Republic v Nairobi City County Ex-Parte Raphael Ngigi Muiruri [2017] KEHC 2672 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

JUDICIAL REVIEW NO.  341 OF 2016

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER OF CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION.

AND

IN THE MATTER OF NAIROBI CITY COUNTY PHYSICAL PLANNING ACT (CAP 286 LAWS OF KENYA) NAIROBI CITY COUNTY BY –LAWS

BETWEEN

REPUBLIC………………...………………….......APPLICANT

VERSUS

NAIROBI CITY COUNTY …………………….RESPONDENT

RAPHAEL NGIGI MUIRURI ……….EX-PARTE APPLICANT

JUDGMENT

1. On  2nd August  2016   Honourable  Justice  Lenaola  ( as he then  was)  granted  to the  exparte  applicant  herein Raphael  Ngigi Muiruri leave to file Judicial Review  proceedings  and  on  19th August  2016  the  exparte applicant  filed the substantive  notice of motion  dated  18th  August  2016  seeking orders:

a) An order  of certiorari do issue  to  bring this honourable  court for purposes  of  it being quashed, the  notice of the respondent  dated  28th  July  2016   requiring  the exparte  applicant  to demolish/remove  suit premises  situated  in plot No.  ‘B’ UHURU ESTATE PHASE IV  within the next   seven(7) days;

b) An order of prohibition prohibiting the respondent from  continuing to issue  any further  defective, unlawfully  and  illegally  enforcement  notice to the  exparte  applicant  in relation to his property  plot  No’B’ Uhuru Estate  Phase IV.

c) That costs of this application be provided.

2. The application is supported by the  statutory statement  and  verifying  affidavit   sworn by Raphael Ngigi  Muiruri  on 1st  August  2016  and  filed together  with the chamber  summons for leave.

3. The exparte  applicant  claims  that the  respondent  through its Director of Planning Compliance and  Enforcement  Department  has issued  a defective, illegal and unlawful  notice dated  28th  July 2016  giving the  applicant  seven (7) days to demolish  and or remove   the  premises  for the applicant’s house   on plot  No.  B at Uhuru Estate Phase IV.

4. According to the applicant’s  deposition, on  13th August 1998  he was  allocated  by  the  respondent  residential  plot No.  ‘B’ Uhuru Estate Phase  IV  and he  duly paid  the  allotment  fees upon  which he  was issued  with a beacon  certificate.

5. Later,  the  applicant  in  1999  submitted  his building  plans  to the respondent’s Town Planning Committee who approved  them on  16th April  1999.

6. The applicant alleges that he also submitted building structural and architectural plans to the respondent and they duly were approved.  He then commenced construction of the foundation of his house in 1999 but owing to insufficient finances, the construction stalled.

7. In the intervening period, he was issued with a lease agreement by the City Council of Nairobi pending grant of lease.

8. In September 2006, the applicant alleges that he resumed construction of his premises after securing relevant renewal of the building, structural and architectural plans for the respondent which plans  were duly approved by the respondent.

9. According to the exparte applicant, throughout  the  construction period, the respondent’s  servants, agents or employees used to  supervise  and  ensure that  the  building  was  constructed  in accordance with the approved plans.

10. To his  utter surprise  on  28th July  2016,  the  respondent  without any  lawful cause  whatsoever  purportedly  issued  an   enforcement  notice  dated  the same  day  requiring the  exparte  applicant  to stop developing  and  demolish the  property  on the suit   premises.

11. According to the exparte applicant, the enforcement notice is defective, illegal and unlawful because:

a. The notice   alleges that the suit  premises is an  ‘open space  at  Uhuru Estate’ whilst  in reality  and  from the foregoing, he had  developed the  plot extensively  and  that the plot was  privatized in  1998 when he  was  allocated the  property.

b. That the notice  states that  the  developments  done on the suit  premises  are done  contrary to the  provisions  of  the  Physical Planning   Act Cap  286   Section  30(1)  and  the Nairobi City County Building By-laws yet the developments  on the premises  were done  with the consent  and  approvals  by the respondent.

c. That  the  enforcement notice   was  served  on  28th  July  2016  requiring compliance within 7 days of stoppage of further illegal  development  on the suit premises  and  remove the same  yet there were no developments going on, in the same suit  premises  and that the already developed premises were done with the  approval of the respondent as required under the Physical  Planning  Act  hence it is unfair  for the respondent  to demand  that the premises  be  removed  within  7 days.

