Paul Otieno Mungla t/a Paul Mungla & Co.Advocates v Anne Achieng Ajanja [2015] KEHC 4565 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI

MISCELLANEOUS CIVIL APPLICATION NO.624 OF 2012

PAUL OTIENO MUNGLAT/A PAUL MUNGLA & CO.ADVOCATES ………………………..APPLICANT

VERSUS

ANNE ACHIENG AJANJA………………...............................................………….…………….RESPONDENT

RULING

Before me are two applications, one by  the client/respondent Anne Achieng Ajanja  dated 24th March  2014  supported by her   affidavit  sworn on the same day, and  filed  on 24th April 2014, brought  under the  provisions  of  Order 22 Rule 22, Order 40 Rules 1 and 2  and Order  51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure  Rules, Sections  1A, 1B, 3A and 63 (e)  of the  Civil Procedure Act, Article 159 of the Constitution  of Kenya  and all other  enabling  provisions  of the law.

This application seeks for orders

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That this Honourable court does  bring  into court  the decree issued to the client/judgment  debtor/applicant in HCC133 of  2007 and order that out of the same, the sum of kshs  347,125 be remitted  to the advocate/decree holder  in satisfaction  of the decree issued herein.

That  this honourable court do order  a stay of  execution of the judgment and  order made  by this honourable  court pursuant  to the advocate/respondent’s  application dated  4th April 2013.

Those costs of this application be provided for.

The application is premised on the grounds that:

The client/ judgment debtor/applicant has a decree for costs issued against her in favour of the advocate =/decree holder herein.

The client/judgment debtor/applicant has no known sources of income and the intended execution will only visit anguish since she is in no position and has no other known means of settling the present decree.

That the only available income that the Judgment debtor possesses is the decree issued in her favour in HCC No. 133/2007.

That if the said stay of execution is not granted, the judgment debtor will suffer immensely since the intended execution will not attain its intended purpose of funds for the advocate/decree holder but will visit anguish upon the judgment debtor.

The  client/judgment debtor has never  refused to pay   the advocate but is facing serious  financial constrains  and is willing to offset  a part of her decree in satisfaction  of  whatever  sums that she may  owe the  advocate.

That unless the application is granted, the advocate decree holder threatens to levy execution against the client judgment /debtor.

That  substantial  loss will  result to the  client judgment/

Debtor unless the order sought is granted.

The application has been made without any unreasonable delay.

The application ought to be granted in the interest of equity and justice.

The supporting affidavit by the applicant/client/judgment debtor

expounds  on the above grounds,  with emphasis that the advocate  had initially agreed to indulge  her to settle decree for costs  by installments  but he reneged  and threatened  to execute and that no prejudice  will be  occasioned to him as  the amount of taxed costs  in her other  suit HCC 133/2007  will be paid  to him  once  called into this court.

This application  is opposed  by the advocate  vide  his replying  affidavit  sworn on 1st August  2014  and filed on 4th August  2014 wherein he deposes  that after  successfully  representing  the client herein in ELC  133/2007 and securing  her a judgment  of Ksh 9. 03 million plus costs and interest, she did not  pay him his fees and  he subsequently  filed and   had his advocate  client  bill of costs  assessed  and allowed at Ksh  347,125. 00 only and judgment  entered  on 4th April 2013 but that the client  vigorously opposed the advocate’s bill of costs through her advocate  on record but that she had since  only paid  him Ksh 70,000. 00.

It is  further  deposed that she has had  periodic contacts of employment  with the United Nation  during the pendency of these proceedings  hence,  she could not be genuine  in her averments  that she is  of no other means  of settling  the balance. It is further deposed that the client owns and operates a private saloon car KBA 172E Toyota station wagon which ownership is inconsistent with her allegations that she is impecunious and unable to settle the decretal sum herein.

It is further deposed that it is the client who is the tenant in Nyayo Embakasi estate house No. 13 Court   292 and not her daughter in the objection proceedings hereto.

That the said motor vehicle KBA 172E was one of the items proclaimed by auctioneers and that t advocate has no interest in her decree in HC ELC 133/2007.

The second  application is by the objector, Laura Akinyi Odhiambo file by a Notice of Motion dated 24th March 2014  brought  under  the provisions  of  Order 22 Rule  51(2) of the  Civil Procedure  Rules  2010 and all other enabling provisions  of the law seeking  for:

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That  the attachment  with respect  to the objector’s  chattels found at  Nyayo Estate Embakasi  House No. 13 Court No. 292 and attached on account of a warrant of  proclamation dated 17th March 2014  be lifted.

