Republic v Bernard Mutuku Mutiso alias Richard Kariuki Wanjiru [2020] KEHC 7098 (KLR)

Full Case Text

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MACHAKOS

(Coram: Odunga, J)

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 7 OF 2020

REPUBLIC..................................................................................................PROSECUTOR

VERSUS

BERNARD MUTUKU MUTISO Alias RICHARD KARIUKIWANJIRU...ACCUSED

RULING

1. The accused herein, Bernard Mutuku Mutiso, faces the charge of Murder contrary to section 203 as read with section 204 of the Penal Code (Cap 63) Laws of Kenya for which a plea of not guilty was entered. The particulars of the charge were that on the night of 3rd and 4th day of October, 2019 at an unknown time at Iveti Forest within Kathiani Sub-County in Machakos County, murdered Peter Manyonge Wamocho.

2. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and pursuant to Article 49(1)(h) of the Constitution, was entitled to be released on bond or bail, on reasonable conditions pending a charge or trial, unless there were compelling reasons not to be so released.

3. It was however the Prosecution’s case that there existed compelling reasons militating against the accused’s released on bond. According to Miss Mogoi, learned prosecution counsel, the main reason for opposing the release of the accused on either bond or bail was that the accused had a pending criminal case being Criminal Case No. 384 of 2019 in which he was charged with the offence of Obtaining by False Pretences which case was pending delivery of judgement. According to learned counsel, while the accused was out on bond he committed a traffic offence being Traffic Case No. 250 of 2019 in which he pleaded guilty and paid a fine. It was however during the period he was out on bond that the instant crime was committed. It was therefore contended that the accused is likely to commit another offence if released on bond since he is a habitual offender. In support of this position learned counsel relied on R. vs. Daniel Mwoka.

4. It was further submitted that there are other suspects who are still at large hence it was the prosecution’s belief that if released the accused was likely to ensure that the other suspects are not apprehended and there was also likelihood that he would interfere with the witnesses.

5. In response, the accused, through his learned counsel, Miss Muthini, submitted that the accused had been in custody since October, 2019. According to her, the accused was given a release order in the traffic case and paid the fine on 24th February, 2020. It was therefore submitted that the accused was not free at the time it was alleged that he had committed the instant offence. It was submitted that since the judgement in Criminal Case No. 384 of 2019 is yet to be delivered that cannot be a basis for denying the accused bond. Similarly, a traffic case cannot be used as a basis of doing so. It was submitted that the accused has a constitutional right to be released on bond on reasonable terms since no compelling reasons have been given.

6. According to learned counsel, they were not aware of the suspects alleged to be at large as the charge sheet did not mention them.

7. In a rejoinder, Miss Mogoi explained that the accused was out on bond in Criminal Case No. 384 of 2019 when he was arrested for the traffic offence on 8th October, 2019. However, the instant offence was committed on 3rd October, 2019 during which time he was not in custody.

Determination

8. I have considered the application, the affidavits both in support thereof and in opposition thereto.

9. Article 49(1)(h) of the Constitution provides that:-

An accused person has the right …

(h) to be released on bond or bail, on reasonable conditions pending a charge or trial, unless there are compelling reasons not to be released.

10. The Constitution however has not identified what qualifies under the term “compelling reasons.” The ordinary meaning according to Thesaurus English Dictionary of the word “compelling” is forceful, convincing, persuasive, undeniable and gripping. From this plain meaning it is apparent that the court would consider any fact or circumstances brought to its attention by the prosecution which would convince the court that the release of the accused would not augur well for the administration of justice or for the trial at hand. The court would therefore in my view consider the circumstances of each case using commonly known criteria, primary of which is whether or not the accused will attend trial.

