Republic v National Transport Services Authority Ex-Parte Extra Solutions Ltd [2017] KEHC 2112 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

JUDICIAL REVIEW NO.  260 OF 2017

IN THE MATTER OF PROCUREMENT OF TENDER NO. NTSA/NCB-011/2015-2016: TENDER FOR SUPPLY, DELIVERY AND INSTALLATION OF ASSET TAGGING, BAR CODING AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEM BY MS NATIONAL TRANSPORT SAFETY AUTHORITY

AND

IN THE MATTER OF AWARD OF TENDER NO.  NTSA/NCB-011/2015-2016: TENDER FOR SUPPLY, DELIVERY AND INSTALLATION OF ASSET TAGGING, BAR CODING MANAGEMENT SYSTEM TO MS EXTRA SOLUTION LIMITED.

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE CANCELLATION OF THE TENDER AWARD.

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND ASSET DISPOSAL ACT, 2015

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA, 2010

REPUBLIC………………..............................…….............APPLICANT

VERSUS

NATIONAL TRANSPORT SERVICES AUTHORITY....RESPONDENT

EXTRA SOLUTIONS LTD …………………..EXPARTE APPLICANT

RULING ON REVIEW

1. On 25th May 2017 this Court, as duty judge in chambers  received  an exparte  notice of motion  dated  24th May  2017 under certificate of  urgency  seeking  leave of court  to institute  Judicial Review  proceedings challenging  the decision of the  procuring entity- National  Transport   and  Safety Authority  on 20th March  2017  cancelling the tender  award by  the  procuring  entity  National  Transport  and  Safety Authority(NTSA) the  respondent  herein.

2. The Court  upon certifying the  natter as  urgent  and  as filed by the exparte  applicant herein, Extra Solutions Limited, observed  that time was of  essence  in challenging  administrative  decisions  and that as the  time for  challenging   the  Review Board’s  decision by way   of  Judicial  Review  had lapsed  from  20th March 2017  to 24th May 2017  when the application for leave  was lodged,  the court found that the application was an overshoot  as it involved  the exparte applicant challenging  the  decision of the  procuring   entity directly to the High Court as opposed to filing the challenge before the Review Board.

3. The court directed  that the  applicant  do explore the other available  mechanisms  under the  Public Procurement  and Asset Disposal Act  as  stipulated in Section  174  of the Act.

4. Soon thereafter  the exparte  applicant  Extra  Solutions Limited  filed a notice  of  motion dated  12th June  2017  under certificate  of urgency seeking orders that the Honourable  court  be pleased  to review  her orders  by setting aside her orders made on the  25th  May  2017  dismissing  the application  dated  24th May  2017  and   replacing  the same   with orders granting prayers sought in the said application  being prayers  No. 2, 3 and  4  of the notice of motion; Costs of the application.

5. The motion is predicated on the grounds that: The  14 days  within which the  application  challenging  the  breach as  enshrined  in Section 167  of the  Public Procurement  and Asset Disposal Act  had already expired  and the Board  therefore  had no  jurisdiction; That Section 174 of the Public Procurement  and Asset Disposal Act  states as  follows:  The right  to request  a review  under this part is in addition to any other  legal remedy  a  person  may have;” That the two  above  and   other evidence  to be adduced  in the affidavit   herein contains  discovery  of new  important matter of law as well as evidence  which after due diligence  were not brought  forth before  the court; That it is not  mandatory  that a  party who fails  to meet the  requirements of  Section 167 cannot  proceed  to court after  the  day limited  for taking  action is already  passed; That the action by the respondent was discriminatory, biased  and  malicious  and the applicant  can as well  take out a judicial review to challenge the unconstitutional conduct  on the part of the corporation arrived at through its administrative  processes.