12. It  was  further alleged by the  exparte  applicant  that the  enforcement  notices  did not  accord  him the opportunity  to be heard  by  the Appeals  Liaison Committee  as the notices  were served  on him on  28th July  2016  yet he  was supposed  to have appealed  to the Liaison  Committee by 3rd  July 2016   which is unfair  and  unjust  and  contrary to the rules  of natural justice on the right to be  heard.

13. The applicant therefore  urged the court to  intervene  and  quash the impugned notice of enforcement and prohibit the  respondent  from  issuing any further  unlawful, illegal and  defective  notice  in relation to the suit  premises.

14. On 15th November 2016, the respondent filed grounds of opposition to the  exparte applicant’s  application contending that this court lacks jurisdiction to  determine this application as the matter involves land use, land planning  and  management  matters which  are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Environment  and  Land  Court  as  per Section 13(2)  of the Environment  and  Land Court   Act, Cap  12A  Laws of Kenya, and the Constitution of Kenya,  2010.

15. It was further contended that the alleged approvals did not emanate from the Nairobi City County Government.

16. Thirdly, that even if the alleged approvals emanated from the Nairobi City County, the exparte applicant did not commence   and complete the construction of the alleged approved structures within two years of allegedly obtaining the approvals.

17. Further, that the exparte  applicant  did not  renew  the  alleged approvals  after the lapse  of two years  from  the year  2008; and  finally, that the Nairobi County  Government  was therefore right in issuing  the  enforcement notice to the  exparte applicant  hence the application   filed by  him should be dismissed with costs.

18. The respondent also filed a replying affidavit on 23rd November 2016 sworn by Dr Robert Ayisi, the then Acting County Secretary complementing the grounds of opposition.  While conceding  that the exparte  applicant  is an allottee  of the  suit premises, whose development plans were approved in 1999 by the  defunct  Nairobi City Council, nonetheless, it was  contended that  the  exparte  applicant  is not  the legal owner of the said  premises  hence the  respondent  has the mandate  to issue  enforcement  notices  if the exparte  applicant  is non  complaint.

19. The Ag County Secretary maintained that the property is an open space as per the enforcement notice issued to the exparte applicant.  That  a letter of allotment  is merely an intention to allot the land  and  not a registrative (sic) interest in land hence  the suit land  is still  legally  owned by the respondent  who is allowed to deal with  it  as the principal  owner.

20. According to  the  respondent, the  development  approval dated  16th April  1999 by  the  Town Planning Committee  was  conditional  that such  development  should have  been  commenced  within  12 months  of  the approval date  and if the  development  was not completed in two years  of the date of approval,  the approval would be  null and  void.

21. That the  exparte applicant   having   failed to  develop   the  plot in  1999 and  instead  started  to develop it in  2006   and that  as there is no current development approval, the current   development  is null and   void   as the  approvals  are  required   after  every  2 years.

22. That the  developments  if any  are contrary to Section  30  of the Physical  Planning  Act which  prohibits any  development  without approval  of the local authority.

23. That the suit  property is reserved  as an open space  pursuant  to Section  29(f) of the Physical Planning Act  hence the applicant  has no right  to the  open space  which is also   public  property.

24. It was further contended that the applicant had not shown that from 2006, 2008-2016   he had   any approvals    to develop the said plot.

25. That therefore  this court  cannot prohibit  further issuance of enforcement  notices  to the applicant  as the  respondent  is mandated by Section  29(f)  of  the Physical Planning Act  to control the use of and development  of land  and   buildings  within the  Local Authority  area and  that as Section  38 of the Physical Planning  Act  empowers  the  Local Authority to issue such  enforcement notices where  the developer proceeds  to develop  without permission or where the conditions attached  to the  development  permission have been  breached.

26. In a rejoinder, the exparte applicant swore  a supplementary affidavit  on 2nd December, 2016   deposing  that the replying  affidavit  sworn by  Dr Robert Ayisi is misleading  and  arbitrarily  aimed  at depriving the applicant of his rights and  interests  over the suit  premises  on plot  No.  ‘B’ Uhuru Estate Phase IV.