11. It is true that the right to bail is not absolute and where there are compelling reasons the said right may be restricted. Nevertheless, since the Constitution expressly confers the said right, it is upon the prosecution to show that there exist compelling reasons to deny an accused person bail. What the compelling reasons are, however, depend on the circumstances of each case and these circumstances are to be considered cumulatively and not in isolation. The mere fact therefore that the offence with which an accused is charged carries a serious sentence is however not necessarily a reason for denial of bail. That ground only becomes a factor if it may be an incentive to the accused to abscond appearing for trial. Therefore, the real question that the court must keep in mind is whether or not the accused will be able to attend the trial. The imposition of terms of the bail if necessary must similarly be for the purposes of ensuring the attendance of the accused at the trial and ought not to be based solely on the sentence that the accused stands to serve if convicted. It is therefore my view that the discretion to grant bail and set the conditions rests with the court. In exercising its discretion, the court must seek to strike a balance between protecting the liberty of the individual and safeguarding the proper administration of justice. As the fundamental consideration is the interests of justice, the court will lean in favour of liberty and grant bail where possible, provided the interests of justice will not be prejudiced by this. Put differently, bail should not be refused unless there are sufficient grounds for believing that the accused will fail to observe the conditions of his release. In S vs. Nyaruviro & Another (HB 262-17, HCB 122-17, XREF CRB 1454A-B-17) [2017] ZWBHC 262 (31 August 2017), the Court held that:

“The refusal to grant bail and the detention of an accused in custody shall be in the interests of justice where one or more of the following grounds are established where there is a likelihood that the accused, if he or she were released on bail, will (i) endanger the safety of the public or any particular person or will commit an offence referred to in the First Schedule; or (ii) not stand his or her trial or appear to receive sentence; or (iii) attempt to influence or intimidate witnesses or to conceal or destroy evidence; or (iv) undermine or jeopardise the objectives or proper functioning of the criminal justice system, including the bail system… the ties of the accused to the place of trial; the existence and location of assets held by the accused; the accused’s means of travel and his or her possession of or access to travel documents; the nature and gravity of the offence or the nature and gravity of the likely penalty therefore; the strength of the case for the prosecution and the corresponding incentive of the accused to flee; the efficacy of the amount or nature of the bail and enforceability of any bail conditions; any other factor which in the opinion of the court should be taken into account…In considering any question…the court shall decide the matter by weighing the interests of justice against the right of the accused to his or her personal freedom and in particular the prejudice he or she is likely to suffer if he or she were to be detained in custody, taking into account, where applicable, the following factors, namely (i) the period for which the accused has already been in custody since his or her arrest; (ii) the probable period of detention until the disposal or conclusion of the trial if the accused is not released on bail; (iii) the reason for any delay in the disposal or conclusion of the trial and any fault on the part of the accused with regard to such delay; (iv) any impediment in the preparation of the accused’s defence or any delay in obtaining legal representation which may be brought about by the detention of the accused; (v) the state of health of the accused; (vi) any other factor which in the opinion of the court should be taken into account… In assessing the risk of abscondment, the established approach is for the court to assess this risk by first assessing the likely degree of temptation to abscond which may face the accused. To do this, one must consider the gravity of the charge because quite clearly, the more serious the charge, the more severe the sentence is likely to be. In Sv Nichas1977 (1) SA 257 (C) it was observed that if there is a likelihood of heavy sentences being imposed the accused will be tempted to abscond. Similar sentiments were stated in S v Hudson 1980 (4) SA 145 (D) 146 in the following terms;

“The expectation of a substantial sentence of imprisonment would undoubtedly provide an incentive to the accused to abscond and leave the country.”

In other words, the possibility of a severe sentence enhances any possible inducement to the accused to flee. See also Aitken v AG 1992 (2) ZLR 249 and Norman Mapfumo vs. The State HH 63/2008… The other relevant factor to be considered is the relative strength of the state’s case against the accused on the merits of the charge and therefore the probability of a conviction. It stands to reason that the more likely a conviction, the greater will be the temptation not to stand trial. Despite being the fulcrum of the application, this factor must be considered together with other factors in the case.”

12. Gravity of the offence as a consideration was appreciated however by Mbogholi Msagha, J in Criminal Application No. 319 of 2002 Priscilla Jemutai Kolonge vs. Republic (unreported) at page 3, wherein he held as follows:

“However, the nature of the charge or offence and the seriousness of the punishment if the applicant is found guilty must be considered in applications of this nature. I subscribe to the observation that where the charge against the accused is more serious and punishment heavy, there are more probabilities and incentive to abscond, whereas in case of minor offences, there may be no such incentive.”

