R v Radebe (CRI/A 40 of 96) [1996] LSHC 117 (9 December 1996)

C R I / A / 4 0 / 96 IN T HE H I GH C O U RT OF L E S O T HO In the matter between A N A N I AS T H E M BA R A D E BE A P P E L L A NT and R EX R E S P O N D E NT J U D G M E NT D e l i v e r ed by the H o n o u r a b le M r. Justice M . M. R a m o d i b e d i, A c t i ng J u d g e, On the 9th d ay of D e c e m b e r, 1 9 9 6. T he appellant a p p e a r ed before the Senior R e s i d e nt Magistrate of M a s e ru c h a r g ed w i th the c r i me of theft c o m m on it b e i ng alleged that u p on or a b o ut the 7th d ay of April 1 9 94 a nd at or near M a b o te Police Station in the district of M a s e ru he did unlawfully a nd intentionally steal a certain m o t or vehicle T o y o ta H i l ux T w in C ab w h i te in colour Registration n u m b er A E 0 7 9, e n g i ne n u m b er 4 Y 9 0 7 6 0 5 9, chassis n u m b er Y N 6 7 7 0 0 3 7 87 the property of the Christian C o u n c il of L e s o t h o. T he A p p e l l a nt w as f o u nd guilty as c h a r g ed a nd s e n t e n c ed to four years i m p r i s o n m e n t. He a p p e a ls on t wo g r o u n ds only, n a m e l y: "(a) that the conviction is against the w e i g ht of e v i d e n c e. ( b) that the s e n t e n ce is too h a r sh a nd i n d u c es a s e n se of s h o c k ." It is c o m m on c a u se in this c a se that the said m o t or vehicle w as in fact stolen on the d a te alleged in the c h a r ge sheet a nd w as s u b s e q u e n t ly retrieved by the police f r om PW1 D a n i el M a k h e le at M a p u t s oe Ha C h o n a p a se on 2 4 th N o v e m b er 1 9 9 4. It is not disputed that it h ad b e en sent to the latter by the appellant h i m s e lf for respraying a nd p a n el beating. It is significant that w h en it w as so retrieved the said m o t or vehicle still b o re the s a me e n g i ne n u m b e rs a nd chassis n u m b e rs as reflected in its registration certificate EX " A" held by the Christian C o u n c il of L e s o t h o. W h at h ad b e en c h a n g ed w as the registration n u m b er of the m o t or vehicle in that it w as no l o n g er A E 0 79 but n ow b o re registration n u m b er K 0 1 5 4. At the trial of the matter M r. M e n t i es w ho a p p e a r ed for the appellant c o n c e d ed that the m o t or vehicle in question w as i n d e ed stolen. He is r e c o r d ed on p a ge 34 of the r e c o rd of p r o c e e d i n gs as h a v i ng stated as follows:- "the a c c u s ed is n ot guilty of theft. T h e re is p r o of that the vehicle is stolen, the vehicle w as f o u nd in the h a n ds of a p a n el beater w ho sent the police to my client. T he a c c u s ed h ad p o s s e s s i on of the vehicle constructively. W h at is in dispute is that the a c c u s ed did n ot k n ow that it is stolen. T he a c c u s ed w as a b o na fide p o s s e s s o r. T he a c c u s ed w as a m a n. To c o n c l u de w h at is the charge. T h e re is no p r o ve (sic) that the a c c u s ed r e c e i v ed the g o o ds k n o w i ng this vehicle to be a stolen vehicle. T he a c c u s ed w as a b o na fide b u y e r" M r. K h a s i pe w ho a p p e a r ed for the appellant b e f o re me a d o p t ed the s a me a p p r o a ch as M r. M e n t i es by c o n c e d i ng that theft h ad b e en p r o v e d. M r . K h a s i pe s u b m i t t ed h o w e v er that the appellant h ad b o u g ht the m o t or vehicle in question f r om o ne M i c h a el S e l e pe w i t h o ut a ny k n o w l e d ge that it w as stolen. As I s ee it the fate of this c a se rests on the explanation that the appellant g a ve in v i ew of the fact that he w as f o u nd in p o s s e s s i on of a stolen vehicle. In this r e g a rd it is i m p o r t a nt to b e ar in