People v Attorney General and Ors (2025/HP/0482) [2025] ZMHC 152 (22 December 2025)

IN THE HIGH COURT FOR ZAMBIA AT THE PRINCIPAL REGISTRY HOLDEN AT LUSAKA (CIVIL JURISDICTION) 2025/HP/0482 IN THE MATTER OF: ORDER 5 3 RULE 3 O F THE RULES O F THE SUPREME COURT OF ENGLAND AND 1965 (THE WHITE BOOK) 1999 SECTION 145 ( 1 ), OF THE ZAMBIA WILDLIFE ACT NO. 14 OF 2015 OF THE LAWS O F ZAMBIA THE FAILURE BY THE MINISTER OF TOURISM AND ARTS TO RENDER A DECISION OF AN APPEAL AGAINST THE D E CISION OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL PARKS AND WILDLIFE ON AN APPLICATION F O R DISCLOSURE OF REQUESTED DOCUMENTATION F R OM THE LOWER ZAMBEZI NATIONAL PARK AND IN THE MATTER OF: AND IN THE MATTER OF: BETWF. EN: THE PEOPLE AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Ex-parte CHAPTER ONE FOUNDATION Ex-parte CONSERVATION ADVOCATES ZAMBIA RESPONDENT 1 S T APPLICANT 2ND APPLICANT Before the Honourable Mrs Justice Ru t h Chibbabbuka on the 22n d day of December, 2025 F'or the Applicant: For the Respondent : Mr B. Malisa, Messr s Malisa and Partners Legal Pr acli lioncrs Mr C . Bikoko and Ms A. Bowa, State Advocates JUDGMENT Cases refe rred to: 7. Derrick Chitala (Secretary of tlte Zam /J ill Democratic Congress Vs The Attorney General (7 995- 97) Z. R 9 1 2. Zambia Federation of Employers V.s The l\tlomey General 20 7 2/ HP/ 0884 3. Dean Namulya Mung'omba and others Vs /Jeter Machungwa Golden Mandandila and another SCZ Judgment No. 3 of 2003 Jl 4. R Vs Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex-parte National Federation of Self Employment & Small Businesses Ltd [1982/ AC 617 5. Cahil Vs Sutton (1980) 1. R 2 69 6. Chikuta Vs Chipata Rural Council (1974) Z. R 241 7. Ridge Vs Baldwin [1964} A. C 40 8. Council of Civil Service Union Vs Minister for Civil Service 1985 A. C 374 9. Associated Provincial Picture Houses Vs Wednesbury Corporation (1 948) 1 K. B 223 CA 10. Council of Civic Service Union Vs Minister of State for Civil Service (1984) 3 ALL E. R 935 11. Patel V Municipal Council of Broken Hill 1912 R&N 600 12. The People Vs Luanshya Municipal Council, ex parte Chendaeka (1969) ZR 69 7 3. The People Vs Livingstone Municipal Council, ex parte Simioti (1969) ZR 53 (HC) 14. Re RH (1999) WDA 20 7 1 15. Padfiled Vs Agriculture Food and Fisheries (1968) AC 997 Legisla tion referred to: High Court Act, Chapter 27 of the Laws of Zambia Rules of the Supreme Court, 1999 Edition (The White Book) Other works re ferre d to: Administrative Law in Zambia: Cases and Material Chewe, A. N (2 020), Juta and Company Limited, Claremont at page 3 96 Black's Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition, Bryan A. Gamer Judicial Review of Public decisions, Citizens Information, www.citizensinformation.ie 1.0 Introduction This is an a pplication by w ay of Judicial Review made pursuant to Order 53 Rule 3 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1999 Edition (The White Book), for an Order of Mandamus to compel the Minister to perform h is statutory duty. The applicant a lleges that the resp onden t's disr egard and n eglect to a dher e to the procedure as prescribed is procedurally improper, illegal and irrational. Leave having b een granted to commence judicial review proceedings on the 6 th May, 2 0 25, the same operate d as a stay of the respondent's actions throu gh the Department of National Parks and Wild life granting Tourism Concession Agr eements in the Lower Zambezi National Park until final determinalion of the matter. 1.1 Reliefs S o ught The m ain applicant seeks the following reliefs: J2 1. An order of mandamus directed to the Minister of Tourism and Arts compelling him to perform his statutory duty under Section 145(1) of the Zambia Wildlife Act No. 14 of 2015 to determine the Appeal submitted to him by the applicants on the 3 rd day of February, 2025 and to render and communicate his decision to the applicants in writing. 2. An order of mandamus compelling the Minister of Tourism and Arts to fulfil his statutory duty under Section 38 (1) of the Zambia Wildlife Act No. 14 of 2015 by undertaking a comprehens ive Wildlife Impact Assessment in the Lower Zambezi National Park, as formally requested in a letter dated 3 rd February, 2025. Furthermore, the Minister is required to ensure that the findings of the assessment are duly documented, finalized and formally served upon the applicants in accordance with legal and procedural r equirements. 3. Costs. 1.2 Facts relied on On the 2 nd June, 2023, the 2 nd applicant t hrough its advocates wrote a letter to the Director of the Department of National Parks and Wildlife (DNPW) asserting that Tourism Concession Agreements within the Lower Zambezi National Park had been awarded by DNPW without adherence to a public tendering process. This lack of transparency was said to have resulted in an information gap among members of the public which led to the 1st applicant formally requesting access to all r elevant documents pertaining to the aforementioned agreements. On the 26Lh June, 2023, the 1st applicant wrote a follow up letter to the Director of DNPW reminding them no response had b een provided to the request made in the previous correspondence. In light of the refusal of DNPW to avail the requested documentation, the 1s t applicant filed a petition into court on the 7 th September, 2023 alongside other environmental issues in the petition in relation to the granting of Tourism Concession Agreements through Adaptive Management processes. On the 16 th April, 2024, the Constitutional Court rendered a judgment in two parts being the majority judgment and the J3 dissenting judgment. In the dissenting judgment, the Court affirmed the 1st applicant's right to access the requested documentation. On the 2nd December, 2024, the 1st and 2nd applicants wrote to the Director DNPW, formally requesting for the documentation relating to the award of Tourism Concessions in the Lower Zambezi National Park. In response, the respondent acknowledged receipt of the letter on the 13th December, 2024. Another letter dated 26 th December, 2024 was written by the DNPW in response to the applicant's letter of the 2nd December, 2024. This letter provided a justification for the DNPW's reliance on adaptive management processes but regrettably failed to address the matter of furnishing the requested documentation as previously sought by the applicants. In order to formally notify the respondent of their failure to address and provide the documents requested for in prior correspondence, and to reiterate t h eir request, the applicants wrote a letter to the Director of DNPW, on the 15th January, 2025. That in accordance with the guidance provided by the Constitutional Court in the aforementioned judgment, the applicants on the 3rd February, 2025 submitted a formal letter to the Honourable Minister of Tourism and Arts, requesting that a Wildlife Impact Assessment be conducted in the Lower Zambezi National Park. Upon observing the respondents continued failure to provide the requested documentation, the applicants resolved to escalate the matter by lodging an appeal with the Minister of Tourism and Arts, citing the Director of DNPW 's non-disclosure of the required documentation. 1.3 Affidavit verifying facts An affidavit verifying facts was filed on the 8 th April, 2 025 sworn and deposed to by Raymond Kaima, a Governance Specialist in the 2 nd applicant company. The said affidavit verifies the facts as outlined above . 