6. The  application was also  supported by the annexed  affidavit of  Ken Wamae   sworn on  12th June  2017  deposing that the   exparte  applicant  won the tender  and  before the contract   was signed, the tender was cancelled by the procuring entity for  reasons   that one or two persons felt that the applicant was not worth  awarding  the  tender because it may not have given a bribe to the considering committee of the respondent; That the applicant was not known by anybody sitting at the tender committee; The procuring entity was corruptly influenced after the  applicant  had  won  the  tender to  change their mind  and  restart  the process  to conveniently  aid one of their own; That therefore the process was characterized by malice, ill intentions, bias and discrimination which is a subject of Judicial Review processes; That any other legal action is not prohibited under Section 174 of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act; That  they chose to come to court because the National Transport and  Safety  Authority  kept them  waiting  hoping  the contract  would be  signed   upon which 14  days  for challenge  to the Review Board  elapsed; That the respondents pretended  to be holding  discussions  with the  applicant  only for time to elapse  and that the applicants  would be  left with no remedy  if the court  does not  give them an opportunity to be  heard; That moreso, the respondent has not even  notified  the  Director  in accordance  with Section 63 (2)  of the Act, within  14 days  of  termination  of the  award hence  their action is illegal, ultra vires  their mandate; That the applicants have reliable information as to who the  tender is likely  to be awarded  and  that the  issues  raised  are over and above what the Review Board could hear and   determine  as there  breach was  of rights  of the applicant  when  the respondent  discriminated  against the applicant.

7. It was asserted that locking the applicant out would be encouraging maladministration as well as violation of the applicant’s right to access justice through the court.

8. The application was opposed by the respondent who filed a replying affidavit sworn by Patrick K. Wanjuki on 19th July 2017.  The  respondent’s  counsels  also filed a  preliminary  objection  notice dated  19th July 2017 contending  that  the court lacks jurisdiction by virtue of Section  35(2),39,167(1)  and  17  (c)  of the Public Procurement  and  Asset Disposal Act, 2015; that the court  lacks jurisdiction  by virtue  of Section 8(3)  and  5  of the  Law Reform Act, Cap  26 Laws  of Kenya  as read with Order  43 Rule  1(1) (a) and  Order 45  Rule 1(1) (a)  of the Civil Procedure  Rules.

9. In the  replying  affidavit sworn  by Mr  Patrick  K. Wanjuki the Head of Procurement  of the respondent  National Transport  and Safety Authority, it is deposed that the applicant has not demonstrated that it has exhausted the prescribed dispute  resolution  procedures  before commencing  Judicial Review.

10. That the  procurement  process  was  above  board and   nothing would  have been  easier for  the applicant  to  provide evidence  of the alleged  corruption and  or present  them to the Ethics and  Anti-Corruption Commission  or the police for  investigation and  or prosecution; That the applicant  has  not availed  any evidence  of malice, ill will, bias and discrimination and or that it was denied  audience  by the  Public  Procurement Administrative Review Board  to justify  its  commencement  of the Judicial Review  proceedings; That  the  applicant  was an  indolent  and  dilatory suitor  as nothing  prevented  it from  filing  a request  for  review before  the  Board  within  14 days  of its  knowledge  of the  purported  breach of duty by the respondent; That there is no evidence that the Board has no jurisdiction and or refused to hear and   determine the purported grievances; That the  applicant  slept  on its rights  to access  justice  and  the chamber  summons  could not  cure the  applicant’s  indolence  and  laches; That the impugned order was   issued exparte and the applicant has not annexed   it hence this application is fatally defective and ought to be struck out in limine; That there is no plausible reason why the order of 25th May 2017 should be reviewed; That  the  applicant should  have appealed  against the  said decision hence the  application for review is  frivolous, lacks  merit, and  fatally  incompetent  and  ought  to be struck  out in limine.

11. The respondent also filed grounds of opposition dated 19th July 2017 replicating the preliminary objection filed on the same day.

12. The  court did  direct  on 2nd October  2017  that the application be heard orally, with the  preliminary  objection, grounds of objection and  replying affidavit   forming  substantive  responses  to the  application for  review  by the applicant.

13. The application   was heard on 17th October 2017 as scheduled with Mr Omino submitting on behalf of the applicant   while Mr Gachuba advocate submitted on behalf of the respondent.

14. According to Mr Omino, the National Transport and Safety Authority is a public body and in the  process  of evaluating   tenders, exercises quasi judicial  jurisdiction so any error  committed  by it would  be reviewed  by way of  Judicial Review  proceedings  not withstanding that the party  complaining  could have  gone before  the Tribunal.

15. It  was  submitted that Section  174  of the Public Procurement  and Asset Disposal Act is clear that in  addition to  the  remedies under  the Act, a party can  seek for other  remedies  through this  court by way of Judicial Review, to review  the actions of  the Board.