m i nd the r e m a r ks of G r e e n b e rg J q u o t ed w i th a p p r o v al by W a t e r m e y er A . J . A. in R ex v Difford 1 9 37 A . D. 3 70 AT 3 73 to the following effect:- "It is equally clear that no o n us rests on the a c c u s ed to c o n v i n ce the court of the truth of a ny explanation he gives. If he g i v en an explanation, e v en if that explanation be i m p r o b a b l e, the court is n ot entitled to convict unless it is satisfied, n ot o n ly that the e x p l a n a t i on is i m p r o b a b l e, b ut that b e y o nd a ny r e a s o n a b le d o u bt it is false. If there is a ny r e a s o n a b le possibility of his explanation b e i ng true, then he is entitled to his acquittal." I respectfully agree. I m ay a dd h o w e v er that the explanation m u st be g e n u i ne a nd n ot m e r e ly a tactical p l oy to a v o id conviction. I turn t h en to consider the appellant's explanation w i th a v i ew to d e t e r m i n i ng w h e t h er it m ay possibly r e a s o n a b ly be true in the particular c i r c u m s t a n c es of the c a se b e f o re m e. It w as the e v i d e n ce of the appellant that he stays at P e k a, in the district of Leribe. He is a w e l d er by profession. He c a me to k n ow the m o t or vehicle in question w h en it w as driven by o ne M i c h a el S e l e pe w ho u s ed to p a ss by his w o r k s h o p. T h is M i c h a el S e l e pe w as "just a c u s t o m e r" a nd n ot his friend. T he appellant testified that t wo or three m o n t hs since seeing the said M i c h a el S e l e pe driving the m o t or vehicle in question he a s k ed the latter to sell it to h im b ut " he refused." T h en in his o wn w o r ds the appellant states:- " He ( M i c h a el S e l e p e) c a me a g a in a nd at that t i me h ad b r o k en a front w h e el b e a r i n g, he a s k ed me to give h im m o n ey b e c a u se the vehicle w as troubling h i m. T h at w as in the m o n th of M a y, 1 9 9 4. T h is t i me he c a me to me he w as n ot selling it to m e. I h ad to give h im R 3 0 , 0 0 0 - 00 cash. I a s k ed h im to let me c h e ck the vehicle. First I a s k ed h im to drive us to F i c k s b u rg t o w n. I h ad sent it to the clearance police so as to find out w h e t h er it w as w o r th b u y i ng or w h e t h er it w as a stolen o n e. I w as present at F i c k s b u rg w h en a clearance certificate police said we w e re n ot to h a ve it cleared. I f o u nd o ne B r o wn w ho t o ok us to o ne Potgieter w ho told me that the c o m p u t er w as not functioning, we w a i t ed for tern (sic) m i n u t es a nd left o ur particulars to Potgieter a nd we w e re s u p p o s ed to c o me the following d a y. I said to M i c h a el that I w as w o r k i ng a nd a s k ed h im to h a ve it cleared. He did c o m e, he c a me b a ck w i th a clearance certificate. I did n ot go w i th M r. S e l e p e. N ow that the vehicle w as cleared he s o u g ht R 1 0 , 0 0 0 - 0 0. I did p ay h i m. I did n ot p ay h im the full a m o u nt b e c a u se he n e e d ed the m o n ey to take the 4 x4 vehicle for registration leaving his car at my h o m e, he w o u ld h a ve to register the vehicle w i th his o wn cash. He c o u ld p ay for registration. He c a me b a ck w i th c h a n ge of o w n e r s h ip a nd a sk me to sign t h e m. I did sign t h e m. T he following d ay he c a me w i th the vehicle a nd the blue c a r ed (sic). It w as in J u ne if I am n ot m i s t a k e n, 1 9 9 4, I g a ve h im R 2 0 , 0 0 0 - 00 a nd g a ve me the blue c a r ed (sic). I w i sh to h a nd in the blue card as an exhibit in this case. T he b l ue card is h a n d ed in a nd m a r k ed exhibit " D ". T h is is the blue card I w as g i v en by M