R v Ranthithi and Another (C of A (CRI) 12 of 7) [2008] LSCA 13 (11 April 2008)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF LESOTHO HELD AT MASERU C of A(CRI) NO. 12/07 In the matter between: MOLIKENG RANTHITHI PASEKA NAMANE FIRST APPELLANT SECOND APPELLANT AND REX AND IN THE CROSS­APPEAL OF REX AND RESPONDENT APPELLANT FIRST RESPONDENT MOLIKENG RANTHITHI SECOND RESPONDENT PASEKA NAMANE THIRD RESPONDENT RANKAE MOKATSE SHOBELA TSOEU FOURTH RESPONDENT NTHOBOHLOKOA SHOAEPANE     FIFTH RESPONDENT SIXTH RESPONDENT MAKOANYANE TLELETLELE SEVENTH RESPONDENT CHERE RANTHITHI EIGHTH RESPONDENT MANESA MATLI CORAM: RAMODIBEDI JA SMALBERGER JA PEETE JA HEARD: DELIVERED:   11 APRIL 2008 4 APRIL 2008 SUMMARY Criminal law ­ Murder ­ Appeal against both conviction and sentence   —   Crown's   cross­appeal   against   sentence   ­ Impropriety   of   suspending   sentence   following   a   murder conviction   ­   Section   314(2)   of   the   Criminal   Procedure   and Evidence Act 1981. Criminal procedure ­ Evidence partly recorded in Sesotho as opposed to English ­ No translation furnished ­ Rule 58(4) of the High Court Rules 1980 as amended ­ Rule 5(5) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2006. JUDGMENT RAMODIBEDI JA [1] In the early hours of the morning of 15 July 2001, and at or near Topa village in the district of Thaba Tseka, a group of men from Thabana­Mahlanya   village   attacked   one   Tikene   Mohlokoane (PW1) whom they suspected of having stolen donkeys belonging to one of them, namely, the third respondent in the cross­appeal. They surrounded his house and threatened to burn it down if he did not come outside.  Some of them carried firearms, both big and small.   PW1   raised   a   hue   and   cry   for   assistance   from   his   co­ villagers. They promptly obliged by rushing to PWl's house. They included   PWl's   father,   Khomonyane   Mohlokoane   (PW3)   and PWl's younger brother, Thabo Mohlokoane. [2] When the two groups of men met, a shot went off from the direction of   the   group   from   Thabana­Mahlanya.   Thabo   Mohlokoane (hereinafter referred to as "the deceased") was fatally shot in the stomach. Consequent upon this incident, the two appellants in the main   appeal   together   with   the   respondents   in   the   cross­appeal, including six other men who do not feature in this appeal, were indicted on a charge of the murder of the deceased. [3]  At the close of the Crown case, the trial court mero motu discharged the fourth, fifth and seventh respondents in the cross­appeal. The following   people  were   convicted   of   murder   at   the   close   of   the case: the first and second appellants as well as the third, sixth and eighth respondents in the cross­appeal. They were sentenced as follows:­ 1) 2) 3) The   first   appellant   was   sentenced   to   five   (5)   years imprisonment, half of which was suspended conditionally for three (3) years. The   second   appellant   was   sentenced   to   eight   (8)   years imprisonment half of which was suspended conditionally for three (3) years. The third, sixth and eighth respondents in the cross­appeal were sentenced to a period until the rising of the court. [4]  The   first   and   second   appellants   in   the   main   appeal   have   now appealed to this Court against both conviction and sentence. In so far   as   conviction   is   concerned,   they   complain   that   this   was premised solely on "supposition and utter speculation contrary to factual evidence". As regards the sentences, they complain that these are harsh and that they invoke a sense of shock. [5]   In   its   cross­appeal,   the   Crown   for   its   part   has   sought   to   appeal against the discharge of the respondents referred to in paragraph [3]   above.   