Republic v Director of Immigration Services, Cabinet Secretary for Interior and Co-ordination Government Exparte Planet Motors Company Limited [2016] KEHC 1345 (KLR) | Contempt Of Court | Esheria

Republic v Director of Immigration Services, Cabinet Secretary for Interior and Co-ordination Government Exparte Planet Motors Company Limited [2016] KEHC 1345 (KLR)

Full Case Text

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

Judicial Review No.  392  Of 2016

IN THE MATER OF:  THE APPLICATION  BY PLANET MOTORS  COMPANY  LIMITED  FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW ORDERS  OF CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION  AND MANDAMUS  AGAINST THE DECISIONS OF  THE DIRECTOR  OF IMMIGRATION  SERVICES AND THE CABINET SECRETARY FOR INTERIOR AND CO-ORDINATION OF NATIONAL  GOVERNMENT.

AND

IN THE MATTER OF:  ARTICLES 22, 23, 27, 29, 39, 47, 50(1) AND 165 (3) (b) & (6) OF THE CONSTITUTION.

AND

IN THE MATTER OF:SECTIONS 10 & 11  OF THE FAIR  ADMINISTRATIVE   ACTION ACT, No. 4 OF   2015, LAWS OF KENYA.

AND

IN THE MATTER OF: KENYA CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION ACT, CAP 172 OF THE LAWS OF KENYA, AND REGULATIONS THERE UNDER.

BETWEEN

REPUBLIC…………………………… …………….…...….APPLICANT

AND

DIRECTOR  OF IMMIGRATION SERVICES ……..….1ST RESPONDENT

CABINET  SECRETARY  FOR INTERIOR

AND CO-ORDINATION GOVERNMENT ………......2ND  RESPONDENT

PLANET  MOTORS COMPANY LIMITED .......EXPARTE  APPLICANT

AND

SAJJAD  AHMAD………………………………....INTERESTED PARTY

JUDGMENT ON CONTEMPT OF COURT

1. By an  application dated  6th September  2016  brought  under Section  5 of the Judicature  Act  and all enabling   provisions of the law, the exparte   applicant Planet  Motors  Limited  seek from this court  orders that:

a) the Director   of Immigration  Services, Principal  Immigration Officer  In charge of  JKIA on the night  of  3rd   September  2016 and the Officer  in charge  of station JKIA  Police Station be  committed to prison for  6 months   or such  period  as the court shall  determine for  contempt  of the orders of this court dated  30th August  2016;

b) That the Interested Party  Sajjad  Ahmad  be  allowed safe  passage  into the country at the alleged contemnor’s  cost and to offer  an apology  for the humiliating/embarrassing the oppressive  treatment  of the interested party by forcibly, irregularly and unlawfully removing  him from the country;

c) That the  court do issue any  other such  further order as it shall deem  just in the circumstances; and

d) That costs be provided for.

2. The application is predicated  on the grounds that on  30th August  2016  this court issued  orders  inter alia, that the leave granted  herein shall  operate  as stay of enforcement  of  any decision  by the respondents  until the motion for Judicial Review  if filed, is heard   and determined  interpartes; That  the exparte  applicant  promptly  served the respondents  with the orders  herein on  31st August    2016   together with  a notice of penal consequences; and that the  respondents  duly acknowledged  service; That  consequently, the exparte   applicant  arranged for  a visit by that the Interested  Party who is its director  in the country  for purposes  of the pending work permit  application and related  matters; That on  3rd September   2016 the Interested Party returned to the country from Dar esalaam  Tanzania  following the orders of this  court issued on  31st August   2016; and that  on his arrival at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (KIA)  he applied for  the visa but  the 1st respondent upon receipt  of the Interested  Party’s  visa application, acting through the Principal Immigration Officer in charge  of JKIA  on the night of  3rd September  2016   arrested  the Interested Party  in collusion  with   2 unnamed  police  officers  from  JKIA  Police Station and detained him overnight  at the respondent’s  holding facility within the airport, and  dismissed the orders of this court  as not being orders; that   on 4th September  2016  the  1st respondent  acting through  the said immigration officer  hurriedly booked  the Interested Party on a  return   flight back to Dar esalaam in willful and flagrant  disobedience  of court orders  which is   contemptuous of court orders; That  the Interested  Party was never accorded  any hearing   before being  denied entry  into the country  and that he was instead  being returned to Tanzania  despite owning  business  in this country  which  employs many Kenyans; the pendency  of this case and his pending work  permit appeal; that the actions of  the respondents are prejudicial to the  applicants  and may lead to closure of the business operations hence, loss of  employment  and livelihoods  unless the  contempt  is purged; that those  actions  of the respondents are denying the applicants the benefit of the law and the court  orders, court processes  and due process; and that the  respondents have  made a mockery  of court  orders and court   processes which ridicules the dignity  of the court.

