Republic v Cabinet Secretary for Transport, Infrastructure Housing and Urban Development & National Transport & Safety Authority Ex parte Kenya National Union of Co-operatives Staff & Ethics And Anti-Corruption Commission [2017] KEHC 2070 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

JUDICIAL REVIEW

MISC. APPLICATION NO.  485 2016

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION  BY KENYA NATIONAL UNION

OFCO-OPERATIVES  STAFF FOR  JUDICIAL REVIEW  ORDERS OF

CERTIORARIAND  PROHIBITION AGAINST THE ENACTMENT OF

THETRAFFIC(MINOROFFENCES) RULES 2016 BY THE CABINET

SECRETARY IN-CHARGEOFTRANSPORT, INFRASTRUCTURE,

HOUSING  AND URBANDEVELOPMENT;AND THE

NATIONAL  TRANSPORT   & SAFETY  AUTHORITY

AND

BETWEEN

REPUBLIC......................................................................................................APPLICANT

VERSUS

THE CABINET SECRETARY FOR TRANSPORT,

INFRASTRUCTURE HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT....1ST RESPONDENT

THE NATIONAL TRANSPORT & SAFETY AUTHORITY...............2ND RESPONDENT

AND

KENYA NATIONAL UNIONOF CO-OPERATIVES STAFF......EX PARTE APPLICANT

ETHICS AND ANTI-CORRUPTION  COMMISSION...................INTERESTED PARTY

RULING ON PRELIMINARY OBJECTION

1. On 12th October 2016, this court granted to the exparte  applicant Kenya National Union of  Co-operatives Staff, to institute  Judicial Review  proceedings, against  the  decision of the Cabinet Secretary, for Transport, Infrastructure, Housing and  Urban Development made vide legal notice No.161 of 23rd  September, 2016.

2. On 1st November 2016, the exparte applicant dutifully filed the substantive notice of motion within the  21st  days stipulated  in the order  for leave.

3. In response to the substantive notice of  motion, on  23rd January  2017, the Attorney General  filed a  replying  affidavit  sworn by Mr Irungu Nyakera, the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Transport, Infrastructure, Housing and  Urban Development, the 1st respondent herein.

4. It is that replying affidavit and legal representation of the Attorney General’s  office of the  1st respondent  that invited  the  exparte applicant herein to file a notice of  preliminary objection dated 23rd February 2017 seeking to debar the  Attorney General from representing  the 1st respondent in these Judicial Review  proceedings  on the grounds that:

1) The Attorney General’s representation of the 1st respondent  offends Article 156(4) and (6) of the Constitution; and  Sections 5 and  6  of the office of the Attorney General Act, No. 49  of  2012.

2) Representation of the 1st respondent by the Attorney general places the State/republic on both sides of the dispute  in violation of the law and known/settled practice.

3) On the whole, the replying affidavit dated  23rd January, 2017 as drawn and filed by the Attorney General is misconceived, incompetent and fatally  defective, hence it  should be  struck out  and  or expunged  from the record.

5. In support of the preliminary objection, the exparte  applicant’s  counsel, Mr  Miyare  filed written submissions  quite  detailed  comprising  13 pages  and annexed  a list of  authorities, 16  in number  to fortify  his client’s  position  on the issue of whether  or not the  Attorney General  should  represent the  Cabinet Secretary  for Transport, Infrastructure, Housing  and  Urban  Development   in these  Judicial Review  proceedings.

6. Parties’ advocates also made oral submissions.  Mr Miyare   counsel for the exparte applicant submitted that the preliminary objection as filed is a pure point of law   grounded on the Constitution and Statutory law- office of the Attorney General Act hence it meets the threshold set out in the Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Company Ltd vs West End Distributors Ltdcase.

7. There are  no proceedings   initiated   before this court seeking declarations that the Attorney  General’s   representation of  the  1st respondent  and  all  other similar  proceedings  is unconstitutional and  or unlawful.