Furthermore,   the   Crown   challenges   the   sentences imposed as being too lenient and contrary to section 314 (2) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 1981. [6]   Before   proceeding   further,   it   is   convenient,   first,   to   express   this Court's displeasure at the unsatisfactory state of the record in this matter. There appears to be a new trend by some judicial officers and some counsel  to conduct  proceedings in the High Court in Sesotho without furnishing a translation. See for example  Basia Lebeta v Rex C of A (CRI) No. 1/08 which was heard during the current session of this Court. Counsel who appeared before this Court in the instant matter have informed us that this new trend has come about as a result of an amendment to Rule 58 (4) of the High Court Rules 1980. In its original form the Rule provided as follows:­ "Where evidence in any proceedings is given   in   any   language   other   than English   such   evidence   shall   be interpreted by a competent interpreter. " [7] In Lenka v Rex 2000­2004 LAC 832 this Court, approving Rex v Tseliso Mafeka 1992­96 (2) LLR 1199 (HC), held that the practice of judicial officers acting as their own interpreters at the trial, and thereby failing to use sworn interpreters, amounts to a fatal irregularity. [8] Seemingly, as a response to this Court's decision in  Lenka's  case, the learned Chief Justice amended Rule 58(4) in terms of section 2 of the High Court (Amendment) Rules 2006, Legal Notice No.75 of 2006. In its amended form Rule 58(4) now reads as follows:­ "Where   the   evidence   in   any proceedings   is   given   in   any language   other   than   in   English such         evidence       shall       be interpreted   by   a   competent interpreter. However, it shall be competent   in   civil   or   criminal proceedings   for   a   presiding judge   to   record   evidence   in English without the assistance of a   court   interpreter   where   all parties   know   and   understand Sesotho  and  the  services of  the interpreter   cannot   be   secured without undue delay, expense or inconvenience. " It is plain from Rule 58(4) as amended that evidence given in civil or criminal proceedings  must  be recorded in English. To that extent, the Rule  in its amended form  emphasises   the  use  of  English  rather  than detracts from it. In this regard, it is important to realise that the Rule in its original form has not been changed by the amendment in so far as the English language is concerned. What has happened is that a proviso has now been added in the amendment to make it competent for judicial officers to "record",   as   opposed   to   "interpret",   evidence   in   English   in circumstance spelt out in the Rule. [10]  Notwithstanding   the   above   considerations,   the   record   of proceedings   in   this   matter   contains   several   passages   where evidence was recorded in Sesotho without any translation being furnished. I point to the following examples, taken at random:­ (1)   On page 18 of the record the following evidence is recorded :­ "CC:Please go on. What did they (the accused)   tell   him?   Did   they answer or they didn't? PWl:The   only   person   who   answered was   Paseka, likatana, I will kill you. "   saying   "you CC: Where is he? PW1:Ke eno Mohlomphehi, moqosuoa oa bobeli." On page 28 of the record the Crown counsel asked PW1:­ "CC: So what happened thereafter? PWl:Eaba Mapolesa  a ba lokolla hore  ba batle moo mo ba belaellang. Ba ile ba batla ba seke ba thola letho. " On page 60 of the record the Crown counsel asked PW2 about what the police discovered at the scene of crime :­ "CC:What did they  (the police) discover? PW2:Ha ba qeta ho bona mofu, ho mofu mona ba itse ho bonahala o thuntsoe. Tholoana e ne e kene mona ke e nyane, ha se ea sethunya se seholo.   Joale   ha   ba   qeta   ba   be   ba   sheba mona   hore   na   likhaketlana   hore   na   ebe likhaketlana   li   ke   ke   tsa   fumaneha   tsa sethunya se senyane le se seholo, empa li ile tsa fumaneha. " (4) The record further shows on page 80 thereof that the learned trial Judge asked PW3 the following question:­ "HL :.........you told the chief, you did not tell the chief who shot your son, you told the police, is that so? I am saying, the first thing, you   told   the   police   who   shot your   son,   you   didn't   tell   the chief? Is that so? PW3:E, ke itse o thuntsoe ke ntate Paseka. " (5)   Again on pages 148­149 the learned Judge put the following question to PW5:­ "HL: Were these people, you say A3 was present on the occasion of searching Tikene 's straw? PW5:E, le ba bang " [11] What is incomprehensible to me is that the evidence of witnesses given in Sesotho was, in several places, not interpreted. This, despite the fact that an interpreter was present in court. The evidence was not recorded in English, contrary to Rule 58(4) of the High Court Rules. It is no doubt convenient at this stage to repeat what this Court said in similar circumstances in Lebeta's case, supra, namely :­ "[5]   Whatever   the   merits   or   demerits   of Rule 58(4) of the High Court Rules in the context of the above two cases, the attention of Judges and counsel must now   be   drawn   to   Rule   5(5)   of   the Court   of   Appeal   Rules   2006   on records.   