Premier Credit Zambia Limited v Muwanei Brendah Mwandamena (2024/HPC/0171) [2024] ZMHC 207 (17 May 2024)

IN THE HIGH COURT FOR ZAMBIA AT THE COMMERCIAL REGISTRY HOLDEN AT LUSAKA (Civil J urisdiction) BETWEEN: 2024/HPC/0171 PREMIER CREDIT ZAMBIA LIMIT PLICANT AND MUWANEI BRENDAH MWANDAMENA RESPONDENT Before Honourable Lady Justice Chilombo Bridget Maka. For the Applicant: Mr. M. Chitupila & Mr. F. Mulenga - Messrs. Gill & Seph Advocates. For the Respondent: Mr. I. K. Mulenga - Messrs. Iven Levi Legal Practitioners. JUDGMENT Legislation Referred to: 1. The High Court Act, Chapter 27 of the Laws of Zambia. 2. The Lands and Deeds Registry Act, Chapter 185 of the Laws of Zambia. Cases Referred to: 1. Peggie Zulu (Suing as Administrator of the estate of the late James Zulu) vs. Lucia Kamanga Makina and Walter Mununga Kanqai- 2017 /HPF /0036 (Unreported). 2 . Chola Chakonta and Agness Nyondo Chakonta vs. The Administrator of the Estate of Patrick Malaya- 2015/HP /2447. 3. Kelvin Hang'andu and Company (A Firm) vs. Wehby Mulubisha (2008) Z. R, 82 Vol. 2 (S. C). 4. BP Zambia PLC vs. Interland Motors Limited SCZ Judgment No. 5 of 2001. J1 5. Chick Masters Limited and Another vs. Investrust Bank PLC Appeal No. 74 of 2014. 6. Kasabi Industries Limited vs. Intermarket Banking Corporation Limited Appeal No. 168 of 2009. 7. Elpe Finance Limited vs. Richard Malwa- 2017 /HKC/0017(Unreported). 8 . Fidelitas Shipping vs. U. V /0 Exportcliles (1995) 2 All ER, 4 . 9 . Posa Estates Limited and 4 Others vs. First National Bank Zambia Limited Appeal No. 007 of 2020. 10. Lackson Mwabi Mwanza vs. Sangwa Simpasa and Chisha Lawrence Simpasa (2011) 1 Z. R, 436. 11. Hamalambo vs. Zambia National Building Society SCZ Appeal No. 64 of 2013. 12. National Movement Against Corruption vs. Sofram Safaris Limited, Mbeza Safaris Limited, Swanepoel & Scandrol Limited and Leopard Ridge Safaris Limited SCZ Appeal No. 16/2007. Other Works Referred to: 1. Patrick Matibini, Zambian Civil Procedure- Commentary and Cases (2017) Lexis Nexis. 1. Introduction. 1. 1. Through an Originating Summons filed on March 7 th , 2024, the Applicant initiated this action against the Respondent. The Originating Summons were accompanied by an affidavit and skeleton arguments filed on the same date. 1.2. The reliefs being sought as endorsed on the Originating Summons are as fallows:- i. An Order that the property known as Lot No. 19175/M, Lusaka be conveyed and assigned to the Applicant. J2 ii. An Order that the Deputy Registrar of the High Court executes the deed of assignment (including any other conveyance documents that may arise) for and on behalf of the Respondent and in favour of the Applicant. iii. Any further or other relief the Court may deem fit. iv. Costs. 1.3. The Respondent contested the action by filing into Court an affidavit in opposition accompanied by skeleton arguments on 25th March, 2024. 2. Background. 2.1. The background to this action is that the Applicant initiated a mortgage action against Robsiko Supplies and General Contractors Limited, Robert Sikota, and Muwanei Brendah Mwandamena (the Respondent in this case) under Cause No. 2022/HPC/0294 (referred to as the earlier action), which was presided over by Justice B. C. Mbewe. • 2.2. In the earlier action, the Respondent was sued 1n her capacity as a guarantor and mortgagor concerning an equitable third-party mortgage on a property known as Lot No. 19175/M, Lusaka (referred to as the mortgaged property) , which is owned by the Respondent. 2 .3. The action was determined in the Applicant's favour through a Consent Judgment dated 14th July, 2022. J3 3 . The Applicant's Case. 3.1. The core of the Applicant's evidence was that according to the Consent Judgment from the earlier case, they were to receive a payment of ZMW189,833.34. failure to which the Applicant would have the right to take possession of the mortgaged property and pursue the Respondent further. Produced and marked "EKM 1" was a copy of the Consent Judgment. 3.2. It was alleged that there had been a default in the payment of the Judgment sum. Despite efforts to take possession, these attempts proved futile as the Respondent had either refused, ignored, or neglected to execute the necessary documents for the assignment of the mortgaged property to the Applicant. Copies of correspondence to the Respondent were produced as exhibit "EKM 3". 3.3. The legal arguments emphasized that the key issues to be resolved were whether the Applicant had the right to have the mortgaged property assigned to it and whether an Order should be granted, directing the Deputy Registrar to execute the assignment and other related documents. Central to the argument was the invocation of section 14 of the High Court Act, which empowers Courts to nominate an individual to execute documents in a conveyance when a person refuses or neglects to do so as mandated by a Judgment or Order. 