27. The applicant  maintained that  he is the  lawful owner of the  suit  plot as  the  letter of  allotment  dated  13th August  1998  has never  been withdrawn  hence his rights  still stand.

28. That there is no way the plot is an open space as he pays standard premium and annual ground rent   from 1998 todate.

29. That on   15th August   2006  the  respondent in a Daily  Nation advertisement  made  it clear that the letter  of allotment  and beacon  certificates  can be  used as  ownership documents  for purposes of  development  plans  submission.

30. That the plot having  been  privatized  through  allocation of the same on  13th August 1998 and a lease  agreement  executed  on  16th September  2006,  it cannot  be  a  reserved  open space.

31. That the respondent cannot purport to use their rights as registered  owners of the plot to arbitrarily deprive  the applicant  of  his rights  and  interests  over  the  suit property  as  lesee by issuing  defective  notices  indicating that the suit plot is an open space.

32. That the enforcement notices interfere with the applicant’s rights and  interests and  harassment  to his  family and that the construction  was completed  between 2006  and 2008 after obtaining relevant   renewal  of the building  structural  and  architectural  plans from the respondent.

33. That since 2008 the applicant had not carried out any construction  on the suit  plot  as alleged  and so he  did not  require  any  current construction permits or approvals   and therefore the  respondent was being  malicious  as it has  never reclaimed the premises since 2006  hence the enforcement  notice is illegal, unlawful and malicious  since there are no  developments carried out without   approval or permission from the respondent.

34. That  Sections  29 and  30  of the  Physical Planning Act  do not  permit  the  respondent  to abuse its power.

35. That unless this court intervenes the respondent’s actions will place the applicant’s family in jeopardy and that they shall suffer irreparable damages  unless the orders sought are granted.

36. Both the parties’ advocates filed and exchanged written submissions and authorities.

37. The exparte  applicant filed  his submissions  dated  22nd  March  2017  on  23rd March  2017  restating  his case  and  the response  by the respondent  while  framing   the  following  key  issues for  determination:

a. Whether  or not  the  enforcement  notice dated  28th July  2016  is defective, illegal  and   unlawful.

38. In answering  this issue, the applicant maintained in his submissions that the notice   described  the applicant’s   plot as  open space  yet the  applicant  is a  legal  allottee of Plot No.  ‘B’ at Uhuru  Estate Phase IV since  1998 and  which allotment has never  been revoked  or withdrawn and that the  exparte applicant  is still the  owner thereof, paid survey fees, standard  premium and  ground rent since 1998 todate.

39. Further that there  is a binding  lease agreement  between the  applicant  and the respondent  dated  6th September  2016  hence the  enforcement  notice is illegal.

40. The exparte applicant  denied  being in  contravention of Sections  29 and 30  of the Physical Planning  Act  as alleged  by the respondent  that he had no  authority  to construct  on the plot  or that he was constructing on the plot without necessary  approvals, or that  he had since  1999 failed to construct  on  the plot.  He maintained  that he  had since  2008  not constructed  on  the plot as the construction  commenced  in 2006  and  ended  in 2008  and  since  then, no construction  works  had been  undertaken  on  the plot   hence no law had  been  violated  by him.

41. It  was  further  submitted  that by serving the  applicant  with notice  on  28th July 2016   requiring  him to comply  within 7 days  to  appear  before the Liaison Committee  on 5th July  2016  a date which  had already  passed, denied the  exparte  applicant  the opportunity of being heard at the Liaison Committee   concerning  the suit premises hence,  a violation of  the Rules of Natural Justice.  Reliance was placed on Onyango v Attorney General CA 152/1986[1978] e KLR where in allowing  the appeal the Court held that the principle of natural  justice  applies  where ordinary people would reasonably  expect  those making  decisions  which  will affect  others to act  fairly by giving  them an  opportunity  to be heard before imposing  a loss of liberty.

42. It  was  submitted that a notice requiring the applicant   to appear before  the Liaison Committee on 3rd July  2016, yet the notice  was  dated  28th July  2016,  was defective  and  therefore denied  the  exparte  applicant  an opportunity  to be heard before  being  asked  to demolish/remove the  premises.  He also claimed that Article 47 of the Constitution that guarantees every person the right to fair administrative action had been violated by the respondent.