16. Further, that the fact that  14 days  had lapsed,  the  applicant  did not   lose the right  to come before  this court for an appropriate   remedy and that Article  165(6)  of the Constitution is clear.

17. It  was  emphasized  that this  court has  the authority  to look into  and  question  actions  of the respondent  public body.  It was submitted that if this court could have taken this factor into account, it would have arrived at a different decision.

18. Counsel  for the applicant admitted that it  was their  error  to fail to set out  the problem  that led the  applicant  to this court, which  was  Article  165 (6)  of the Constitution.

19. Mr Omino clarified that they are not complaining that the court misunderstood the law but that they did not bring the applicable provisions of the law to the court’s attention.  It was submitted that in this case, the application was not heard fully and a ruling made unlike in the Biren Amritlal Shah & Another vs Republic   & 3 others [2013] e KLR case cited by the respondents.

20. Further, it was submitted that the Abdullahi Mohamud vs Mohamud Kahiye case examined different circumstances.

21. The applicant’s counsel further submitted that in the High Court  Miscellaneous  13/2006  case the judge   was clear  that the matter  did not  lie before  the  judge  but  was for  the  Deputy Registrar.

22. Counsel maintained that a party who is aggrieved by the decision  of a body can come to court  even if the  Review Board  has not heard the dispute  and that his  client  laments  of abuse of  Human Rights  in the manner  in which  the  tender  was  evaluated and  terminated  after an award.

23. In opposition to the notice of motion, Mr Gachuba counsel for the respondent submitted that there are no grounds for review based on Order 45 of the Civil Procedure Rules.  That the application was brought under the Law Reform Act and Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules.  It was further submitted  that Order  43(1) (a)  of the Civil Procedure  Rules  is clear  that any order  or ruling  in Judicial Review  proceedings  can only  be challenged  by way  of an appeal.

24. Counsel  relied  on the Biren Amritlal  Shah  & Another  vs  Republic   & 3 Others [2013] e KLR case  and  Order  43   Rule 1(a) as expounded on by Honourable Mutungi J in Francis  Omwenga  vs  Marani  Land  Disputes  Tribunal  & Others  [2015] e KLR.He maintained  that  even if  review  was  to be  available, the  applicant  herein  has not met the  threshold for  review  of the court’s own orders and more specifically, that the  requirements  for review  under order  45  of the Civil Procedure Rules have not  been fulfilled.

25. It  was  submitted  on behalf of the respondent that there is no new evidence, or new matter and that if the court  misinterpreted  Section 174  of the Public  Procurement  and  Asset Disposal  Act,  there  are many  avenues  under the Act  including Section 35 (1) of the Act which empowers the  authority to  investigate  the  matter upon  request  from any person.

26. It  was   submitted that  Section  39 of  the  Act provides  for  Judicial Review  after  investigations.  It  was  submitted that  the  other  route  would  be  under the  court’s  inherent powers to seek for  extension of time to  file for  a request  for  review.

27. It  was  submitted that  even if this court  was  to review   its own  orders, there has  been  no reason  given for  failure  to comply  with the 14 days  for  filing   an application for  Judicial Review. Reliance was placed on Pancras  T. Swai  vs Kenya Breweries Ltd[2014] e KLR and the case of Abdullahi Mohamud  vs Mohamud  Kahiye.

28. Counsel for the applicant urged  the  court to  dismiss the application for  review  with costs

29. In a brief rejoinder, Mr Omino  submitted that all the  remedies  set out  in the Act  must be  exhausted  within  14 days  but that the  applicant  had run out of time because the  respondent  kept  writing  to the exparte applicant  saying they  were looking  into the matter  that is why  the  applicant  chose  to come before  court for  redress.

DETERMINATION

30. I have  considered  all the  foregoing and  in my humble  view  the issues  that  flow  for determination  in this matter  are

1) Whether this court  has the jurisdiction  to review  its  own orders  made suo motu  on 25th May 2017  and if  the answer  is  yes,.

2) What orders should this court make?

3) Who should bear the costs  of the application.