This   Rule   provides   in mandatory terms as follows:­ 'The copies of the record  shall be in English  and clearly typed on A4 standard paper in double­ spacing on one side of the paper only.' (Emphasis added.) [6]   It   remains   only   for   me   to   stress that,   for   the   purposes   of   an appeal   to   this   Court,   both judicial officers and counsel are obliged to   have   Sesotho versions,   or   indeed  any   version other   than   English,   translated into   English   by   a   sworn interpreter   notwithstanding   any perceived inconvenience   or personal discomfort in the use of English." [13] With this prelude, I proceed now to deal with the case concerning the appellants in the main appeal. As indicated above, the facts show   that   a   group   of   men   from   Thabana­Mahlanya   village surrounded PWl's house. This was followed by the shooting of the deceased. But, first, it is necessary to record briefly the relevant events leading up to this incident. [14]   It   is   not   disputed   that   some   time   prior   to   the   fateful   night   in question,   six   donkeys   belonging   to   the   third   respondent   in   the cross­appeal   went   missing.   Three   of   the   donkeys   were   later discovered   but   the   other   three   were   found   slaughtered   on   the border between the villages of Thabana­Mahlanya and Topa. PW1 was suspected of having stolen them but, as indicated above, a search   instigated   by   the   Thabana­Mahlanya   group   upon   his premises did not yield anything incriminating against him. The same exercise was repeated in the presence of the police but the result   was   the   same.   No   donkey   meat   was   found   anywhere   at PWl's place. [15]   Apparently,   the   Thabana­Mahlanya   group   was   unhappy.   They threatened to return in the absence of the police and "collect" PW1 since the police declined to arrest him. It is the Crown's case that they did return and that they killed the deceased in what followed. To that extent, the Crown's case,  as I understand it, is that the attack was premeditated and that the fact that in trying to shoot PW1 the bullet hit the deceased does not absolve the appellants. [16] It is now opportune for me to deal with the case concerning the appellants in the main appeal. THE CASE AGAINST THE FIRST APPELLANT [17] It is not disputed that the first appellant was part of the Thabana­ Mahlanya   group   which   surrounded   PWl's   house.   He   is   the chairman of some anti­stock theft unit in the area. He is a licence holder of a pump­action gun, Exhibit "1". Indeed it is not disputed that on the night in question he was carrying it. [18] It is common cause that the first appellant was present at PWl's house   on   the   night   in   question.   PW1   testified   that   the   first appellant pointed a gun at him.   The following witnesses: PW3, Sello   Moalosi   (PW4),   Tsethemang   Leqela   (PW5)   and   Thabiso Mohlalisi   (PW6)   testified   that   the   first   appellant   threatened   to shoot   them   all.   He   was   holding   a   big   gun,   a   fact   which   he, himself,   concedes.   He   insulted   them   by   referring   to   them   as "likatana" (rags). He was trying to chase them away, apparently so that they could not render assistance to PW1. [19] Meanwhile, PW3 sought from PW1 the reason why the Thabana­ Mahlanya group had surrounded his (PWl's) place. At that stage the second appellant fired a shot at PW1 but, in the process, hit the deceased fatally. A burst of gunshots was heard from the Thabana­ Mahlanya   group.   This   was   followed   by   an   exchange   of   stone throwing between the two groups. [20]   Testifying   in   his   own   defence,   the   first   appellant   admitted   his presence at PWl's house. He, together with his co­villagers, had gone to arrest PW1. He could not explain why, if that was the case, they visited him under the cover of darkness. Nor could he explain why they carried firearms. Be that as it may, he conceded that   he   was   armed   with   the   firearm   Exhibit   "1".   He   testified, however,   that   he   did   not   use   it   because   he   was   knocked unconscious   by   the   men   from   Topa   village.   