Republic v Director of Public Prosecutions & Directorate of Criminal Investigations Ex-parte Ramesh Chandra Govind Gorasia [2016] KEHC 763 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

JUDICIAL REVIEW

MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO.  331 OF 2016

IN THE MATER OF AN APPLICATION BY RAMESHCHANDRA GOVIND GORASIA FOR LEAVE TO APPLY FOR ORDERS OF PROHIBITION

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHIEF MAGISTRATE’S COURT AT MILIMANI LAW COURTS IN CRIMINAL CASE NO.  1043 OF 2016

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE PENAL CODE & CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE

AND

IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLES 29(a), 39, 48 & 50 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, 2010

BETWEEN

REPUBLIC ……………………..……………………………………....APPLICANT

VERSUS

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS......................1ST RESPONDENT

DIRECTORATE OF CRIMINALINVESTIGATIONS………...2ND RESPONDENT

RAMESH CHANDRA GOVIND GORASIA........................EXPARTE APPLICANT

RULING

1. On  28th July  2016, the exparte  applicant, RAMESH CHANDRA GOVIND GORASIA vide  chamber summons  dated  28th July 2016 and   supported by statement  of facts  and  verifying  affidavit  sworn by the  applicant  Ramesh Chandra  Govind  Gorasia  and   annextures  thereto sought  from this court  leave to apply to apply for Judicial Review  orders of  prohibition  prohibiting  the respondents   from prosecuting  the applicant and  from proceeding any  further  or taking any other step in any manner  whatsoever  with criminal case  No. 1043  of  2016   filed  in the Chief Magistrate’s  Court, Milimani Law Courts,  Nairobi against  the applicant  as the  accused  person; costs  be provided  for; and  that the grant  of leave  herein do operate  as a stay of the criminal  proceedings  filed  against the applicant  at the Chief  Magistrate’s Court, Milimani  Law Courts being criminal  case No. 1043 of  2016  pending  the hearing   and determination  of the Judicial Review   application.  The application was supported by 8 grounds on the face of the chamber summons.

2. The matter   was placed  before  me on  29th July 2016  when I certified  the  same  as urgent  and directed  the applicant’s  counsel  to serve the  respondents   for interpartes  mention on  10th August  2016.  I granted an interim stay until then.

3. On 10th August   2016 the respondents did not appear. only the applicant’s  counsel  did appear  and the court  fixed he matter for   interpartes  hearing  on  20th September  2016,  while extending  the interim stay orders.  I also ordered service to be effected upon the respondents.

4. On 20th September   2016 all parties appeared.  Timelines   were given  for the respondents  to file  their replying  affidavit and  the   court also ordered for  service of  the pleadings  upon other  interested  parties  who are  Respondents in Criminal Application No. 11/2016  private  prosecution proceedings.  I also extended the interim orders of stay until 5th October 2016.

5. On  5th October  2016,  Mr  Mungai  counsel for the applicant  had filed  another  notice of motion  seeking to enjoin the Principal Secretary, Ministry of  Lands  as a party.  The respondent’s  counsel raised  the issue  of  res judicata   in that there   was  HC Miscellaneous Application  No. 304/2016   which had  been heard and determined  by Honourable Justice  Odunga.  The court directed parties to urge that preliminary objection first before any other matter could be heard on this file.

6. On  3rd October  2016 all the parties’ advocates  appeared  and urged the said   preliminary  objection, with Mr  Ochwo counsel  for the interested  parties  submitting  that  annexture  JP5  annexed  to the replying  affidavit  sworn by Jayesh  Patel in paragraphs  12 and  15   of the replying  affidavit is the ruling by  Honourable  Odunga J in HC  Miscellaneous Application  No.  304 of  2016   wherein  the applicant herein  Ramesh  Chandra Govind  Gorasia  sought leave   of court   to apply for  Judicial  Review  orders of  prohibition  to  prohibit    the respondents  in this matter, the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Director of Criminal Investigations   from prosecuting and  proceeding any further  or taking   any further  steps in any whatsoever  with criminal case  No. 1043 of  2016   filed at the Chief Magistrate’s Court, Milimani Law Courts, Nairobi; Costs  and  that the  leave granted  do operate  as stay of  the said  criminal proceedings  pending  hearing  and  determination of the Judicial Review  proceedings.