1.4 Grounds on which relief is sought Procedural impropriety J4 On the ground of procedural impropriety, the applicants contend as follows: a . The respondent wilfully disregarded and/or neglected to adhere to the procedures prescribed under Section 146 ( 1) and (2) (d) of the Act concerning the handling of the appeal submitted by the applicant. Pursuant to the provisions of the Act, the respondent is legally obligated to collaborate with the Director of the DNPW to establish regulations aimed at facilitating the effective implementation of the law. That these regulations are required to include procedural mechanisms for the Minister to hear and determine appeals, thereby ensuring the existence of a robust system for addressing grievance and resolving disputes arising under the Act. b. The respondent failed and/ or neglected to comply with the procedural requirements set forth under Section 38 (1) of the Zambia Wildlife Act. In accordance with the Act, the respondent is legally obligated to conduct a Wildlife Impact Assessment upon request by a party that has reasonable grounds to believe that an existing or proposed government plan, activity, or action undertaken by the Government, an individual, or an organisation may result in adverse effects on wildlife within in the National Park, as was the case with the applicants. c. In the present case, the respondent has neither initiated an inquiry to address the issues raise d in the appeal nor formally rejected the appeal by providing written reasons to the applicants. Such inaction represents a deviation from the procedural requirements established under the Zambia Wildlife Act and amounts to procedural impropriety. Furthermore, the respondent has failed and/ or neglected to respond to the afor ementioned letter requesting the conduct of a Wildlife Impact Assessment. To date, no such assessment has b een undertaken, d espite the formal request and the statutory obligation imposed under the relevant provision Illegality Under the ground of illegality, the applicant contends as follows: JS a. The respondent's failure to d etermine the appeal and carry out a Wildlife Impact Assessment, as mandated by Section 145 (1) and 38 (1) of the Zambia Wildlife Act r espectively, constitutes an illegality and amounts to an abdication of a statutory duty. Section 145 (2) of the Act further stipulates that any decision rendered b y the Minister following an appeal is subject to further appeal before the High Court. This provision underscores the legal obligation of the Minister to render a decision. The law does not permit the Minister to remain inactive or fail to address the appeal, as is the case in the present matter. Such inaction by the respondent amounts to breach of a statutory duty and constitutes an illegality. Irrationality Under the ground of irrationality, the applicant contends that: a . The respondent's failure and/or neglect to either consider and determine the applicant's appeal or outrightly reject it and communicate its d ecision, even after the lapse of over 2 years, is unreasonable and constitutes a violation of the principles established under the W ednesbury standard of unreasonableness. No reasonable administrative body, properly applying itself to the relevant law and facts, would take more than a year to decide whether to accept or reject an application, especially given that the applicants have been actively requesting the necessary documentation for a period exceeding 1 year. b. The failure by the respondent amounts to a continuing breach of the applicant's constitutionality guaranteed rights under Article 255 (m) of the Constitution, which provides that the public shall have access to environmen tal information in order to preserve, protect and conserve the environment. c. The respondent's unjustified delay in rendering its decision is unreasonable, particularly in light of Section 145 (1) of the Zambia Wildlife Act, which expressly allows an aggrieved party to appeal the decision of the Director of the DNPW to the Minister. The J6 respondent's failure to either reject or consider the appeal constitutes unreasonable conduct, as the absence of a decision creates a clog in the administrative process available to the applicants. This inaction effectively obstructs the applicants' ability to seek recourse through the administrative channels that are dependent on the respondent's decision . d. The respondent's failure and/ or neglect to provide a response or, more critically, to take action on the applicant's request: for the Minister to conduct a Wildlife Assessment within a two-month period was unreasonable given the sensitivity of the matter. The inaction is particularly concerning in light of th e applicant's prior notification that the department has been continually awarding Tourism Concession Agreements, resulting in overcrowding in the western part of the Lower Zambezi National park. Such failure to act constitutes an ongoing bre ach of the applicant's rights under Section 38 of the Zambia Wildlife Act, thereby jeopardizing ecological balance and potentially leading to irreversible environmental degradation in the affected area. 2.0 The applicant's submissions in support of the Judicial Review application Counsel for the applicant in their Notice filed on the 8 th April, 2025 contended that the respondent is the Chief Advisor to the Government of the Republic of Zambia and is sued in that capacity pursuant to the provisions of the State Proceedings Act and the High Court is vested with the constitutionally prescribed jurisdiction to review the actions, inaction and decisions of statutory bodies and other exercising a public func tion such as the respondent. Th at in this regard, the Constitution under Article 134 (c) A ct No. 2 of 2016 states: "134. The High Court has subject to Article 128- (c) jurisdiction to review decisions as prescribed J7 It was counsel's further argument th at the r espondent is a body amenable to judicial review and for this argument reference was made to the case of Derrick Chitala (Secretary of the Zambia Democratic Congress Vs The Attorney General1 . Counsel went on to contend that the Minister of Tourism and the Director of the Department, exer cise functions as outlin ed under Section 5 (2) of the Zambia Wildlife Act No. 14 of 2015. That th ese functions clearly constitute p ublic duties, thereby rendering them subj ect to judicial review. Furthermore, that in the process of hearing appeals, the respondent performs functions that are undeniably quasi-judicial in nature, which underscores the n eed for compliance with legal standards and procedural fairness in the execution of s u c h duties. Counsel contended that the superior courts in this jurisdiction h ave advanced and affirmed the scope and breadth of judicial review through a series of landmark d ecisions. That in the case of Zambia Federation of Employers Vs The Attorney Genera12 Judge Kondolo S. C as he was then stated succinctly that: "In Zambia, the length and breadth of judicial review has been pronounced in several Supreme Court decisions and High Court matters one of which is Nyampala Safaris Zambia Limited & others Vs Zambia Wildlife Authority in which the Court said as follows: ' .. .. A decision of an inferior Court or a public authority may be quashed (by an order of certiorari) where the Court or authority acted: - 1. Without jurisdiction 2. Exceeded its jurisdiction 3. Or failed to comply with rules of natural justice where those rules are applicable 4. Where there is an e rror of law on the face of the record; or 5. The decision is unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense J8 It was argued further that the Supreme Court in the case of Derrick Chitala (Secretary of the Zambia Democratic Congress) Vs The Attorney General in approvin g the principles from the English jurisprudence simplified th e grounds of judicial review as follows: "Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can consistently classify under three heads the grounds upon which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call "illegality", the second "irrationality" and third ''procedural impropriety". Counsel submitted that in relation to cit ation of parties, in the case of Dean Namulya Mung'omba and others Vs Peter Machungwa Golden Mandandila and another3 the Supreme Court h eld that: "1. There is no rule under the High Court in which judicial proceedings can be instituted and conduced. Thus, by virtue of Section 10 of the High Court Act Chapter 27 of the Laws of Zambia, the High Court is guided as to the procedure and practice to be adopted .. .. 