3. The application  is further supported  by the supporting  affidavit of Maratab Bashir, the Managing Director of the applicant  company reiterating  the grounds  in support  of the application  and giving  a  narration of  how the  interested  party  was    treated   on arrival  at the JKIA, while  annexing   an affidavit  of service  sworn  by Salmon Achola  a court process server  sworn  on 1st   September  2016; evidence  of service    of the orders of   30th August  2016; a  letter   dated  5th September  2016  and copy of passport  for the interested  party; a letter  of invitation into the country dated  3rd  September  2016; the Interested Party’s Boarding pass for  3rd September 2016 from Dar esalaam to JKIA and for  4th September  2016  from JKIA  to Dar salaam via Kenya Airways (KQ.).

4. despite  service of the application upon the respondents/alleged contemnors, there  was no appearance  in  court on   21st September  2016  when the application  was  fixed for  interpartes  hearing  by the  court.

5. Mr Miyare  counsel for the applicant  prosecuted  the application for contempt  of court and submitted that this court  did on  30th August   2016  issue  orders  of leave to apply for Judicial  Review  Orders  and also  granted to the applicant  stay of  enforcement  of the decision of the  1st respondent to place the Interested  Party on the immigration watch  list  and  the refusal thereof  to consider  his appeal  for class G  work permit.

6. Mr Miyare submitted that the  order of stay  was served on  the respondents  on  31st August   2016  and   that as at that date, the interested  party  was  out of the country, having  been barred  by the respondents  to enter the country on the grounds inter alia, that the  “Interested Party’s  intended  role/duty  could be  performed  by a local as  opposed  to a  foreign  employee.”

7. According to the applicant, the orders of this court  impugned the respondent  to stay any decision until the substantive  motion  was heard  and determined.  It   was submitted that the substantive motion will  be rendered  nugatory   unless the orders sought are  granted.

8. Mr Miyare  also submitted that  after filing this  application for contempt the respondents tried  to reach  out to  the Interested  Party giving him  a visitor’s pass  which is  expiring  in  2 weeks.  He prayed that the respondents  be ordered  to purge  their  contempt   before they  are heard  and that if  possible, they should  grant the  Interested  Party a special pass.

DETERMINATION

9. I have   carefully considered  the application by the exparte applicant  seeking  that the respondents or their  agents/servants  purge  the contempt   of court for disobeying  orders of this court  made on  30th August   2016   and that they be  cited and punished  for disobeying the said  court orders   by barring the  Interested Party  from entering  the country.

