Republic v DCIO-Starehe Division Nairobi, Director of Public Prosecution, Joseph Mburu t/a Sanford & Daughters & Veronica Mary Njeri exparte Zachariah Wakhungu Baraza t/a Siuma Auctioneers [2017] KEHC 6145 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

JUDICIAL REVIEW NO.  154 OF 2015

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY ZACHARIAH  WAKHUNGU  BARAZA   T/A  SIUMA AUCTIONEERS  FOR LEAVE TO  APPLY TO THE HIGH COURT FOR JUDICIAL  REVIEW ORDERS S OF PROHIBITION.

BETWEEN

REPUBLIC.......................................................................APPLICANT

VERSUS

DCIO-STAREHE DIVISION NAIROBI ..................1ST RESPONDENT

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTION ...........2ND RESPONDENT

JOSEPH MBURU

T/A SANFORD & DAUGHTERS.................1ST INTERESTED PARTY

VERONICA MARY NJERI..........................2ND INTERESTED PARTY

EXPARTE

ZACHARIAH WAKHUNGU BARAZA T/A SIUMA AUCTIONEERS

JUDGMENT

1. By a notice of motion dated 26th May 2015 the exparte applicant Zachariah Wakhungu Baraza T/A Siuma Auctioneers seeks from  this court Judicial Review  order of  prohibition  to stop  and refrain  the DCIO Starehe Division, Nairobi and the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) from summoning, arresting  and  preferring  criminal charges  against him   on the basis  of issues  arising  from Milimani CM CC No. 1355  of  2015 Tripple Eight Properties Ltd Vs. Joseph Mburu T/A Sanford & Daughters  & Another  in which the Chief Magistrate’s court granted an order of eviction which  was executed  by the exparte applicant.

2. The Exparte applicants case is contained in the statutory  statement and supporting affidavit filed together with the application for leave granted on  19th May  2015  by Honourable  Justice  Korir.

3. It is deposed and asserted by the exparte  applicant that he is a licenced Class B  Auctioneers  and duly  authorized  to execute court process in Nairobi and Kiambu  counties  as stipulated  in the copy if his practicing  licence   annexed  as ZWB1.  That  on 27th March  2015, the Chief  Magistrate’s  court  in Milimani CMCC No. 1355  of  2015  issued  an eviction  order directed  to Joseph Mburu t/a San Ford & Daughters  and  Veronica Mary Njeri to move out of the property known  as LR No. 209/ 1635/2 situate  at Pangani  in Nairobi  as shown by  annexture  ZWB2  copy of the order.  That on 31st March 2015 the exparte applicant was instructed by Tripple Eight Properties Limited to execute the order issued in the aforementioned suit at Milimani Chief Magistrate’s court.

4. That on the same  day 31st  March  2015 the  exparte applicant  applied to the Nairobi County Police Commander  to be provided  with security while executing the court order and paid shs  3,000/- as  evidenced  from ZWB3  copy of application, receipt   and  letter from the County Commander  directed  to the OCPD Starehe  to provide  him/the auctioneer with security  executing  a  court order.

5. According  to the exparte  applicant, when he went  to execute the court order on  2nd April  2013  at about  4. 00pm in  the company of the police  officers, from Pangani Police Station, they were not able  to execute  the order as they  discovered that the goods that were to  be moved  required machines  to move  them out  of the property and it  would take  not less than  10 (ten)  hours to do the  work.  They therefore postponed the exercise as they could not finish it within time allowed in law which is by 6. 30 pm.

6. The applicant therefore agreed with the police  officers that the order would  be executed   the following week  after the Easter Holidays, and  as the law does not  permit  an eviction to be carried out twice and  hence, they could not  remove part of the property out  of  the premises  as they  were to hand over  the premises to the plaintiff in Milimani CM CC  No. 1355 of 2015  after eviction.

7. That on  3rd April 2015  the exparte  applicant left  for  Bungoma to attend a church function  at Christ the King  Catholic  Church, Bungoma  Town and he returned  to Nairobi on  7th April  2015  at  11. 30 a.m. after Easter Holidays.

8. That on 27th April 2015 when the exparte applicant went to check if the interested party had moved out of the premises on LR No.  209/1635/2, he found that they had moved out as earlier promised.

9. That on  11th May  2015  the exparte applicant  was summoned by the DCIO  Starehe Division to record  a statement  on an alleged  malicious  damage to  the interested parties’ property.

10. That he found the allegations of malicious damage to property malicious   as he was not in Nairobi at that time.

11. That the 1st respondent  DCIO summoned  the exparte  applicant  a second time  on 15th May  2015  on which date he  was told that  his finger prints  would be taken  after  which he  would be  arraigned  in court to  face  charges of  malicious  damage   to property.

12. According  to the exparte applicant, it would  not have  been possible  for him  to damage  the interested  parties’  properties  because when  he first  visited  their premises, he  was  in the company of eleven (11) police officers from Starehe Police Division  and that no  eviction  took place  on that day.

13. HowevHowever, that the DCIO Starehe would hear none of the exparte applicant’s statement of defence.  That in his view, the issues  which  the interested  parties are  raising   regarding   their eviction can only be  addressed by  the court  which issued  the eviction  order and  not in a criminal court.

14. That the court  which issued  the  orders for  eviction  has a duty  to demand   from the exparte  applicant to file a  report on  how the  eviction   was done and not to commence parallel proceedings in a criminal court.  That by the 1st respondent demanding to know from the exparte applicant whether or not he evicted the interested parties from LR No. 209/1635/2 he is usurping the court which issued the eviction order.