43. On the part of the  respondent,  its counsel  Senior Counsel Professor Tom Ojienda’s   firm  filed written  submission dated  18th April  2017 on the same  date  reiterating the  grounds  of opposition  and  replying  affidavit sworn by Dr Robert Ayisi  contending  that the exparte  applicant  had not  demonstrated  that he deserves  the  Judicial Review  orders of certiorari  and  prohibition.  The  case  of Council of Civil  Service  Union  vs Minister  of State for  Civil Service [1984] 3  ALL ER  935   was  cited, setting out the grounds  upon  which Judicial Review   would issue  namely, illegality, procedural  impropriety  and  irrationality.  Further reliance  was placed  on Republic  vs  The Commissioner  of Lands  Exparte  Lake Flowers  Limited Nairobi HCC Miscellaneous Application 1235/1998as adopted in Republic vs Commissioner General, Kenya Revenue Authority Exparte  BOC  Kenya  Limited  [2014] e KLR.

44. According  to the  respondent, it  has a statutory  mandate  under Sections  29  and  30  of the Physical Planning  Act hence it is under a duty to regulate and monitor   development  plans and activities  within its  area  and to enforce non compliance.

45. That in this case the applicant has no right of ownership of the impugned plot since there is no lease in favour of the applicant and therefore the enforcement notice was in order as there was no approval prior to the alleged developments.

46. It  was  submitted  that under Schedule Four of the Constitution, the respondent  has a mandate  to control County Planning  and  Development hence  it must ensure  that all  property  within its  scope  are developed  in accordance  with the Physical Planning Act.

47. That in enforcing  the Physical Planning Act as stipulated  under Section 38 of the Act, the respondent had not   acted  irrationally by issuing an enforcement notice and that it would be  extremely  dangerous  to allow  developments  in the City County without  approval  by the respondent.

48. It was further submitted that the applicant is confused as to when he was issued with approvals to develop the plot due to the contradictory statements.  Reliance  was placed  on Republic vs  Attorney General & 4 Others Exparte  Peter Gathecha  Gachiri & Another [2014] e KLRwhere Majanja J stated,  inter  alia, that Section 38  empowers  the local  authority  to issue  an enforcement  notice where the  developer  proceeds  to develop  without  permission or where the conditions attached to the development  permission have been  breached.

49. It  was submitted that the applicant had not obtained the requisite  approvals  for  development  on the plot and that he has  built  in a property  that belongs  to the public  which is  a public utility hence the applicant should not be  in its occupancy.

50. On whether the letter of allotment  gives interest  in land, it  was submitted that only  a lease  and not  a  letter of allotment  gives  rise to  propriety interest  in  land hence  the  applicant’s  right to a  property  under Article 40 of  the Constitution  did not  arise.  Reliance   was  placed on Wreck Motors  Enterprises s v The Commissioner of Lands  & 3  Others  Nairobi  CA  71/1997(Unreported) where  the court held  inter alia:

“ Title  to landed  property  normally  comes into existence  after issuance  of a letter of allotment, meeting  the  conditions  stated in  such a letter and actual issuance thereafter of a title document.”

51. In the view of the respondent, the applicant  did not  abide by the  letter  of allotment   which states  that the  buildings  were to be   for residential  purposes  but that  instead, the applicant  had constructed a block of flats upto two levels and that the  applicant had not been issued with a lease because of non compliance with the right  procedures  and  had  build on  public utility land. further that the applicant had breached the conditions contained in the allotment letter that he could only construct single family dwelling  units,  a block of flats.

52. Relying  on John Mukora  Wachihi  & Others  vs Minister  of Lands & Others  HC Petition  82  of 2010  cited in  Evans  Kafusi Mcharo  & Permanent  Secretary  Ministry of Roads, Public Works  and  Housing  & another (2013)  e KLR, it  was submitted that the court observed that “the distinction  between the  holder of  a letter  of allotment  and  of a lease  or a  title  document, is based on the fact that the right to  property protected  under the law  and  the  Constitution is afforded to registered  owners  of land; that a letter of  allotment  is not proof  of the title as it is only  a step in the process of   allocation  of land.”