The   evidence   on record   is   clear,   however,   that   this   was   after   the   deceased   had already been shot. [21] It is clear from the record of proceedings that the first appellant actively associated himself at least with the second appellant. As chairman   of   the   anti­stock   theft   unit,   he   led   the   murderous operation   against   PW1.   But   more   importantly,   by   carrying dangerous weapons such as firearms, the first appellant must have foreseen that either PW1 or someone standing close to him might be shot and killed. Indeed the Crown's evidence shows that when he was shot, the deceased was standing close to PW1. The conclusion is, therefore, inescapable that in conducting the operation in question, the first appellant was reckless as to whether the death of PW1 or, as it happened,   that   of   the   deceased   ensued   or   not.   See  S v Ntuli 1975 (1) SA 429 (A) at 437. He was, therefore, correctly found guilty of murder. THE CASE AGAINST THE SECOND APPELLANT [22]   The   case   against   the   second   appellant   is   overwhelming.   The evidence of Marothi Ralekhela (PW2), a headman of Topa village, shows that the second appellant and one Ngoako Maphatsoe (A8 at the trial) came to him on the night in question looking for PW1. PW2 requested him to wait until the following morning since it was too late in the night.    The second appellant did not heed the headman's   request   but   went   straight   to   PWl's   house   where   he started the attack as mentioned above. [23]   The   evidence   of   the   Crown   witnesses   PW1,   PW3   and   PW5 squarely placed the second appellant at PWl's house on the night in question. Not only that, the second appellant threatened to kill all the people who had come to PWl's assistance. Interestingly, the statement of Litseho Masilo which was handed in by consent at the trial as Exhibit "B" confirms this point. The statement  also confirms  the  presence   of   the first   and  second  appellants   at  the scene of crime. The second appellant was carrying a firearm. [24] Both PW1 and PW3 testified that they saw the second appellant shoot the deceased who was standing next to PW1.       The latter said that he actually "saw the fire coming out from the gun". He also heard the gun report. The deceased "staggered to the ground". The evidence of PW3 corroborated that of PW2. He, too, testified that   he   saw   "the   fire   coming   from   him   (the   second   appellant) going to my son" (the deceased). [25] The second appellant testified on his own behalf. He conceded that he   was   present   at   PWl's   house.   While   waiting   for   the   chief   to arrive in order to facilitate their "meeting" with PW1, the second appellant's group was attacked by Topa villagers. He testified that he heard firearm reports from Topa villagers. The firearm Exhibit "1" was "never" used because the owner thereof, namely, the first appellant, was hit right at the beginning of the fight. I may pause there to observe that the second appellant is plainly lying on this point. As will be recalled, the ballistic report established that the firearm   Exhibit   "1"   was   in   fact   discharged.       Furthermore,   the second appellant himself confirmed that this firearm was found on the side of the Thabana­Mahlanya group. [26] The second appellant testified that he heard firearm reports on the side of the Topa villagers. This, despite overwhelming evidence that there was no shooting from that group. Finally, the second appellant denied carrying any firearm at all. Nor did he shoot the deceased. [27] After seeing the witnesses, observing their demeanour and hearing their evidence, the trial court believed the Crown witnesses and disbelieved the appellants. This finding  is fully justified on the facts. There is no misdirection shown to exist. An appellate court is loathe to interfere with the trial court's findings of fact in the absence of a misdirection. [28] The evidence has established that the second appellant was carrying a   firearm.   He   was   boisterous,   threatening   to   shoot   the   Topa villagers who had come to PWl's rescue. He ended up discharging his firearm, shooting the deceased in the process. I consider that in these circumstances the second appellant must have foreseen the possibility of resultant death, either of PW1 or the deceased who was   standing   close   to   the   former.   