7. That the learned judge  after  hearing the said  application, and  citing several  authorities  dismissed  the said  application for leave to  apply and that the said  application  having been   found to be  constituting   a defence in the pending criminal  case  and the court   observing  that there   was not even  copy of    the charge  sheet  annexed, the  application  was determined on merits  and not   on technicalities.

8. Further, it was submitted that the applicant is guilty of non disclosure   of the fact that there   was the ruling by Honourable Odunga J.

9. The interested  party’s counsel  further submitted   that the  applicant, after losing  out  in JR  304/2016  should have  filed  an appeal   and not a fresh  application   for leave   which  is  an abuse of the  court process  and  Resjudicata.

10. The above submissions by the interested party’s counsel    were adopted in their entirety by the respondent’s counsel Mr Ondimu.

11. In opposing  the preliminary  objection, the applicant’s  counsel, Mr Mungai  submitted that the matter   herein is  not Resjudicata  because  the ruling  of Honourable  Odunga  J was based   on the facts  before him.

12. Further, that this application  annexes  a copy of the charge  sheet  with which the applicant   was charged in the lower  court, and which  charges the applicants  seek to  prohibit  hence there  is no  Resjudicata.

13.  In addition, Mr Mungai submitted that the observations by the learned judge  on the issue  of the charge  sheet  came  in the last  paragraph  of his ruling  which means  it never formed the core of his decision to dismiss the  application for leave.

14. In a brief rejoinder, Mr Ochwo submitted that the learned judge in JR 304/2016   dismissed the applicant’s application on merit.  That he did not strike out the application.  Further, that the  dismissal of JR 304 of 2016  has not  been set  aside  hence this court’s  hands  are tied  and that the court  cannot sit  on appeal  of the decision of Odunga J.

Determination

15. I have carefully considered  the preliminary objection  raised by the  interested   party as  supported by the  respondents  and opposed by the  exparte  applicant  through their  respective  counsel’s on record.

16. In deciding    whether to uphold the  preliminary  objection, the court  is guided  by the  often  cited case  of Mukisa  Biscuits  Manufacturing  Company  Ltd  Vs West  End Distributors  Ltd [1969] EA 696 where  the Court of Appeal  for Eastern Africa held  that a preliminary  objection consists  of  a point of law which has been  pleaded, or  which  arise   by clear  implication out of the  pleadings, and  which, if  argued  as a preliminary  objection  may dispose of  the suit.  The  court further  held that   a preliminary  objection would   normally  be argued  on the assumption that all facts  pleaded  by the other  side  are correct and cannot be raised  if any  facts  have to be  ascertained  or if  what is sought is  judicial discretion.

17. In the instant case, the basic facts  are that  this Judicial Review  application  is the same  in all  material  particulars  as JR  304/2016  between the same  parties and  that in the latter matter, the court declined to grant  the orders  sought vide   the ruling of the court  delivered  on 20th July  2016  after which , the applicant  herein, instead  of  filing an appeal  thereof, chose to  file another  fresh  application and it so happens  that the  new application  is now before  me, a different  judge  from  the judge  who  heard and dismissed  JR  304/2016.

18. It  is therefore  alleged that  this  application  is Res judicata  JR 304/2016  which  was heard  and determined   on merits  and not  on a  technicality.

19. The applicant did not deny that the prayers and the parties in the former JR 304/2016 application are the same as the prayers and parties in these proceedings.  The only   contention  is that  in JR  304/2016, the  learned  judge  found that  no charge  sheet  in the  criminal  case   was  annexed  and that  the applicant had  in  this application  annexed  a copy of  the charge  sheet   showing   the  offences  that he is  charged  with before  the  subordinate  criminal  court.