53. In light  of the  above, it  was  submitted that the respondent  cannot be   prohibited  by this court from issuing  enforcement  notices  as it  owns  the land in issue and as it  is so mandated  under Section 38 of the Physical Planning Act to so issue notices, protecting the land  under Section 29(f) of the Physical Planning Act  otherwise   the court  will be   interfering  with the powers  of the county as stipulated  in the Physical Planning Act to  reserve  and  maintain  all land  planned for open  spaces.  The respondent urged the court to dismiss the applicant’s application with costs.

DETERMINATION

54. I have considered the exparte applicant’s  case, the  respondent’s responses and  their  respective  advocate’s  written  submissions  as supported by constitutional,  statutory  and  case law  cited.

55. In my humble view, this matter raises very import legal questions.  However, one very  critical  legal  question  that must  first  be  determined  before the court  delves  into the merits  and demerits of the motion is whether this court  has jurisdiction  to hear  and determine the issues  raised  in this  matter.

56. In the respondent’s grounds of opposition filed on 15th November  2016  and which  the  exparte  applicant  has not  countered  in his submissions, question whether  or not this court  has jurisdiction  to hear  and  determine this application  on account that it involves land use, land planning and management, matters which are exclusively within the  jurisdiction of the Environment  and  Land  Court as per  Section 13(2) of the Environment and  Land  Court Act Cap 12A Laws  of Kenya,  and the  Constitution  was raised.

57. The question of whether this court has the requisite jurisdiction to hear  and determine  a matter  must  be  considered  in line with both  the constitutional and  legal imperatives because it is   trite  law  that jurisdiction  stems from  the  constitution  and the law.  The court  cannot  arrogate  itself jurisdiction  which it does not have( see Samuel  Kamau  Macharia  vs Kenya  Commercial  Bank  Ltd & Others  [2012] e KLR (SC).

58. On the other hand, the constitution or statute could limit  jurisdiction  of a court and  where there  is such  limitation of jurisdiction by the Constitution and  or statute, a court  of law would be  acting  in vain if it  heard and  determined  a matter  where  it is clear that  the court had no  jurisdiction to hear and determine a matter.  It is  for that reason  that when  an issue is raised  as to  whether or not  a court  has  jurisdiction  to deal  with a  particular  matter before it, it is crucial  to be clear  about  what is meant by jurisdiction.  Lord  Diplock L.J ( as  he then was) in Garthwaite  v Garthwaite  [1964] 2 ALL ER  233 stated:

“ In its narrow and  strict  sense, the “jurisdiction of validly  constituted  court connote  the limits  which are  imposed   upon its power to hear and  determine  issues between  persons seeking  to avail themselves  of its process  by reference

i. To the  subject matter of  the  issue, or

ii. To the  persons between  whom  the  issue  is joined, or

iii. To the kind of relief sought or to any combination of these factors.

In its  wider sense, it embraces  also the  settled  practice  of the court as to the way in which  it will exercise  its power  to hear and determine  issues which fall within  its  “jurisdiction” the  strict  sense, or as  to circumstances  in which it will grant  a particular  kind of relief  which it  has jurisdiction ( in the   strict  sense) to grant, including  its settled  practice to refuse  to exercise  such powers  or to grant such  relief  in  particular circumstances.”

59. John Beecroft Saunders in his Treatise Words and Phrases Legally Defined VOL.3 at page 113states:

“ By  jurisdiction is meant the authority  which a court  has to decide matters that are litigated before it or to take  cognizance  of matters  presented  in a formal  way for  its decision.  The limits  of this  authority are  imposed  by the statute, charter  or commission  under which  the court is  constituted,  and  may be  extended  or restricted  by like means.  If no restruction or limit is imposed the jurisdiction is said to be unlimited.  A limitation may be  either  as to the king  and nature of the actions and matters of which the  particular court  has  cognizance  or  as to the area  over which  the jurisdiction  shall  extend, or it may pertake  both  these characteristics.  If the jurisdiction of an  inferior  court or  tribunal ( including an arbitrator) depends on the existence of  a particular state of  facts, the court or tribunal must inquire  into the existence  of the facts in order to  decide  whether  it has  jurisdiction; but   except where  the court  or tribunal  has been  given power to determine conclusively  whether the facts  exist.  Where a court takes upon itself to exercise a jurisdiction which it does not possess, its decision amounts to nothing.  Jurisdiction must be acquired before judgment is given.”