8. According to Mr Miyare, Judicial Review is public  in nature  and is brought  in the name of  the Republic  as espoused  in the cases of  Welamondi vs  The Electoral Commission  of Kenya  Miscellaneous Application No. 82  of 2002  [2002] 1 KLR 486; Farmers Bus Service and Others vs The  Transport Licensing Appeal Tribunal [1959] EA 779  as  well as in Mohamed Ahmed  vs Republic [1957]  EA  523; which  cases  also espouse issues  of the parties  to Judicial Review  proceedings.

9. According  to the exparte  applicant’s  counsel, the  Republic  is the applicant in Judicial Review proceedings and that  under Article 165(6) of the Constitution, the court is the superintendent  over the parties.  It  was  submitted that the respondent is the crown agency  whose  decision  is impugned  and that the exparte  applicant  is a mere relator on behalf  of the state.

10. Further, it was submitted that in Judicial Review  proceedings, there  is no true  dispute  between  the crown and the exparte applicant  as  was stated in the case of  Lang  vs  British Columba (Superitendent of Motor Vehicles [2005] BCCA 244.  It was submitted that in Judicial Review  everybody  is a party thereto.  It  was  further submitted that  the role of the Attorney General in Judicial Review  proceedings is pursuant  to Article  156(6) of the  Constitution  being that  of representing  the  National Government   in civil proceedings before the court or to any other legal proceedings   to which the National Government  is a party  other than criminal proceedings .  It  was also  submitted that the  office of Attorney General  Act  further  emphasis the role of the Attorney General.

11. In the  circumstances, it  was  contended  that this matter falls  outside  the National Government  since these  proceedings  are brought  by the state  at the relation of the state against  the state agency, Cabinet Secretary hence the Cabinet Secretary cannot be  the  National Government  to invite legal  representation  by the Attorney General.

12. Reliance  was  placed on  Article  260  of the Constitution on the definition of the National Government Mr Miyare  maintained  that the Cabinet Secretary  cannot be  National Government.  He relied  on the case  of Farmers  Bus Service and  Others vs The Transport  Licencing Appeal Tribunal  (supra)citingBurns vs  Bansley [1949] 79 CLR 101 to the effect  that the government  is independent  of persons  who constitute it.

13. In counsel’s view, state officers are not Government  and  that therefore the Attorney General will be violating the Constitution  and the and the  office of the Attorney General Act if  he represents the  1st  respondent  Cabinet Secretary  Mr Miyare  submitted  that it  will be an absurdity  if the  Attorney General is put  on both sides  of the  divide.  Instead, he proponed that the Attorney General should represent the exparte applicant.

14. Mr Miyare gave an analogy of where the Director of Public Prosecution in private prosecution would represent the respondent which is unacceptable.  He maintained  that the only  lawful position to be taken  by the  Attorney General  is that  of the Republic( exparte applicant) and not  the other   way round  otherwise  the absurdity  would be  inexplicable.  He relied on James  Aggrey  Mwamu & Others  vs The Chief Justice of the Republic of  Kenya  HC Miscellaneous 150 of  2004 unreported  where the  role of the  Attorney General in Judicial Review proceedings  was  explained by Honourable Tanui J which Mr Miyare  submitted that it  was  decided  per incuriam, and which  authority counsel  urged this court  to declare  as bad law.

15. In opposition to the preliminary objection, Miss Ngelechei Litigation counsel on behalf of the Attorney General representing the 1st respondent submitted that the Attorney General derives authority from Article 156 of the Constitution   5 of the office of Attorney General Act.

16. Miss Ngelechei submitted that the Attorney General  represents  the National Government in all legal proceedings  except criminal proceedings  and that the 1st respondent  being sued  as an organ  of the state, the Attorney General  is under  a duty to  represent  it.  Miss Ngelechei submitted that in  Judicial Review  matters , remedies  are issued  in the name of the  stated as a practice  but that  it did not  place the  Cabinet  Secretary  in the place of the  applicant  hence  the Attorney General  has locus  to represent   the  Cabinet Secretary.  She urged the court to dismiss the preliminary objection with costs.