15. That the  Director of Public Prosecutions entrusted  with  prosecutorial  powers should  exercise such   powers  fairly  and  reasonably  but that  he failed  to do so.

16. That the same   issues being investigated by the DCIO are the same issues pending    before Milimani CMCC 1355 of 2013   hence the orders sought   should be granted.

17. In response  to the notice of motion,  the  respondents filed  a replying  affidavit  through   the affidavit sworn by No. 65240  Corporal Steven Owour attached to DCI Department   investigations  duties  and   the investigating  officer of the case. CPL Owuor deposes that indeed  the CM’S  Court at Milimani   did on  27th  March  2015   issue  an eviction  order for the  interested parties   to  be evicted   from LR  209/1635/2  situated at Pangani  in Nairobi.

18. That on  2nd April  2015  the exparte  applicant  moved in to  execute the orders  but instead removed  some items  from LR 209/1627  instead  of LR  209/1635/2.  That  LR  209/1627  is private property  is situated  in Pangani area  and   is leased by the 1st interested party by the owner  Stephen  Kinyanjui Kahungu, and that this property is distinct  from LR 209/1635/2  which was the suit  property   described  in Milimani CMCC  No.  1355/2015 as shown by the annexed deed plan marked ‘SO2’.

19. That on  6th April   2015  the  exparte applicant’s  agents  went with a fork lift  and  pushed all the items, merchandise and  equipment on LR  No. 209/1627 to one  side of the plot claiming that they wanted  to possess half  of the  property   and  in the process, did  a lot  of damage  to the  1st interested  party’s property.

20. That Stephen  Kinyanjui  Kahungu  who is  not a party to the  suit had  leased out to the  1st interested  party  his premises  LR  209/1627  since   30th March  2011   for shs  20,000 per month and the premises  were used for  stocking  auctioned  goods for  sale  in the name of Sanford  and Daughters  General Merchants.

21. That  the exparte  applicant  was physically  present  on  2nd  April  2015  when the  process  of eviction   started  and  during  the  wrongful  and  illegal eviction  on LR No. 209/1627  instead of the suit property subject of Milimani CMCC 1355/2015 being LR No. 209/1635/2 and that there are  witnesses who  were at the scene   hence the defence  of alibi  is an  afterthought.

22. That the police are mandated by Section 24 of the National Police Act to investigate any complaint brought to their   attention in order to determine whether   a criminal offence has been committed.  That  following the complaint,  investigations  commenced   and the  exparte  applicant  was  summoned  on  11th May  2015  and  15th May  2015 to  record his statement   which he did.

23. That had the exparte applicant done due  diligence, he would have  known the difference  between the  two separate  but adjacent   properties  and that failure to carry out due diligence cause serious  financial  loss to  the  1st interested  party.

24.                        That both the exparte  applicant  and  the plaintiff in CMCC 1355/2015 learnt that   they had  made  a grave mistake   in moving   into LR 209/1627  instead of LR 209/1635/2 but dismissed  claims of responsibility  for malicious damage  to property  of the  1st interested  party.

25. That the  respondents  are acting  lawfully  as stipulated  by the National Police Service Act, the Office  of Director  of Public  Prosecutions Act and the Constitution in investigating a complaint of malicious damage to property.

26. That under   Section  193 A of  the criminal  Procedure Code, Cap  75  Laws of Kenya, the fact that any matter in issue in any criminal proceedings  shall not  be a ground for any  stay,  prohibition, or delay of criminal  proceedings, as all the  cases will ultimately   be determined  on merits.

27. That the exparte applicant has not demonstrated that the respondents acted without  jurisdiction or in excess of their  powers conferred  upon them  by the  law or that they have  infringed, violated, contravened or  in any  other manner failed to comply  with constitutional or statutory provisions.

28. That the exparte  applicant has not demonstrated that the respondents failed to act  independently or have acted capriciously, in bad faith  or abused the legal  process in a manner  to entitle  them stay  the  arrest   and  or the charges  sought.

29. That  the applicant’s application is based on  non disclosure  of material facts  made with  latent  intent   to mislead  the court as  to the true  facts leading  to the ongoing  investigations  and  possible  charges  against  him.  That there  is no  averment   that the  evidence  against the  exparte  applicant  does not  meet the threshold required by law to institute  the intended charges.

30. That the application has been filed in bad faith, is misconceived and abuse of the court process and meant to defeat the cause of justice.

31. That the accuracy and correctness or facts gathered in an investigation can only be assessed  and  tested  by the trial  court which is best equipped  to deal  with the  quality and  sufficiency  of evidence  gathered and properly  adduced in  support of any   criminal charges that  may be  preferred against  the exparte  applicant.

32. The respondents urged the court to dismiss the exparte applicant’s application and allow the respondents discharge their constitutional mandate.

33. The interested  parties Joseph  Mburu  t/a  Sanford  & Daughters   and  Veronica  Mary  Njeri  did not  participate  in these  Judicial Review  proceedings.

34. Counsels for the exparte applicant and for the respondents filed written submissions which they relied on and the court   adopted those submissions for purposes of writing this judgment.

35. The exparte applicant’s submissions  were filed on 15th November 2016, by the exparte applicant’s counsel, Mr J.S. Khakula advocate relying on the affidavit in  support of the motion, the statutory statement and reiterating the facts as   summarized  in this judgment.