That costs of the application be awarded to the objector.

The application by the objector is supported by the grounds that the proclaimed chattels belong to the objector who has never been a party to the proceedings herein. The said application is further  supported by  the sworn affidavit  of Laura Akinyi  Odhiambo  who deposed that she  is a tenant  to the mentioned  premises  and pays rent  dutifully  and that her  chattels as listed in  the attached proclamation by Keysian Auctioneers  dated 17th March 2014.  That  she has  never been a party to this  suit and  that the auctioneer  had threatened  to attach items that  fall outside  the ambit  of the attachable  chattels and that it is  in the interest  of justice  that the orders sought  are granted.

The above application by the objector was equally opposed by the advocate/decree holder.

The two applications by the client/judgment debtor and objector were agreed to be heard and argued together, with one response from the respondent/advocate decree holder.  When the said  twin applications  came up for hearing on 13th November  2014, Mr Kandere  advocate submitted  on behalf  of the client/judgment debtor, Mr Makori  appeared and submitted  on behalf of the objector/applicant  and Mr Mungla advocate submitted on his own behalf for his law firm as the advocate/decree holder.

In support of the judgment/debtor’s  application, Mr Kandere submitted that what  the judgment debtor  was seeking  from this court  was extreme  indulgence   to be allowed  to bring  into this  court a decree  to offset  the advocate’s  taxed  costs, pursuant  to the principles  of  equity, justice and good conscience.  That the  judgment debtor  was  in possession of  a decree in a suit ELC 133/2007 where  the advocate  decree holder was representing  her and after its  successful conclusion, advocates costs were taxed  after a dispute  with the client  but that  since  she is not  in a sound  financial position to settle  the taxed and decretal costs, in the absence of any other  known law  allowing decree in another  court to  be brought into  the proceedings  to settle  the claim, this court  should  exercise  equity and good conscience  to allow this  application and allow the  client/judgment debtor  to liquidate  the decree using  another decree as she has  been settling  by installments.

On the  part of the  objector, it was submitted by Mr Makori   that the attached  goods  do not belong to the  judgment debtor  but to  the objector  who is a  lawful tenant  in the premises  wherein  the items  were proclaimed and that she is only a tenant to the judgment debtor  and a daughter to her. Further, that the objector has an equitable interest and a right to the attached property hence the judgment debtor has no justiciable claims to the same.

In opposition to both the applications by the judgment debtor –client  and the objector, Mr Mungla  advocate –decree-holder submitted, urging the  court to dismiss  both applications with costs  that justice  in the case demands  that this court  must act  within he  established  legal framework and not in  a vacuum.  That  as he  was not  a party to  the ELC 133/2007, the court  cannot grant  the prayer  for  calling into  this court a  decree passed  in another suit  and as he  has no interest   in her decree in the ELC 133/2007.

He further  submitted  that the  judgment  debtor does not  deserve  the mercy of this court  as she  is a total liar, to the  effect that  she  is impecunious yet  she owns  motor vehicle  registration No.  KBA 172 E as shown by copy of records, which motor vehicle was available for attachment in execution of decree herein.  That the judgment debtor has come  to court  with unclean  hands  and has  remained  silent  on that  issue  and neither  has  she rebutted  the contention  that she is employed  by the United Nations  on periodic  assignments.

In opposing   the objector’s application to the  proclamation levied by Keysian Auctioneers on 17th March 2014, the advocate/decree holder submitted that the objector is the daughter to the judgment/debtor  /client and that although she alleges  that all the household  goods as proclaimed  were  hers, she  laid no claim to the motor  vehicle  registration No.  KBA 172F.

That the  objector is  equally a liar as the purported  lease/ tenancy agreement  exhibited  had expired on 1st May  2013  at the time of the proclamation and that  albeit  the said purported  lease/tenancy agreements commands that all payments  be made in the landlord’s account, there is no  single   deposit slip by the objector  into  the landlord’s account.  That  the objector  was personally known to the decree/holder  and that she had personally approached  the decree holder  and informed  him that  she  was a student  at Kenya  polytechnic  living  with her  aunt in Kileleshwa  and that  in the absence  of evidence that she was in any employment   to earn a living  and afford such  rent of Ksh 28,000. 00 and in the absence of evidence  from  the receipts  as to who  the recipients  of rent  were, the objector  was less than  candid   with the court.