r. Selepe. I w a n t ed to register that vehicle b e c a u se he h ad c h a r ge (sic) me a lot of m o n e y. A f t er t wo m o n t hs f r om the t i me I b o u g ht the vehicle f r om h im he c a me to m e, M r. S e l e pe stays at V e r e e n i g i n g, he is a d a g ga dealer." I o b s e r ve at o n ce that the appellant's explanation as stated a b o ve w as n e v er p ut to the p o l i c e - w o m an w ho actually arrested h im n a m e ly P W5 D e t e c t i ve P o l i c e - w o m an K a p he in cross e x a m i n a t i o n. N or w as the appellant's story p ut to the investigating officer P W6 D e t e c t i ve T p r, S e n g o a r a. In my v i ew this is a factor to w h i ch the court m u st inevitably h a ve regard in d e t e r m i n i ng the g e n u i n e n e ss of the a c c u s e d 's explanation a nd w h e t h er s u ch explanation m ay possibly r e a s o n a b ly be true a nd n ot just an afterthought raised for the first t i me after the C r o wn h as c l o s ed its c a se a nd is no l o n g er able to investigate the d e f e n ce story a nd to react accordingly to it. It is true that a question w as p ut to P W1 D a n i el M a k h e le that the appellant h ad b o u g ht the m o t or vehicle f r om " M r. M i t c h el S e l e p e" a nd that the latter supplied h im w i th the Registration Certificate b ut in my v i ew this w as n ot the p r o p er w i t n e ss to p ut the a c c u s e d 's explanation to particularly as P W1 w as i n t r o d u c ed as an a c c o m p l i c e. As earlier stated the m o t or vehicle w as f o u nd in his p o s s e s s i on w h i le in the p r o c e ss of respraying it. In a ny e v e nt I o b s e r ve that it w as n e v er p ut to P W1 in cross e x a m i n a t i on w h at the particulars of the said M i c h a el or M i t c h el S e l e pe w e r e, w h at his a d d r e ss w as or w h e re he c o u ld be f o u n d. It is my c o n s i d e r ed v i ew that a criminal c a se is n ot a g a me of c h a n ce w h e r e by o ne p l a ys o n e 's c a r ds close to o n e 's chest in the h o pe of springing a surprise u p on o n e 's adversary. I consider therefore that the court is entitled to d r aw an a d v e r se inference f r om the fact that the a c c u s e d 's explanation w as n ot p ut to the relevant C r o wn witnesses in cross e x a m i n a t i on n or w e re a ny particulars a nd physical a d d r e ss of the said M i c h a el or M i t c h el S e l e pe intimated in cross e x a m i n a t i on of the c r o wn witnesses in order that the C r o wn c o u ld be able to follow up the explanation. W h at t h en h a p p e n ed w as that the C r o wn h e a rd for the first t i me w h en the appellant testified that the said M i c h a el S e l e pe "stays at V e r e e n i g i n g, he is a d a g ga dealer." I o b s e r ve that e v en then the a d d r e ss g i v en w as decidedly v a g u e. To s ay that a m an stays in V e r e e n i g i ng w i t h o ut a ny precise a d d r e ss thereat d o es n ot help. It w as for that r e a s on that the learned Public P r o s e c u t or p ut the following questions to the Appellant:- " Q: D id y ou tell the police a b o ut M i c h a el S e l e pe A: I did. Q: D id y ou give t h em his a d d r e s s? A: I do n ot h a ve t h e m. Q: W o u ld y ou like M r. S e l e pe give e v i d e n ce in this case. A: Y e s. Q: F or l o ng t i me w o u ld y ou w i sh h im called, t wo m o n t h s? A: He w as staying at the flat a nd a m o n th w o u ld suffice." As I s ee it there is n o w h e re in the r e c o rd of p r o c e e d i n gs that the appellant e v er m a de e v en a t o k en a t t e m pt to call for the e v i d e n ce of the said M i c h a el S e l e pe n or did he request the C r o wn to h a ve the latter