36. According  to the exparte  applicant  he approached  this court  when the   respondents  insisted  on charging  him  for a criminal  offence  he did not  commit.  He averred that despite the Director of Public  Prosecutions’  constitutional  prosecutorial  mandate  conferred  by Article 157 of the Constitution, the court  can intervene to stop  the criminal  prosecution as  was held in  Stanley  Munga  Githunguri  v  Republic [1985]  KLR  34  that the court  can interfere  with prosecutorial powers in the  following  instances:

i.Where  a criminal  prosecution is an  abuse of  court process;

ii.Where a prosecution is a contravention of a person’s constitutional freedoms and rights.

iii. Where the prosecution is contrary to public interest and or policy.

37. Further reliance was placed on John Murutu  Kigwe & Another  V Republic  Nairobi  HCC  223 of  2000  where  Rawal  J ( as she then  was) held that  the court  has inherent  power to terminate  proceedings it decides are an abuse  of the court  process and  thus protect citizens  from malicious  prosecution   and  that may lead  to unnecessary  infringement   and  curtailing  of their rights.

38. Further reliance   was placed on Samuel Kamau Macharia  & Kibe Vs Attorney General Nairobi Miscellaneous   Application  No. 356 of  2000  where it   was held that where  a prosecution  is instituted  for any other purpose  than to  uphold the legitimate  ends of criminal law the court will  come out  strongly   to protect   any such  accused  persons.

39. The exparte  applicant’s  counsel further  relied  on the English  case  of Director  of Public Prosecutions   vs Humphreys  [1976] 2 ALL ER  497where  Lord Salmon  stated, inter alia,  that:

“It is  only when the prosecution amounts to an abuse of  the process of court  and  is oppressive  and  vexatious  that the judge  has power to intervene.”

40. Further reliance was placed on the case of Gulan  & Another, vs  CM’s  Court  & Another [2006]  e KLR where  the court  held that  powers of  the  High Court   to stop criminal  prosecution  must be  exercised  sparingly  and  that  the High Court must always  be ready to intervene to  prevent  any  prosecution  which is  vexatious, oppressive,  malafides,  frivolous or taken up for  other improper  purpose such as  undue  harassment of a  party or abuse of  court process.  Further, that a criminal prosecution which is  commenced  in the absence  of proper  factual  foundation  or basis  is always suspect  or  lace with ulterior motive or improper  purpose.

41. Counsel for  the exparte  applicant  went on and on citing  many  other decisions  and the principles  espoused  therein on the court’s  intervention  to stop  prosecution including: Peter D’costa  vs Attorney General  & Another  Petition  83/2010  where the Court of Appeal  stated that “ the court  must be used properly  and in  good faith, and must  not be  abused.  This means that the court will  not allow  its functions  as a court of law  to be misused  and  will summarily prevent   its machinery from being   used  as a means of vexation it follows that  where  us an abuse of court process, there is breach of the  petitioner’s  fundamental  rights on the  petitioner  will not  receive  a fair trial.  It is the duty of the court to stop such abuse of the justice system.”

42. Counsel further relied on Justus Kathenge vs Director of Public Prosecution & Others [2014] e KLR where the court  stated inter  alia, that the High Court in the exercise  of  its  supervisory  jurisdiction   can analyse  the information  relied on  by the Director of Public Prosecutions  in making  the decision  to charge  an accused person  without  usurping  the powers  of the trial court.

43. Further reliance was placed on Exparte Floriculture International Limited Nairobi HC Miscellaneous Application No. 1214 of 1997 (unreported) where Kuloba J (as he then was) pointed out the factors that must be   taken into account before a criminal prosecution is launched and held:

“ So it is incumbent  upon an intending  prosecutor  to assess  and examine  carefully the availability, credibility   and  credit of witnesses, the   potential  admissibility  and  reliability  of evidence   such as  confessions   and  whether  the witnesses  are likely  to turn  up to testify.  So there must initially be a promising case.  A mere  scintilla  of evidence   should not take  one  to the court and if  the prosecutor  in good faith  nurses  significant  doubts  about  the sufficiency of evidence, there  should be  no criminal  proceedings.”

44. It was submitted that the court  in the above  case noted  that sufficiency  of evidence  is determined  by getting  right answers  to and  being satisfied  with them  on the question  of :

a)Elements  if the alleged crime

b)The facts necessarily to establish each of the constituent elements of the crime.

c)Witnesses.

d)Whether the witnesses are readily available and credible.

e)Whether their evidence is capable of being reasonably believed.

f)Is the court likely to believe that evidence.

45. And that the court concluded that no outcome is likely to be achieved by a criminal process.  It is a waste of public time; money and resources to prosecute, besides creating unnecessary social tension in the community.

46. The exparte  applicant’s  counsel  also  stated that there  was  abuse of  the respondent’s  constitutional  mandate. He relied on Republic Vs Chief  Magistrate’s court Nairobi & 3 Others  exparte Stephen Oyugi  Okero [2015] e KLR  where the  court observed  that sometimes  it is necessary  for the court  to look  at the statements  in order to  establish  if there is   evidence to  support the  charges.  That absence of evidence  is a  good ground  for quashing  a  criminal trial  and the  court cannot  conclude  that there is no  evidence without looking  at the witness statements  and the  exhibits.

47. In this case, it is claimed that the statements  by the interested  parties  and statements  of other witnesses show that  the exparte applicant never  carried  out  the alleged eviction and  was not  at  the interested parties’  premises  on 6th April  2015  and  7th April  2015  when the alleged acts of  malicious  damage to property occurred.  That one  Mutinda  who was  stated  to have been  present  at the premises of the interested parties  never recorded  his statement and that none of the  witnesses  mention that the exparte  applicant  was present  at the interested parties’   premises   on 3rd, 6th and 7th  April  2015.