10. It is  not disputed that on  30th August  2016   this court issued orders  staying the decision of the respondents  as per  the Judicial Review  orders which  were intended  in the  9 prayers  namely:

i. The decision purporting to vary  Mr Sajjad  Ahmad’s  pass  under Rules  26(3)  of the Kenya  Citizenships  and Immigration  Regulations, 2012   signified by the  1st respondent’s   embossment  dated  6th May 2016  on Mr Sajjad’s  passport  No.  FF 1150882;

ii. The 1st respondent’s decision placing Sajjad  Ahmad   on the immigration  watch list communicated   to the  applicant verbally sometimes in July 2016.

iii. The decision  of the 2nd respondent to return   to the 1st respondent   for his review  and recommendations;

iv. Removal of Mr Sajjad  Ahmad   from its  immigration  “watchlist.”

v. To allow the applicant’s appeal dated  16th  June 2016   for class G permit  on behalf  of Mr Sajjad  Ahmad.

vi. To  discharge  its mandate  and impartially consider  the applicant’s application dated  16th June   2016  for class-G permit  on behalf  of Mr Sajjad  Ahmad, independent  of the recommendations  of the 1st applicant.

vii. From arbitrarily  arresting  detaining, harassing  and or deporting  Mr Sajjad   Ahmad  or in any  manner  whatsoever  curtailing/ impending  Mr Sajjad’s  Ahmad’s  liberty/freedom   of movement  with regard to the  matters herein.

viii. Declaration that the rejection  of the applicants  application for class- G  work  permit   on behalf  of Mr Sajjad Ahmad  due to failure  by the applicant  to disclose  a previous  application; Confiscating Mr Sajjad Ahmad’s  passport  No.  FF1150882  and varying  his pass  thereby causing Mr Sajjad Ahmad’s unfair  removal from the country, and placing him on the immigration  watch list  and refusal to  promptly  consider  his appeal  for class G work permit on his behalf  are a breach of the applicant’s  rights  to fair administrative  action, freedom  and security  of the Interested  Party’s person, right to  freedom  of movement  and right  to secure  protection  of the law;

ix. A declaration that the variation of the Interested  Party’s pass  before  expiry  and his  consequent   removal from   the country  without any  lawful reasons/cause, and without  a formal  process and or notice  as contemplated  under Rule  26 (3) of the KCI  Regulations 2012  was a violation of the Interested  Party’s  rights and  fundamental freedoms.

11. The question for determination is whether the respondents are in contempt   of court orders made on 30th August 2016   and whether they should be punished for such contempt.

12. Contempt  is defined  by Black’s Law   Dictionary  Ninth Edition as:

“ Conduct  that defies the  authority  or dignity   of  a court.  Because  such conduct  interferes with the administration  of justice, it is   punishable usually by fine  or imprisonment.”

13. It is  trite that  all persons  are subject  to the law.  In Teachers  Service Commission V Kenya  National Union of Teachers  & 2 Others [2013] e KLR, Ndolo J observed that.

“ the  reason why courts will punish for contempt   of court  then is to safeguard  the rule of law which is fundamental in the administration of justice.  It has  nothing  to do with the integrity  of justice.  It has  nothing  to do with the integrity   of the judiciary  or the court  or even the personal ego  of the presiding  judge.  Neither is it about ………..the applicant who moves the court by taking out contempt proceedings.  It is  about  preserving  and safeguarding  the rule  of law.”

14. This court  is in total  agreement   with  the above  persuasive  observation by my  sister judge of the Employment   and Labour  Relations  Court  and add that  courts  of law  are vested  with the power  to punish  for contempt  of court  in order to safeguard  the rule of law in  the administration of  justice  and in  order to  maintain the supremacy  of the   law and    respect  for law and order in our society.

15. It is  therefore the duty  of the courts to ensure  that citizens  bend to the law and not vice versa  since the failure to obey the law would create chaos  in the society.  A party  who obtains  an order  of  the court  expects  that  the order  shall  be obeyed  by those  to whom  it is  directed.  A court  order  once  issued  by the court  binds  all and  sundry and is  expected  to be obeyed. Court orders are never issued in vain and neither are they foolhardy.

16. A party who is served with a court  order must  obey that  order and   do what  the order commands   him/her   to do  or refrain   from doing  what the  order has restrained  him/her from doing  and seek to challenge  that order, in the event that the order appears to be oppressive.