17. In a brief  rejoinder, Mr  Miyare  submitted that in Judicial Review, the state  is the master  and is  merely  supervising  its agent through  courts and not merely  a matter of  practice.  He maintained  that  role of the court is  entrenched  in Article 165(6)  of the Constitution and that it   also has a  historical  significance  hence the court  should allow  the  preliminary  objection.

DETERMINATION

18. I have considered the foregoing.  In my humble view, the main issue for determination in this matter of the preliminary objection is whether the preliminary objection is merited.  To determine that issue, there are other ancillary questions to be considered.   A preliminary objection must meet the threshold  espoused  in the case of  Mukisa  Biscuit  Manufacturing  Company  Ltd  v West End  Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696  where the court, Sir Charles  Newbold  observed:

“A Preliminary objection is in the nature of what used to be a demurrer.  It raised a pure point of law which is urged on the assumption that all the facts pleaded by the other side are correct.  It cannot be raised if any facts have to be ascertained or if what is sought is the exercise of judicial discretion.  The improper raising of points by way of preliminary objection does nothing but unnecessarily increase costs and, on occasion, confuse the issue.  This improper practice should stop.”

19. It is worth noting that there is no specific constitutional and or statutory provision cited which expressly or by implication bars the Attorney General from representing government ministries or departments in judicial review proceedings. it therefore follows that one has to examine principles of law and practice to establish whether there is guidance on the issue herein.

20. The preliminary  objection  raised by  the exparte applicants herein is predicated on the grounds that the Attorney General’s representation of the 1st respondent Cabinet Secretary Ministry of Transport, Infrastructure, Housing  and  Urban  Development offends Article  156(4) and  (6)  of the Constitution; Section 5 and  6  of the office of the Attorney General Act No. 49 of  2012; Article  156   of the Constitution  establishes  the office  of the Attorney General.

21. Under Sub Article 4 thereof, the Attorney General:

a) is the principal legal  advisor  to the Government;

b) Shall represent  the National Government in court  or in any other legal proceedings to which the National government is a party, other than criminal proceedings; and

c) Shall perform any other functions conferred on the office by an Act of Parliament or by the President.

d) The Attorney General shall have authority, with the leave of the court, to appear as a friend of the court in any civil proceedings to which the Government is not a party.

e) The Attorney General shall promote, protect and uphold the rule of law and defend the public interest.

22. In 2012, vide Act  No. 49  of 2012  Parliament  enacted office  of the Attorney General Act which  commenced  on 4th January  2013, Section 5  of the Act sets out  functions  of the Attorney General in addition to the Constitution mandate set out  in Article  156  of the Constitution.  The functions are in addition to those stipulated in Article 156 of the Constitution and shall be responsible for:

a) Advising government ministries, Departments, constitutional Commissions  and  state  corporations  on legislative  and other  legal matters;

b) Advising the government on all matters relating to the Constitution, International law, human rights and  consumer protection  and  legal aid;

c) Negotiating, drafting, vetting and interpreting local and  international  documents, agreements  and  treaties  for  and  on behalf of the  government  and its agencies;

d) Coordinating, reporting  obligations  to international human rights  treaty  bodies  to which  Kenya  is a member  or on  any matter  which member states  are required  to report;

e) Drafting  legislative  proposals  for  the government  and  advising  the  government and  its agencies  on  legislative  and  other legal  matters;

f) Reviewing  and  overseeing  legal matters  pertaining  to the registration of companies, partnerships, business names, societies, adoption, marriages, charities, chattels, hire  purchase  and  coat of arms;

g) Reviewing  and  overseeing  legal  matters pertaining  to the administration  of estates and  trusts;

h) In consultation with the Law Society of Kenya, advising the government on the regulation of the legal profession.

i) Representing the national government in all civil and  constitutional matters  in accordance  with the Government  Proceedings Act ( Cap 40);

j) Representing  the government  in matters  before  foreign courts  and  tribunals; and  performing any function as may be  necessary  for the effective discharge of the duties and  the exercise of the powers  of the Attorney General  under Section 5(2)  of the Attorney General’s Act, in the  exercise  of  the  functions conferred  by the Constitution and this Act, the Attorney General shall provide efficient and  professional legal services to the Government and the public for the purpose of facilitating, promoting and  monitoring  the rule of law, the protections of human rights  and democracy.