20. The issue  of whether   the plea of Resjudicata  can be  raised  as a preliminary  objection  was considered   in Omondi Vs  National  Bank  of Kenya  Ltd & Others [2001] KLR  579: [2001] 1 EA 177 where  it  was  stated that:

“ The objection  as to the  legal   competence  of the plaintiff  to sue in their capacity as directors  and shareholders  of the  company  under receivership  and the plea of  Resjudicata  are  pure  points  of law  which if  determined  in favour  of the respondent,  would  conclude  the litigation  and  they  were  accordingly  well  taken  as preliminary  objections.  In determining both points the court is perfectly at liberty to look at the pleadings and other relevant matters.

……what  is  forbidden is for  counsel  to take, and the court  to purport to determine, a point of preliminary  objection  on contested  facts  or in  the exercise  of judicial  discretion  and therefore  the contention that  the suit is  an abuse of the process of the court for  the reason that the defendant’s  costs  in an  earlier  suit have  not been   paid  is not a  preliminary   objection because  to stay  or not to stay a suit for such  reason is not done   ex debito   justiciae ( as  of right)  but as  a matter  of judicial  discretion.”

21. In the instant case, I find that the doctrine of Resjudicata was properly taken as a preliminary objection on a point of law. I must then revisit the legal principles   guiding the applicability of the doctrine of Resjudicata.

22. In Lotta V Tanaki [2003] 2 EA 556 the court held:

“ The  doctrine  of  res judicata  is provided for in Order 9  of the Civil Procedure Code  of  1966  and its object is to bar multiplicity  of suits and guarantee finality  to litigation.  It makes   conclusive   a final judgment between the same parties or their privies in the same issue by a court of competent jurisdiction in the subject matter of the suit.  The scheme of Section 9   therefore contemplates five conditions which, when co-existent will bar a subsequence suit.  The conditions are

i. The  matter directly  and substantially  in issue  in the former  suit;

ii. The former suit must  have been   between the  same parties  or privies  claiming  under them;

iii. The parties  must have   litigated  under  the same    title   in the former  suit;

iv. The court  which decided  the former suit   must have  been competent  to try  he subsequent  suit; and  the matter in issue must have been heard  and finally  decided  in the former suit.”

23. In Gurbachan  Singh Kaisi V Yowani Ekori  CA  62/1958, the former  East  African Court  of Appeal held, citing  Yat  Tung  Investments  Company Ltd  V Dao Heng  Bank  Ltd [1975] AC  581,590:

“ Where  a given matter   becomes  the  subject  of litigation  in,  and of adjudication  by a  court of competent  jurisdiction, the  court requires  the parties  to that litigation  to bring forward  their whole case, and will not, except under special  circumstances, permit  the same  parties to open the  same subject  of  litigation in respect of a matter which  might have   been brought  forward  as  part of the subject  in contest, but   which was not brought  forward, only  because  they  have,  from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident , omitted  part of their  case.  The plea of Resjudicata  applies, except  in special  cases, not only to points  upon which the court  was   actually  required  by the parties  to form an opinion  and  pronounce  a judgment, but  to every  point which  properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties exercising reasonable  diligence, might  have brought  forward  at the time.  No more  actions  than one  can be  brought  for the same cause  of action and the principle  is that where there is  but one cause of  action, damages  must be  assessed once  and for all.  A cause of  action is every  fact  which it  would   be necessary for the  plaintiff to prove, if  traversed, in order to  support  his right   to the judgment  of the court.  It  does not  comprise  every piece  of  evidence  which is  necessary  to prove  each fact, but  every  fact  which  is necessary  to be  proved.”

24. Waki JA in Apondi V Canuald Metal Packaging [2005] 1 EA 12 held:

“ A party   is at liberty  to choose  a  forum  which has  the jurisdiction to adjudicate  his claim, or  choose to  forego  part of his  claim and he  cannot be  heard to  complain about  that choice  after the event   and  it would be   otherwise  oppressive  and  prejudicial  to other  parties  and an abuse of the court process to allow  litigation by installments.”