3. Order 53 is comprehensive. It provides for the basis of judicial review; the parties; how to seek the remedies and what remedies are available." That in th e foregoing case, it was stated that our High Court Rules were not applicable and fur ther t h at u nder t h e Rules of the Supreme Court of England 1965 (White Book), the citation of parties in judicial review matters, parties are cited as herein cited. Counsel went on to argue that the applicant furth er relies on the underlying policy that a ll inferior courts and authorities h ave only limited jurisdiction or powers and must be kept within in their legal bounds . That this is the concern of the crown, for the sake of ordinary administration of justice, but it is a private complaint, which sets the crown in motion. J9 2.1 The applicant's skeleton arguments In their skeleton arguments, filed on the 8th April, 2025, counsel argued that notwithstanding the statutory obligation imposed upon the respondent under Section 145 (1) and (2) of the Zambia Wildlife Act wh ich mandates the rendering of a decision upon receipt of an appeal, the respondent, has to date, failed to provide a determination on the matter. That this omission constitutes a breach of statutory duty as prescribed by the said section 145 (1) and (2) of the Zambia Wildlife Act which states: "145 (1) A person who is aggrieved with the decision of the Director or Committee under this Act may appeal to the Minister within thirty days of the receipt of the decision of the Director of Committee. (2) The decision of the Minister on an appeal under this section shall be subject to appeal to the High Court within thirty days of the receipt of the decision of the Minister. It was counsel's considered view that an inference arises from the foregoing provisions establishing that the respondent is statutorily obliged to r ender a decision upon receipt of an a ppeal. That upon receiving the applicant's appeal on the 3 rd February, 2025, Lhe respondent incurred a legal duty to decide on the said appeal and to communicate its determination to the applicant. Further that t h e respondent has failed Lo fulfil these statutory obligations as no decision has been rende r ed, nor has any communication b een made to the applicants in relation to the appeal. Counsel a rgued that the applicants have demonstrated before this court that on the 3 rd February, 2025, they formally submitted a letter to the respondent, requesting the respondent's intervention in conducting a Wildlife Impact Assessment in t h e lower Zambezi National Park. That the respondent has to date faile d lo take any action in respect of this request and that this omission constitutes a. breach of a statutory duty, contrary to the provisions of Section 38 (1) of the Zambia Wildlife Act which explicitly mandates the Minister to carry out such an assessment as it provides: JlO "38(1) A person who has reasonable grounds to believe that a proposed or existing government plan or activity of the Government, an organisation or person may have an adverse effect on wildlife in a National Park, Community Partnership Park, bird or wildlife sanctuary, Game Management Area or open area, may request the Minister through the Director that a wildlife impact assessment be conducted." In m aking r efer ence to the foregoing p rovision, counsel c ontended that an inference of the same establishes th at th e respon den t is statu torily obligated to conduct a Wildlife Impact Assessmen t . Counsel was of the consider ed view that upon receivin g t he applicant's requ est on 3 rd Febru ary, 2 0 25, the r espondent incurred a legal duty to not only conduct the assessment but also to communicate its find ings to the applicants. On this basis, coun sel submitted that the applicants have demonstrated sufficient grounds to seek the remedy of mandamus, compelling the respondent to fulfil its statutory obligations. For this argument r eference was mad e to the learned author of Administrative Law in Zambia: Cases and Material Chewe, A. N (2020), Juta and Company Limited, Claremont at page 396 which states: "The remedy of mandamus operates to compel an administrative authority to perform its duty. It does not lie to direct the authority with respect to the manner in which to perform such duty. In Zambia, mandamus has shown great potential for being a good device to compel administrative bodies to execute their duties. It has been invoked in many cases. In two licensing cases namely, the People u Luanshya Municipal Council ex parte Chendaeka (1969) ZR 69 and The People v Livingstone Municipal Council ex parte Simioti, (1969) ZR 53 mandamus was expected as an appropriate device to compel licensing authorities to hear and determine applications for trading licenses in accordance with the law." On the foregoing submissions, counsel prayed that an Order of Mandamu s be granted. J11 3.0 The respondent's Affidavit in Opposition The respondent filed an affidavit in opposition on the 23 rd July, 2025 sworn and deposed to by Dominic Chiinda a Director in the DNPW who avers as follows: The applicants wrote to the respondent to request for information with regard to the award of Tourism Concession Agreements in the Lower Zambezi National Park. In response, the respondent on the 26 th December, 2024 did write to the applicants providing information with r egard to the Tourism Concession Agreements and further explained that the respondent was open for any further meetings to clarify any concern s the a pplicants may have. By a letter dated 3 rd February, 2025, the applicants appealed to the Minister, seekin g his indulgence in a review of the decision by t he DNPW issued in respecl of the letter regarding the request for documentation as made by themselves. Before the Minister of Tourism could h ear and determine the Appeal, the applicants proceeded to commence Judicial Review proceedings against the respondent. The Minister requested for a meeting with the applicants for the purpose of gaining a comprehensive understanding of the appeal. The purpose of the meeting was to explore how best the matter could be resolved and to cater to the interest of all stakeholders. The DNPW has not issued any Tourism Block Concession in any National Park or Game Management Arca since 2015. The Department has instead been granting Tourism Concession Agreements for leasing of tourism sites on a regular basis as part of the national agenda to develop national parks using internal guidelines for site a llocation. The DNPW h as granted approximately 70 tourism sites to various operation over the years through Tourism Concession Agreements for accommoda tion and other tourism purposes across the country using the same guidelines. The Department has not exceeded any limits of sites in any Protected Area that has resulted in overcrowding and degradation of n atural ecosystems. The General Management Plans for South Luangwa and Kafue National Parks are still valid and tourism developments have been allowe d in zones where developments through tourism concession agreements are permissible. The Lower Zambezi National Park however, has no subsisting General J12 Management Plan as such all-site a llocation through tourism concession agr eements are based on internal guidelines for site allocation in the park and Game Management Areas. One of the manda tes of the DNPW is to carry out commercial activities related to consumptive and non-consumptive tourism and carry out any other activities r elating to tourism wildlife conservation and management. Accordingly, the Minister through the D ep artment has the responsibility to award sites subject to laid down procedur es in order t o promote and increase b ed