60. The above definition  of “jurisdiction”  was cited with approval by the Court of Appeal by  Nyarangi  JA  ( as he then  was) in  Motor Vessel  ‘Lilian S’ vs  Caltex  Oil (K) Ltd  [1989] KLR  1 and in Seven seas Technologies Ltd v Eric Chege (IC) Miscellaneous  Application  29/13   [2014]  e KLR Nzioka Wa Makau J  held that  where  a court of law  finds that  it has no  jurisdiction to hear and  determine  a matter, it  must down  its tools.

61. What the  respondent  is  saying  is that  this court (High Court) lacks the competence to hear and  determine this application because the issues  raised herein fall within the jurisdiction of the Environment  and Land  Court  as stipulated  in Section 13(1) of the Environment  and Land  Court  Act and  the Constitution.

62. Although the  specific  provisions of  the Constitution are not  cited, this  court is  deemed  to know the law  and  from whence it derives  its jurisdiction.

63. Article 165 of the Constitution confers in the High Court unlimited  original  and appellate jurisdiction  in criminal and  civil matters; jurisdiction  to determine  that the right or  fundamental  freedom in the Bill  of Rights has been denied, violated, infringed or threatened; jurisdiction to hear  an appeal from a decision  of a tribunal appointed under the constitution; to consider the  removal of a person from office, other than a tribunal  appointed  under Article  144 of the Constitution; Jurisdiction to hear any question respecting the interpretation of this constitution including the determination of……..;Any other jurisdiction, original or appellate conferred on it by legislation.

64. Under Article  165(5), the  High Court   is expressly  prohibited  from hearing  and  determining  matters reserved for   the  exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the  Constitution  or falling  within the  jurisdiction of the courts  contemplated  in Article  162(2)  of the Constitution.

65. The High Court is however conferred with supervisory   jurisdiction under Article 165(6) of the Constitution over subordinate courts  and  over any person, body  or authority exercising  a judicial or quasi  judicial function, but  not over  a superior  court.

66. In addition, Article 165(7) of the Constitution makes  it clear  that for  the purposes  of Clause (6)  of  High Court may  call for  the  record  of any  proceedings  before any  subordinate  court or  person, body  or authority  referred  to in Clause(6)  and may  make any  order or give  any direction it considers  appropriate  to ensure  the fair  administration  of justice.

67. Of  significance  is that the High Court’s  jurisdiction is limited  by Article 165(5) of the Constitution in that it is  prohibited  from hearing and determining matters in the exclusive  jurisdiction  of the Supreme  Court  and  courts  contemplated  in Article  162(2) of the Constitution.

68. Under Article 162(2)  of the Constitution,  the Constitution  contemplates the establishment   of specialized  courts with the status of the High Court to hear and  determine disputes relating  to(a) Employment and labour relations and(b) The Environment  and  use  and  occupation of, and  title to land, and the  jurisdiction of the said courts of equal status is to be determined  by Parliament  through  legislation.

69. In  2012, the National Assembly  enacted  the Employment  and  Labour Relations Court  Act and  the  Environment  and  Land Court  Act, which have  since  been severally  amended.

70. Section 13(2) of the Environment  and  Land Court  Act  confers  on the Environment and  Land  Court  jurisdiction , original  and appellate  to hear and  determine  all disputes  in accordance  with Article 162(2) (b) of the Constitution and with the  provisions  of the Act  or  any  other law  applicable  in Kenya  relating  to environment  and land .

71. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 162(2) (b) of the Constitution, the court shall have power to hear and determine disputes:

a) Relating  to environment  planning  and  protection, climate   issues, land  use planning  title, tenure, boundaries, rates, rents, valuations, mining, minerals and other natural  resources:

b) Relating to compulsory acquisition of land;

c) Relating to land administration and management.

d) Relating  to public, private  and  community  land and  contracts, choses in action or other  instruments granting  any enforceable  in land; and

e) Any other dispute relating to environment and land.