48. It  was  submitted that the decision  to prosecute  the  exparte applicant  amounts to abuse of court process  and that  Section  34  of the Civil Procedure  Act prohibits the  taking of any  other court, save  the trial court  any issue  arising  between the parties  to the suit over execution of satisfaction of a  decree of the court.

49. That the act complained of  arose out of execution of lawful court orders  issued by  the CM’s court  hence any  issue ought to be resolved through the same suit and not through the criminal case.  That the dispute is purely civil hence the  insistence of the  charge  against the exparte applicant  is tainted  with malice  as there are  many  gaps in the statements of  witnesses.  counsel relied on Musyoki  Kimanthi vs  Inspector  General of Police  and  Others [2014] e KLR  where Majanja  J stated:

“It is not in public interest or in the interest of administration of justice to use the criminal justice system as a pawn in civil disputes.  It is   unconscionable and a traversity of justice   for the police to be involved in the settlement of what is purely a civil dispute   litigated in court.”

50. The exparte applicant maintained that the decision to charge him with a criminal offence is tainted with malice, irregularities and  insufficiency   of evidence which calls for the intervention of the court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction.  He urged the court to allow the motion as prayed.

51. Only  the  2nd  respondent  Director of Public Prosecutions  filed submissions  on  7th March  2016  on behalf  of Director of Public Prosecutions  and the DCIO Starehe  Division  maintaining that they acted within their mandate and authority  in investigating   and subsequently, instituting  criminal proceedings against the  exparte  applicant  based on  conduct  arising from the execution of an  eviction order, being key  players  in the criminal  justice system deriving  their mandate from  Sections   28 and  24  of the National Police  Service Act for the 1st respondent, and Article 244 of the Constitution on the functions of the Directorate  of Criminal  Investigations, and  Article  157  of the Constitution  on the part of  Director of Public  Prosecutions, the 2nd  respondent.

52. Reliance was placed on the following decision on the duty of the police to   investigate complaints   and the Director of Public Prosecutions’ mandate to prosecute- HC Miscellaneous  Application 519/2005 Surjit Singh vs The principal   Magistrate Kibera; HC Constitution Ref.165/11Rosemary  Wanja  Njau  & 2 Others vs Attorney  General  & Others.

53. It  was  further submitted that there  was   a genuine  complaint  from the interested  parties that the exparte  applicant unlawfully entered property LR  209/1627  on  2nd  and  6th April  2015   and  maliciously  caused   damage  to property using  a fork lift  and  therefore the respondents exercised their mandates and authority in investigating the complaint.

54. Reliance  was placed  on Jacob  Juma  vs Director of Public  Prosecutions & 8 Others  HC JR  Petition  652/2009  where it  was  held that  investigations  are an integral  part of the Administration  of justice  and that the onus is on  the applicant  to convince the court   why such criminal investigations  should be stopped.  Further, that whoever alleges   excess of jurisdiction on the part of the respondents, breach of natural justice or that the police considered extraneous matters or were actuated by malice must prove with evidence such allegations.

55.  It was submitted that there is no demonstration on the part of the applicant as to which law had been infringed by the police investigating him.

56. On whether  there is  any obligation on the police  to notify  a suspect  or other  authority of an intention to investigate, it  was  submitted,  relying  on the decision in Cargo Distributors Ltd v Director of Criminal Investigations, HC Miscellaneous  Application  39/2006  that the work of the police and  crime  detection  would be hampered  seriously  if every time  an investigation became necessary  and the police wanted to make  a move, they would be required  to initiate   formal proceedings   first  and  also give details to  the court  beyond   demonstrating  a  reasonable  suspicion  of commission  of a crime before  obtaining  a warrant  to investigate.

57. Further that the police must be allowed to move with speed to prevent any destruction of vital evidence in crime detection (HC Rev.352/2009 – David Njane Ruiyi & Another vs Republic.

58. The respondents urged this court to adopt the decision in Teresia Wanjiru Githinji v The Attorney General & another HC Miscellaneous 1295/2005 and direct the applicant to submit   himself before the trial court where he will have the opportunity to defend himself.

59.  It was submitted that the role of Director of Public Prosecution deriving his mandate from Article 157 of the Constitution is to institute criminal proceedings against any person and that in doing so he does not require the consent or authority of any person hence there was   no impropriety on his party.  Reliance was placed on Kimano Kibaya vs Republic Cr. Application 453 of 2003 & David Njogu v DCI Miscellaneous Application 658 of 2004.

60. It was therefore  submitted that the High Court will be  crossing  into the line of the independence of Director of Public Prosecutions if it descended  into the arena  of finding whether  there  is a prima facie  case against  the  exparte   applicant.  It was  also submitted that the applicant  had not demonstrated  that the Director of Public Prosecutions had not acted  independently  or had  acted capriciously, in bad faith or had abused the  process in a manner  to trigger  the High Court’s  intervention.

61. Further, that the decision  to charge  the applicant was informed  by the sufficiency of the  evidence  reviewed  and  the interest of  the public  as per the  National  Prosecution  Policy, 2015  and  not  extraneous  factors.