13. The Nigerian Supreme Court (Justice Ibrahim Tanko Muhammad J.S.C.) set out some essential criteria on the issue of whether to grant bail in Alhaji Mujahid Dukubo – Asari vs. Federal Republic of Nigeria S.C. 20A/2006 as follows:

“…When it comes to the issue of whether to grant or refuse bail pending trial of an accused by the trial court, the law has set out some criteria which the trial court shall consider in the exercise of its judicial discretion to arrive at a decision. These criteria have been well articulated in several decisions of this court. Such criteria include among others, the following:-

(i) The nature of the charges;

(ii) The strength of the evidence which supports the charge;

(iii) The gravity of the punishment in the event of conviction;

(iv) The previous criminal record of the accused if any;

(v) The probability that the accused may not surrender himself for trial;

(vi) The likelihood of the accused interfering with witnesses or may suppress any evidence that may incriminate him;

(vii) The likelihood of further charges being brought against the accused;

(viii) The probability of guilty;

(ix) Detention for the protection of the accused;

(x) The necessity to procure medical or social report pending final disposal of the case.

14. However, in Republic vs. Danson Mgunya & Another [2010] eKLR,the Court while appreciating the need in this Country to have a policy on bail/bond was of the view that the above criteria reflects the true legal position but opined that:

“…criteria (ii) above (the strength of the evidence which supports the charge) ought not apply in Kenya except where perhaps the application for bail is being made or renewed after the court has placed the accused on his defence. This is inconsistent with the principle that an accused is presumed innocent. Such criteria should be applied with great caution and only in exceptional circumstances like where there is a statement that show that the accused was caught-red handed or where there is a lawfully admitted confession. Criteria (viii) above (the probability of guilt) appears to be in reference to where an accused has been placed on his defence.”

15. That case was decided before the policy on bail-bond was formulated. It is now clear that in interpreting the right to bail, section 123A of the Criminal Procedure Code gives the parameters for the grant of the right to bail as follows:

(1) Subject to Article 49(1)(h) of the Constitution and notwithstanding section 123, in making a decision on bail and bond, the Court shall have regard to all the relevant circumstances and in particular—

(a) the nature or seriousness of the offence;

(b) the character, antecedents, associations and community ties of the accused person;

(d) the strength of the evidence of his having committed the offence;

(2) A person who is arrested or charged with any offence shall be granted bail unless the court is satisfied that the person—

(a) has previously been granted bail and has failed to surrender to custody and that if released on bail (whether or not subject to conditions) it is likely that he would fail to surrender to custody;

(b) should be kept in custody for his own protection.

16. In Kelly Kases Bunjika vs. Republic [2017] eKLR, Muriithi, J was of the view that:

“The second limb of paragraph (b) of sub-section (1) of section 123A must be read separately and disjunctively from the first part so that the Court considers whether the accused ‘if released on bail (whether or not subject to conditions) it is likely that he would fail to surrender to custody’…Of course, the accused is standing trial for all the alleged offences of robbery with violence, escape from lawful custody and assault, and he is entitled to the presumption of innocence. It is no derogation of his right to that presumption of innocence that he is refused bail; it is merely the exercise of the Court’s mandate to grant bail as constitutionally empowered. It only means that the Court finds a compelling reason within the meaning of the Constitution to refuse bail in the particular case.”

17. The considerations in determining whether or not to grant bail are set out in Kenya Judiciary’s Bail and Bond Policy Guidelines, March 2015 at p. 25 which sets out judicial policy on bail as follows:

The following procedures should apply to the bail hearing:

(a) The Prosecution shall satisfy the Court, on a balance of probabilities, of the existence of compelling reasons that justify the denial of bail. The Prosecution must, therefore, state the reasons that in its view should persuade the court to deny the accused person bail, including the following:

a. That the accused person is likely to fail to attend court proceedings; or

b. That the accused person is likely to commit, or abet the commission of, a seriousoffence; or

c. That the exception to the right to bail stipulated under Section 123A of the Criminal Procedure Code is applicable in the circumstances; or

d. That the accused person is likely to endanger the safety of victims, individuals or the public; or

e. That the accused person is likely to interfere with witnesses or evidence; or

f. That the accused person is likely to endanger national security; or

g. That it is in the public interest to detain the accused person in custody.