On   any   account,   the   second appellant was reckless as to the fatal consequence and it occurred. He, too, was correctly found guilty of murder. See  Ntuli's  case (supra). [29] For the sake of convenience, the appellants' appeal against sentence will be considered together with the respondent's cross­appeal on the issue. THE RESPONDENT'S CROSS­APPEAL [30] As previously mentioned, the Crown has sought to appeal against the discharge of the respondents referred to in paragraph [3] above. The notice of cross­appeal filed of record, however, clearly shows that the appeal is directed against sentence only and not conviction. For the avoidance of doubt, the notice of cross­appeal reads :­ KINDLY TAKE NOTICE THAT, the appellant having not been satisfied with   the  sentence  imposed   by   the magistrate   (sic)   court   in   CR/66/02 intends   to   appeal   against  sentence. " (Emphasis added.) [31] Despite the fact that the notice of appeal is unmistakably directed against sentence only the grounds of appeal irregularly attack the discharge of the fourth, fifth and seventh respondents.       When these difficulties were pointed out to Mr. Mokuku for the Crown at the hearing of the matter,  he fairly  and  properly abandoned the cross­appeal against the respondents in question. Counsel adopted a correct approach, especially in view of the fact that the Crown's evidence against these respondents was very flimsy. They were not identified. The Crown failed to establish a prima facie case against them. [32] The Crown tried manfully, but without any conviction, I suspect, to show that this was a case in which the doctrine of common purpose should apply. There was insufficient evidence to support this view except   mere   suspicion.   It   is   true   that   in   his   evidence   PW3 characterised   the   attack   by   Thabana­Mahlanya   group   as   a "mission" to kill his son. He even went to the extent of literally saying that there was common purpose. I should be slow to accept his word on the issue in view of the fact that he was not part of the Thabana­Mahlanya   group   at   any   time.   He   never   attended   any meetings   with   them.   It   follows   that   his   evidence   on   common purpose is mere speculation and conjecture, coming as it does from an   understandably   disgruntled   father   of   both   the   deceased   and PW1. [33]   The   correct   approach   in   a   case   such   as   this   is   to   consider   the individual participation of each accused in the commission of the offence   without   reference   to   the   doctrine   of   common   purpose. Viewed in this way, and as I repeat, I am satisfied that the Crown failed to establish a prima facie case against the respondents in the cross­appeal. [34] This brings me to the question of sentence. It is well­recognised that sentence is a matter which pre­eminently lies at the discretion of the trial court. A Court of Appeal will not ordinarily interfere in the absence of a misdirection resulting in a miscarriage of justice. It is, however, salutary to have regard to section 9(4) of the Court of Appeal Act 1978. It reads as follows:­ "On appeal against sentence, the Court shall,   if   it   thinks   that   a   different sentence   should   have   been   passed, quash the sentence passed at the trial and   pass   such   other   sentence warranted   in   law   (whether   more   or less   severe)   in   substitution   therefore (sic)   as   it   thinks   ought   to   have   been passed,   and   in   any   other   case   shall dismiss the appeal. " [35]   As   previously   mentioned,   the   trial   court   suspended   sentences   in respect of the first and second respondents in the cross­appeal. Mr. Maieane  for these  respondents  conceded  before  us that  the trial court was incompetent to do so. This concession was fairly and properly   made.   