capacity in National Parks so as to raise revenue for s u stainable wildlife conservation and managem ent of wildlife protected areas. In circumstances where a Protected Area h as an expired General Management Plan (GMP) or no GMP, the Ministry of Tourism through the DNPW is mandated to manage such a Protected Area and in doing so it uses Adaptive Management Processes by relying on site suitability assessm ents and guidelines formulated for such circumstances. Prior to any site award, it is a requirement that a multidisciplinary team of officers conducts a s ite suitability assessm ent, which r eport informs managem ent decisions. The final determination for granting of tourism sites is made after r eceiving a positive decision letter of the Environmental Project Brief (EPB) or Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) from U,e Zambia Environmental Agency (ZEMA), acceptable business plan, negotiation of terms and conditions and clearances by the Ministries of Tourism, Finance and Jus tice . The awarding of sites is a fair and transparent p rocess executed in accord ance ,vith To urism Concession Investmen t Guidelines (Guidelines on site allocation to investors) and relying on t he a pproved Client Service Charter for the Ministry of Tourism and the DNPW. Any investor at anytime is at liberty to a pply for sites in the National Parks across the country, subject to s ite availability as p art of the n ationa l agen da to develop n ational p arks. The Department as a public institution h as a lways availed information to a n y person or institu tion that requ ests for information that may b e availed to the public. The Departmen t relies on formulated guidelines for th e award of J13 Tourism Concession Agreemen ts as neith er the Act n or Gener a l Managemen t plans prescr ibe procedures for so doing. 3 . 1 The respondent's skeleton arguments In their skeleton arguments filed on even date, counsel for the respondent argued that this case is not fit for judicial review as the a p plicants have presented before this cour t misguided or trivial complaints of an administrative nature. For thi s a r gumen t relia n ce was p laced on th e case of Derrick Chitala (Secretary of the Zambia Democratic Congress) Vs Attorney General. Counsel argued further that t h e a pplicants lack th e r equis ite locus standi as their interest is expressed as that of "pu blic interest" in transp arent concession -awarding. That in th e case of R Vs Inland Revenue Com missioners, Ex-parte National Fede ration of Self Employme nt & Small Businesses Ltd4 Lord Dip lock h eld that: "mere interest of a citizen in having correct administration of the law is insufficient" It was counsel's furth er submission that in an a pplication for judicial review, the thresh old inquiry is w h eth er the app licant possess a sufficien t interest in the d ecision ch a llen ged. That t h e applicants a s sert that the awar d of th e Tourism Concession Agreements with in the Lower Zamb ezi was not p ublic enough , yet advances no claim that they themselves were a b idder, a prospective concessionaire, or otherwise personally harmed by the process. Further that in an application for judicial review an applicant must show more t han "intellectual interest or concern for good governance". Rather they must demonstrate or have real personal interest in an outcome which is something that goes beyond mere public spiritedness or curiosity. For these arguments, reference was made to the case of Ca hil Vs Sutton5 where Henchy J stated: "Where the person who questions the validity of a law can point to no right of his which has by reason of the alleged invalidity been broken, endangered or threatened, then, if nothing more can be advanced, the courts should not entertain a question so raised. J14 To do so would be to make of the Courts the happy hunting ground of the busy-body and the crank." Counsel argued further that a precondition to invoke Judicial Review is the existence of a decision or action by the public authority that is capable of being reviewed. That where no decision has been made, that is where there is an omission or inaction, the jurisdictional basis for judicial review is significantly undermined unless it can be shown that the inaction amounts to a constructive refusal or abuse of discretion. Counsel went on to argue that the Director of National Parks and Wildlife wrote to the applicants on 26 th December, 2024 stating that the department had been issuing out Tourism Concession Agreements within the Lower Zambezi. Further that the Director stated that the area in question had no subsisting General Management Plan but relied on internal guidelines and Game Management Areas. That although Section 28 (5) of the Zambia Wildlife Act No, 14 of 2015 which provides that the Minister is not prevented from granting concession agreements within a Game Management Area this had not been done . It was counsel's considered view that unless the applicants could demonstrate that the delay by the Minister is a failure to perform a statutory duty under Section 145 (1) o[ the Zambia Wildlife Act No. 14 of 2 015 then judicial review could not be employed as it cannot serve as a tool to compel authorities to make decisions in the absence of a clear legal duty to do so within a defined time frame. That the courts are primarily concerned with assessing whether a d ecision once made, was unlawful due to irrationality, procedural unfairness or illegality and not with intervening in administrative silence per se. Reference was made to Section 145 of the Zambia Wildlife Act, of 2015 which provides" "A person who is aggrieved with the decision of the Director or the Committee under this Act may appeal to the Minister within thirty days of the receipt of the decision of the Director or Committee." Counsel argued that where a written law has laid down a procedure to follow, a ll parties are bound by that procedure and a party has no jurisdiction to address an issue via any means other than the laid down procedure. For this JlS argument reliance was placed on the case of Chikuta Vs Chipata Rural Counci16 . That the applicants herein lodged an appeal to the Minister of Tourism, and the decision of the Minister in this m atter has not been determined. Notwithstanding this position, the Minister should be allowed an opportunily to h ear and determine the matter. Counsel contended that while judicial review traditionally targets decisions rather than omissions, in certain cases, a prolonged failure to act where the action is mandated by the law itself can be the subject of Judicial Review. But that such a claim would n eed to be carefully framed around the failure to perform a legal duty and not merely dissatisfied with administrative silence. That the appellants have not demonstrated the appropriateness of the remedy of judicial review. [twas counsel's further argument that Sections 5 and 2 of the Zambia Wildlife Act No. 14 of201S give the DNPW authority to enter into agreements to carry out commercial activities related to tourism which involves conventional tourist activities such as viewing animals, photographing, bird watching, wilderness walks, walking safaris, angling, canoeing and boat ride. Further that the said Act empowers the Department to encourage development of wildlife and regulate tourism block concessions consequently, the awarding of Tourism Concession Agreements is an incidental power of the Department. In response to the grounds relied on by the applicant for judicial review, counsel for th e respondent contended as follows: Procedural impropriety or failure to comply with the rules of natural justice It was counsel's conlention that where the rules of natural justice apply and the decision has been reached in breach of those rules judicial review will lie and for this argument reference was made to the case of Ridge Vs Baldwin7 . That the rules of natural justice embody