18. I associate myself with the view expressed by Muriithi, J in Kelly Kases Bunjika vs. Republic (supra) that:

“It is clear that the primary consideration for bail is whether the accused will attend his trial for the charges facing him, and it must, therefore, be a compelling reason if it is demonstrated that “the accused person is likely to fail to attend court proceedings”. The question in this matter becomes whether there is, on a balance of probabilities evidence that the accused is likely to abscond. The accused claims to have a good defence to the charge of escape from custody. The nature of such defence and evidence is not disclosed. The accused merely asserts his “constitutional right to be granted Bond/Bail on reasonable and favourable terms.”

19. From the constitutional point of view, however, an accused person has the right to be released on bond or bail, on reasonable conditions pending a charge or trial. Therefore, the accused does not have to apply for release on bond since a person on whom rights have been bestowed under the Constitution is not obliged to ask for the same. This right can only be limited where it is shown that there exist compelling reasons not to be released. Those compelling reasons include the ones set out hereinabove. It is however my view that the burden to prove the existence of the said compelling reasons falls squarely on the prosecution. That was the position in Republic vs. William Mwangi Wa Mwangi [2014] eKLR where Muriithi, J held that:

“It is now settled that in the event that the state is opposed to the grant of bail to an accused person it has the onus of demonstrating that compelling reasons exist to justify denial of the Constitutional right to bail…It is trite that the cardinal principle which the court should consider in deciding whether to grant bail is whether the accused will turn up for his trial and whether there are substantial grounds to believe that he is likely to abscond if released on bail.”

20. In this case the opposition to the accused person’s release on bond is based on the ground that the applicant is a repeat offender who faces a charge of Obtaining by False Pretences and during the period he was out on bond in the said case he committed a traffic offence as well as the instant case. While the prosecution has relied on the decision of this Court in R vs. DANIEL MUOKA MUTHUSI Machakos High Court Criminal Case No. 18 OF 2018, in that case the accused hadbeen convicted in criminal case no. 384 of 2019 342 of 2012 with grievous harm and was sentenced to 7 years which he served at Kamiti Maximum Prison. The Court found that if the accused in that case was sentenced in 2012 for 7 years, then it would seem that he was not free for too long before he was charged with the new offence which he was alleged to have committed on 10th July, 2018. The Court therefore was of the view that while the court must presume that the applicant is innocent, the applicant’s antecedents cannot be ignored and in declining to release the accused on bond at that stage, the Court was of the view that his past record was relevant in determining whether or not there exist compelling reasons to deny him bail.

21. The Court however found that once the vulnerable witnesses’ testimonies had been taken the accused was be at liberty to renew his application.

22. It is therefore clear that the facts of that case are distinguishable from the present one. The only conviction against the accused is that of a traffic offence whose nature has not been disclosed. It might range from obstruction to causing death by dangerous driving for all we know. Accordingly, that cannot amount to compelling reason for the purposes of refusal to grant bond/bail. As regards the pending criminal case, the accused is yet to be found guilty. This Court cannot therefore state with certainty that he committed the said offence. Less still can this Court make a definite finding that the accused committed the instant offence. In Foundation for Human Rights Initiatives vs. Attorney General [2008] 1 EA 120 it was held by the Constitutional Court of Uganda that:

