I reiterate that  the consent   order of  1st December  2000  finally   settled the main dispute between the parties herein  although as  observed  by Honourable  Justice Githinji J (as he then was)  who even closed the file and directed  enforcement  of the consent  subsequently  recorded, parties  appeared to have  a deep routed   dispute   whose  solution may not even  lie in the litigations in court  since it appears  that not even the  conciliation  process  ever helped  them to   resolve  their  differences.

89. But that  observation  does not   mean that  the parties are free  to resuscitate the  case which  was  finally  and  completely  determined  unless, as  correctly   submitted by the plaintiff’s /respondent’s counsel, the parties apply  to set  aside the   consent  orders   which are   validly  on record.

90. Having found that  there  was  no pending  suit capable  of being  dismissed, I must  determine  whether   that order of dismissal   should  remain   on record.  In my humble  view, this  court has  the inherent  jurisdiction which is unlimited  to make  such  orders  as may be  necessary  for the ends of justice or to prevent  abuse of the process of the court. The court in dismissing the suit for want of prosecution when there was no pending suit for dismissal was mislead by the applying party.

91. Invoking  the inherent  jurisdiction of the court to the circumstances   of this case, I would  in the circumstances vacate  that order  dismissing   a suit that  was long  settled, as that  order of dismissal was made in vain.  This is not to sit   on appeal of the decision of Honourable   Waweru J.   I am fortified  by the  English  case of  Macfoy Vs United  Africa  Company  Ltd  [1961] 3 ALL ER  1169 at  1172  where  the court held that:

“If   an act   is void, it is in law a nullity.  It is not   only bad, but incurably bad.  There is no need for an order of the court to set aside.   It is automatically null and void   without more ado, though it is sometimes   convenient   to have the   court declare   it to be so.”

92. In the present case,  I can only conclude  that the “ dismissal    of the plaintiff’s  suit” herein  and therefore the order thereof    was  of   no legal   effect   since there   was no   suit capable  of being   dismissed  for want   of prosecution, the suit having been settled by the consent order of 1st December, 2000.

93. In other words, an order  marking the  suit was settled  in itself   is a decree  and once there  is a decree  which finally   settles   the case, unless set aside varied  or reviewed  either  by the same  court   or on appeal, it  remains  a decree. A decree cannot therefore be dismissed for want of prosecution. And neither can another decree issue subsequent to a decree save on appeal.

94. And   as there  was no suit   capable  of being  dismissed for want of prosecution, it   follows that   Sections  34  and  91  of the Civil Procedure Act are not available to the defendants/applicants  herein, seeking for  possession of their  land through eviction  of the plaintiffs/respondents from the said  land.

95. I reiterate that the applicants/defendants herein cannot use   a decree in form of a dismissed suit that is a nullity   to evict the respondents   from the Church land or premises.  They can only use any other known lawful means.

96. Furthermore, a perusal of the pleadings does not show any claim or counterclaim for occupation, title to and or ownership    of land.   The dispute   between the  parties hereto   was around the right to  access  and  worship  from the  Church of God OF East Africa situate in BuruBuru area of Nairobi County by two different factions of the same Church,  and not  over ownership of  or  proprietary rights  over the land  or buildings.

97. Consequently, what the applicants/defendants  are asking  from this court is for this  court to convert the claim as settled  by the consent    order of  1st December  2000 into another fresh dispute   between  the parties    which dispute   if any can now be  safely  disposed  of  through the   implementation of the consent    order of  1st December 2000 or if  that is not  sufficient   enough to dispose of the feuds, parties  shall   be at complete   liberty to  institute   appropriate   proceedings   relating  to ownership , title   to or occupation of  land before  the court of competent   jurisdiction which is the Environment  and  Land Court  as stipulated  in Article  162(2)  (b)  of the Constitution, as well as  Section  13(1)  of the Environment   and  Land Court Act  2011.

98. The upshot of the above analysis  is that this suit   came to a final  determination  on 1st December  2000  through  a consent   which was  reduced into an order   and  decree of the court  and  what these   feuding    parties ought to  be enforcing   is that order  settling the suit as per the consent  of  1st December  2000.

99. This court  cannot recall  and  or nullify  a judgment  which   was validly  entered  into by consent  of  the parties  and d by a court or competent   jurisdiction.