3.4. The Applicant cited the High Court cases of Peggie Zulu (Suing as Administrator of the estate of the late James Zulu) vs. Lucia Kamanga Makina and Walter Mununga J4 Kangai'11 and Chola Chakonta and Agness Nyondo Chakonta vs. The Administrator of the Estate of Patrick Malaya121 wherein the applicability of section 14 of the High Court Act was discussed. 3.5. According to the Applicants, the facts delineated in paragraphs 6, 7, and 9 of the affidavit supporting the Originating Summons fulfill the criteria stipulated in section 14 of the High Court Act. 3.6. It was argued that since there exists a Judgment against the Respondent and she has failed to satisfy the Judgment amount, coupled with her refusal to execute the necessary documents for the transfer of ownership of the mortgaged property to the Applicant, this constitutes a suitable scenario for this Court to wield its authority and direct the Deputy Registrar to execute the assignment and all other pertinent documents regarding the transfer of the mortgaged property. 3.7. The Applicant beseeched this Court to grant the reliefs sought as endorsed in the Originating Summons, with costs . 4 . The Respondent's Case. 4.1. The essence of the affidavit evidence is that this issue had already been thoroughly adjudicated upon, and pursuing it further constitutes an abuse of the Court process. It was argued that the Judgment rendered under Cause No. 2022/HPC/0294 outlined remedies available to the Applicant in the event of default on payment of the JS • Judgment sum in installments, and transferring the title of the mortgaged property to the Applicant was not among the remedies stipulated. 4 .2. The Respondent acknowledged her indebtedness to the Applicant in her capacity as a guarantor. She clarified that since the execution of the Consent Judgment, she has been making payments towards the Judgment sum to the best of her ability with limited resources. However, she averred that the mortgage transaction between herself and the Applicant does not constitute a sales contract that obligates her to transfer the mortgaged property to the Applicant. 4.3. Further that as advised by her Advocates, she firmly believed in the principle of "once a mortgage, always a mortgage." Consequently, she contended that the Applicant cannot now pursue ownership of the mortgaged property to be transferred to it. 4.4. In the legal arguments, the Respondent contended that the Applicant's claim to have the mortgaged property conveyed to it was misconceived, misplaced, and unattainable. She argued that such a request constitutes an abuse of the Court process due to the proliferation of actions and forum shopping. The Respondent emphasized that the entire matter had already been adjudicated upon, and a Judgment had been rendered by Justice B. C. Mbewe. To bolster this argument, reference was made to the case of Kelvin Hang'andu and Company (A Firm) vs. Wehby Mulubisha13l J6 wherein forum shopping was disapproved and condemned as an abuse of the Court process. 4.5. The Respondent stressed that initiating a new action solely for enforcing a Judgment amounted to forum shopping. It was emphasized that the Applicant should have pursued enforcement in the same Court that issued the Judgment, rather than initiating a new action. Furthermore, it was noted that the Consent Judgment outlined the available options to the Applicant in case of default by the Respondent, and transferring ownership of the mortgaged property was not listed among them. 4.6. Regarding the Applicant's invocation of section 14 of the High Court Act, the Respondent contended that this section is not applicable to the present circumstances. It was argued that this Court could only invoke section 14 of the High Court Act when there is a specific Judgment directing a person to execute conveyance documents. 4.7. The Respondent cited the terms of the Consent Judgment, highlighting that none of the directives therein instructed the Respondent to convey, assign, or transfer ownership of the mortgaged property to the Applicant. Consequently, the Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the action with costs. 5. The Applicant's Case in Reply. 5.1 . The evidence presented in reply indicated that the reliefs sought in this matter had not previously been adjudicated upon and are separate from those under Cause No. J7 2022/HPC/0294. This case emerged due to the Respondent's non-compliance with the Consent Judgment issued under Cause No. 2022/HPC/0294. It was emphasized that the Consent Judgment primarily addressed the possession of the mortgaged property and the pursuit of the Respondent as a guarantor in the event of default. 