23. Section 7 of the Act further stipulates that:

“ (1) despite the provisions of any written law to the contrary or in the absence of any other written law, the Attorney General shall have the right of audience in proceedings of any suit or inquiry of an administrative body which the Attorney General considers.

a) To be  of public interest  or involves  public property; or

b) To involve the legislature, the judiciary or an independent department or agency of the Government.  Section 9 of  the Act  establishes he  Solicitor General  who is  the  principal  Assistant  to the Attorney General  and  whose  functions  are among   others:

c) Conduct, or assign and supervise all court cases, including appeals or petitions on behalf of the Attorney General.

24. Under Section  17(1) of the Act, no Ministry  or  Department  shall engage  services of a consultant  to render  any legal  services relating  to the  functions  of  the Attorney General without the   approval  of the Attorney General. Section 19 of the Act stipulates that all Government Ministries and  Departments  shall seek the opinion  of the  Attorney General on  any matter raising  substantial  legal  constitutional issues.

25. The statutory and constitutional provisions set out above all speak to the functions of the Attorney General and the officers under the office.

26. The exparte  applicant  claims  that  Judicial Review  remedies  are public in nature   and  instituted  in the name of the  Republic  who should  be representing   the  exparte applicant  because the state in judicial review matters in the master and is merely  supervising its agent  through  the  courts and  not merely  a matter of practice.  Further, that the role of the court is supervisory.

27. The principal role of the Attorney General in Kenya’s  constitutional  framework is to uphold and  promote  the  rule of law  and to protect the public  interest;  human  rights  and  democracy.

28. From the Act and constitutional provisions that I have  reproduced  herein above, among  others, the Attorney General  advises  National Government and other  National  Government  entities; participates as a member of  the  Cabinet, and  advises  Cabinet  on legal  and  constitutional  questions  to ensure that the Government understands its legal and constitutional obligations.  The  Attorney General  is the titular head of the legal profession( Bar) in Kenya  and  has oversight for the legal  advise given to Government by all  Government  lawyers and  private   legal  consultants.

29. In other words, the office of Attorney General is responsible, ultimately, for ensuring that the government’s decisions and actions   respect and   uphold the Rule of Law.

30. Independent of government   functions, the Attorney General is responsible for the promotion and protection of the public interest.  He has audience before any court of law or tribunal.

31. According to Sir Elwyn Jones the former Attorney General of the United Kingdom 1964-1970:

“The Attorney General is the protector..  of the  public interest  generally.  The aspect  of his duties  had a very  early  origin.  He had for long  been the proper  person to take  legal proceedings  where the interests  of the public  are endangered, or acts  tending  to public injury are done without  authority.

32. In Gouriet v Attorney General [1978] Lord Wilberforce  stated:

“ In all  these  matters  the  Attorney General  role is to seek a just  balance   between often  conflicting  public   interests.  The  functions referred to above may be held by the Attorney General as an inherent  part  of his  ancient  office or  may have been  conferred  upon him  by statute.

Thus, Parliament has again and again recognized his particular  role  in this sphere  of seeking to  balance the public interest  in matters of  character  which  have been mentioned.  In doing so, it has reinforced his inherent powers.”

33. As to whether  the public interest  functions  of the Attorney General  are amenable  to Judicial Review, Lord  Chancellor, the Earl of Halsbury in London County Council  v Attorney General [1902] stated:

“ In  a case  where  as part of his public duty  he has a right to  intervene…the  determination of the question  whether  it is a proper  case  for the Attorney General  to proceed  in, is a  matter  entirely  beyond   the jurisdiction of  this or any other  court.  It is a question which the law  of this  county  has made  to reside  exclusively  in the Attorney General.  The public  interest  role  of the  Attorney General  is intended  to serve as  a  back stop to prevent  or remedy any injustice  in or pressures  on other parts  of the justice  system.”