25. Odunga J in Republic Vs City Council of Nairobi & 2 Others [2014] e KLR stated thus:

“ However, I must  say here  that the  mere  addition of parties  in a  subsequent  suit does not  necessarily  render the doctrine  of  Resjudicata  inapplicable  since a party cannot  escape  the said  doctrine  by simply  undertaking  a cosmetic  surgery in his pleadings if the added parties  peg their claim under  the same  title as  the parties  in the  earlier suit, the doctrine  will still be invoked  since the   addition of the  party would  in that case be for the sole    purpose of decoration and dressing  and nothing  else.  Under   explanation  6 to Section  7 of  the Civil Procedure  Act,  where  persons  litigate  bona  fide in  respect  of a public right  claimed in common  by themselves   and others, all persons   interested  in such  right shall , for the  purposes  of the Section, be  deemed  to claim under the persons  so litigating.”

26. In Pop –in (Kenya) Ltd  CA  80/88 (Unreported)  relying on Yat Tung  Investment  Ltd (supra)  the Court of Appeal held  that:

“ parties must bring before  the court, exercising  reasonable  diligence, all points that they  could take  and  that points  not taken then cannot  be taken again  as the same would amount to an abuse of the process  of court.”

27. In Lali Swaleh  Lali  & Others  Vs Stephen  Mathenge  Wachira  & Others  Civil Application No.  257 1994 Nairobi (unreported), the Court of Appeal  in upholding  the decision of Shah J in the  trial court  held:

“ on the  issue of Resjudicata, it would, in  our view, require, the skills  of a spin  doctor  to say  that the  judge  was wrong.”   The learned  judge  in the  trial court  had held  that an application for  interlocutory  injunction having  been decided on  the principles  laid down  in  the Giella V Cassman Brown, a  similar  application cannot be  brought once  again even in a subsequent suit  when a former   suit, in which the application   was dismissed, stood struck out on account   of the proceedings therein  being  incontestably  bad.”

28. Again inMburu Kinyua  V Gachiani Tuti [1978] KLR 69 [1976-80] 1 KLR 790 the Court of Appeal  further held that:

“ However caution must  be taken to distinguish between discovery of new  acts and  fresh  happenings.  The former may not necessarily escape  the application of the doctrine   since parties  cannot by  face lifting  the pleadings evade  the  said doctrine.”

29.  In the case ofSiri  Ram Kaura  V MJE  Morgan  Civil Application No Nairobi  71/60  [1961] EA 462the thenEACA stated  as follows:-

“ The  general principle  is that  a party cannot  in a subsequent  proceeding raise  a ground of claim  or defence  which has  been decided   or which, upon the pleadings or the  form of issue, was  open  to him  in a  former proceeding between the same parties.  The mere  discovery  of fresh  evidence  ( as distinguished  from the development  of fresh circumstances) on matters  which have  been open for  controversy  in the earlier  proceedings  is no  answer to a defence  of resjudicata.

The law  with regard to Resjudicata is that it is not  the case, and it would  be intolerable  if it  were the case, that a  party who has been unsuccessful in a  litigation can be allowed  to reopen  that  litigation  merely by  saying that  since the  former  litigation there is  another  fact going  exactly  in the  same direction  with the facts  stated  before,  leading  up to the same relief which I asked  for before, but it  being in addition   to the facts   which I have mentioned, it  ought now to be  allowed to be the  foundation of a  new  litigation, and  I should  be allowed  to commence  a new  litigation merely upon  the allegation of this additional fact.  The only  way in which  that could  possibly be admitted  would be  if the  litigant   were prepared to say, I  will show you that this is  a fact  which entirely   changes the aspect  of the case, and I  will show  you further  that it  was not,  and could not, by  reasonable   diligence  have been  ascertained  by me before.