a duty to act fairly. Further that procedural impropriety was defined in the case of Council of Civil Service Union Vs Minister for Civil Service 8 wher e Lord Diplock stated that: "Procedural impropriety is the breach of an express stat;,..,1.tory requirement and comm.on rules of natural justice. " J16 Counsel argued that the respondent has neither breach ed any express statutory requirement n or the common rules of natural justice. That this is because neither the Minister nor the Director have rejected the request of the applicant. It was counsel's considered view that the applic ants h ave misconstrued t he provisions of Section 145 (1) of the Zambia Wildlife Act which provides: "A person who is aggrieved with the decision of the Director or Committed under this Act may appeal to the Minister within thirty days of the receipt of the decision of the Director or Committee." Further th at Section 146 (1) of the said Act provides that the Minister may after consultation with the Director, by regulation, prescribe anything required to be prescribed under the Act and for the b etter carrying out of the provisions of the Act. That although Section 38 (1) of th e Zambia Wildlife Act provides that a person t.hat has r easonable grounds that a proposed existing plan may have an a dverse effect may request for a Wildlife Impact Assessment, the ap plicants has not demonstrated any such reasonable grounds t.o warrant the Wildlife Impact Assessment as they have not advanced any evidence to that effect. As such it was u nreasonable for the applicants to assert that a delay by the Minister and t h e Director amounts to an abdication in that the Wildlife Impact Assessm ent n ot being carried out will amount to an excess of jurisdiction. Unreasonableness or the Wednesbury principle Counsel argued t hat the locus classicus wit h regard t.o unreasonableness is the well -known decision in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Vs Wednesbury Corporation9 which established thatjudicial review is meant to ensure d ecisions are not so unreasonable that no sen sible authority could have arrive d at them . It was counsel's considered view that a mere delay in r espondin g to t h e applican ts does not fall within the confines of what has b een classified as unr easonable in the Wednesbury sen se. J17 Irrationality and Unreasonableness Reference was made to lhe case of Council of Civic Service Union Vs Minister of State for Civil Service 10 where the Court defined irrationality and unreasonableness as follows: "By irrationality I mean what now rs succinctly referred to be Wednesbury unreasonableness. It applies lo a decision which is oulrageous in defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could arrive at it.. ............... . A decision is unreasonable if it is manifestly absurd, if it is outrageous in its defiance of logic, or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to he decided could have arrived at it." On the basis of the aforem entioned case, counsel argued that for irrationality to be applied as a ground for judicial r eview, the action in question must b e so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person or authority, having applied its mind to it could have made the decision. That again, the actions of the respondent cannot be classified as such . On th e foregoing arguments, counsel argued that the application for judicial review be dismissed with c osts to the r espondent. 4 .0 The applicant's affidavit in reply In an affidavit in r eply filed on the 14th August, 2025 sworn and deposed to by Chipego Musisi a Programme Assistant in the 2 nd applicant institution, it was averred as follows: On the 26Lh December, 2024 the r espondent did provide a letter containing some information, but the information was incomplete and omitted key documents specifically requested for. The letter of appeal to the Minister was dated 3l5L January, 2025 which was receive d by the office of the Minister on the 3 rd February, 2025 . Judicial review proceedings were commen ced b efore Jl8 the Minister rendered a decision due to the Minister's failure to act within a reasonable time after the appeal was lodged despite repeated follow-ups by the applicants and the Minislcr has not rendered any decision to date. The applicants are both public interest organizations whose mandates include governance, transparency, wildlife conservation and environmental protection, while the respondent has a statutory responsibility to safeguard the environment in protected areas such as the Lower Zambezi National Park. The applicants have been denied access to critical environmental information relating to tourism concessions in the Lower Zambezi National Park and have had to expend resources in pursuit of lawful processes. The applicants are acting within their mandates to promote transparency, good governance and environmental conservation. As such their involvement is prompted by the respondent's allocation of tourism concession in the Lower Zambezi National Park without availing the requested environmental information essential to prevent potential irreversible h arm to the environment. A meeting was held with the r espondent and it was later discovered that the General Management Plan had nol expired, but was subject to review at certain intervals. The respondent has not made any further effort to engage the applicants on their appeal and has in the meantime, proceeded to grant tourism concessions in the Lower Zambezi National Park. The procedure for the grant of tourism concessions requires among other steps a transparent call for proposals, evaluation against pre-determined criteria and stakeholder consultations prior to awarding any concession. These procedures have not been followed by the respondent in the allocation of tourism sites in lhe Lower Zambezi National Park. The failure by the respondent to review the General Management Plan docs nol invalidate its contents. The applicants have not been furnished with any site suitability assessm ent reports, environmental project briefs, environmental impact assessm ents or other documentation demonstrating that the procedure has been complied with for the concessions in question. There h as been no transparency by the respondent in the a llocation of sites due to the absence of d isclosure of k ey environmental information and procedural documents requested by the J19 applicants as well as t h e failure to engage stakeholders and members of the public th rough a consultative process. As such the allocation of sites to investors has not followed the procedure. The infor mation provided b y t h e r espondent to th e a pplicant was incomplete and insufficient for the applicants to assess potential environmental h arm. The General Management Plan does not provide the procedures and criteria to be considered in the award of Tourism Concessions as well as detailing the allowable limits of use for different zones in the National Park. The General Management Plan does however provide for a transparent and competitive process for allocation of tourism sites in t h e National Park, which has not been followed by th e respondent. 