5.2. It was asserted that since the action under Cause No. 2022/HPC/0294 constituted an equitable mortgage action, the appropriate procedure for taking possession of property subject to such a mortgage involved obtaining an order for the property to be conveyed and assigned to the Applicant. Subsequently, it was deemed necessary to seek an order for the Deputy Registrar of the High Court to execute the Deed of Assignment on behalf of a party that refused to fulfill this obligation. This action was initiated with the specific purpose of taking possession of the mortgaged property. 5.3. It was asserted that the Respondent breached the payment terms specified in the Consent Judgment and neglected to settle the Judgment debt as per the terms outlined in the guarantee agreement, evidenced by document marked "EKM 1 ". Based on advice from the Applicant's legal representatives, it was believed that in accordance with the Consent Judgment and subsequent breach of its terms, the Respondent's right of redemption was extinguished. Consequently, the only remaining action is for the Applicant to take possession of the mortgaged property. J8 5.4. In its legal arguments in reply, the Applicant refuted the notion that this action constitutes an abuse of Court process, asserting that the matter has not been previously adjudicated upon. It was emphasized that there has never been a Judgment pertaining to the reliefs sought herein by the Applicant. Furthermore, it was reiterated that the reliefs sought in this action are distinct from those under Cause No.2022/HPC/0294. 5.5. It was argued that the Applicant is pursuing the conveyance of the mortgaged property to them and seeking the Deputy Registrar of the High Court to execute the assignment on the Respondent's behalf. These were regarded as new reliefs stemming from the Respondent's non-compliance with the Consent Judgment. 5.6 . To submit on what constitutes abuse of Court process, reference was made to the cases of BP Zambia PLC vs. Interland Motors Limitedl4 1 and Chick Masters Limited and Another vs. Investrust Bank PLCl5 1. 5.7. It was argued that Cause No. 2022/HPC/0294 concluded after being heard, determined, and resolved, whereas the matters addressed in this action have never been adjudicated upon. The Applicant reiterated that the reliefs sought herein have never been resolved through full settlement between the parties and are being pursued for the first time. To support this contention, reference was made to the Kelvin Hang'andu and Company {A Firm) case cited earlier. J9 5.8. The Applicant further contended that this case warrants an Order for the conveyance of the mortgaged property to it. It was emphasized that the mortgaged property, pledged as security, constitutes an equitable mortgage, and the Consent Judgment granted the Applicant the authority to take possession of it in the event of default in paying the Judgment sum. It was argued that the procedure for a successful litigant to take possession in cases of equitable mortgages was elucidated in the case of Kasabi Industries Limited vs. Intermarket Banking Corporation Limited(6l. 5 .9. The Applicant argued that the Consent Judgment stipulated the procedure for taking possession of the mortgaged property, which necessitates the unconditional conveyance of the property. Furthermore, it was asserted that the conveyance process is facilitated by the application of section 14 of the High Court Act in cases where there is a refusal to execute the conveyance documents. 5.10. The Applicant referred to the High Court case of Elpe Finance Limited vs. Richard Malwa(7l to underscore the mortgagee's entitlement to foreclose on the mortgaged property 1n cases where the mortgagor defaults on the payment of the Judgment debt. It was emphasized that foreclosure is achieved through the process of taking possess10n and unconditionally conveying the mortgaged property. Based on this precedent, the Applicant contested the Respondent's assertion that there was no Order directing no the conveyance of the mortgaged property in the Consent Judgment. 5.11. The Applicant contended that the Respondent misconstrued the implications of section 14 of the High Court Act and lacked insight into the practical enforcement of equitable mortgages. It was asserted that a thorough examination of the Consent Judgment alongside section 14 of the High Court Act and the precedent set in the Kasabi Industries case unequivocally indicates that conveyance was indeed prescribed. That this obligation was activated by the Respondent's failure to fulfill the payment of the Judgment sum. 5 .12. This Court was implored to disregard what was characterized as frivolous excuses presented by the Respondent, emphasizing that this is a straightforward enforcement action. It was argued that the Applicant is unequivocally entitled to enforce the Consent Judgment by taking possession of the mortgaged property. Reliance was placed on the case of Musaku Mukumbwa vs. Rody Musatwe, Northern Breweries Limited and Kailande Trading Limited which was not properly cited and shall therefore not be considered. 