…..The  point is not whether  the  respondent   was badly  advised  in bringing  the first  application  prematurely, but  whether  he has since   discovered  a fact  which entirely  changes  the  aspect  of the case  and which  could  not have been discovered  with reasonable  diligence  when he  made  his first  application.”

30. In the  instant case, having  examined  he ruling  in JR 304/2016  and  the present  application  for leave  and what  it seeks to achieve, I have  no  doubt  in my mind  that the parties  are the same, and the subject  matter is the same  in all  material  particulars.

31. The  cosmetic  panel  beating  that the  applicant  seeks to introduce  in this matter  is to  add another  party who is the  Principal Secretary, Ministry  of Lands, and Urban Housing; and  the  annexing  of  a charge sheet  which Honourable  Odunga J in JR 304/2016 in dismissing  that application  for leave, observed, had not been  annexed  to the affidavit  by the same  applicant.

32. In my humble  view, what the applicant is s telling this court is  that “ I was badly  advised in the other matter that is why I did not  annex  the charge sheet  and or enjoin the  Principal Secretary, Ministry of  Lands  and   Urban Housing   hence  that application  was prematurely  filed.”

33. The applicant  is not  telling this court that what  he has since  discovered is a fact which  entirely  changes  the aspect of the case and which could not have been discovered with  reasonable  diligence  when he  made his  first application.

34. In dismissing  the application for leave to apply for Judicial Review  in JR  304/2016, Honourable  Odunga J  was  clear in paragraphs 13,14,15, 16 & 17 of the Ruling  dated  15th July  2016  that the applicant  had not  proved  that he  had a prima  facie  arguable   case for  grant of  leave, based  on the facts  as averred  by the  applicant  in the verifying  affidavit; and  that  it was not sufficient  to  just  throw grounds for the grant of  Judicial Review  and contend  that a  prima facie  case  has been made out.

35. From the said  concluding  paragraphs  of the learned  judge’s  ruling, it  is clear  in my mind  that the learned  judge  determined  that  application on its  merits by applying  himself  to the relevant principles in granting   leave to apply for  Judicial Review orders.

36. The learned judge did not strike out the application on a technicality.  He dismissed  the application upon  satisfying  himself  that the  applicant  had not   adduced  sufficient  evidence  to prove that  he deserved  the orders  sought.

37. Even if the learned  judge observed at the end that the charge sheet  was not annexed, that was a merit  issue that  a charge sheet    was the most crucial document to show what offences the applicant had been charged with, and  which charges  the applicant  was  seeking to  prohibit, by that application yet, strangely, the applicant   had not annexed   the said charge  sheet document.

38.  The  applicant  cannot, therefore, at this  stage claim that this application  is now  complete  with all the required but more   importantly, with the crucial  document  which is  a charge sheet  which he  failed to annex  to the  first application.

39. The applicant  has not given any  explanation why he  did not  annex  the charge  sheet  in the earlier   application which  was dismissed,  and which  failure  was not the only  or sole  reason why the learned  judge  dismissed his application for  leave to  apply for  Judicial Review  orders.

40. If the applicant   considers, which he   has not, that the omission  to annex  the charge sheet   was  inadvertent  or that  the charge sheet  came in late , he should  have tried  applying for  review  of the ruling of Honourable Odunga  J or even  appeal  against  that ruling, and not  to seek to  relitigate the matter by  way of a fresh application, which in essence, is  seeking to have a second  bite at the cherry.

41. In my humble view, the applicant is abusing the court  process.  furthermore, even after  being  forewarned  of  this  preliminary  objection that this matter  is Resjudicata Judicial Review No. 304/2016, his counsel  casually prepared for the response  to the  preliminary  objection  which  is a clear  point  of law   and which,  if  successful, would determine  the  whole  matter  without  going  into its merits.