4.1 The applicant's skeleton arguments in support of the affidavit in reply In their skeleton arguments of even date, cou nsel argued that the Minister's failure to render a decision on their appeal, lodged on the 31st January, 2025 for over th ree months, constitutes a constructive failure t o act under Section 145 (1) of the Zambia Wildlife Act No. 14 of 2015. Thal this prolonged inaction a m ounts to a breach of t h e Minister's statutory duty to act with out unr-easonable delay. Further that the respondent's contention that no statutory Limeframe exists for determining the appeal does not absolve the Minister of the duty to act expeditiously. Coun sel contended that the principle of reasonableness in administrative action as recognized in the High Court Act and gen eral administrative law principles r equires that statutory duties be discharged within a reasonable time, particularly in matters concerning environmental protection where d elay r isks irreversible. To buttress this argument, r eference was made to the case of Patel V Municipal Council of Broken Hil111 where the Court of Appeal h eld that failure to proceed upon lawflllly determined policy amount to a wrongful abdication of duly. Counsel contended f1.ulher that the remedy of mandamus has been consistently applied by Zambian courts to compel public authorities to discharge statutory duties. That in the cases of The People Vs Luanshya J20 Municipal Council, ex parte Chendaeka 12 and The Pe ople Vs Livingstone Municipal Council, ex parte Simioti13 , th e remedy of mandamus was granted to compel licensing at1thorities to hear and determine applications in accordance with th e law. Further that in the cases of Re RR (1999) WDA14 and Padfiled Vs Agriculture Food and Fisheries15 the courts held that a Minister can not decline to exer cise s t atutory p ower s if doing so fru strates the purpose of the legislation. Th a t in casu the Minister's prolon ged inaction is frustrating the legislation and squarely attracts mandamus. That the respondent's inaction coupled with the ongoing a llocation of tourism concessions in the Lower Zambezi National Park, justifies the applicant's recourse to this court to compel th e per formance of the Minister's statu tory duty. IL was contended that the respondent's failure to disclose critical information, including site su itability assessm ent repor ts, environ men tal project briefs and environmental impact assessm en ts viola tes th e principles of transparency and public participation as provided for u n der Sections 6 and 91 of the Environmental Management Act No. 12 of 2011 . Coun sel was of the considered view that the incomplete information provided by the respondent on the 26 th December , 2024 and the absence of key procedural documents undermine the respondent's statutory obligation to ensure transparency in the management. of prot ected areas as required under the Zambia Wildlife Act and the Environmental Management Act. Counsel went on to argue that while there exists a General Management Plan for Lower Zambezi National Park, t h e same is subject to period ic review which review process as well as granting o f concession s must adhere to transparen t and cons1.1ltativc procedures to safegu ard environm ental integrity. Th at the absence of d isclosed docum entation demonstratin g compliance with t h ese procedures, undermines th e respondent's claim of lawful administration. Further that the a r gument that there is no General Management Plan cannot substitute for the transparent and competitive process required for concession allocation. J21 With regard to the applicant's locus standi counsel argued that the applicants as public interest organizations dedicated to governance, transparency, wildlife conservation and environmental protection have clear standing to pursue this application. That their mandates align with the public interest in preventing irreversible environmental harm in the Lower Zambezi National Park, a protected area of significant ecological value. Further that the applicant's pursuit of environmental information is grounded in specific concerns about the lack of transparency in concession allocation as evidenced by the incomplete information provided on the 26lh December, 2024. Additionally, that Section 4 (3) of the Environmental Management Act as read together with Article 256 of the Constitution (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 2016 empowers any person in Zambia to take out an action to compel government authorities to desist from or take action that will prevent environmental harm. On this basis, counsel was of the considered view that the argument that the applicants do not have standing is without merit and should not entertained by lhis court. Lastly, counsel argued that timely access lo environmental information is critical to prevent irreversible harm to the Lower Zambezi National Park. That the ongoing allocation of tourism concessions during the pendency of the appeal heightens Lhe urgency of this matter. Further that the Environmental Management Act underscores the public's right to access the environmental information to participate in decision-making processes. As such the respondent's failure to provide the requested documentation frustrates the applicant's a bility to assess and address potential environmental risks, constituting s ubstantial harm that warrants judicia l intervention. On the foregoing arguments counsel prayed that this court grants the applicant 's a pplication for judicial r eview, compelling the respondent to render a decision on the appeal and disclose the requested docume ntation 5 .0 The Hearing At the hearing counsel for the applicants submitted that in their application for judicial review they were seeking two orders of Mandamus. Firstly, to J22 compel the Minister of Tourism and Art lo perform a statutory duty by rendering a decision on the appeal submitted to the Minister on the 3rd February, 2025. Secondly, to act on the request made on the day of 3rd February, 2025 requiring him to conduct a Wildlife Impact Assessment in the Lower Zambezi National Park. Counsel placed reliance on the Notice of Application for leave to commence judicial review, the affidavit in support, statement of facts, list of authorities and skeleton arguments all filed on the 8 th April, 2025. Reliance was also placed on the Originating Notice of Motion filed on the 7 th May, 2025 after leave was granted. Counsel argued that the reason for their application was because of a dministrative inertia on the part of the Minister of Tourism and Arts who ·had a simple task of r endering a decision, whether positive or negative. That if the applicants were to b e dissatisfied with the Minister's decision, Section 145 of t h e Zambia Wildlife Act provides an avenue of appeal against the d ecision of t h e Minister. The failure or neglect by the Minister to make a decision presents a clog in the administration procedure provided for by statute and this can a ttract a mandamus from t his court. That they were mindful that judicial r eview is not concerned with t h e merits of the d ecision that the decision maker m akes and this court is not being invited to dive into th e merits of the appeal before the Minister. Rather the question before this court is whether the d elay or failure by the Ministe r to render a decision for 68 days and when the applicants made an application before this c ourt which is now 6 month s ago, is too long a delay given the nature of the matter being that of the environment. That this court must therefore construe it as a failure to perform a statutory function and order the Minister to forthwith make a decision on the appeal and also direct that a Wildlife Impact Assessment be undertaken in line with the applicant's r equest. Counsel also prayed for costs. In opposing thC:; a pplication , c ounsel for the respondent placed r e liance on t he a ffidavit in opposition dated 23rd July, 2 0 25 as well as their li st of authorities and s k ele ton arguments. C ounsel argued t hat judicial r eview is not concerned with the decision but the decision-making process, that it to say, it is J23 concerned with the legality, rationality and procedural propriety of the decisions made. That a crucial pre-condition for the invocation of judicial review is the existence of the decision or action of the public authority that is capable of being reviewed. Counsel submitted that where there is an omission or inaction, this does not invite the jurisdictional basis of judicial review unless it can be shown that the inaction amounts to a constructive refusal or abuse of discretion. That judicial review does n ot serve