Further, Mr Mungla submitted  that  the judgment/debtor  and objector  had displayed  out right  dishonestly  before the  court hence  they could not  benefit  from the equity of the court.  He urged the court to dismiss the two applications with costs.

In response, Mr Kandere submitted  that he had provided  the provisions of the  law under  which the  judgment debtor’s application  was brought  and that the Constitution had given  the court  power to make  any orders  within its jurisdiction.  In addition  that HCC 133/2007 was relevant  to this matter  as the decree  therein is what had  given rise  to this matter   maintaining  that the judgment /debtor  was not in  a financial  position  to liquidate  the claim  as he was currently  unemployed  and  was only seeking  for more  time to  settle  decree  herein after enforcement  of decree in HCC 133/2007.

Mr Makori  advocate on behalf of the objector  responded that  Order 51  Rule 1  is clear  as to what  the objection is required to demonstrate  before court  to  wit an interest  whether legal or equitable  and  urged the  court to find that the receipts  filed were genuinely issued by the landlord.

I have carefully  considered  the two applications by the judgment  debtor and  the objector, supported  by the affidavits  sworn by the respective  applicants, the  annextures  thereto and the replying  affidavits  opposing  the said applications  as separately filed  and argued.

I have also carefully considered the rival oral submissions by counsels for the respective parties. The relevant law as cited has also been considered in writing this ruling.

None of the parties to the two applications cited any case law to support their propositions/opposition

On the application by the judgment debtor, from the provisions of the law relied on, the only issue for consideration is whether the application for stay and for calling of decree in ELC 133/ 2007 is merited.

The power to grant such an order as sought is purely in the discretion of the court, which discretion, however, must be exercised judiciously.

Sections  1A and IB of the Civil Procedure  Act  enjoin  the court  to apply the  overriding  objectives  of the Act  to facilitate  the  just, expeditious, proportionate  and affordable  resolution of  civil disputes governed   by the Act.  And  for purposes  of furthering  the overriding  objective  specified in Sections 1A of  the Act, Section 1B mandates  the court to  handle  all matters  presented  before  it for the purposes of  attaining  the aims  of:

The just determination of the proceedings;

The efficient  disposal of the business of  the court;

The efficient use of the available judicial and administrative resources.

The timely disposal of the proceedings, and  all other  proceedings in the court, at a cost affordable  by the respective  parties; and

The use of suitable technology.

Under Section 3A, nothing in the Act shall  limit or otherwise  affect  the inherent  power  of the court to  make such  orders  as may be  necessary for the  ends  of justice  or to  prevent  abuse  of the process of the court.

Order 22 Rule 22 of the Civil Procedure Rules gives this court discretion to stay execution of decree pending any application.

On the other hand, Order 40 Rule 1 and 2  refer to temporary  injunction  and interlocutory  orders which  I find irrelevant in the circumstances  of this case  as it is a clear case of stay of execution of decree and invocation of the orders  of injunction  is far-fetched.

Under Section 69(e) of the Civil Procedure Act, does not exist hence, the provisions as cited is equally irrelevant and inapplicable.  The Section 69 of the Civil Procedure Act has no Sub Section and it concerns decision where appeal is heard by two or more judges.

However, Section 63 (e)  of the Civil Procedure Act provides that  in order to prevent  the ends  of justice  from being defeated m the court may, if it is so  prescribed (e) make  such other  interlocutory  orders  as may appear  to the court  to be just  and convenient.

Article  159 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010  is on  judicial  authority of the courts and  tribunals established  under the  Constitution; and  in exercising  such authority, the courts  and tribunals are enjoined  to be guided  by the principles  that :-

Justice  shall be done  to all, irrespective  of status;

Justice shall not be  delayed;

Promotion  of ADR;

Administer justice without undue regard to procedural technicalities; and

The purposes and principles of the Constitution are protected and promoted, among other principles.

Order  50 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure  Rules  is the procedure  for making all applications to court  and gives  the court the  discretion to direct  on whether  an application shall be  heard  in chambers or in open court.

Having  set out  the law as  relied on by the judgment /debtor /client/applicant, the issue for  determination  in her application is whether  she deserves  the exercise  of the discretionary  power of the court  to grant her  the orders sought.