34. Professor  I.  Sagay San in his address on the role of the Attorney General in the administration of justice,   in  2007 gives  the  history of the Attorney General and  states that:

“ The office of the Attorney General is a very old office.  It can be  traced back  to England  in the  13th  Century  and  he early  beginnings of the legal  profession itself.

The  sovereign  was  unable to appear  in person in his own  courts  to plead  in any case  affecting  his own interests.  It  was therefore necessary for an Attorney to plead the  sovereign’s cause.  It  was  the  responsibility  of the King’s  Attorney  to maintain  the interests of the sovereign  before the Royal courts…..”

35. The Attorney General in this case  drew  and  filed an affidavit   on behalf  of the Principal  Secretary State Department  of Transport, Ministry of Transport, Infrastructure, Housing  and  Urban Development. The Principal Secretary is the Accounting Officer of the Ministry whose decision is being challenged by the exparte applicant.

36. According  to the exparte  applicant, prerogative orders  are issued  in  the name of  the  crown/Republic  to  supervise  actions of its  agents hence  the  Attorney General  should not  represent  such agents  in this case, the Cabinet  Secretary.  Several  decisions  were relied on  including  Lang v British  Columbia  (Superitendent of Motor Vehicles) 2005, BCCA 244 ; Re Allen  and  Superitendent  of Motor Vehicles  and  Attorney General  of British  Columbia  [1986]  BCLR   (2nd) 255; Republic vs Attorney General & Another  Exparte  James Alfred  Koroso[2013] e KLRwhere the courts held  that the state, the Republic on  whose behalf  the  public  officer  undertakes  his duties that  will compel  him, a servant, to do what he is  under  a duty to perform.  That  judicial review  is never issued  against the government but  a government  official  to do  what the  government  through Parliament, has  directed  him to do.

37. It was therefore maintained that the Attorney General can only join the prosecution of the Judicial Review proceedings if at all, and not to defend such proceedings as is the case herein. It is submitted that the Attorney General’s  unlawful representation of the 1st respondent curtails the government’s  supervision of its agents  or servants  of the state  against  their master which is gravely  inimical to public  interest  and  that such representation  places the  Republic on  both sides  of the dispute  which in  effect  violates the public interest law and that the provisions  of  Article  156  of the Constitution  only obligates the Attorney General to  represent  the  government  and that  Tanui B.K. J in James Aggrey  Mwamu & Others  vs  The Chief  Justice  in HCC Miscellaneous  150 of  20004  (unreported) erroneously allowed the Attorney General  to represent  the Chief Justice  hence his decision  was made  per incuriam hence the replying  affidavit  filed  by the Attorney General should be  expunged  from the record  as  unlawful and  incompetent.

38. This court does   appreciate  the  important  issue  raised by the exparte applicant’s counsel and the persuasive  decisions/opinions  derived  from foreign jurisdictions on the  matter which, basically stipulates that  judicial review  remedies  are prerogative writs of the crown issued by the court  as  supervisor  of the action of  administrative  bodies and that  as they are  issued  in the name  of the  Republic/crown, then the Attorney General  being  a  protector  of  the Rule  of Law,  public interest  and  democracy  should not  purport  to represent  the state agent/servant  whose actions  are impugned.  What the  exparte  applicant  is insinuating  is that the  respondents  should  engage  services  of a private  advocate  to represent them and not the  Attorney General.

39. The  Office of the Attorney General is a constitutional office and  in the public service, and  in  all civil cases filed against  Government Ministries/Departments, the Attorney General  ought to  be made  a party as the Principal Legal advisor  to the National  Government, not just  a mere advocate representing  the government  department.