17. In Kenya, there exist two legal regimes  for punishing  a contemnor.  The first  legal  regime  can be found  in Section  5  of  the Judicature Act and Section  63(e)  of the Civil  Procedure Act. Section 5 of the Judicature  Act provides that:

“ the High Court  and the Court   of Appeal  shall have the same power to  punish  for contempt  of court as is for the  time being possessed  by the High Court of Justice  in England  and that  power shall extend  to upholding  the authority  and  dignity  of subordinate  courts.”

18. The above  provisions apply  to all types   and forms of  contempt. On the  other hand, Section  63(e) of the  Civil Procedure Rules provides  that:

“In order to prevent   the ends  of justice  from being defeated, the  court may, if it is so prescribed.

a. ……….

b. …………

c. Grant  a temporary injunction  and in case  of disobedience  commit  the person  guilty  thereof  to prison  and order that  his property  be attached  and sold.”

19. The  other regime  for punishing  for contempt   of court is Order 40 Rule 3(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules which  provides that:

“In  case of  disobedience, or breach  of any such terms, the court  granting   an injunction  may order the property  of the person guilty  of such disobedience  or breach   to be attached and may also order such person to be detained  in prison for  a  term not  exceeding  six months unless in the meantime  the court  directs  his release.”

20. In the instant  case, from the judicial   Review  orders  being  sought  as  per the leave granted  on 30th August  2016, it is  my humble  view that   the alleged  breach  or violation is in respect of the decision  by the respondents relating to prayer No.  VII which seeks as follows:

“ vii. an  order of  prohibition to prohibit   the respondents  acting either  in person   or through  their servants, agents, police  officers, employees or anyone  else claiming to  derive  such authority   from the respondents  from arbitrarily  arresting, detaining, harassing  and/or deporting  Mr Sajjad Ahmad  or in any  manner whatsoever  curtailing  impeding  Mr  Sajjad  Ahmad’s  liberty/ freedom of movement   with regard   to the matters herein.”

21. The above prayer for which  leave  was granted  by this court to commence  Judicial Review  proceedings  is in the form of  a restraining  or prohibitory  injunctive  order  and therefore  when the court granted a stay of enforcement  of any decision  by the respondents affecting  the interested party, the order  clearly among others  prohibited the  respondents from arresting   or detaining  or deporting  the interested  party or  in any  manner curtailing  his freedom of movement   until   the  substantive  motion once  filed   is heard   and determined  interpartes.

22. From the application  and grounds  put forward  by the applicant   in this  application, it is  claimed that the respondents despite being served  with the orders  of this court dated  30th August   2016, when the interested  party  landed   at JKIA  on  3rd  April  2016   from Dar-esalaam, Tanzania, he was  arrested and detained  until  4th September   2016  when he  was put  on the next  flight  and deported back to Dar esalaam, Tanzania, the country   from which he  has come from.

23. It is not denied that the interested party is a director of one of the biggest companies registered in this country and dealing   in the importation and sale of motor vehicles from Japan.

24. It is also not in dispute that the said company employs about   15 Kenyans as sales persons, automotive mechanics and maintenance staff and office support staff besides the security team.

25. From what is disclosed in the applicant’s affidavit, it is possible  that the Immigration Department  has got issues  with the  Interested  Party’s  status  in this country and that is why they have verbally communicated to him that he is on the watch list.

26. Nonetheless, those  issues appear to be work related  and not that  the Interested  party  is a security   risk for if it   was the latter case, I  see no reason why  the respondents  should not  have filed  a challenge  to these proceedings  for this court’s  consideration.

27. That notwithstanding, the Interested Party has  subjected himself  to the  jurisdiction of this  court as a  law abiding   immigrant, seeking  for  resolution of the dispute over  his status, while  complaining that in the process of determining his  status  in the country,  the respondents  are violating  his rights  which are  guaranteed  in the Constitution of Kenya, 2010.