s u b p o e n a ed on his behalf. It is significant for that matter that it is c o m m on c a u se that the appellant w as o ut on bail since the 8th D e c e m b er 1 9 9 4. In v i ew of the fact that the trial o n ly c o m m e n c ed on 2 8 th F e b r u a ry 1 9 96 a nd w as o n ly finalised on 2 4 th O c t o b er 1 9 96 I am of the v i ew that the appellant h ad a b o ut 22 m o n t hs within w h i ch to call the said M i c h a el S e l e pe as a w i t n e ss b ut apparently he s i m p ly did n o t h i ng a b o ut it. O n ce m o re I c o n s i d er that this is a factor w h i ch w o u ld entitle a ny r e a s o n a b le m an to d r aw an a d v e r se inference against the appellant in the c i r c u m s t a n c es of the case. It is true there is no o n us on an a c c u s ed p e r s on to p r o ve his i n n o c e n c e. T h at o n us is a l w a ys on the c r o wn t h r o u g h o ut to p r o ve the guilt of the a c c u s ed b e y o nd r e a s o n a b le d o u b t. B ut w h e r e, h o w e v e r, the a c c u s e d 's c o n d u ct is p r i ma facie incriminating as is the c a se before me in as m u ch as the appellant w as f o u nd in p o s s e s s i on of a recently stolen m o t or vehicle t h en as earlier stated I c o n s i d er that the a c c u s e d 's inability to give the full a d d r e ss of the alleged seller a nd to call h im in e v i d e n ce are certainly factors f r om w h i ch the court is entitled to d r aw an a d v e r se inference against the w h o le of t he a c c u s e d 's explanation in the particular c i r c u m s t a n c es of this case. To h o ld o t h e r w i se w o u ld result in a serious miscarriage of justice a nd no conviction w o u ld ever be possible in c a s es s u ch as the o ne b e f o re m e. J RL M i l t o n: S o u th A f r i c an C r i m i n al L aw a nd P r o c e d u re V o l. II states a t p 6 5 1 :- "usually an e x p l a n a t i on is unlikely to assist X u n l e ss it g i v es particulars, s u ch as the n a me a nd a d d r e ss of the p e r s on f r om w h om he s a ys he o b t a i n ed the g o o d s ." I agree. It is significant that despite the fact that the appellant c l a i ms to h a ve b o u g ht the m o t or vehicle in q u e s t i on for R 3 0 , 0 0 0 - 00 there is no receipt for this h u ge a m o u n t. O n ce a g a in a ny r e a s o n a b le m an is entitled to d r aw an a d v e r se inference against the appellant on this aspect. N or d o es it m a ke s e n se that despite t he fact that on appellant's o wn v e r s i on the said M i c h a el S e l e pe w as n ot selling the m o t or vehicle in q u e s t i on the appellant w o u ld nevertheless still g i ve h im R 3 0 . 0 0 0 - 0 0. T h e re is t h en the appellant's e v i d e n ce that he w e nt to F i c k s b u rg to find o ut w h e t h er t he m o t or vehicle in q u e s t i on w as stolen. As earlier stated this w as n e v er p ut to t he c r o wn w i t n e s s e s. W h at is m o re I find it significant that n o w h e re d o es the appellant s u g g e st in his e v i d e n ce that he e v er a p p r o a c h ed the L e s o t ho P o l i ce for clearance. O ne w o u ld h a ve i m a g i n ed that the starting point for c l e a r a n ce of a m o t or vehicle for registration in this c o u n t ry is L e s o t ho police. In a ny e v e nt this is exactly h ow I u n d e r s t o od the e v i d e n ce of P W9 G r a ce M a l i s e bo T s u t s u bi w h e re s he states at p a ge 32 of the r e c o rd of p r o c e e d i n gs :- "I am working at Berea S ub Accountancy. I am acting as a S ub Accountant, I have been working at the S ub Accountancy for 20 years one of my duties is to register vehicles. I should have change of ownership before I can register road worthy