40. The  office of  Attorney General  Act makes  clear provisions  tha  All government  Ministries  and Departments shall seek the Attorney  General’s  legal opinion in matters raising  substantial legal or constitutional issues.  The issues  raised herein raise  serious  or substantial  legal questions  and  it is  for that reason  that I fund  that the Attorney  General is either enjoined hereto or is under a legal duty to appear and  represent  the   relevant   government  Ministry  or Department.

41. The role  of the Attorney General  today in Kenya is different  from the role  of the Attorney General  in England  and  in the period  prior to the 2010  Constitution.  In England, the Attorney General  is also  the public prosecutor  as  was  the case in Kenya prior  to 2010.  The National Government  is represented  by Government  Ministries  and  Departments which are  sued  in  civil legal  proceedings.

42. No doubt, judicial review  proceedings  involve  challenging   of  decisions made by persons in administrative capacities  or compelling the  performance  of statutory  duties by public bodies.  The  Attorney General being the Principal legal advisor  to the National Government has  a duty to advise the relevant Government  Ministry  on what is  expected of it, whether  proceedings are brought by  way of Judicial Review  in the name of Republic  or by way  of civil suit.

43. I find no legal bar to the Attorney General to represent the 1st respondent Cabinet Secretary sued in his official capacity   in this matter as the author of the impugned legal notice.

44. The exparte  applicant  has not  sought legal  services/representation of  the Attorney General  hence they cannot  complain that the Attorney General  should be standing on their  side of the  case  and not  on the side of  the  1st  respondent Cabinet Secretary representing the relevant  government  or state  department.

45. In my  humble view, the preliminary  objection raised is  a  mere  technicality which cannot be upheld at the expense of substantive justice, and the public interest.  Public interest demands that state resources be  used  in an effective  and  economical  manner. Barring the Attorney General from representing a government Department in these proceedings means that resources will have to be expanded to hire lawyers from private practice to represent and advise the government on its obligations towards citizens. That is not, in my view, the spirit and letter of Article 156 of the Constitution and the Office of the Attorney General Act, 2012. Citizens should not be overburdened with the cost of meeting legal fees of private enterprises when the Government spends huge sums of money e in salaries to sustain a whole law firm in the name of Office of the Attorney General, full of qualified and competent advocates to represent the Government in proceedings such as these.

46. The  Attorney General is paid by  the public to  represent   their interests.  This is a case where  the  1st respondent  can be  ordered to  pay costs  of these  proceedings to the successful party.  Those  costs  will be derived  from  the  public  coffers.  It does not make economic sense for the government Ministry or state department to hire services of a private advocate to represent it in such   proceedings when no prejudice is shown to occur if the Attorney General represents the relevant Government Ministry in court, as stipulated in law.

47. Without the Ministries and Departments, in place, the rest of government or state are  a mere abstract entities which cannot appear pro se  and on their own in a court of law.  In the cases referred  to by Mr Miyare from the  foreign  jurisdictions, none of them  explicitly  stipulate  that because  judicial  review  remedies  are issued in the name of the Republic  then the Attorney General cannot  be a legal  representative for the respondent.

48. In addition, with Judicial Review  remedies  being elevated  to being constitutional  remedies  as  opposed to  the  traditional  prerogative  writs issued in the name of the crown or Republic, this  court is of the view that  the format of bringing judicial review proceedings in the traditional name of the Republic is a procedural issue  which cannot  override  substantive  justice to the  parties. That procedure is now overtaken by the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015, as not all judicial review proceedings instituted challenge decisions of or compel or prohibit performance of public duties.

49. According  to the  exparte  applicant, the  1st   respondent  is not a National Government therefore does not warrant being  represented by the Attorney General. As I have stated, government  is an abstract entity  and life is  only breathed in  it by the various entities/offices that form the  national government  which are the  respective  state Departments  and  or Ministries, which cannot  on their  own run  the affairs  of Government  without  the respective  office  holders,  in the form of Cabinet Secretaries  and Principal Secretaries, to perform official government functions and exercise powers bestowed upon them by statute s or the Constitution. It is for that reason that decisions of Cabinet Secretaries become Government decisions and not individual decisions of the particular office holder.