5.13. Regarding the assertion that the action constituted forum shopping, the Applicant countered by arguing that the Court in the earlier action became functus officio and no longer had jurisdiction after the Consent Judgment was entered. In support of this argument, the Applicant cited the opinions Jll of the learned authors of Zambian Civil Procedure Commentary and Cases who wrote as follows at page 1135:- "As a matter of general principle, once a Judgment or Order has been made, the Court is functus officio and no longer has jurisdiction over the matter in controversy." 5 .14. The Applicant reiterated its prayer that it be granted the reliefs it is seeking. 6 . Hearing. 6.1. During the h earing of this matter, legal representatives from both parties were in attendance. 6.2. Mr. Chitupila, representing the Applicant, indicated that he would be relying on the affidavit in support and skeleton arguments submitted to the Court on March 7, 2024, a long with the affidavit in reply and its accompanying skeleton arguments dated April 15, 2024. 6.3. Mr. Mulenga representing the Respondent equally placed reliance on filed affidavit in opposition and skeleton arguments dated 25th March, 2024. He added that the Respondent's defence was res judicata and that reliance on section 14 of the High Court Act was misplaced. He drew this Court's attention to Lord Dennim's dictum at page 8 in the case of Fidelitas Shipping vs. U. V /0 Exportcliles181 at which he guided that there is a strict law that disallows a J12 party from bringing another action against the same party for the same cause. 6.4 . Mr. Mulenga also referenced the decision in the cited case of BP Zambia Pie vs. Interland Motors'41 to underscore its argument that re-litigating the same subject matter with the same parties constitutes an abuse of the Court process. He emphasized that parties should not be permitted to repeatedly engage the same opponent in legal battles over the same issue in different Courts. 6.5. The remainder of Mr. Mulenga's oral submissions repeated arguments already outlined in the Respondent's skeleton arguments and will not be reiterated here. 6 .6. Mr. Mulenga prayed that the matter be dismissed. 6. 7. In response, Mr. Chitupila contended that the Respondent lacked a comprehensive understanding of the legal principles concerning abuse of Court process and the enforcement of equitable mortgages. He urged the Court to carefully compare the facts of this case with those of the earlier case to discern that the issues at hand were distinct. He directed the Court's attention to paragraphs 2.6, 2 .7 , and 2.8 of the Applicant's skeleton arguments in reply. 6.8. Regarding the enforcement of equitable mortgages, Mr. Chitupila referenced clause 6(b) of the Consent Judgment, which according to him, permitted the Applicant to take possession of the mortgaged property in the event of default. He argued that the guidance provided by the Kasabi J13 Industries case indicated that possess10n 1s achieved by unconditionally con veying the property by the mortgagor. 6.9. Mr. Chitupila highlighted that the initial affidavit in support demonstrated that the Applicant h ad previously approached th e Respondent, requesting th e conveyance of the mortgaged property, which was declined. He argued that this invoked the applicability of section 14 of the High Court Act. 6.10. Mr. Chitupila also r epeated th e arguments in the skeleton arguments. He prayed that the reliefs sought be granted with costs. 7. Consideration and Determination. 7 .1. I h ave thoroughly reviewed the Application by the Applicant and the Respondent's opposition, alongside their respective oral and written submissions. 7 .2. The factual background of this action is undisputed and has been outlined in paragraph 2 of this Judgment. The Applicant acknowledged initiating this action to en force the Consent Judgment 1n Cause No . 