Although  in his submissions, Mr Kandere  did not  delve into  the relevant provisions  of the law  as cited, he urged this  court to apply the principles  of equity, justice  and good conscience to grant  the orders  sought.  This court can only apply those principles if there are no specific provisions of law providing of the prayers being sought.  As I have exposed the provisions of the law, Sections 1A and 1B, 3A and 63(e) of the Civil Procedure Act are clear on what this court is enjoined to do, in the determination of disputes under the Act.  And even  where there is no specific  provision  to the contrary, Section 3 of  the Civil Procedure  Act provides  that: Nothing  in the  Act shall  limit or otherwise  affect  any special jurisdiction or power conferred , or any special  form or  procedure prescribed, by or under  any other  law  for the time being  in force.

In other words, although Mr  Mungla  submitted that this court must base its  decision on the prayers  sought  on sound legal principles and not in  a vacuum, and whereas I agree with  him, I do not  find that    the orders  being  sought can  be granted  in a vacuum, with   the relevant  Sections of the law  and the Constitution  having been cited  and even if  there were no  such provisions  cited, that in itself  would not  render  the application void as Section 3, 1A and 1B  of the Civil Procedure  Act would come in handy.

The only question for this court’s determination is whether, in the circumstances of this case as submitted, the judgment/debtor /applicant’s application should be granted.

Section 38 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that:

“38 subject to such conditions and limitation as may be prescribed, the court may, on the application, of the decree holder, order the execution of the decree

By delivery  of any property specifically decreed;

By attachment and sale, or by sale  without attachment of property;

By attachment of debts;

By arrest and detention in prison of any person.

By appointment of a receiver; or

Such other manner as the nature of the relief granted may require.”

The decree subject of thus suit is a monetary one for payment of money by the judgment/debtor to the decree holder. The latter has many options available under Section 38 of the Civil Procedure Act to enforce the said decree.  When he exercised his option to attach the judgment debtor’s property, he was met with resistance in two ways-

An objector who is the judgment debtor’s daughter claiming that the attached chattels belong to her; and

The application by the judgment debtor  urging  this court  to stay execution  herein until decree in ELC 133/2007 wherein  the advocate/decree holder herein successfully  represented  the judgment debtor /client is called  into this court  to settle  this decree as  the amount in ELC 133/2007  is higher.

This court notes that although the judgment debtor has cited HCC 133/2007, the annextures disclose an ELC 133/2007 decree issued on 21st March 2014 and given on 20th April 2012.  The  corresponding  certificate of costs  in that  matter is for Ksh 643,110. 00 being party and party costs  as  per certificate  issued on  18th March 2014  and taxed on 11th February 2014.  The parties  to that case are Dickson Elkana  Sese vs Attorney General, Commissioner  of Lands, Registrar  of Lands, Nancy Wambui Kamau and Ann Achieng  Ajanja the judgment debtor  herein, who  was the successful party  in ELC 133/2007 and  in whose favour  the decree and certificate of costs were  given.

In his submissions, Mr Kandere however seeks  for time to settle the decretal sum whereas  in the body of the  application, the judgment debtor seeks  for an order  to b ring  into this court  the decree issued  to the client/judgment debtor in HCC 133/2007 and order for the sum of   Ksh 347,125. 00 to be  remitted  to the advocate/decree holder herein  in satisfaction  of the decree  issued  herein; which two positions  are quite distinct, contradictory and inconsistent.

In my view, this court  cannot  and has no power  to order  for the decree passed  in an Environment and Land Court  to be  brought  into this court  for settlement  of the  decree herein, other than in a manner  provided  for under Section 38(c )  and order  23 of the Civil Procedure Act and  Rules  on attachment  of debts  or Garnishee proceedings which have  to be commenced  by the decree holder.  The judgment  debtor in this case  is however, selecting  the mode of execution of decree  herein  for the decree  holder  and that mode  is that “please, attach my decree in ELC 133/2007 which  is  not yet  due for  settlement  but take it  and enforce  it, take your money and give me  the balance.”

In my considered  view, the application herein  is the reverse mode of  Section 38 (c)  and Order 23  of the Civil Procedure  Act and Rules  which is  an abuse  of the process of court and  is therefore  misconceived.

In addition, to call for the decree in ELC 133/2007 is to interfere with the process of the Environment and Land Court, which is a superior court of the same status as the High Court, but not subordinate to this court.  The Environment and Land Court is an independent superior court, as established under Article 162 (2) (b) of the Constitution.  It is a Court that operates independent of the High Court and its decrees cannot be enforced by this court (High Court).  The execution of decree herein by the decree holder by way of attachment is a legal process hence the principle of legality is fulfilled.