62. That there is no evidence of  breach of Rules  of Natural  Justice or  that  the  applicant  might  not get a fair  trial  as  guaranteed by  the Constitution hence this  application  was  filed in bad faith, is misconceived, an abuse of the court  process and  meant to  defeat  the  cause of  justice  as there is no  demonstration  of the law that  has been infringed  or that the respondents acted in  excess of jurisdiction or  powers conferred  by law.

63.  On whether the High Court has vide Judicial Review jurisdiction to question the merits of a criminal case by analyzing evidence gathered in support of criminal charges and order the prohibition of a valid prosecution, reliance was placed on KNEC vs Republic CA 266/96 and Halsburys Laws of England 4th Edition, VOL 1 at page 37, paragraph 128 and a submission made that the accuracy  and correctness  of the  evidence  or facts  in  an investigations can only be  assessed  and  tested  by the  trial court   which is  best  equipped  to  deal with the quality  and sufficiency of the evidence  gathered  and  properly adduced in support  of the charges as   was held  in William  S.K.  Ruto  & Another v Attorney General & Another HC CC 1192/2004 that analysis  of evidence  should be  done before the trial court which can competently  make a  finding whether  or not a criminal offence was committed  after hearing the evidence,  as  was  held  in Thuita Mwangi & 2 others V EACC  & 3 Others  HC Petition  369/2013.

64. it  was submitted that it would be  improper  if a Judicial Review  court would  try or attempt  to determine the  intended  criminal case  which is not  before it.  That   what  the  present  applicant  has raised would form  a basis of  his  defence in the  trial court and  not in this Judicial Review proceeding, as only the trial court can determine whether an offence  has been  committed.  Reliance  was  placed on Paul Stuat Imision & Another Vs Attorney General & 2 Others HC Petition  57/2009andin Dr  Hastings  Kinjili V Republic  & Others   HC Miscellaneous  271/2002   where the court held that  the  applicant  shall have the  opportunity to  tell the  trial court  all that which he is   telling the judicial review court  since the laws  of Kenya provide for a fair  trial before the criminal court  that tries  him by answering  any charges, challenging evidence,  cross examination of  witnesses and  the right to  counsel.

65.  On whether  the court should  prohibit  the exparte applicant’s  prosecution based on  the fact  that there is a pending  civil  case  on the same  subject  matter, it  was submitted  that  Section  193 A  of the  Criminal  Procedure Code, Cap  75 Laws of  Kenya allows   concurrent  civil and criminal   proceedings and that  in Rosemary Wanja  Njau  & 2 Others v The Attorney General HC Constitution Ref 165/2011 & Paul Mwangi Nderitu v PM Nairobi  HC Miscellaneous  901/2001 it   was held that  the mere fact  that a matter which forms  the subject  of criminal proceedings  has with it  a civil  flavour  should not be  a basis for stopping  a criminal case.

66. It  was therefore  submitted that the present  application does not  meet the prerequisite requirements for grant  of  Judicial Review  orders sought   and  that the applicant  should submit  himself  to the trial  court.

67. The parties advocates adopted the above written submissions.

DETERMINATION

68. I have carefully considered the exparte   applicant’s application together with the supporting documents.  I have  also considered  the terse opposition by the respondents and the parties respective written submissions for and against the prayers sought, supported  by several case law cited  and  statutory  and  constitutional provisions.

69. The main issue for determination in this case is whether the applicant is entitled to the orders sought herein. The power to prosecute is vested in the Director of Public Prosecutions vide Article 157 of the Constitution while the power  to investigate the complaints leading to any prosecution is vested in the Director of Criminal Investigations under the leadership of the  Inspector General of  Police pursuant to section 24 of the National police Service Act.

70. The  exparte  applicant’s  prayer before the court  as per  the  leave of court granted  on 19th May 2015  is for Judicial Review order of  prohibition to issue to  prohibit the Director  of  Criminal Investigations from summoning   and or arresting   him  on the basis  of  matters arising  from Milimani CM CC  No.1355/2015( Tripple Eight  Properties  Limited  V Joseph  Mburu t/a  Sanford   & Daughters   & Veronica  Mary Njeri; and  that this court  be pleased  to make further   or other orders  as it may deem fair and  just.

71. It should be noted from the onset that there  is no specific prayer  sought against the 2nd respondent Director of Public Prosecutions and therefore this court shall not waste very precious judicial time deliberating on whether or not the Director of Public Prosecutions  should be  prohibited  from prosecuting the exparte  applicant  since no  prohibition  is sought against  him.

72. According to the exparte applicant, he  is  an officer of the court, a class B  Auctioneer   and  that  the  subject matter  allegations  against him  arose from  his duties  in  executing a valid court   order in  Milimani  CM CC  1355/2015.

73. Further, that albeit   it is claimed that he maliciously  damaged  the interested   parties’  property, he did not  carry away any  of their properties  on the  first day  of going  to the premises  as  it   was  late.  Further, that on the said occasion, he   was accompanied by 11 police officers hence he could not have damaged any property under their watch.

74. In addition, the exparte   applicant avers  that  after  abandoning the  eviction   of the interested  parties  from the suit  premised LR  209/1635/2  on 2nd  April  2015  at  4. 00pm as it  was late, the following  day he travelled to Bungoma to attend to a church  function and  returned  on 7th April  at  11/30 am after Easter Holidays hence he does not understand how he could have damaged any properties  belonging to the interested  parties yet  he never went back to their premises and  that when he  returned  from Bungoma and  went to  check on  27th April  2015 he  found that  the interested parties  had moved  out of the premises  as promised hence he did nothing else capable of being  construed  to mean that  he maliciously  damaged   the interested parties’  property, to warrant  being summoned  and  or being arrested  or being  arraigned in court to face charges of malicious  damage to  property.