42. The applicant  also  mischievously  failed to disclose to this  court,  when he filed  the subject exparte chamber  summons  for leave under certificate  of  urgency,  that he  had filed an earlier application  with the same  facts  and same parties  which had been  dismissed  by Odunga  J,  and explaining  why  he considered  that this  court, nonetheless, had  some  residual  powers to hear  and determine this  matter  on its  merits.

43. Failure to  disclose  previous  similar  proceedings  affecting  the same  parties  over the   same  subject  matter is  being mischievous, frivolous, vexatious  and an abuse of the court  process.

44. It also matters not that the  applicant now  intends  to enjoin  the Permanent Secretary  Ministry  of Lands  and  Urban  Housing   as a party  to these proceedings.  The court can as well on its   own motion, order that any person  who is  likely to be affected by the  Judicial Review orders  be served  and or be enjoined  to these  proceedings, should  it be satisfied  that they  are  necessary  parties.

45. An attempt  to enjoin  the Permanent Secretary  Ministry  of Lands  to these proceedings  would not  in any way  cure the problem of the plea of Resjudicata.  The Court of Appeal  in CA  36/1996     UHDL vs CBK & Others  warned and  I  echo  that  warning  to the  applicant’s  counsel herein that:

“Before we  depart  from this  appeal,  we must  sound  a stern  warning.  If advocates  insist  on  filing  and arguing applications similar to the ones dismissed, in future, we  will call upon advocates to show  cause why they should not be  made  personally  liable for costs, as litigation  to them is a luxury.  This appeal  lasted   nearly two months.  Many  others appeals  were not listed for  hearing  because  of  this.  Those litigants   have suffered.  Justice   is for all and all must  have equal  access to  courts  as well  as equal  priorities  in being  heard.”

46. I add that litigating over  the  same subject matter between the same parties is a total   waste of   precious  judicial time  and  resources  and  denies  the many  very deserving litigants of this nation an opportunity to be heard expeditiously.

47. In this  case, the  applicant,  when  he filed  Judicial Review No. 304/206  he was expected to have  brought forward  his whole case   for adjudication since he  was  before a  court of competent   jurisdiction.  He did not  and there are no special  circumstances disclosed herein, that this  court  could consider  to permit   him  to open  up the subject of litigation in respect of the same  subject  matter between the same parties.  Section 7  of the Civil Procedure  Act  expressly  bars  the court from  re litigating   over  the same matter and it  states with a clear prohibition to the court:

“No  court shall  try any suit  or issue  in which the matter  directly  and substantially  in issue  has been  directly  and substantially in issue in a former  suit between the same  parties, or  between parties  under whom they  or any  of them   claim, litigating  under  the same  title, in a  court competent  to try such  subsequent  suit  or the suit in which  such  issue  has been subsequently   raised, or has been  heard and  finally   decided by such  court.”

48. In this case, the grounds upon  which the previous  application  as  dismissed by Odunga J  were predicated  are the  same as  the grounds upon which  this application is premised.

49. What  I view is that the applicant  having  hit a cul-de-sac  in the earlier Judicial Review  application opted to open a fresh  attack in the expectation that this  court may  overlook  to critically  evaluate the previous application and in the  process  fail to discern  that indeed  this application is  Resjudicata   and thereby  give  him a second  bite at the cherry.

50. The applicant herein  may also  have hoped  against  all odds  that the previous  application  is never  brought   to the attention of this   court  or that this court would luckily grant him exparte orders for leave and stay, that  is  why he did  not disclose  to this court  that  there  was  a previous  application which has the same names  of  parties and  subject  matter and  that it  was dismissed  on merits.

51. Majanja J in E.T.S V Attorney General & Another [2012] e KLR  urged courts to be  hawk eyed to avoid  suits  that are  otherwise Resjudicata from being instituted by employing devious  means.  The learned  judge stated  thus:

“ The  courts must  always  be vigilant   to guard  litigants, evading  the doctrine  of Resjudicata  by  introducing  new causes  of action so as  to seek  the same remedy  before the  court.  The test  is whether  the plaintiff in the second suit is   trying to bring  before the court  in another way  and  in a form of a new cause  of  action which  has been resolved  by a court  of competent   jurisdiction.