2022/HPC/0294 , subsequent to the Respondent's failure to settle the Judgment sum. The pertinent provision of the Consent Judgment that the Applicant seeks to enforce is paragraph 6(b) , which reads as follows:- "That in the event that the Respondent defaults in settling any of the payments, that is, the monthly instalments (referred to in paragraph 3 above) or the Applicant's Advocates' costs (referred to in paragraph 5 above) on the date that they fall due and such J14 payments remain unpaid within 7 days of default, then the entire Judgment Sum then outstanding shall become due and payable and the Applicant shall be at liberty to: (b) take possession of Lot Number 19175/M, Lusaka;" 7.3 . The Applicant is now seeking to exercise the option outlined above by requesting the conveyance and assignment of the mortgaged property to themselves. This course of action has been prompted by the Respondent's persistent refusal or neglect to execute the assignment and other conveyance documents, despite numerous requests . According to the Applicant, taking possess10n involves transferring ownership of a mortgaged property to it. 7.4. The essence of the Respondent's opposition was that the action was res judicata and that reliance on section 14 of the High Court Act was misplaced. However, the Applicant reiterated that the claims in this case were separate from those in the earlier case. Furthermore, the Applicant argued that section 14 is applicable to these proceedings since it was triggered by the Respondent's refusal to sign the assignment and other conveyance documents following the default in settling the Judgment sum. 7.5. The Applicant's action is anchored on the prov1s10ns of section 14 of the High Court Act. it enacts as follows: - "Where any person neglects or refuses to comply with a Judgment or Order directing him to execute any conveyance, contract or other document, or to endorse any negotiable instrument, the Court may, on such terms and conditions, if any, as may be just, JlS order that the conveyance, contract or other document shall be executed or that the negotiable instrument shall be endorsed by such person as the Court may nominate for that purpose, and a conveyance, contract, document or instrument so executed or endorsed shall operate and be for all purposes available as if it had been executed or endorsed by the person originally directed to execute or endorse it. " 7.6. The application of the above provision is undisputed. This Court is vested with the discretion to nominate and direct an individual to execute a conveyance, contract, or other document. Such authority is only exercised in situations where a party directed to execute any conveyance, contract, or other document neglects or refuses to comply with the Judgment or Order. The cited Peggie Zulu case is instructive on this subject. 7.7. Hence, the pivotal issue at hand is whether this constitutes a suitable case in which to wield the authority bestowed under section 14 of the High Court Act. Undoubtedly, a Judgment was issued in favor of the Applicant under cause No. 2022/HPC/0294, albeit through Consent. However, it is crucial to meticulously scrutinize the terms of the Consent Judgment to determine whether it includes an Order directing the Respondent to convey or assign the mortgaged property to the Applicant. 7.8. Upon reviewing the Consent Judgment, and as highlighted by the Respondent, there 1s no explicit Order therein directing the Respondent to convey and assign the J16 mortgaged property to th e Applicant. Nevertheless, the Applicant vehemently contended that the Order to take possession of the mortgaged property specified in paragraph 6(b) of the Consent Judgment effectively serves as an Order directing the Respondent to convey or assign the mortgaged property to itself. The Applicant, through Counsel, asserts th at given the equitable nature of this mortgage, possession can only be attained through the conveyance of the property to itself. 7.9. In order to comprehensively assess whether possession and conveyance are interchangeable in th e context of equitable mortgages , I refer to Order 30 Rule 14 of the High Court Rules, which delineates mortgage actions and the available reliefs. It states as follows:- "Any mortgagee or mortgagor, whether legal or equitable, or any person entitled to or having property subject to a legal or equitable charge, or any person having the right to foreclosure or redeem any mortgage, whether legal or equitable, may take out as of course an originating summons, returnable in the chambers of a Judge for such relief of the nature or kind following as may by the summons be specified, and as the circumstances of the case may require; that is to say- i. ii. Payment of moneys secured by the mortgage or charge; Sale; iii. Foreclosure; iv. Delivery of possession (whether before or after foreclosure) to the mortgagee or person entitled to the charge by the mortgagor or person having the property subject to the J17 charge or by any other person in, or alleged to be in possession of the property; v. Redemption; vi. Reconveyance; vii. Delivery of possession by the mortgagee." 7. 10. The concep t of for eclosu re was elucidated in th e case of Posa Estates Limited and 4 Others vs. First National Bank Zambia Limitedl91 as follows:- "When an Order for foreclosure is made by the Court, the same vests ownership of the mortgaged property in the mortgagee and if the mortgagee decides to sell the property it is not accountable to the mortgagor for any surplus of the sale money." 