75. The   exparte  applicant   claims that  having been lawfully engaged  in execution of a  court order, the  1st respondent  Director of Criminal Investigations  had no authority to demand to know  from the exparte  applicant  whether  or not  he evicted the interested  parties  as  per the order  and  that  the  1st respondent  should not  investigate  issues  which are pending  before the Chief Magistrate’s court at Milimani being  CM CC  No. 1355/2015.

76. On the other hand, the Director of Criminal Investigations through a replying  affidavit  sworn by No. 65240CPL Steve  Owour  and  filed in court  on 3rd December  2015 contends that as the investigating officer of the complaint lodged by the interested parties herein, he discovered that the exparte applicant was indeed  executing a lawful court order but  instead of  effecting eviction of the respondents in the civil suit from LR  209/1635/2  as per  the court order,  the exparte applicant  did on  6th April  2015  visite the  LR 209/1627  and that his agents  went with a fork lift  and  in the process  damaged  the property  belonging to the  1st interested  party.  That the  eviction  process started  on 2nd April  2015 when some of the property   was taken  hence his  attempt to seek  an alibi  is merely  an afterthought  and  that the police  should be left  to investigate  the allegations against the exparte applicant.

77. Section  24   of the National  Police Service  Act mandates the police  to investigate  any complaint   brought  to their attention  in order to determine  whether  a criminal  offence    has been committed.  The question therefore is whether the order of prohibition can issue to prohibit any investigations into the alleged malicious damage   to the interested parties’ property.  In Joram Mwenda Guantai vs The Chief Magistrate Nairobi CA 228/2003 [2007] 2 EA 170 the Court of Appeal stated:

“It is  trite that an order of prohibition is an order from the High Court  directed  to an inferior  tribunal  or body  which forbids  that  tribunal or body to continue  proceedings  therein  in excess  of its jurisdiction  or in contravention   of the laws of the land.  It lied, not only in excess of jurisdiction or absence of it, but also for a departure from the rules of natural justice.  It does not, however, lie to correct the course, practice or procedure of an inferior tribunal, or a wrong decision on the merits of the proceedings.

Equally, so, the High Court has inherent jurisdiction to grant an order of prohibition to a person charged before a subordinate court and considers himself to be a victim of oppression.  If the  prosecution  amounts to  an abuse of the process  of the court  and is oppressive and  vexatious, the judge has the power to intervene and the court has the  inherent  power  and the duty  to secure  fair treatment  for all persons  who are   brought before  the court or  a subordinate  court and   to prevent  an abuse  of the process of the court.”

78. In Mexiner & Another V Attorney General [2005] 2KLR 189 the same Court of Appeal stated:

“The Attorney General has charged the appellants with the offence of murder in the exercise of his discretion under Section 26(3) (a) of the Constitution.  The Attorney General is not subject to the control of any other person or authority in exercising that discretion (Section 26(8) of the Constitution).  Indeed, the High Court cannot interfere with the exercise of the discretion if the Attorney General in exercising his discretion is acting lawfully.  The High Court can, however, interfere with the exercise if the discretion if the Attorney General, in prosecuting the appellants is contravening their fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the constitution particularly the right to the protection of the law enshrined in Section 77 of the Constitution…..Judicial Review is concerned with the decision making process and not with the decision making process and not with the merits of the decision itself.  Judicial Review deals with the legality of the decisions of bodies or persons whose decisions are susceptible to Judicial Review.  A decision can be  upset  through certiorari  on a matter of law if on the  face  of it, it is made without  jurisdiction or in  consequence  of an error  of law.

Prohibition restrains abuse or excess of power.  Having   regard  to the law,  the finding  of the learned  judge  that the sufficiency  or otherwise  of the evidence  to support  the charge of  murder goes to the  merits of the decision of the Attorney General  and not to the legality  of the decision  correct. The other grounds, which the appellants claim were ignored   ultimately, raise the question whether the evidence gathered by the prosecution is sufficient to support the charge.  The criminal trial process if regulated by statutes, particularly the Criminal Procedure Code and the Evidence Act. There are also constitutional safeguards  stipulated  in Section  77 of the  Constitution  to be observed in respect  of both  criminal  prosecutions  and  during  trials.  It is the trial court, which is   best equipped to deal with the quality and sufficiency of the evidence gathered to support the charge.  Had leave been  granted in this case, the appellants  would have caused the Judicial Review court to embark upon examination and appraisal of the evidence of about 20  witnesses   with a view  to show their innocence and that  is hardly the  function of the  Judicial Review court.  It would indeed be a subversion of the law regulating criminal trials if the Judicial Review court was to usurp the function of a trial court.”

79. In Kuria & 3 Others Attorney General [2002] 2 KLR 69the court stated inter alia:

“ The court  has power  and  indeed the  duty to prohibit   the continuation of the criminal prosecution if extraneous matters  divorced from  the goals of justice guide  their instigation.  It is duty of the Court to ensure that its process does not  degenerate into tolls for  personal  score settling or  vilification  on issues pertaining to that which the system was even  formed to  perform…A stay (by an order of prohibition should be granted where compelling an accused person  to stand  trial would  violate the fundamental principles of justice which underlie the society’s  sense of fair play  and  decency  and  or where  the proceedings  are oppressive  or vexatious …….