28. That  being the case, the respondents  having been   served with a court  order prohibiting  them from  arresting  and or  detaining  and deporting the  Interested  Party are  bound to obey the court order and come to  court to challenge it.  In the alternative, if the   respondents   have any reason to believe  that the  interested  party   was   a security   risk,  they should have arrested  him on his arrival   at JKIA  and  brought  him to court  with a sworn  affidavit  detailing  the reasons why it was necessary  to arrest him  contrary to the court orders  prohibiting  such arrest.

29. On the evidence  presented  before this court, I am satisfied  that the respondents   were on   31st August  2016  served with the   court order   issued by  this court  on  30th August  2016   which order  was clear.  I am equally satisfied that the said  court order had a penal notice warning of the consequences  of disobedience thereof.

30. I am   also satisfied  on the material   presented  by the applicant  that the Interested Party  was arrested on  3rd September  2016,  detained at JKIA  on his arrival  from Dar salaam, Tanzania  via KQ and on  4th September  2016   he  was deported  back to Dar esalaam  despite  the court order   prohibiting such action.

31. Although the application herein  was brought  under Section 5 of the Judicative Act,  and all other enabling   provisions  of the law, I am satisfied  that even without  citing   the  provisions  under which the application was brought, the breach  complained  of is  in respect   of the prohibition  which  is a conservatory order in the nature of an injunction and therefore  Section  63 of  the Civil Procedure Act and Order  40 of the Civil procedure  Rules apply  and no leave  to apply would be required.

32. The order was received on 31st August 2016 by the Investigations  and Prosecution Section of the Department  of Immigration Services who,  upon receipt  thereof ought   to have cascaded the order  to the Principal Immigration officer  in charge at JKIA on the night of 3rd September 2016 so that upon arrival of the Interested Party as per  the invitation letter of  3rd  September  2016 by the applicant, who also  undertook  to host the Interested Party and to meet  all his  expenses  of stay, he  would not  be arrested, detained or deported.

33. However, from the available  affidavit evidence, there is no evidence  that the recipient of the order of  30th August  2016  disseminated  that  order to  the  immigration officers at JKIA or any  other border or  entry point.

34. There is also no evidence of constructive  knowledge  of that order by the  Principal  Immigration  Officer  in charge  at JKIA on the night  of 3rd September  2016 and or the officer  in charge of station, JKIA Police Station.

35. I say so because  the affidavit  evidence   does not disclose  how  service  of the order  was effected  on the two  officers   at JKIA  and or that  they were  aware of the said  court order.

36. At  paragraph 8 of the  applicant’s  affidavit, it is deposed that  upon arrival  at JKIA on 3rd September 2016, the Interested Party was  arrested by the Principal Immigration  Officer  in charge of JKIA  in collusion  with some  2  unnamed  Police Officers  from JKIA  Police Station on the ground  that the Interested Party   was not permitted  to enter the  country, and  that the Interested Party  was detained overnight at the respondent’s  holding  facility  within  the airport.

37. The  same affidavit  at paragraph 9 further states that  the said  immigration officer who  declined  to name himself  to the Interested  Party contemptuously  dismissed  the court orders herein  given to him by the Interested Party, stating  “ Those are not orders.”

38. However, what is striking about the affidavit   referred to above is that it is not sworn by the Interested Party who is directly affected by the order and the alleged actions of the respondents in contravention of the order.  The affidavit is sworn by one Maratab Bashir the director of the Exparte Applicant.  The  said   deponent  does not  state how  he came  to know or learn about  the actions of the respondents  as meted against  the Interested   Party  and in  alleged flagrant  disobedience of the court  orders  of  30th August  2016.

39. The said affidavit does not state that the deponent who is not the affected party was informed of those happenings at JKIA and by whom.  Neither does the said deponent  state  that he was  personally at JKIA  when the respondents acted the way  they did and  or that he is the  one or the Interested Party who  showed  the alleged  contemnors the  court orders  and that the immigration  officer retorted contemptuously that “ those  are not orders.”

