Paul S. Kambatika v Zambia Electricity Supplies Corporation Ltd (Appeal 186 of 2000) [2001] ZMSC 123 (24 April 2001)

IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR ZAMBIA APPEAL NO. 186 OF 2000 HOLDEN AT LUSAKA (Civil Jurisdiction) BETWEEN: PAUL S KAMBATIKA APPELLANT AND ZAMBIA ELECTRICITY SUPPLIES CORPORATION LIMITED RESPONDENT CORAM: Ngulube, CJ, late Chaila, JS, and Chibesakunda, JS. On 1st February, 2001 and 24th April, 2002. For the appellant - F. S. Chunga, of Silweya and Company For respondent - Mrs. M. Lisimba and C. Siamutwa, Inhouse Counsel. JUDGMENT Ngulube, CJ, delivered the judgment of the Court. Case referred to: 1. Attorney-General -v- Richard Jackson Phiri (1988-89) ZR 121. On 1st February, 2001, when we heard this appeal, we dismissed it with costs and said we would give our reasons later. The judgment giving such reasons was to have been written by our brother Chaila but following his untimely death this judgment may now be taken as that of the majority. The appellant was the plaintiff and the respondent the defendant and this is what we shall call them. The plaintiff worked for the defendant as a driver from 1st April, 1974, until 19th October, 1989, when he was dismissed on disciplinary grounds. He was charged with misconduct when he took two bags of cement from the defendant’s premises without authority and when he took the vehicle he had used to his house over lunch contrary to instructions. He was called upon to exculpate himself and he did so; he appeared before domestic disciplinary tribunals and was given a hearing. Nonetheless, he sued for wrongful dismissal. The learned trial Judge dismissed the action, finding that all the correct procedures had been followed and natural justice duly observed. It was argued before us that though the plaintiff had been subjected to the administrative procedures applicable within the company, there was nonetheless unfairness because the plaintiff had to appear before the personnel officer and the two security guards who had caught him at it. It is infact very fair that a person accused should have the opportunity to confront his accusers and to cross-examine them. The truth here, as Mrs. Lisimba submitted, was that the correct procedures had all been followed and the opportunity was given to the plaintiff to exculpate himself. The dishonest conduct alleged amounted to a dismissable offence and he was duly summarily dismissed. It was quite pointless to expect this Court to simply substitute its own views for those of the domestic disciplinary tribunals. As we have said in many cases in the past, it is not the function of the Court to interpose itself as an appellate tribunal within the domestic disciplinary procedures to review what others have done. The duty of the Court is to examine if there was the necessary disciplinary power and if this had been exercised in due form. Where natural justice is expected, the Court examines if this was satisfied. Of course, the Court will also be concerned to see that the disciplinary procedures were properly invoked, that is to say, that there was infact a sufficient substratum of fact to support their invocation since otherwise the exercise of disciplinary powers will be regarded as bad: See our decision on all these points in ATTORNEY­ GENERAL —v- RICHARD JACKSON PHIRI (1). It was for the foregoing reasons that we dismissed this appeal. M. M. S. W. Ngulube, CHIEF JUSTICE. L. P. Chibesakunda, SUPREME COURT JUDGE. FOR YOUR SIGNATURE NGULUBE CJ