50. The exparte  applicant  in his  substantive notice of motion  is accusing  the  1st respondents of  promulgating  rules  without  subjecting  them to public  participation.  The  1st  respondent  in filing  the replying affidavit  contends that the Rules were subjected  to  public participation hence there was no breach of the constitutional or  legislative  provisions.  The replying affidavit is sworn by the Principal Secretary State Department of Transport, not by the Attorney General.

51. In my  humble view, therefore, in view  of the provisions  of Article 156  of the Constitution which are   clear  that the Attorney General is mandated   to represent  the  National  Government  in court  in civil  or in any other  legal  proceedings  to which the   National Government  is a party other  than criminal  proceedings, the words  or in any other legal  proceedings, I have no doubt that the any other  legal  proceedings  to which the   National Government  is a party, extends  to Judicial Review  proceedings  where  a State Department  or Ministry  is a party  like in this case.

52. Furthermore, Judicial Review  remedies also  constitutional  remedies. I am therefore unable  to find  that  the James Aggrey Mwamu & Others v The Chief Justice case  was  decided  per incuriam  by Honourable  B.K. Tanui  J (as he then was), as the  exparte applicant  would  want this court to believe  and  hold.  I do not  find  any unlawfulness or  incompetence  in the replying  affidavit   sworn by the  Principal Secretary  and  filed on  behalf of the  1st respondent  Cabinet  Secretary.

55. In addition, this  court is unable  to  find that any representation of the Attorney General  in these   and  similar proceedings  is a violation of the Constitution, relevant statutes and  known/settled  practice.

54. The times  when a court of law  would determine  proceedings  on account that  they were  completely  muddled  in form and  thus incompetent and misconceived save where such form  affects  the substance  of the proceedings are long  gone.  Article  159 2(d) of the Constitution obligates  this court  to ensure  that  in exercising   judicial  authority,  justice is  administered  without undue  regard to procedural  technicalities  and  (e)  the  purposes  and  principles  of the Constitution  are protected  and  promoted.

55. This court therefore declines to turn to procedural pit falls  which  do not  affect the  substance  to  deny  the  1st respondent  access  to justice  and  the right to legal  representation by  the government  and state  machinery  especially where it is not demonstrated that the exparte applicant will suffer any prejudice,  if the Attorney General represents the 1st respondent or that the Attorney General is conflicted in any way.

56. In the instant case, the  1st  respondent  is not before the  court as  an individual but as an office of Cabinet Secretary  in its capacity as such, having promulgated rules that the exparte  applicant  herein in challenging  their constitutionality.

57. It is not the same as the Cabinet Secretary in his personal capacity being sued and seeking legal services or representation by the Attorney General.  Article 156(4) ( c) of the Constitution is clear  that the  Attorney General can  perform  such other  functions as shall be  conferred  by an Act of Parliament  or by the  President  and in this  case, the  office of Attorney General  Act confers  on the Attorney General  the function of representing  the National Government in all civil proceedings in which the National Government  is a party and  also  in any other proceeding  to which the  National Government is a party, other than  criminal  proceedings.

58. Therefore, although legal representation is different from legal  advise, I find  that this case  is clearly  distinguishable  from the  Isaac Aluoch Polo Aluochier  vs  Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta  & William Samoei Ruto.

59. It is clear to me that  the  Attorney General  can perform  any other such functions  for as long  as the  said functions  do not conflict  with or  are  inconsistent  with the  Attorney General’s  constitutional functions.

60. Albeit  the authorities  such aRepublic vs  Machakos  County  Government & 2 Others Exparte Johnstone Muthama  [2016] e KLR insist that  the  Judicial Review  proceedings  are neither  civil nor criminal proceedings, the authority does not  acknowledge  the  fact that the  Judicial Review proceedings  are no longer the traditional prerogative  proceedings  and the fact that with the  enactment of Fair Administrative Action, 2015, there is  a shift from Judicial Review  being  merely remedies  against decisions of public authorities.