certificate, Lesotho and R SA sales tax certificate from Sales Tax. T h en I register a vehicle - Registration Certificate." I c a n n ot s ee t h en h ow the L e s o t ho police c an e v er be side-stepped in the registration of a m o t or vehicle. I find that this is y et a n o t h er factor w h i ch a ny r e a s o n a b le m an w o u ld be entitled to take into a c c o u nt in d r a w i ng an a d v e r se inference against the appellant in this case. J u d g i ng f r om the c i r c u m s t a n c es of this c a s e, I am of the firm v i ew that appellant's explanation that he a p p r o a c h ed the police at F i c k s b u rg for clearance w as no m o re t h an an a t t e m pt to pull the w o ol o v er the learned trial Magistrate's e y e s. I o b s e r ve that e v en the appellant's b l ue c a rd itself w as w i t h h e ld f r om the c r o wn w ho s aw it or h e a rd a b o ut it for the first t i me w h en the appellant w as testifying in the w i t n e ss b o x. T he appellant w as t h en t a k en to task on this a s p e ct in c r o ss e x a m i n a t i o n :- " Q. W hy did y ou not give the police the blue card? A. My lawyer had instructed me not to." F or my part I find it h a rd to i m a g i ne that if the appellant seriously b e l i e v ed that he h ad a g e n u i ne b l ue c a rd in respect of the said m o t or vehicle he c o u ld h a ve b e en led to w i t h h o ld it f r om the police a nd thus effectively h a m p er police investigations as to the authenticity thereof. As it t u r n ed o ut the c r o wn led e v i d e n ce in rebuttal w h i ch clearly established that appellant's aforesaid b l ue c a rd w as n o t h i ng b ut a forgery. T h is w as the e v i d e n ce of C h a r l es L i b e t so w ho is the C h i ef Plant S u p e r i n t e n d e nt at L e s o t ho G o v e r n m e nt Printing. It w as his e v i d e n ce that the appellant's b l ue c a rd w as n ot printed by the G o v e r n m e nt Printer. A l t h o u gh appellant's b l ue c a rd g i v es the o u t w a rd a p p e a r a n ce that it w as issued by B e r ea S ub A c c o u n t a n cy it w as d i s o w n ed in rebuttal by B e r ea S ub A c c o u n t a nt P W9 G r a ce ' M a l i s e bo T s u t s u bi in the f o l l o w i ng w o r d s :- "I see EX " D" it is a Blue Card but according to my records it does not c o me from my office. This serial n u m b er which appears in ex " D" does not appear in my records and the nature of the Date S t a mp is not the one we use in my office." T h e re is t h en the fact that appellant's b l ue c a rd is s u p p o s ed to h a ve b e en issued by B e r ea S ub A c c o u n t a n cy despite the fact that the appellant lives at P e ka w h i ch is in L e r i be district. N or d o es the d i s c r e p a n cy e nd there. A p p e l l a n t 's b l ue c a rd indicates that the registration n u m b er of the m o t or vehicle is K 0 1 54 w h i ch b e l o n gs to T h a b a - T s e ka district yet as earlier stated the date s t a mp t h e r e of is s u p p o s ed to be that of B e r ea S ub A c c o u n t a n cy a nd n ot T h a b a - T s e k a. In my v i ew this d i s c r e p a n cy w as e n o u gh to h a ve p ut the appellant on inquiry a n d / or at least to h a ve a r o u s ed his suspicion if he h ad no k n o w l e d ge that the m o t or vehicle in q u e s t i on w as stolen. To c o m p o u nd the appellant's p r o b l em it t h en t u r n ed o ut that the registration n u m b er K 0 1 54 in fact b e l o n g ed to L e s o t ho H i g h l a n ds Authority a nd that it w as a caterpillar. In contrast to t he b l ue c a rd b e l o n g i ng to the Christian C o u n c il of L e s o t ho in r e s p e ct of the m o t or vehicle in question, A p p e l l a n t 's blue