The context of article 23(6)(a) confers discretion upon the court whether to grant bail or not to grant bail. Bail is not automatic. Clearly the court has discretion to grant bail and impose reasonable conditions without contravening the Constitution. While the seriousness of the offence and the possible penalty which would be meted out are considerations to be taken into account in deciding whether or not to grant bail, applicants must be presumed innocent until proved guilty or until that person has pleaded guilty. The court has to be satisfied that the applicant should not be deprived of his/her freedom unreasonably and bail should not be refused merely as a punishment as this would conflict with the presumption of innocence. The court must consider and give the full benefit of his/her constitutional rights and freedoms by exercising its discretion judicially…]. It is not doubted or disputed that bail is an important judicial instrument to ensure individual liberty. However, the court has to address its mind to the objective of bail. However, the court has to address its mind to the objective of bail and it is equally an important judicial instrument to ensure the accused person’s appearance to answer the charge or charges against him or her. The objective and effect of bail are well settled and the main reason for granting bail to an accused person is to ensure that he appears to stand trial without the necessity of being detained in custody in the meantime. Under article 28(3) of the Constitution, an accused person charged with a criminal offence is presumed innocent until proved guilty or pleads guilty. If an accused person is remanded in custody but subsequently acquitted may have suffered gross injustice. Be that as it may, bail is not automatic and its effect is merely to release the accused from physical custody while he remains under the jurisdiction of the law and is bound to appear at the appointed place and time to answer the charge or charges against him.”

23. As for the allegation that there are other suspects who are at large the charge sheet does not disclose that the accused committed the offence with any other person. According to the Information, the instant offence was allegedly committed on the night of 3rd and 4th October, 2019. The Prosecution has not indicated what steps if any it has takn in apprehending the said suspects. The accused person cannot be denied his constitutional rights simply because the investigative agencies have not been keen in their work.

24. Regarding the allegation that the accused is likely to interfere with witnesses, I associate myself with the opinion expressed in Rep vs. Dwight Sagaray & other High Court Criminal Case No. 61 of 2012 that:

“For the prosecution to succeed in persuading the court on this criteria (of interference), it must place material before the court which demonstrate actual or perceived interference. It must also show the Court for example the existence of a threat or threats to witness; direct or indirect incriminating communication between the accused and witnesses; close familial relationship between the accused and the witnesses among others…, at least some facts must be placed before the court otherwise it is asking the court to speculate.”

25. In my view, the Court is required to explore the possibility of achieving the primary objective of granting bail, which is the attendance of the accused at the trial, by imposing such conditions that would ameliorate the possibility of the exceptions being a hindrance to the fair trial. In this case I have considered the reasons advanced by the prosecution to justify the court’s denial of the release of the accused person on bail and in my view they do not meet the legal threshold of what amounts to “compelling reasons” for the purposes of Article 49(1)(h) of the Constitution. In other words, the bare allegations made herein that there is incentive for the accused to abscond based on unproven existing criminal charges against the applicant cannot by any stretch of imagination be termed as forceful, convincing, persuasive, undeniable and gripping.

26. In the circumstances of this case, balancing the interests of the accused, the public, the victim and the complainant, I order that the applicant be released on bond pending his trial on the following terms:

a)The applicant shall be released on a bond of Kshs. Five Hundred Thousand (Kshs 500,000. 00) with two sureties of the like sums. The said sureties to be approved by the Deputy Registrar of this Court.

b)During the pendency of this case, or until further orders of the court, the applicant shall appear for the mention of his case once every 30 (thirty) days and in default of any one appearance without justifiable cause, the bond shall stand cancelled and the surety shall be called to account.

c)The applicant shall not interfere with any of the witnesses or in any manner influence the prosecution of the case.

d)If the applicant violates the conditions stipulated herein his bond shall stand cancelled and she shall be remanded in custody till the conclusion of his trial.

27. Orders accordingly.

28. This ruling has been delivered pursuant to section 168 of the Criminal Procedure Code as read with Article 50 of the Constitution in the absence of the accused due to the prevailing restrictions occasioned by COVID 19 pandemic and particularly as the decision is in favour of the Accused.

Ruling read, signed and delivered in open court at Machakos 30th day of March, 2020.

G V ODUNGA

JUDGE

In the presence of:

Ms Edna Ntabo for the State

Sadique for the Prison

CA Josephine