The machinery of criminal justice is not to be allowed to become a pawn in personal civil feuds and individual vendetta.  It is  through this mandate of the court to guard   its process  from being  misused or abused  or manipulated  for ulterior  motives  that the power of Judicial Review  is  invariably  invoked so as to zealously  guard  its court’s) independence and impartiality as per Section 77(1)of the Kenya  Constitution  in relation to  criminal proceedings and Section  79(9) for the  civil process)……………….

There must be concrete grounds for supposing that the continued  prosecution  of a criminal  case manifests  an abuse of  the judicial procedure, much that the public  interest would  be best served   by the staying  of the  prosecution……”

80. InRepublic V CM Mombasa Exparte Ganjee & Another [2002] 2 KLR 703 the court held, inter alia:

“It is not the purpose of a criminal investigations or a criminal   charge or prosecution to help individuals   in the advancement of frustrations of their civil cases.  That is an abuse of the process of the court.  No matter  how  serious  the criminal charges may be,  they should not be allowed to stand if  their  predominant  purpose it to further  some other  ulterior  purpose.  The sole purpose of criminal proceedings  is not for the advancement   and  championing  of a civil case of one  or both  parties in  a civil dispute, but  to be impartially  exercised  in the interest  of the general  public interest………”

81. From the above decisions, and applying the principles settled therein to this case, it is clear that Judicial Review does not deal with the merits of the decision but with the process of decision making.  It deals with issues such  as whether  the decision maker had the jurisdiction to make the decision, whether  the persons affected by the decision were heard   before it  was made  and  whether in making  the decision  the  decision maker  took into  account relevant  matters or did  take into  account irrelevant matters.  Judicial Review proceedings cannot be invoked to settle contested matters of fact that would lead the court to delve into the merits of the dispute as the court would not have jurisdiction to do so.

82. As earlier stated, what is sought to be prohibited in this case is the summoning and arrest (or continuation of the prosecution)  of the exparte applicant Zacharia Wakhungu Siuma and not  a criminal  trial   for there is   not even a charge sheet   annexed to the  pleadings to show what  exact charges  the investigators  have settled  on and  or  what decision  the Director  of Public  Prosecutions has made  regarding   the  complaint by the interested parties.

83. In the premises, this court must be cautious not to trespass  into the jurisdiction of the investigating officer or the criminal or even civil court which may eventually be called  upon to determine  the issues hence  this  court ought not  to make a determination which  may affect the  investigations  which may affect the   investigations  or yet  to be concluded  investigations  or  prospective  trial.

84. That this  court has the  jurisdiction   to prohibit investigations  which are  being conducted  with the aim of achieving an ulterior motive and  not  intended to  achieve  justice  is undoubted.  However, the burden of proving that the discretion  power given  to the  police to  investigate   into the complaint regarding  malicious  damage  to the  1st interested  party’s  property  ought to be interfered  with by  the court  in order to prevent  abuse of power or abuse  of the court process lies on the exparte applicant.

85. It is  not sufficient  to allege  that the  intended  trial is bound to flop  or that  the complainants have  no basis  or that the issues at hand constitute  both criminal or civil liability; for, the court ought not to interfere  with the  investigative  powers conferred  on the police  unless  cogent  reasons  are given for  doing so( See  Republic vs  CM Milimani & Another Exparte Tusker Mattresses  & 3 Others [2013] e KLR.

86.  In the   instance case, the exparte  applicant  is  not a party to the civil proceedings  pending before  the  subordinate  court at Milimani  vide CM CC  1355/2015, in   which an  eviction  order  was  issued on  an interlocutory  application  on  27th March  2015   against the   defendants/interested parties  herein from  LR No.  209/1635/2.

87. It is  not  disputed that  the exparte  applicant  is  a Class B  Licenced  Auctioneer   who  received the court order in question  for execution and  that he  sought and  obtained police assistance  to execute  the said  order against   the interested parties.  What is in contention and  subject  of investigations by the Director of Criminal Investigations  is whether in the process of  executing   lawful court orders, the exparte  applicant  went outside  his mandate  and maliciously  damaged  the  1st interested  party’s property  as claimed  by the investigating  officer.

88. In my humble view, the police are entitled to investigate any allegation of commission of a criminal offence whether allegedly committed outside or within or in the course of execution of a lawful court order or in the performance of a public duty.  It cannot be that because the exparte applicant was merely executing a court order then he is prima facie incapable of committing any culpable offence.

89. In the present proceedings, this court is unable to find any evidence of malice, or unlawfulness on the part of the Director of Criminal Investigations or excess or want of authority or abuse of power.  There is  also no  evidence that  the exparte  applicant  was subjected  to  wanton harassment  or intimidation or even of  manipulation  of the court  process so as to  seriously  deprecate  the likelihood  that the  exparte  applicant  might, if the Director of Criminal Investigations  completes investigations into the allegations  against  the  exparte applicant  and decides  to charge him with an  appropriate  offence, then the exparte  applicant will  not get a fair trial as stipulated  in Article  50  and  51  of the Constitution.

90. I refuse to be persuaded that because the alleged offence was allegedly committed   during the process of execution of a court order in a civil suit then the entire criminal  investigations initiated against the exparte applicant  is an abuse  of the court process.

91. The applicant has not demonstrated how the process of the court is being abused or misused. He has not shown the basis upon which his rights  are under serious threats of being violated by the criminal  investigations or eventual prosecution.