as a tool to compel authorities to make d ecisions in the absence of a clear legal duty to do so within a defined time fran1e. Further that the courts in ju dicial review are primarily concerned with assessing wh ether a decision once made was unlawful due to irrationality, procedural u nfairness or illegality. As such mere silence or indeed administrative delay docs not amount to a decision rcviewable under judicial review unless a clear statutory duty has been breached. Counsel argued that the applicants have placed reliance on Section 145 (1) and Section 38 (1) of the Zambia Wildlife Act, which provisions do not impose an express tirneboun d obligation on the Minister or indeed the Director of Wildlife and National Parks to respon d directly t o t h e letter or to commission a Wildli.fe Impact Assessment. It was counsel's su bmission that without a statutory duty being breached, judicial r eview cannot stand. It was argued further Lhat although there was a delay on behalf of the respondent, the respondent did try to furnish the applicants with the requested information and had called for meetings to settle the matter so that all parties could have their needs met. On this basis counsel submitted that the applicants were prematurely before the courts and this application should therefore be dismissed with costs to the respondent. In reply, counsel for the applicants argued that they were at a loss as to why a public body exercising an admin istrative function like a Min ister would casually refer to a failure to perform an admin istrative task as a mer e delay. That the respondent had not appreciated that the remedy of mandamus under judicial review exists for specifically this reason, to compel a body or someone with a statutory duty to perform that function. J24 Counsel argued further that although Section 145(1) and (2) of the Zambia Wildlife Act do not give a timeframe within which a Minister is supposed to render a decision, the Act does give a timeframe of 30 days v.,ithin which a person aggrieved with the decision of the Committee or Director must appeal to the Minister. That the Act also gives a time frame of 30 days for someone who is aggrieved with the decision of the Minister to appeal to the High Court. As such from these provisions this court should interpret them to give effect to Lhe statute. That from their reading of the said provisions it is clear that the Minister does not have carte blanche to just sit and do nothing when an appeal or request to conduct a Wildlife Impact Assessment comes to his table. Counsel argued firmly that to suggest that because the statute does not give a specific time frame in which the Minister should respond, yet the neighbouring provisions have a time frame is actually unreasonable and irrational. That the learned author of Administrative Law in Zambia, Cases and Materials, Dr Anne Kangwa Chewe at page 295, paragraph 10.2.4 dedicates an entire section about a failure or refusal to perform. Counsel argued further that when the law requires someone to do something and in this case the Minister fails to attend to the appeals as part of the administrative process, th at person is expected to do that function and it has to be performed within a reasonable time. That for the test of reasonableness as to the t ime the Minister should take before rendering a decision, this court should look no further than the provisions in Section 145 (1) and (2) of the Zambia Wildlife Act. In concluding their arguments, counsel contended that they were not prematurely before the court because no decision had been made, rather that they were b efore the court specifically because of that. Counsel made reference to pages 396 to 398 of Administrative Law in Zambia which text dedicates a section on the writ of mandamus which is currently before this court. Counsel reiteraled that lhe because the decision of the Minster is a vital step between the decision of a Director and an appeal before this court, the inordinate delay by the Minister is a fetter which presents a blockage in J25 the administrative process enshrined by the Act and as such 1s liable to judicial review. Counsel prayed that a ll the th ree re.liefs in the applicant's Notice for Judicial Review be granted. 5.0 The decision of the Court Before delving into the main issue before the cour t, there is an aspect of t h e locus standi of U1e applicants before this court. Counsel for t h e respondent argues that in a n application for judicial review, an applicant must show more t han "intellectual interest or a concern for good governance". That they must demonstrate or have real personal interest in an outcome. Counsel for the applicants, on the other h and argued that Section 4 (3) of the Environmental Management Act as read wit h Article 256 of the Constitution empowers any person in Zambia to take out a n action to compel government authorities to d esist from or take action tha t. will prevent environmental harm. In addressing this issue, the learn e d author of Administrative Law in Zambia, Cases and Materials, Dr A. K Chewe at page 364 states that: "A person who is aggrieved by the action of an administrative office r can apply to court for judicial re view of that administrator's action." From the foregoing, it is clear that there must be a nexus between the action of the administr ative officer and the person wh o indicates that they have been aggrieved for t h e m to h ave locu s standi. On a perusal of the core mandate of the applicants, J find that they do have locus standi to present their application before court m ore so that their queries are being a ttend ed to by the respondent through the office of the Departmen t of National Parks and Wildlife and th e office of the Minister of Tourism and Arts as is outlined in the affidavit evidence before this court. Turning now to the crux of the matter, Judicial Review is defined by Black's Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition, Bryan A. Garner as: J26 "A court's power to review the actions of other branches or levels of go1Jernment especially the court's power to invalidate legislative and executive actions as being unconstitutional." Black's Law Dictionary also defines Judicial Review as: "A court's review of a lower courts or an administrative body's factual or legal findings." The applicant has brought this application pursuant to Sections 145 (1) and 38 (1) of the Zambia Wildlife Act No. 14 of 2015 which provide as follows: "145 (1) A person who is aggrieved with the decision of the Director or Committee under this Act may appeal to the Minister within thirty days of the receipt of the decision of the Director of Committee." "38 (1) A person who has reasonable grounds to believe that a proposed or existing gol.)emment plan or activity of the Government, an organisation or person may have an adverse effect on wildlife in a National Park, Community Partnership Park, bird or wildlife sanctuary, Game Mangagment Area or open area, may request the Minister through the Director that that wildlife impact assessment be conducted." The main grievance b efore this Court is that the Minister of Tourism and Arts has failed to make a determination on t h e applicant's appeal following the d ecision of the DNPW in a letter dated 26th December 2024. The said DNPW in its letter justified its reliance on an adaptative management process to issue Tourism Concession Agreements in the Lower Zambezi. The applicant claims that although it lod ged its appeal against the Director's decision on the 3 rd February, 2025, contrary to the said Sections 745 (1) and 38 (1) of the Zambia Wildlife Act cited above, the Minister of Tourism and Arts has not made a decision over its appeal to date. It is the applicant's contention that the lack of a decision over the appeal to date is unreasonable and that the said delay warrants this court's intervention. J27 As already indicated a b ove, J