c a rd d o es n ot d e s c r i be the m o t or vehicle as a 4 x 4. I find that this is a h u ge difference as it relates to the m a ke of the m o t or vehicle in q u e s t i on a nd that o n ce m o re this d i s c r e p a n cy w o u ld certainly h a ve p ut the A p p e l l a nt on inquiry a n d / or a r o u s ed his suspicion if he did n ot k n ow that the m o t or vehicle w as stolen. N or c an the court o v e r l o ok the fact that there is u n d i s p u t ed e v i d e n ce that the m o t or vehicle in question h ad b e en sent by the appellant to P W1 for r e s p r a y i ng a nd p a n el beating. I i m a g i ne that that in itself w o u ld certainly m a ke identify of the m o t or vehicle by the true o w n er v e ry difficult i n d e ed a nd is as s u ch a factor against the appellant in this case. I am satisfied that the c u m u l a t i ve effect of the a b o ve m e n t i o n ed factors are s u ch that it c a n n ot be said that the appellant's explanation m ay possibly r e a s o n a b ly be true. In my v i ew these factors point to the sole r e a s o n a b le inference that the appellant is the thief. I find therefore that the a c c u s e d 's guilt h as b e en p r o v ed b e y o nd r e a s o n a b le d o u b t. I am fortified in the v i ew that I t a ke in this m a t t er by the r e m a r ks of D i e m o nt JA in S v S a u ls a nd others 1 9 81 (3) S . A. 1 72 at 1 82 w h e r e in he states as follows:- "The State is not obliged to indulge in conjecture and find an answer to every possible inference which ingenuity m ay suggest any m o re than the court is called on to seek speculative explanations for conduct which on the face of it is incriminating," I respectfully a g r e e. It is significant that the learned j u d ge q u o t ed w i th a p p r o v al a p a s s a ge in a m i n o r i ty j u d g m e nt g i v en by M a l an JA in R v M l a m bo 1 9 57 ( 4) S . A. 7 27 at 7 38 to the f o l l o w i ng effect:- "In my opinion there is no obligation upon the crown to close every avenue of escape which m ay be said to be open to an accused. It is sufficient for the crown to produce evidence by means of which such a high degree of probability is raised that the ordinary reasonable m a n, after mature consideration c o m es to the conclusion that there exists no reasonable doubt that an accused has committed the crime charged. An accused's claim to the benefit of a doubt w h en it m ay be said to exist m u st rest u p on a reasonable and solid foundation created either by positive evidence or gathered from reasonable inferences which are not in conflict with, or outweighed by the proved facts of the case," T h e se r e m a r ks c o m m e nd t h e m s e l v es to me in this c a se a nd I respectfully a d o pt t h em herein. I o b s e r ve that R u m p ff J. A. e x p r e s s ed a similar v i ew in S v R a ma 1 9 66 ( 2 ) S . A. 3 95 AD 3 95 at 4 0 1. M r. K h a s i pe t h en s u b m i t t ed that the court m u st take into a c c o u nt the fact that the l e a r n ed trial magistrate did n ot file r e a s o ns for rejecting appellant's explanation. I a g r ee that in a p r o p er c a se this is a valid consideration to take into a c c o u nt b ut t h en e a ch c a se m u st be d e c i d ed on its o wn merits including the nature a nd the strength of the c r o wn case. O b v i o u s ly if the c r o wn c a se g a t h e r ed f r om the r e c o rd of p r o c e e d i n gs is v e ry strong against the appellant as is the c a se h e re it is of no c o n s e q u e n ce that the trial magistrate h as n ot filed r e a s o ns of j u d g m e nt a l t h o u gh this m u st n e v er be e n c o u r a g e d. T h e re is h o w e v er a better r e a s on for rejecting M r. K h