On whether  it is appropriate  to enforce  decree  by way of attachment, I find in the affirmative for reasons  that the decree holder  has chosen  the most appropriate mode  of execution of decree and should it not  bear any fruits, he has  other options  available  under Section 38 of  the Civil Procedure  Act.  It cannot be stated that  attachment  of property  subjects the judgment debtor  to anguish as the judgment debtor  has not demonstrated  any anguish  that she  is likely  to suffer.  In any event, she states that she is unemployed and that she has no attachable property, which allegations have been counteracted by the decree holder.

The decree holder has exhibited evidence of a motor vehicle KBA 172E as belonging to the judgment debtor who has not controverted that fact.  The judgment debtor has not shown that if that motor vehicle is sold, it will not fetch the decretal sum claimed or that its attachment and sale will subject her to untold hardship.

In my view, the judgment debtor  only intends to stretch  and postpone  the payment of the decretal sum so  long as she  is able to engage  the decree holder  in endless  legal gymnastics  which  I find, are clearly  intended to delay  justice and abuse  the process  of court.

The judgment debtor displayed dishonesty by citing HCC 133/2007 while knowing that the matter is an Environment and Land Court matter ELC 133/2007 and which decree can only be enforced by the ELC and not by the High Court.  The Judgment debtor also stated that she was unemployed but does not disclose where she got the Ksh 70,000/- which she paid to the decree holder.  She claimed that she has tried to plead with decree holder to be patient and wait until she sorts  out her  financial issues  but that  he has adamantly  refused  which plea  was only  made  on 13th March 2014  after the  decree holder  had written  on 13th March 2014 asking for timelines of settlement  and to date 12th May, 2015, there is no indications  as to when those financial  issues would or are likely to be sorted out.

The judgment debtor has  not demonstrated  that she is even in the process of executing that  decree  in ELC 133/2007 to recover  the costs as awarded to her yet the decree  was passed  on  20th April 2012  and it  appears  from the annexture  AAJJ that she  only extracted  the said decree in ELC 133/2007 after the proclamation by Keysian Auctioneers  on 17th March  2014  and equally, she only had her bill of costs  taxed  in the same  ELC 133/2007  on 11th February 2014 against the Attorney General and extracted   the certificate of costs on 18th March 2014.  This was only after the decree holder herein sought to enforce his decree against her by the proclamation of 17th March 2014.  No doubt, the judgment debtor is not interested in expeditious justice but inside shows and cannot earn this court’s consideration.  Justice is for both parties to a dispute.  The decree holder has a legitimate expectation to expeditiously recover his fees as decreed by the court, yet the judgment debtor does not seem interested in pursuing her own claim against the judgment debtor in ELC 133/2007 and wants to offload that burden to the decree holder herein.  That is not permissible.  This court finds that it would be unfair and unjust to allow the judgment debtor delegate her own role of battling out with the Attorney General over costs to the decree holder advocate who is not a party to those proceedings in the ELC matter. She must bear her own burden.

In the circumstances, I find no merit in the judgment debtor’s application and submissions   and I accordingly   dismiss it with costs to the respondent /decree holder.

Turning on to the objector’s application and objection to the proclamation  of attachment  of movable property dated 17th March 2014 by Keysian Auctioneers,  I have carefully  considered  the application, supporting affidavit of Laura Akinyi Odhiambo, the replying affidavit  by the decree  holder and  the oral submissions  by counsels  on the same. The only issue for determination is whether the objection proceedings herein are meritorious.

Under Order 22 Rule 51(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules 2010,

“51 (1)  Any  person claiming to be  entitled  to or to have a legal  or equitable  interest  in the whole  or part of any property  attached  in execution  of a decree  may at  any time  prior to payment out of the  proceeds  of sale of such  property  give  notice in writing to  the court and to all the parties  and to the  decree holder  of this objection to the attachment  of such property.

(2) Such notice shall be accompanied by an application supported by affidavit and shall set out in brief the nature of the claim which such objector or person makes to the whole or portion of the property attached.”

Under  Rule  52, the objector  is entitled to  an automatic  stay of  execution  upon  complying  with Rule  51 and  under Rule 53,  if the judgment debtor after receipt  of notice of  objection  to attachment fails  to reply  to the court within  the period  prescribed  by the Notice  the attachment  shall be raised.