udicial Review's provmce relates to t h e determination as to the validity of either an execu t ive's, legislator's or administrative body's action or d ecision. Th e Cou r t is not concerned with t h e m erit or demerits of the decision taken. With regard to t h e case a t h and, it is app a r ent that t h e Min ister is yet to mak e a decision and hence this application. According to the auth ors of Judicial Review o f Public deci sions, if th e adjudicating body has yet to issue a decision, the H igh Court can compel them Lo make a decision by issuing an Order of Mandamus. Further the learned author of Administrative Law in Zambia, Cases and Mate rials, Dr A . K Chewe at pages 394 to 395 states that: "Through judicial control of administrative actions, a number of remedies have been designed and accepted within the legal system to ensure that those affected by decisions receive fairness and justice under the available systems. The remedies include the following: • application for judicial review under Order 53 of the Rules of the Supreme Couri of England (White Book 1999) by which means a person who is aggrieved by an administrative action or determination may seek one or more of the following remedies, namely certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, declaration, injunction and damages ..... " The said learned author at page 295 also states that: "10.2.4 Failure or refusal to perform When the law requires someone to do something, the person or authority is expected _to perform that function. The autho,~ity cannot contract out of it, and failure to perform amounts to breach and is ultra vires ..... . A person can be said to have failed to exercise his or her duty if that p erson unlawfully delegates it, surrenders it or abdicates it. The couri will compel such a person to act." J28 With the foregoing in mind, the argument advanced by counsel for the respondent that Lhe judicial review process cannot be employed lo compel a public officer to perform an administrative function is misconstrued. A clear reading of the above texts ind icates that a public officer can be compelled by way of judicial review to perform an administrative duty. That. b eing said, it must be noted that neither Sections 145 (1) or section 38 (1) of the Zambia Wildlife Act No. 14 of 2015 provide for the Minister's response to an appeal or a request for a Wildlife Impact Assessment. In relation to the h andling of appeals by the Minister, Section 146 (1) and (2) (d) of the said Act provides that: "146 (1) The Minister may, after consultation with the Director, by regulation, prescribe anything required to be prescribed under this Act and for the better carrying out of the provisions of this Act. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the regulations made under that subsection may make provision for- (d) the hearing and determination of appeals by the Minister" From a reading of the a bove provisions, there is nothing that obligates the Minister by law to determine appeals received from the decision of the Director or Committee of the DNPW within a given time frame. It is also to be noted that there is no time frame given for the Director or Committee of the DNPW to respond to a query as was the case in casu as the applicants wrote to the DNPW on the 2 nct June, 2023 and only got a response on the 13th December, 2024 and thereafter on the 26 th December, 2024. Evidently, this is not a desirable position on the score that t h e said Minister and DNPW cannot have a carte blanche approach in dealing with the said queries and appeals as argued by counsel for the applicants. This is because as public officers, they owe a duty to the general citizenry of the Republic of Zambia to diligently perform their functions in accordance with the power and authority bestowed upon them in their office. The key word then is performing their duties within a reasonable time which aspect I will discuss in a bit more detail below. J29 In relation to Section 38 (] ) o f Lhe ?,am bia Wildlife Act Lhis courl notes that equally ther e is nothing in t h is provi s io n Lhal obligates the Minister of Tourism and Arts to conduct a Wildlife lmpacl Assessm ent as earlier pointed out . It merely indicates that a p erson may request for it to be done on reasonable grounds that a proposed or existent activity of the Government, an organisation or a person may have an adverse effect on the wildlife in a n ational park, community p a rlnersh.ip park, bird or wildlife sanctuary, game managem ent area or open area . Section 38 (2) indicates that where the Minster r e quires an environmenta l impact a s s essment lo b e conducted, it shall b e conducted m accordance with the procedures specified under the Environmental Management Act. Consequently, th e law as it s ta nds u nd er the Zam bia Wildlife Act is such that once an appeal or request for a Wild life Impact Asse ssment is made to the Minister , the r esponse and timeframe for r esponding lies very much within that Minister's hands. The applicants h ave argued that the delay in response by the respondent is an a bdication of the Minister's duty . The r esponde n t however has argue d that lhe Minister has nol failed or d elayed in giving a response to the applicant's query a s an in itial meeting was held to try and address the interests of lhc p arlics. I find and agree that the respondent h aving responded to tbc a p p lica n t's le llcr a nd initiatin g talks by way of meeting is an intention to respond Lo Lhe question s raised by the applicants. As such , the respondent cann ot be sa id lo have a bdicated its r esponsibility as a lleged by the applicant. Conscqucn lly, Lhc argument that there exists an illegality on the p art of lhe rcspond e nl c annot stand. The question that b egs an a nswer however, is whether the r espondent has taken steps to respond to the applicants queries and requests with in a r eason a b le time. As a lread y est ablishe d , th er e is no fixe d statutory timeframe for a Minister to respond lo a decision made on appeal to his office. Additionally, there is no fixed st.a Lu Lory timcframe for him to conduct a Wildlife Assessment. Th a l b eing s a id , is Lhc r e spondenl at liberty to take as much time as it feels or n oL Lo acl a l a ll? l do not think that that was the intention of the legislature when iL passed this particula r piece of legis lation, J30 and would agree that thi s would be unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense. What is apparent however, is Lhat the response must take into account the context of t h e query and what is being asked. r say so because the query or request must take into accou n l Lhe n a ture and complexity of the issue at hand for it to b e classified as a "reasonable li m e" . Without delving into the meril of lh e substantive issue, the request on the appeal before the Minister in my consider ed view may not require as long a period of time for him to make a decision on or take action as compared to the request to undertake a Wildlife Impact Asse ssment. A period of three months at the time this application was made in my view is too short a time to expect an exercise of such proportions, that is the Wildlife Impact Assessment, to b e undertak en. Additionally, there is nothing in the law that compels the Minister lo und e rlake such an exer cise and as such an Order of Mandamus is not approprimc for Lh is p a rtic u lar request. The parties a re however encouraged to discuss an a ppropriate course of action with regard to the said Wildlife Impac t Assessment.. Consequently, an Order of M andamus will only issue as follows: 1. To compel the Minister of Touris m lo determine the Appeal submitted to him by the applicants on the 3 rd day of February, 2 0 25 and to render his decision to the applicants in writing within 90 d ays of this Judgm en t . Each party will b ear the ir own costs. Leave to app eal is granted . J31