a s i p e 's s u b m i s s i on in this regard. It is this. It e m e r g ed d u r i ng a r g u m e nt b e f o re me a nd this is c o m m on c a u s e, t h a n ks to the diligence of the Director of Public P r o s e c u t i o ns M r. M d h u li w ho b r o u g ht my attention thereto, that the record of p r o c e e d i n gs in this m a t t er w as n ot p r e p a r ed by the C l e rk of C o u rt as is t he usual c a se b ut w as instead p r e p a r ed by appellant's attorney M r. K h a s i pe at his office. M r. M d h u li s u b m i ts therefore that it w o u ld be w r o ng to b l a me the learned trial magistrate for n ot h a v i ng filed r e a s o ns in as m u ch as there w as no w ay he c o u ld be able to file s a me in the a b s e n ce of the r e c o rd of p r o c e e d i n gs w h i ch h ad b e en t a k en a w ay f r om h im by M r . K h a s m e. I agree. It is for this r e a s on that preparation of r e c o r ds of p r o c e e d i n gs in criminal c a s es is best left to the C l e rk of C o u r t. O t h e r w i se there is b o u nd to be miscarriage of justice s o m e w h e re a l o ng the line. I m p o r t a nt exhibits are likely to be m i s p l a c ed or d e s t r o y ed by the u n c a n ny a nd g e n i o us criminal if this practice is to be f o l l o w e d. In the result therefore the a p p e al against conviction is h e r e by d i s m i s s e d. R e g a r d i ng s e n t e n ce it is trite l aw that this is a m a t t er p r e e m i n e n t ly within the discretion of the trial court. I find h o w e v er that this court is at large to interfere w i th the s e n t e n ce i m p o s ed by the court a q uo in this matter by r e a s on of the fact that there are no r e a s o ns furnished for the sentence. W h i le I g a ve the learned magistrate the benefit of d o u bt for failing to file r e a s o ns for conviction I am n ot p r e p a r ed to do so in respect of sentence. T h is is b e c a u se this court h as stated t i me a nd a g a in that r e a s o ns for s e n t e n ce m u st be g i v en at the t i me w h en the s e n t e n ce is actually b e i ng i m p o s ed a nd n ot after the a c c u s ed h as n o t ed an a p p e al the r e a s on b e i ng that it is of p a r a m o u nt i m p o r t a n ce for the a c c u s ed to k n ow the r e a s o ns w hy he is so s e n t e n c e d. S ee M o j e la v R ex 1 9 77 L LR 3 21 at 3 2 4. I h a ve seriously c o n s i d e r ed the p e r s o n al c i r c u m s t a n c es of the appellant as fully set o ut in the r e c o rd of p r o c e e d i n g s. As against this there is the fact that theft of m o t or vehicles is r a m p a nt in this country. T he appellant's c o u n s el h i m s e lf s u b m i t t ed in mitigation of s e n t e n ce at the trial :- "the c o m m u n i ty views crimes with wrath." I a g r e e. It m e a ns therefore that courts w o u ld be failing to protect the c o m m u n i ty if their s e n t e n c es w e re s e en to be t oo lenient. A deterrent s e n t e n ce is called for here. T he c o u rt m u st therefore a n x i o u s ly s e ek to strike a b a l a n ce b e t w e en the interests of t he individual a nd society as a w h o l e. In all the c i r c u m s t a n c es of the c a se I am of the v i ew that the a p p e al on s e n t e n ce partly s u c c e e ds a nd that the appropriate s e n t e n ce is o ne of four ( 4) y e a rs i m p r i s o n m e nt half of w h i ch is s u s p e n d ed for a p e r i od of five y e a rs on condition that the appellant is n ot f o u nd guilty of the c r i me of theft c o m m i t t ed d u r i ng the p e r i od of s u s p e n s i o n. M . M. R a m o d i b e di A C T I NG J U D GE F or A p p e l l a nt F or R e s p o n d e nt : : M r. K h a s i pe M r. M d h u l i.