40. In addition, it is not clear from the letter  of invitation dated  3rd September  2016  whether  that letter  was received  by the Director of Immigration Services  and even  so, the said  letter  does not  indicate  the expected  date of  arrival of the Interested  Party and  via what entry  point, among the many Kenyan international border entry points.

41. The burden of proof of contempt  of court  order  is with the party  who alleges  that the order   was flagrantly disobeyed, even if there is no opposition  from the alleged  contemnor.

42. The standard of proof, on the other hand, in contempt  proceedings, is  higher  than that  of balance  of probabilities, though not  on beyond  reasonable  doubt.  Orders for punishing an alleged contemnor are never issued  at large.  They must  be directed  at a particular  person  who is named  in the order and  who is   alleged  to have  disobeyed   the orders  or aided  or abetted  in the  disobedience  of the court orders, thereafter, the orders would then affect any other person who aids or abets the disobedience of the court order.

43. In this case, the respondents are office holders   thereof of the public offices.  Office holders change from time to time. In order  for  this  court to find that there  was  disobedience  of the court orders and that such  disobedience  must be   punished, the court  must be  given the  names  of the specific  persons  who are alleged to have disobeyed the court orders. The court cannot issue orders to some officer in charge whose names are not disclosed.

44. The charge of contempt of court is akin to a criminal offence against the administration of justice.  A party may lose  his liberty  and therefore  the court, before finding  a person to be in contempt  of court order, must be satisfied, almost  but not  exactly  beyond  reasonable doubt that  the person is in contempt  of court order.  The court  in contempt of court proceedings  must also draw a balance between  two fundamental  principles, on the one  hand, the power of  the court to protect the authority and the  supremacy of the law and on the other  hand, its duty  to  protect  and  uphold the right of a citizen  or person to a fair hearing and or a trial as espoused in Articles  50 and  51 of the Constitution.

45. Where it  is readily apparent that the respondent’s  agents upon which   the  prohibition orders were  served  at the airport  are not  even named or  disclosed,  and neither  is it  known  as to who showed  to the said  unnamed  agents, the court order; and   where   as I have  stated, there is no evidence  from the letter of  3rd September  2016 as to when the Interested Party  was expected to jet in and via what entry point, it cannot  be said that respondents  herein and or their agents  were in  flagrant  breach of the court orders  made on  30th August  2016.

46. It will be noted that  on 31stAugust 2016 when the order was served  upon the respondents was a Wednesday  and the Interested  Party is said  to have arrived in the  country on  3rd September   2016 which  was a Sunday, three days later. Furthermore, whereas  the contempt   proceedings  hereto are directed at the  1st respondent  and his/her agent, being  the  Principal Immigration Officer in charge, of JKIA  on the night  of 3rd September  2016  and  the officer  in charge  of station, JKIA Police Station, the court  has not been told why the 2nd respondent  Cabinet Secretary for interior  and  Co-ordination of National Government  whose  office  was  served with the impugned court orders on  31st August  2016  has not been   cited with  contempt  of court since  the record  is clear that  the orders   were served  upon the Cabinet Secretary’s office  and  not the officer in charge  of station at JKIA.

47. This court has held before in the case of Sam Nyamweya & FKF Vs  Kenya Premier League  & Others   HCC 69/2015 that the court cannot condone selective justice  to be applied for it deprives  persons  equal protection of the law.  In this case, there is no reason  why the applicant  has cited  the Director of Immigration  and his  Principal  Immigration Officer at the JKIA  and left  out the Cabinet Secretary for Interior and Co-ordination   of National Government and instead  cited an  officer in charge  of a Police  Station at JKIA  who  is  directly   answerable  to the Inspector  General of  Police  and not  to the  Cabinet Secretary for Interior and Coordination  of National  Government; particularly when  it is clear that the persons who were  served with the  orders  of  30th August 2016 are the office of Director  of Immigration  Services and the Cabinet Secretary for Interior and Co-ordination of National Government;  and  not the officers  who were to be  found at the  material time of  the alleged  contempt  of court, in contempt  of court.