31. On the  first issue of  whether  this court  has jurisdiction  to review  its own  orders made  on 25th May  2017  the respondent  contends  that the court  has no jurisdiction  to review  its own  orders  in Judicial  Review  proceedings  and that  the remedy  for the applicant  is to file an appeal  as stipulated  in Section  8 and  9 of the Law Reform Act, Orders  43  and  53  of the  Civil  Procedure  Rules.   The respondents  counsel   relied  on the case of  Biren Amritlal  Shah  & Another  vs Republic   & 3 Others [2013] e KLR  and the case of  Francis Omwenga  vs  Marani  LDT  & Others  (supra) where the  court found  inter alia, that  Judicial Review proceedings  are not  amenable  for  review but can  only be  challenged on appeal.  This argument also formed  the basis  of the preliminary objection  and grounds  of opposition filed by  the respondent  to this  motion for  review  of this court’s  own orders of   25th May  2017  which struck out the motion dated 24th May 2017 for leave for being incompetent.  The court of appeal  in  Biren Amritlal  Shah  & Another  vs  Republic   & 3 Others [2013] e KLR  expressed  itself  thus on the  provisions of Section  8(5)  of the Law Reform  Act.

“ It is  therefore quite clear  that appeals  in respect of orders made under  Judicial Review  lie with  the  Court of Appeal.

Therefore, in answering the  question whether the  High Court  had jurisdiction  to entertain  a review application, we  agree with the learned judge of the High Court that, in exercising its special  jurisdiction under the law  Reform Act, the High Court  had no  jurisdiction  to review  its previous  order.”

32. Nonetheless, it is the same  Court of  Appeal,  in the Nakumatt Holdings  Limited  vs Commissioner  of  Value  Added Tax [2011] e KLRthat held that  the  Superior Court  in the matter  before  the court had residual power to  correct  its own  mistakes.  Further, that where  a mistake  is shown  to have been committed  which is  remediable by the court  the same  ought  to be corrected  by the Court  in the exercise of  its inherent  jurisdiction.

33. It therefore  follows that  as  the Court of Appeal  in the  Amritlal Shah(supra) case did not refer to its earlier  case of Nakumatt Holdings when  it rendered  itself  that the High Court  has no  jurisdiction  to review  its own  orders in  Judicial Review proceedings, where a mistake  is shown to  have been  committed  which is  apparent  and  which is remediable  by the court  the same  ought to be corrected by the court  in the exercise  of its inherent   jurisdiction , irrespective  of whether the order  to be corrected or reviewed  was made  in the Judicial Review   proceedings  or not.

34. Thus, where a mistake   has been  brought to the  attention  of the court  which mistake  is capable  of being  remedied, be  it by  way of  review  or otherwise, the court’s  discretion  is not fettered  in its exercise  of inherent  powers to so review its own orders in judicial review proceedings.

35. The review referred to herein which is not by invocation or Order 45  of the Civil Procedure Rules but of the inherent powers of  the court  in order to  do justice  to the parties cannot  be  fettered.  And  where, like in the instant  case, the Court of Appeal  in the two cited cases above has two different views  taken  of the jurisdiction  of the High Court to review its own order in Judicial Review proceedings, this court is free to choose between the  two decisions  especially  where it is  clear like in  the instance  case, that the Amritlal Shah (supra)  case decision  was rendered  by the Court of Appeal  in ignorance  of its former   earlier  decision without  fully analyzing the former  and  thereby departing  from it. This the principle  espoused  in the Court  of Appeal  decision in Major Joseph Mwateri Igweta vs Mukiri M’ethare & Another  Civil Application  No. 8  of  2000.

36. For the above  reasons, it follows that  whereas  there is  no specific  provision allowing  this court to review  its own  orders  in  exercise  of  judicial review  jurisdiction, which  then means  that this court  may not  invoke  the  specific  provisions of  Order 45  of the Civil Procedure  Rules  and  Section  80 of the Civil Procedure Act on  review  of orders  made  by the court  under the Civil Procedure Act and Rules, this court has unfettered residual  jurisdiction  pursuant  to its inherent  powers  to review  its orders  or correct  its mistakes.

37. Thus, from the Nakumatt Holdings (supra) decision it is apparent that where a mistake is shown to have been  committed  which is remediable by the court, the same ought to be  corrected by the court in the exercise  of its inherent  jurisdiction  and  not necessarily under Section  3A of the Civil Procedure Act which strictly speaking does not apply to  Judicial Review  proceedings.