7. In  exercise  of its  jurisdiction  under  the Act, the court shall  have power  to make any order  and  grant  any relief  as the court deems  fit and just, including-

a) Interim or permanent preservation orders including injunction;

b) Prerogative orders.

c) Award  of damages;

d) Compensation;

e) Specific performance

f) Restriction;

g) Declaration or

h) Costs

72. From the above plethora of constitutional and statutory  provisions, it is clear to me that the  High Court’s jurisdiction to hear and  determine  any dispute  or matter  relating  to the  title, ownership, land use, occupation of land, control and  management  of  land or it use  is expressly  ousted  and  the jurisdiction  is expressly  vested in the Environment  and  Land  Court.

73. Furthermore, the power to issue Judicial Review  Order formerly known  as  prerogative orders in matters  land and  environment  is vested  by dint  of Section 13(7) (b) of the  Environment  and  Land  Court Act, in the Environment  and  Land  Court.

74. In this case, the issues  raised in  the notice of motion include  title to  and  legal  ownership of the land   in issue  namely plot  ‘B’ Uhuru Estate Phase IV.

75. The respondent issued  enforcement  notice under  Section  38  of the Physical  Planning Act  Cap  286 Laws of Kenya  requiring  the applicant  to, within 7 days  of the notice, demolish, remove the suit premises  situated in the named plot and has extensively  argued that  a letter of allotment  does not confer  title  and  therefore legal  right to  the  applicant  since a lease  has not been  issued.  It also claims  that the  plot  is an  open space public utility  plot and  was allotted  for  development  of  a single  dwelling  not multiple  flats   which the  applicant  has done.

76. Further,  the respondent  claims that the  applicant  breached  the  terms  and conditions  of allotment  in that he did  not commence to  develop  the  plot within  12 months  from the  date of allotment  and  neither  did he  complete  the development within 24 months  from date  thereof.  It also claims that no renewal of approvals were made by the respondent for the subsequent construction.

77. The applicant on the other hand  asserts  that the respondent  is malicious,  has issued  a defective  and illegal  enforcement  notice  which does not  accord him a   right to  be heard  under Article  47  of the Constitution and that as the notice is dated after the  contemplated  date of hearing by Physical Planning Liaison Committee; that  it denies him  the right to be heard.  He further denies  that the  plot is  an open space and maintains  that the  letter of allotment  and lease  agreement  confer on him  good  title  pending  issuance  of a lease.  He further maintains that he sought and obtained all the necessary approvals from the respondent’s predecessor Nairobi City County.

78. The discourse above no doubt  concerns  ownership, occupation, land use, management  and  planning  by the  respondent as the disputed  land falls  within  its jurisdiction.  That being  the case, I have   no hesitation in finding that only  the Environment  and  Land  Court  has the requisite jurisdiction to hear and  determine  the issues raised  by each of the parties  which even  go beyond  the scope of Judicial Review remedies of certiorari and  prohibition, as  judicial review  is concerned  with the process   and not  on the merits  of  the decision.

79. The  High Court’s jurisdiction in  such matters  of the title to  land, use and or  occupation of land  is expressly  ousted by Article  165(5)  of the Constitution  and   expressly  vested in the Environment  and  Land  Court.

80. This court would therefore be usurping the jurisdiction of the court of  equal status if it heard and determined the merits of the motion before it.  The Environment  and  Land  Court has jurisdiction under Section 13  of the Environment  and  Land  Court Act  to determine  all the issues raised in this application and to grant the  prerogative/Judicial Review  orders  sought herein should it find the application merited.

81. As these proceedings were instituted long after the  establishment  and operationalization  of the  Environment  and  Land  Court, the applicant  cannot be  excused from wandering  in a wrong forum, and therefore  he cannot  benefit  from the  transitional  and  consequential  provisions of Part V Section  22 of the  Constitution as the application was filed over 5 years after the promulgation of the Constitution.

82. For those  reasons, I find and hold that this court has no competent  jurisdiction to hear and  determine  the application dated 18th August 2016   the same is  found to be  incompetently  filed before a court whose jurisdiction in such matters is expressly ousted by the  Constitution.

83. Having  so found, the only  logical  thing is  to down  my tools  and  say  no more  on the merits  of the  application  which is  hereby  struck out for want of jurisdiction.

84. I order that each party shall bear their own costs of these proceedings.

85. Those are the final orders of this court.

Dated, signed and delivered at Nairobi this 16th day of October, 2017.

R. E ABURILI

JUDGE