48. For this  court to  find the officers  at JKIA  on 3rd September  2016  in contempt  of court order and  to punish  them for  contempt  of court or to even to ask them to purge the  contempt  before being  heard which latter  prayer is a violation of their right  to access justice as espoused  in Article  48  of the Constitution and the right  to  fair hearing  and fair trial  espoused in Articles  50 and 51  of the Constitution,  it must be  satisfied  that the  two officers were either served with the orders  allegedly  disobeyed, or that  they had  actual or  constructive  knowledge of the said  orders.

49. As  was held in Wangondu  Vs Nairobi City  Commission CA 95 of  1988, the Court  of Appeal  was clear  that  a person cannot  be denied  an opportunity  to be heard   in contempt  proceedings  unless  and until it  was   established that he had indeed  committed contempt  of court.  The above decision  was made  before the  2010  Constitution  which has made   it clear  that the right to  a fair trial  cannot  be limited ( see  Article  25 of the Constitution).

50. On whether the court should decline to hear the respondents/ alleged contemnors, Lord Denning in  the authority  of Hadkinson V Hadkinson  (1952) AER 567was clear that it is  unusual for a court  to refuse  to hear  a party  to a suit  and that such  cause should  be taken only  when justified  by grave  considerations of public policy.  The fact   that a person  had disobeyed  an order of the court is not  itself  a bar   to his being  heard; a court could  exercise its  discretion to refuse  to  hear him if the disobedience  continued  to impede  the cause of justice.

51. And in Rose Detho V Ratilal Automobiles & 6 Others, Others NRB Court of Appeal CA 304/2006,Githinji JA speaking for majority stated that:

“ The general rule that  a party  in contempt  could not be heard  or take  part in the proceedings in the  same case  until he has purged his contempt applies  to proceedings  voluntarily instituted  by himself  in which  he has made  same claim   and not a case   where all he seeks  is to be  heard in respect of  some matter  of defence  or where he has appealed  against an order  which he  alleges  to be illegal having been  made without  jurisdiction.”

52. Thus, the court does not enjoy any discretion on whether or not it should hear the alleged contemnor especially when the consequences are grave.  It must hear such a person in order not to impede the cause of justice especially where deprivation of his liberty is concerned.

53. A court of law in the performance of its solemn  duty of exercising  jurisdiction to uphold the cause  of justice  and the rule of law and  the self evident  obligation to afford  sundry and all, including   those   who annoy  and  vex judicial officers must accord  all  who seek to be heard  a fair hearing before condemning  them for being in contempt of court orders. In Hell More V Smith (2) [1886] LR 35 C.D.  455 Bowen L.J stated that:

“ The  object  of the discipline  enforced  by the court  in case of contempt  of  court is not to  vindicate  the dignity  of the court or person  of the judge, but to  prevent  undue  interference  with the  administration  of justice.”

54. And in Johnson Vs Grant [1923] SC 789 at 790, The Lord President Clyde in his dictum stated that:

“The law does not exist to protest the personal dignity of the judiciary nor the private rights of parties or litigants.  It is not the dignity of the court which is offended.  It is the fundamental supremacy of the law which is challenged.”

55. However, as was  observed by the  Court of Appeal in Akber  Abdullah  Kassam Esmail V Equip  Agencies  Ltd  & 4 Others  [2014] e KLR

“Thepower to punish for contempt is a drastic power that   sometimes   borders on the arbitrary.  As the saying goes, just like fire, the contempt power can be a good   servant, but a bad master.  If it is not   exercised cautiously and responsibly, it may undermine the very cause of justice   and the rule of law that it is intended to safeguard.  Arbitrary resort to the contempt power imperils the liberty and property of citizens as badly as deliberate disobedience of a court order.”