38. This court  has the inherent power to make such  order as may be  necessary  for the ends  of  justice  and inherent  power is  not donated  by any  statute  or legal  provisions. In Republic vs  Public Procurement Complaints Review  and Appeals  Board and  another  Exparte  Jacorossi Impresse Spa Mombasa  HCMA  365/2006  the court made  it clear   and I concur fully that the court has power under its inherent  jurisdiction to make  orders that  may be  necessary  for the ends  of justice and  to enable  the court  maintain  its character  as  a court of justice  and that this repository  power is necessary  to be there  in appreciation of the fact that  the  law cannot  make  express  provisions  against  all inconveniences.

39. Further, in the Matter of the Estate of George M’Mboroki Meru HC Succession Cause No.  357 of 2004, Ouko  J ( as he then was) held that:

“ It is accepted that the court retains certain intrinsic  authority  in the absence  of specific  or alternative  remedy, a  residual  source  of power, which the  court may draw  upon as necessary whenever it is  just or equitable to do so,  in particular to  ensure  the observance of the due  process  of law, to prevent  abuse of its process, to do  justice  between the parties  and  to secure  a fair trial  between  them.”

40. In Kenya Bus Services Ltd & Others vs. Attorney General and Others [2005] 1 EA 111; [2005] 1 KLR 743 it was held:

“It is trite law that an ex parte order can be set aside by the judge who gave it or by any other judge. The Civil Procedure Rules provide for this. Our Constitution does assume the existence of supportive Civil Procedure regime in so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution. There is nothing inconsistent with the Constitution in the act or principle of setting aside of ex parte orders for good reasons. If an order obtained in a Constitutional application is incompetent or improperly obtained there cannot be any valid reason why the court would not have the jurisdiction to set it aside. Setting aside would be properly justified on grounds of doing justice and fair play and good administration of justice and therefore in furtherance of public policy...Where there is no specific provision to set aside the courts power or jurisdiction would spring from the inherent powers of the court. Whereas ordinary jurisdiction stems from the Act of Parliament or statutes, the inherent powers stem from the character or the nature of the court itself – it is regarded as sufficiently empowered to do justice in all situations. The jurisdiction to exercise these powers was derived, not from statute or rule of law, but from the very nature of the court as a superior court of law, and for this reason such jurisdiction has been called “inherent”. For the essential character of a superior court of law necessarily involves that it should be invested with a power to maintain its authority and to prevent the process being obstructed and abused. Such a power is intrinsic in a superior court, its very lifeblood, its very essence, its immanent attribute. Without such a power, the court would have form but would lack substance. The jurisdiction, which is inherent in a superior court of law, is that which enables it to fulfill itself as a court of law. The judicial basis of this jurisdiction is therefore the authority of the Judiciary to uphold, to protect and to fulfill the judicial function of administering justice according to law in a regular, orderly and effective manner. The need to administer justice in accordance with the Constitution occupies an even higher level due to the supremacy of the constitution and the need to prevent the abuse of the Constitutional provisions and procedure does occupy the apex of the judicial hierarchy of values. Therefore the Court does have the inherent powers to prevent abuse of its process in declaring, securing and enforcing Constitutional rights and freedoms. It has the same power to set aside ex parte orders, which by their very nature are provisional.”

41. As was stated by Kimaru, J in Stephen Somek Takwenyi & Another vs. David Mbuthia Githare & 2 Others Nairobi (Milimani) HCCC No. 363 of 2009 concerning the court’s inherent jurisdiction and power:

“This is a power inherent in the court, but one which should only be used in cases which bring conviction to the mind of the court that it has been deceived. The court has an inherent jurisdiction to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. When the matter is expressed in negative tenor it is said that there is inherent power to prevent abuse of the process of the court. In the civilized legal process it is the machinery used in the courts of law to vindicate a man’s rights or to enforce his duties. It can be used properly but can also be used improperly, and so abused. An instance of this is when it is diverted from its proper purpose, and is used with some ulterior motive for some collateral one or to gain some collateral advantage, which the law does not recognize as a legitimate use of the process. But the circumstances in which abuse of the process can arise are varied and incapable of exhaustive listing. Sometimes it can be shown by the very steps taken and sometimes on the extrinsic evidence only. But if and when it is shown to have happened, it would be wrong to allow the misuse of that process to continue. Rules of court may and usually do provide for its frustration in some instances. Others attract res judicata rule. But apart from and independent of these there is the inherent jurisdiction of every court of justice to prevent an abuse of its process and its duty to intervene and stop the proceedings, or put an end to it”.