52. In the case  of Omondi Vs National  Bank of Kenya & Others (supra) the court  held that:

“ parties  cannot  evade  the doctrine  of Resjudicata  by merely  adding  other parties  or causes  of action in a subsequent  suit.”

53.  In that   case, the  court quoted  Kuloba J in the case  of Janja  Vs  Wambugu  & Another  Nairobi  HCCC 2340/91 (unreported) where he stated:

“ If  parties   were allowed  to go on litigating  for ever over  the same issue  with the same opponent  before courts  of competent  jurisdiction  merely  because  he gives his  case some  cosmetic  face lift  on every  occasion  he  comes  to court , then I do not see the use  of the doctrine  of  Resjudicata  ….”

54. Accordingly, albeit  the pleadings  in the Judicial Review  304/2016   were not  annexed  to the Preliminary Objection  herein, I have no doubt  that the detailed ruling by Honourable  Odunga J which also  sets out  meticulously the prayers  sought in that  matter and the arguments  therein, the issues  are  in parimateria  the same  as what   is contained  in the present  application for leave to apply  for  Judicial Review  orders of prohibition;  and that  this matter is 100% Resjudicata  JR  304/2016 and therefore  to sustain the same would  be  to encourage, aid and  abet abuse  of the court process.

55. In Karuri & Others  Vs Dawa  Pharmaceuticals  Company Ltd  & Others  [2007]  2 EA 235  the court  held that  nothing  can take   away the  court’s  inherent  power to prevent   the abuse of its  process by  striking out pleadings  or striking  out a  frivolous and vexatious  application and  that baptizing  such  matters  constitutional cannot  make them  so if  they are  in fact  plainly an abuse   of the court process.

56. This court is not  left  powerless  even  in Judicial Review    proceedings  where there is  no specific   provision under  the Law Reform Act or  order   53  of the Civil Procedure  Rules to hold  Judicial Review  proceedings Resjudicata; for it   has inherent  jurisdiction  to terminate  proceedings  where the same    amount to abuse  of  the court  process( see Republic Vs  City Council of Nairobi(supra)where Honourable Odunga J restated that:

“ One of cardinal  principles of law is that litigation must come  to an end and where   a court  of competent  jurisdiction   has pronounced   a final decision  on a mater to bring  fresh  proceedings  whether  as  Judicial Review   proceedings  or otherwise  would amount   to  an abuse of  the process  of the court  and would  therefore  not be entertained.  The  court in terminating  the same   would be  invoking its   inherent  jurisdiction  which is not the  jurisdiction conferred  by Section 3A of the Civil  Procedure Act  as such but  merely  reserved  there under( see Kenya Bus  Services Ltd  & Others Vs Attorney General  & Others  [2005] 1EA 111[2005] 1 KLR 743…….”

57. Accordingly, I am of the most considered  view that there is  sufficient  material to  find  the chamber  summons  dated  28th July 2016 Resjudicata JR  304/2016  and to allow  this matter  to proceed to hearing  on merit   is to encourage abuse  of court  process, even if  Resjudicata  doctrine    were  inapplicable.

58. In the end, I come to an  inescapable  conclusion  that the  preliminary  objection as taken  by  the interested  party  and supported  by the  respondents  was  well taken.

59. I therefore  allow  and  uphold  the preliminary  objection and strike out and dismiss  the chamber summons  dated  28th July 2016  as an abuse  of court  process.  All other  consequential  proceedings  and  orders  made  pursuant  to that  chamber summons  automatically fall by the  way side.

60. I however  order each party  to  bear their  own costs of the chamber summons  and of the  preliminary  objection.

Dated, signed and delivered   at Nairobi this 1st day of November, 2016.

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE

In the presence of:

Mr Ochwo for the interested party

N/A for the Applicant

Mr Ondimu for the DPP

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