56. The Court of Appeal   in the  above  Akber  Abdullah  (supra)  case  also cited  with approval  the decision  in Re Clements, Clements V Erlanger [1877] 46 L.J Ch D 383 where Lord  Jessel M.R exemplified the misgivings about invocation of the contempt  power as follows:-

“ It  seems to me that  this jurisdiction   of committing  for contempt    being  practically arbitrary  and unlimited, should  be most  jealously  and carefully watched, and  exercised, if I may say so, with the  greatest  reluctance  and the  greatest  anxiety on the part  of judges  to see whether  there is  no other mode  which  is not open  to the objection  of arbitrariness, and which  can be  brought  to bear  upon the  subject.”

57. In Nyamogo Vs Kenya Posts and Telecommunications Corporation,No Nai 264/1993 the Court of Appeal  expressed itself that the exercise  of the contempt    jurisdiction  has traditionally  been circumspect  and subject to  well defined safeguards  to keep it  to the  straight  and narrow.  The court stated:

“ The  consequences  of a finding of  disobedience  being penal, the party  who calls s  upon the court  to make  such a finding must  show that he   has himself  complied  strictly with  the procedural requirements  and his failure  to so comply  cannot be answered  by merely saying that the other side was aware or ought  to have been  made aware  of what the order  required  him to do.”

58. In the instant case, it is  clear that  there is no evidence that the unnamed Principal  Immigration Officer  in charge  of JKIA   on the night  of  3rd September  2016  and the officer in charge  of JKIA  Police Station  were  the persons  who were  served with  the court order. Secondly, it is clear that the 2nd respondent who was served with the court   order is not made a party to these contempt proceedings.

59. Further, it is clear that only the 1st respondent who was served with the court order is made a party to the contempt   proceedings.  There  is no explanation  given why the 2nd respondent   was carefully  omitted  from these proceedings, and  why the Principal Immigration  Officer  at JKIA  on the night of 3rd September  2016  and the officer  in charge  of JKIA  Police Station who are  not parties to these proceedings  and who were never served  with the court  order should be  cited for  contempt  of court order  and be made  to purge  the contempt  before they are  heard.

60. there is also no evidence that the two unnamed officers at JKIA  were made  aware  of the court order, as there is no affidavit or deposition to that effect, by the person who may have made them aware of the order. This court finds the  affidavit sworn by the applicant by the deponent, in support of this application so generalized that  it does not  disclose  the source of  information  contained  in the paragraphs  concerning the manner in which  the   order of this court  made on  30th August  2016  was disobeyed.

61. For  this court to find  the two  JKIA  officers  contemptuous of court order, it must  summon the respondents  to come  to court  to explain whether upon receiving the order on 31st August   2016, they took  the said order to JKIA and gave directions to the two JKIA officers to obey.  In other words, the court must inquire into the process or channels through which an order received at the Head Office is transmitted to the various border entry points and how fast that is done.

62. In the absence of any  evidence   as to what international border   entry point and  date that the interested  party would be  arriving  through from his destination, and  from where, and in the  absence of evidence  that the  officer’s  managing  that specific  border  entry point  was  served with the court order  or that they  were aware  of the prohibition, this court  would be  acting arbitrarily, if it is proceeds to cite  the 1st respondent  and other  alleged contemnors  for contempt  of court. The thread of evidence linking the two officers to the alleged brazen disobedience   of court orders of 30th August 2016 is too thin.  It does not meet the required standard.

63. Accordingly, I have come to the conclusion that this application must be declined on all the limbs.  It is dismissed with no orders as to costs.

Dated, signed and delivered in open court at Nairobi this 11th day of October 2016.

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE

In the presence of:

Mr Miyare for the exparte applicant

N.A for the Respondents

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