In   this   regard   section   314(2)   of   the   Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 1981 provides as follows:­ " Whenever a person is convicted before the High Court or any subordinate court of any offence   other   than   an   offence   specified   in Schedule III, the court may pass sentence, but order that the operation of the whole or any part   thereof   be   suspended   for   a   period  not exceeding   3   years,   which   period   of suspension, in the absence of any order to the contrary,   shall   be   computed   in   accordance with subsections (3) and (4) respectively, and the order shall be subject to such conditions (whether as to compensation to be made by that   person   for   damage   or   pecuniary   loss, good conduct or otherwise) as the court may specify therein. " Murder  is a  Schedule  III  offence. Accordingly, the trial court  had no power to suspend sentences once the first and second respondents in the cross­appeal had been found guilty of murder. See Nkahlana Lephosa v   the   Director   of   Public   Prosecutions   C   of   A   (CRD   No. 19/2006. [36] In determining a proper sentence in this case, it is necessary to have regard to the triad consisting of the offence, the offender and the interests of society. See for example S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A). As regards the consideration relating to the crime committed, there can be no doubt that murder is a very serious offence indeed. This   Court   believes   in   the   sanctity   of   human   life.   It   is   in   the interests of society that people convicted of murder be put away for a long time. This is so in order to protect society itself against such people. There must also be a distinction drawn between sentences for murder and sentences for culpable homicide. Viewed in this way, I accept that the sentences in this case, ranging as they do from "a sentence to a period until the rising of the court" in respect of the third, sixth and eighth respondents, to an effective sentence of 4 years imprisonment in respect of the second respondent, are woefully inadequate for a murder conviction in the circumstances of this case. Such sentences in my view amount to a travesty of justice. [37]   Regarding   the   personal   circumstances   of   the   respondents,   the following factors must be taken into account in addition to those canvassed at the trial:­ 4) 5) All the respondents are first offenders. The respondents are unsophisticated "tribesmen" from the rural areas. As against these factors, one must take into account the following:­ 6) The respondents took the law into their own hands. In doing so, they defied  the  advice   of   the  police  to  leave  PW1 alone.  They defied the  headman's advice to  desist  from  confronting PW1 at night. 7) Some of them were armed with guns, something that must have been apparent to the rest of the Thabana­Mahlanya group. 8) By pleading not guilty, they failed to demonstrate remorse. It is also important to recognise that the respondents' individual roles in the   deceased's   murder   varied   to   some   degree.   Thus,   for   example,   the sixth respondent appears to me to have played a minor role. The first and second respondents, on the other hand played an active part. The first appellant was the ringleader while the second appellant fired the shot that killed   the   deceased.   There   is,   therefore,   nothing   to   set   the   two respondents   apart.   The   third   and   eighth   respondents'   role   was   less blameworthy than that of the first and second respondents. Their moral blameworthiness is, however, more than that of the sixth respondent. [39]   Giving   this   matter   my   best   consideration,   I   have   come   to   the conclusion   that   the   most   appropriate   sentence   that   will   fit   the crime,   the   offender   and   the   interests   of   society   in   these circumstances is the following:­ The first respondent (Molikeng Ranthithi): 12 years imprisonment. The second respondent (Paseka Namane): 12 years imprisonment. The third respondent (Rankae Mokatse): 10 years imprisonment. The   sixth   respondent   (Makoanyane   Tleletlele):   8   years imprisonment. The eighth respondent (Manesa Matli): 10 years imprisonment. [40] In the result, the following order is made:­ 9) The appellants' appeal in the main appeal is dismissed. 10) 11) 12) The Crown's cross­appeal against the discharge of the fourth, fifth and seventh respondents was abandoned. It is accordingly struck from the roll. The Crown's cross­appeal on sentences against the first, second, third, sixth and eighth respondents is upheld. Such   sentences   are   set   aside   and   replaced   with   the   sentences reflected in paragraph [39] above. JUSTICE OF APPEAL M. M. RAMODIBEDI I agree: JUSTICEOF APPEAL J. W. SMALBERGR I agree: JUSTICE OF APPEAL S. N. PEETE FOR FIRST AND SECOND APPELLANTS AS WELL AS RESPONDENTS IN CROSS­APPEAL: MR. T. MAIEANE FOR RESPONDENT: MR T. MOKUKU