92. In the absence  of concrete  grounds for   supposing   that a criminal prosecution  is an abuse of  process, or  is a  manipulation of sorts  or amounts  to selective  prosecution, it is  not sufficient  that the existence  of a civil suit  wherein  the cause  of complaint   arose   precludes  the  institution of criminal proceedings  even if  it  were based on the same facts and  Section  193A of the Criminal  Procedure Code  Cap 75 Laws of Kenya  fortifies  this position.

93. As   was rightly held in Kuria vs Attorney General (supra)

“…..the effect of a criminal prosecution on an accused person is adverse, but so also are their purpose in the society, which are immence.  There is a public interest underlying every criminal prosecution, which is being zealously guarded, whereas at the same time there is a private interest on the   rights of the accused person to be protected, by whichever means.  Given these bipolar considerations, it is imperative for the court to balance these considerations vis avis the available   evidence.  However, just  as a  conviction  cannot be  secured  without any  basis  of evidence, an order of prohibition  cannot  also be given without any evidence that there is a manipulation, abuse  or misuse  of court process or that there  is  a danger to the  right  of the  accused  person to have  a fair trial In  the circumstances of this case it would be in the interest of the applicants, the respondents, the  complainants, the litigants and the public at large that the criminal prosecution  be heard  and  determined  quickly  in order to know  where the truth  lies  and set  the issued to rest,  giving the  applicants  the chance to clear  their  names.”

94. In Kenya’s post  2010 Constitution, there is  a  tendency  by nearly  every person  who is being  investigated  for  whatever criminal  allegations, to  rush to the  Judicial Review  forum to seek  to prohibit  any investigations or prosecution where one is  mounted  against them.  Whereas some  of the challenge  is genuine  and  meets  the threshold   of being  prohibited, but  it is a worrying  trend  such  that at  the end of it all,  unless  the court is  careful, it  will prohibit  all investigations and or  criminal  prosecutions  since no person  will  ever be  happy  that they are  being investigated  or prosecuted, whether  those  investigations  or prosecution, are  done in  good faith.

95. This court   has not been shown  that  the Director of Criminal Investigations  had no jurisdiction or that  it acted in excess  of its jurisdiction  in  commencing  investigations  into the alleged  malicious damage  to the 1st  interested party’s property by the exparte  applicant while executing a lawful court  order  wherein he alleges to have been done, if at all, with the assistance  of 11 police  officers  from Pangani  Station.

96. The fact that the Director of Criminal Investigations Starehe  summoned the applicant to record  a statement  concerning  the alleged  malicious damage  to property  and that it  was intended that the exparte applicant presents himself for purposes of his finger  prints being  taken with a view of being charged with the alleged offence  does not  amount  to any illegality, abuse of court process or legal process, vexatious, oppressive, malafides, frivolous or for improper  purpose  such as  undue  harassment.

97. The fact that the exparte applicant claims that he was not present on the date when the alleged offence of malicious damage to property   was committed, in my humble view, is the applicant’s defence of alibi which he can mount if the investigators decide to advise the DPP to institute and the DPP decides to charge him in court.  The allegation   that Mr Mutinda’s  statement, who  was  alleged  to have been at the interested party’s  home when the alleged  damage was done, was not taken by the respondents is a pointer to the  sufficiency  of evidence for the intended  trial or prosecution of  the applicant  which is  beyond  the mandate of   this court to determine.  Gaps  in the statements  of prospective   witnesses  in my humble  view, are not  proof   that the decision  to prosecute  the  applicant  is tainted  with malice  and  ill will or that  it  is calculated  to settle   what is purely  a civil dispute.

98. Furthermore, Section  34(1)  of the Civil  Procedure Act  is only relevant  as far as  the  issues  arising  between  parties  to the dispute  in  a civil suit  are concerned.  The section provides:

“ All questions  arising  between  the  parties  to the suit in which the decree was passed or their representatives are  relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the  decree shall  be determined  by the court  executing the decree  and not a  separate  suit.”

99. With utmost respect to the exparte applicant, the criminal investigations are not a separate suit.  Suit as defined under the Civil Procedure Act Section  2  does not included  a  criminal case  or mater  and  therefore it  is a misconception  on the part of the  applicant  to claim  that criminal investigations  or prosecution  is a separate suit,  when it has  never been  the case that a court  exercising  civil jurisdiction  can convert   civil proceedings into criminal proceedings  except  in contempt  of court cases.

100. In other words, the CM’s civil court  would in the circumstances  of this case not  be seized  of the jurisdiction to determine  whether or not  in the  process of  execution of that court’s lawful order, the exparte  applicant  maliciously  damaged the  interested parties  property; and  or  proceed to order that the exparte applicant be tried  summarily  or otherwise for malicious  damage to  property.

101.  I am  therefore unable  to find that  the criminal justice  system  was in  this case  being used as  a pawn  in civil  disputes  and   or that the police   were being   used in  the settlement   of what is purely  a civil dispute litigated  in court, as  was held in Musyoki Kimanthi v Inspector General of Police& Others(supra).

102. Consequently, I am  unable to find, on the material  placed before  me that the  applicant’s  notice of motion   dated   26th May   2015   has any merit  and  the same is  dismissed.  The stay orders in force   are hereby   lifted forthwith.

103. I order that  each party bear  their own costs of the Judicial Review  proceedings as  the  respondents  were represented  by public advocates  and the interested  parties did not participate  in these proceedings.

Dated, signed and delivered at Nairobi this 24th day of January 2017.

R.E.ABURILI

JUDGE

In the presence of:

Mr Kimathi h/b for Mr Khakula for the exparte applicant

N/A for respondents

N/A for the interested parties