100. I then proceed to determine whether the decree can issue on a suit   which is dismissed for want of prosecution. This question must be answered for reasons that the defendant/applicant is using an extracted ‘decree’ which I have  nonetheless   declared  a nullity, to  urge this court  to make  very sustentative orders of evicting   the respondents/plaintiffs  from the Church premises, in order to give  vacant possession of the Church premises to the defendants/applicants, which premises are  undisputedly  wholly  owned   by the defendants, for their exclusive   enjoyment.

101. In Nguruman Ltd   Vs  Shompole  Group  Ranch  & Another  [2014]eKLR, the   Court of Appeal  stated:

“……An order for dismissal for want of prosecution cannot fall into the category of orders granted in finality in any matter   as the merit aspect of the particular   matter affected is never interrogated   before the court makes such an order.  Such orders are therefore usually made purely on technicalities.”

102. Based on the above  decision which is  binding   on this court, I have no  reason to  depart  from it  and  I therefore   find that  no decree  arises from dismissal  of a suit  for  want of prosecution, even  assuming that there  was  any such  pending suit for determination  as at the time Honourable Waweru J ordered for its dismissed  for want of prosecution.

103. But  as I have   stated herein, to  attempt to find that  there  was a suit   pending  determination and  therefore capable of  being dismissed for want of prosecution  after the consent  of  1st December   2000 is tantamount  to reopening   doors to all and  sundry  to jump  onto the  band wagon  and  flood  the court with  past litigation that   was  settled  by final orders  of  a competent   court and in the process, transgress  on the rule of  finality in litigation; and   to  fail to  provide  safeguards  against  absurdities.

104. Section 2 of the Civil Procedure   Act defines  ‘decree’  as:

“ Decree means  the formal expression of an adjudication   which so   far as  regards  the court    expressing it, conclusively determines  the rights  of the parties with   regard to all or any of the  matters in  controversy  in a suit   and may be   either  preliminary or final; it   includes   the striking out  of a plaint   and the determination  of any question  within  Section  34   of Section 91   but does not  include:

a.Any adjudication  from which  an  appeal lies  as an appeal from  an order; or

b.Any order   of dismissal  for default, provided that for  the purposes of  appeal, ‘decree’  includes  judgments, and  judgment  shall be   appealable  notwithstanding the fact that a formal   decree in pursuance  of  such judgment   may not have been  drawn  up or may not be  capable of  being drawn  up.

105. From the above elaborate interpretation Section of the Civil Procedure Act, a decree is a formal   expression of a judgment   of the court which conclusively determines rights of   the parties   to a suit with regard to   all of or any   of the matters   in controversy in the suit.

106. In a dismissal of a suit   for want of   prosecution under Order 17 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the court makes   an order.  It does not enter judgment for the defendant. in my humble view, and as  exemplified  in the Nguruman  Ltd (supra)  case by the  Court of Appeal, an order  of  dismissal   of  suit for  want of prosecution  cannot   conclusively  determine the rights  of the parties  to the  suit with   regard to all  or any of the  matters in  controversy in the suit.

107. I find that   the  ‘default’ contemplated  in  the definition  of  ‘decree’ in Section  2 of the Civil Procedure  Act is  default   or failure to  take action  or to prosecute  the suit as  contemplated  in Order  17 of  the Civil  Procedure Rules, where no  step or  proceeding has  been taken   thereby  occasioning  unnecessary  delay, contrary to the overriding objectives of the law as  stipulated in Section 1A and  1B of the Civil  Procedure  Act and  Article   159 (2) (c ) of the Constitution  which stipulate   that justice   shall be   administered    without undue  delay.

108. In the end,  I find that dismissal  of this suit   which had   nonetheless been  settled  by consent  of the parties was  an act of nullity and  I therefore   find  that the application   by the defendants, which is  not grounded  in law or   on any judicial determination  lacks merit.  The same is hereby dismissed.

109. As the feuding parties, despite  a consent  order of this court settling  the original dispute have refused    to agree to  enforce  their own consent  to  resolve   their issues, I shall   order that  each party bear  their own  costs of  the application  dated  23rd  October   2014, hoping that good conscience shall guide and override them.

Dated, signed and delivered in open court   at Nairobi this   8th day of December 2016.

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE

In the presence of:

Miss Mutindi h/b for George Mbiyu for the defendants /applicants

N/A for the plaintiffs/respondents

CA: Lorna