7. 11 . The right of a m or tgagee to possess10n on th e other h and was clarified by Matibini J. as h e th en was, in th e High Cou rt case of Lackson Mwabi Mwanza vs. Sangwa Simpasa and Chisha Lawrence Simpasal 101 as follows:- "The right to take possession- Since a legal mortgagee gives the mortgagee a legal estate in possession he is entitled subject to any agreement to the contrary, to take possession of the mortgaged property, as soon as the mortgage is made, even if a mortgagor is guilty of no default. (See Birch v Wright [1786) 1 T . R. 378). It is said that a mortgagee " may go into possession before the ink is dry on the mortgage" . (See Four-Maids ltd v Dudley Marshall (Properties) Ltd [1957) Ch. D. 317. When a mortgagee takes possession of the property, he is under an obligation to account not only what he has received during the time he is in J18 possession, but also what he ought to have received under the mortgage deed." 7.12 . From the aforementioned, it is evident that a possession Order is distinguishable from an Order of ownership or foreclosure. The law under Order 30 Rule 14 of the High Court Rules explicitly delineates these two remedies separately, underscoring their difference . 7 .13. Therefore, the Applicant's contention that possession can solely be attained through conveyance lacks legal backing. Moreover, the holding in the Kasabi Industries case , cited by the Applicant, explicitly outlines that the unconditional conveyance of a mortgaged property is permissible only subsequent to an Order for foreclosure, which extinguishes the mortgagor's right of redemption. 7.14. The Consent Judgment that the Applicant seeks to enforce lacks an order for foreclosure among its terms. Instead, the Applicant was granted an Order to take possession of the mortgaged property. The Applicant h as the option to pursue this remedy without having ownership of the prop erty transferred to it. This is because the Respondent's right of redemption h as not yet been extinguished. 7. 15. As regards the Respondent's assertion that this action was res judicata, I make reference to the case of Hamalambo vs. Zambia National Building Societyl 11l wh erein res Judicata was defined as follows: - J19 "Res judicata means a matter that has been adjudicated upon. It is the matter that has been heard and determined between the same parties. The principle of res judicata states that once a matter has been heard between the same parties, by a Court of any competent jurisdiction, the same matter should not be reopened." 7.16. As previously mentioned, the Applicant initiated a mortgage action under cause No. 2022/HPC/0294, wherein the Respondent served as the 3 rd Respondent. According to the Applicant's affidavit in support of this action in paragraph 4, the Applicant sought, among other things, an Order for foreclosure and possession of the mortgaged property, as well as an Order directing the 3 rd Respondent to unconditionally convey title of the mortgaged property to the Applicant. 7 .17. The outlined claims above were among the issues for determination in that earlier action which culminated into the entry of a Consent Judgment which was sealed by my learned brother B. C Mbewe J. The effect of that consent Judgment is as was held by the Supreme Court in the case of National Movement Against Corruption vs. Sofram Safaris Limited, Mbeza Safaris Limited, Swanepoel & Scandrol Limited and Leopard Ridge Safaris Limitedl 121 that:- "A consent judgment, once sealed is final determination of issues therein, it is not possible to join the proceedings after judgment has been pronounced." (Underlined for emphasis ) J20 7. 18. In this case, one of the reliefs sought by the Applicant is the conveyance of the mortgaged property to itself, a matter previously claimed and determined in the earlier action. Consequently, I find that the claim for an Order directing the conveyance and assignment of the mortgaged property to the Applicant is res judicata and cannot be entertained in this instance. 8. Conclusion. 8.1. The Applicant's action lack merit. This is on account that section 14 of the High Court Act is inapplicable to these proceedings. An Order to take possession is not synonymous to an order for foreclosure which allows the conveyance of mortgaged property to a m ortgagee. 8.2. Addition ally, the Applicant claim for the conveyance of the mortgaged property herein is res judicata as same is deemed to have dealt with under Cause No. 2 022/HPC /0294. 8.3. Consequently, all of the Applicant's claims fail and are dismissed. 8.4. Costs are for the Respondent to be taxed 1n default of agreement. Delivered at Lusaka this 17th day of May, 2024 . ............... 0.-..: ........ . Chilombo Bridget Maka HIGH COURT JUDGE J21