61. Judicial review has taken shape with the definition of “ administrator” not  being limited  to public bodies  or authorities.  ‘Administrator' means ‘a person who takes an administrative action or who makes an administrative decision’

62. It follows that  Judicial Review  is no longer  a writ issued  in the name  of the Republic  to its  agents  and servants,  as  ‘administrators’ are not  confirmed  to public  bodies or persons in the public service. The exparte applicant’s proceedings are also brought under the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015.

63. In addition, although it is  often  stated in majority  of decisions  that Judicial Review  are sui generis and  that they are neither  civil nor  criminal proceedings  as stipulated  in Section 8 of the Law Reform  Act, the provisions referred to do not restrict the legal representation of the Attorney General to only civil proceedings but to any other proceedings to which the National Government is a party.

64. The exparte applicant has argued that the crown cannot be both applicant and respondent in the same matter.  Agreed. However, it is the  exparte  applicant  who  has named  the  1st respondent  as such respondent.  He is not saying that the 1st respondent is the crown but a Cabinet Secretary responsible for a specific ministry.

65. In the MC neice  vs British  Columbia  [1981] 13 BCLR  2d  288case, it    was clear that  the  Director of Public Prosecutions  could  not act  for an accused  person  in private  prosecution  proceedings.  That resonates well considering that a private prosecutor takes the position of the public prosecutor, while the public prosecutor becomes a nominal party.  The same  cannot be said of  the Attorney General who is given  the mandate  to represent  the Government  in civil  proceedings and in any  other proceedings  other than  criminal proceedings.

66. The  1st respondent  is a public  officer  occupying  a public/state office and has been enjoined to these proceedings in his capacity as holder of such office having promulgated the impugned  rules.

67. In my  view, it would be absurd  to expect  a Public/Government  Ministry in such  circumstances  to be expected to hire a  private  advocate  to represent  the Cabinet Secretary.  That  would in my view  amount to  wastage of public  resources ( seeTruth Justice and Reconciliation Commission   v   Chief Justice of the Republic of Kenya & another  [2012] eKLRwhere Hon Warsame(as he then was) stated and I concur:

“In recent times, there has been increasing instances of litigations by Commissions without any reference to the office of the Attorney General.   This court has to device a number of strategies to ensure that, that attractive brand of litigation should not be used or allowed to be used for suspicious products of mischief.   One strategy is that before a Commission files a suit, it must seek advice, guidance and concurrence of the honourable the Attorney General in respect of the issues it wants the court to address and determine.  Where such guidance and advice is not sought and/or obtained, the court would have to take further steps to ensure public resources are not wasted on frivolous and useless litigations.”

68. In Isaac Aluoch Poto  Aluochier  vs  Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and William Samoei Ruto, HCC Petition  360/2013 [2014]  e KLR, I find that  case  can be  distinguished  from this  case as the respondents  in that  case  could not  be  described as  National Government for or Government/ State  departments  to warrant legal representation by the Attorney General.  The learned  Honourable Lenaola J (as he then was) was therefore correct in accepting the submission that the respondents   who were also facing   criminal charges at the International Criminal Court could not be represented by the Attorney General because they were charged as individuals and not part of or on behalf of the Government of Kenya.

69. I also  find the learned judge  in the above  Aluochier  case  was  right in finding  that the alleged  actions  of the respondents  could not be  termed  as  actions of the  National Government  to attract  legal representation by the Attorney General as they were alleged  to have committed  criminal offences.

70. It is my view that it would be setting a dangerous precedent to hold that the Attorney general cannot represent government Ministries in judicial review proceedings.

71. Accordingly, I find and hold that the preliminary objection raised by the exparte applicant is misconceived and unmerited.  The same is hereby dismissed.

72. Costs shall be in the cause.

Dated, signed and delivered in open court at Nairobi this 13th day of November, 2017.

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE

In the presence of:

Miss Oriwo h/b for Mr Miyare for the exparte applicant

Mr Barasa h/b for Mr Nyamodi for 2nd Respondent

N/A for 1st Respondent

CA: George