The objector contends that she has an equitable interest in the chattels as listed in the proclamation dated 17th March 2014.  The decree holder on the other hand states that  he is personally known to both the judgment debtor and objector  herein who are mother and  daughter  respectively, and that  the house from which  the chattels  were proclaimed  is rented by the judgment debtor  and not the objector  who is a student at  Kenya Polytechnic, and who did not demonstrate that the items proclaimed  belonged to her.

I have carefully examined the rival submissions and contentious and the annextures including the tenancy agreement exhibited by the objector.  No doubt, the lease agreement annexed is a document that expired at midnight on 1st May 2013 and there is no demonstration that the same was renewed in her favour, assuming as deposed in her affidavit, that she is the tenant in Nyayo Embakasi Estate, Court 292 House No. 013, and not her mother the judgment debtor herein.  Even assuming  that she  was a tenant  by way of an  oral agreement, the objector did not display any evidence  that she was paying  for any water or electricity as a consumer thereof and or resident of the said premises which would  have persuaded  this court  to believe her. There is no evidence that the rent payable was inclusive of water and electricity charges. She did not even avail evidence of deposit of Kshs 27. 000. 00 allegedly paid and held by the landlord as required by the lease agreement annexed to her affidavit.

The attached receipts for rent dated 22/1/2014 and 18/2/12014 respectively do not even state for which specific months the rent was being paid and or received by whom.  In addition, clause 4. 3 of the annexed tenancy agreement is clear that rent was payable monthly in advance on or before 5th of each month. The receipts attached are in my view a creation by the objector and do not appear genuine and I reject them.

Further, the objector did not exhibit any evidence or receipt showing that any of the items contained in the schedule of movable property belonged to her.  The schedule shows that all the 11 items were old.  With affidavit  evidence  from the  decree holder that the objector  is a student  at Kenya  Polytechnic  University and that  she had personally approached him  requesting  for more  time to be  given  to her mother  to settle  the claim, it is  surprising  that a college student  could suddenly  have become  a proud  owner of:

old sofa sets

old colour  television,

old floor carpets

old music  system, old  assorted curtains

old cooker and a cylinder

old fridge

and a microwave

an  old television cabinet

old  wall picture

old  coffee table and old stools

old dining  table and old chairs

old assorted puffs

All valued at about 120,000/- which items, according to the said attached proclamation  were left in the custody of  the judgment debtor Ann Achieng  for attachment after the  expiry of the period  in the notice  of proclamation of attachment. The objector, on the other hand said nothing concerning those clear facts of old household goods, her being a student and the fact that the goods were left in the custody of her mother after proclamation. She did not claim to be housing her mother. The objector did not deny that she was the daughter to the judgment debtor and that she was a university student. She had nothing to comment as to when and how she acquired all the old chattels that were attached and or proclaimed.

This court is indeed  inclined to believe  the decree holder  that the  annexed expired lease tenancy agreement  is suspect as there is no  rent deposit  in the purported  landlord’s  bank account  as provided  for in clause  4. 3 thereof.  In addition, it is common  ground  that a  university student  who is  unemployed (as it was never disclosed that the objector  is employed) living with her  parents, cannot, as  a matter of fact  be the owner of   her parent’s  chattels in  as much as  she may be the user  thereof.

From  the decree holder’s replying affidavit  at paragraph’s  9,10, which depositions have not been controverted  in any way by the objector, I am persuaded that the objector  and her mother  the judgment  debtor  are well  known to the decree   holder  and that  the objection proceedings  herein are a red herring  and a smoke screen intended  to deceive  this court to aid  the judgment debtor  escape  justice at that.

For those reasons, I dismiss  the objector’s  Notice of Motion dated  24th  March 2014 and order  her to pay to the  decree holder costs of the objection  proceedings  for allowing herself  to be used  by her less than  candid  mother to steal a match on the decree holder.

In the same breath, I dismiss the judgment debtor’s application dated 24th March 2014 with costs to the advocate/decree holder.

Dated, signed and delivered in open court at Nairobi this 12th day of May, 2015.

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE

12/5/2015

Coram Aburili J.

C.C. Kavata

Mr Mungla for the applicant/respondent advocate.

No appearance for objector/applicant

No appearance for respondent /client

COURT- Ruling read and pronounced in open court.  The ruling was scheduled for delivery on 22nd January 2015 but was inadvertently omitted from the cause listing for that day

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE

12/5/2015