42. That this Court has jurisdiction to set aside leave and/or stay granted in judicial review proceedings or to review its own orders in judicial review proceedings is not in doubt. The Court of Appeal earlier on  before the Amritlal Shah (supra)  case made this clear in R vs. Communications Commission of Kenya & 2 Others ex Parte East Africa Televisions Network Ltd. Civil Appeal No. 175 of 2000 [2001] KLR 82; [2001] 1 EA 199where it held, in an application challenging grant of leave issued by the High Court:

“Leave should be granted if, on the material available, the Court considers, without going into the matter in depth, that there is an arguable case for granting leave. The appropriate procedure for challenging such leave subsequently is by an application by the Respondent under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, to the Judge who granted leave to set it aside.”[emphasis added].

43. See also Njuguna vs. Minister for Agriculture Civil Appeal No. 144 of 2000 [2000] 1 EA 184.

44. Having considered the above decisions, I am persuaded that this court has inherent powers to review its decisions made in Judicial Review proceedings. In the end, I find  and  hold that  the respondent’s preliminary objection and grounds  of objection  to the effect  that  this court has no  jurisdiction  to review  its own  orders  in Judicial Review  proceedings  has no legal  basis  and  the preliminary objection is hereby  overruled  and  dismissed.

45. Having  so found that  this court  has the inherent  jurisdiction  to review  its own orders  in these  proceedings, the  next issue  and  question for  determination  is whether  this court  should  review  its orders  of  25th May 2017, not on the conditions  stipulated  in Section  80  of the Civil Procedure  Act  and  Order  45  of the Civil  Procedure  Rules, but whether it should  invoke  its inherent  jurisdiction and  why it should  invoke that  inherent  jurisdiction to review its orders  made on  25th May  2017.

46. The applicant’s and  respondent’s  counsels have argued, fervently, relying  wholly on the provisions  of Section  80  of the Civil Procedure  Act and Order 45  of the Civil Procedure Rules  on the conditions  that  must be met  for this court  to  review  its orders  if at all  it has the necessary  jurisdiction to so review.

47. However,  as earlier stated, the  inherent  jurisdiction of this  court which  cannot be  fettered  places the  burden on the  court to examine its own  order and  determine  whether it is  in the interest  of justice and or public policy  to both  parties to review  and or set aside that order.

48. In this  case, the  order which  is sought  to be reviewed   was made on 25th May  2017 exparte  and  on the  court’s  own  motion. The court did not invite the parties to urge the application on its merits before striking out the application for leave.

49. During the hearing of this application for  review, serious  issues have  emerged  which can only be considered indepth by this court if the court were to accord both parties  an opportunity  to be heard on the exparte  application, to be  heard interparties. That  is the apparent  mistake  that the court  finds on  record which this court has the residual power and inherent  jurisdiction to invoke  and  review, by setting  aside the  suo motu  order striking  out the  exparte  applicant’s   application dated  24th  May  2017  and  substituting  that  order of  striking  out the  application with  an order reinstating  the  application dated  24th May  2017  for interpartes hearing  and  determination  on its merits.

50. By so doing, this court  will have  accorded all the  affected  parties  an opportunity  to be heard to ventilate their   grievances fairly and  justly, without, at this stage, considering  whether or not  the  applicant ought  to have been  granted  leave to apply, as the decision to grant  or deny leave is  a  discretionary  one which  must be  exercised  judiciously and upon satisfying the court that the leave sough is merited.

51. Albeit  the applicant  has not  openly  complained that he  was not  heard before  that  order of  25th may  2017   was made  striking out its  application, having  approached  the court with  an application seeking  review of the exparte order, it is the  view of this court  that the applicant  should  be  heard, on the merits of the application, while according the opposing parties an opportunity to participate in the process, notwithstanding  the  provisions  of order  53  of the Civil Procedure  Rules which  empowers this court to consider the  application for leave  exparte  in chambers while  being silent  on whether  the court  is under any duty   to invite  arguments from the  exparte  applicant.

52. The right  to be heard  being one of the fundamental  human  rights  and  which is  generally universal  and  inalienable, as  espoused  in Article  50 of the Constitution,  coupled with the  right to access justice under Article 48 of the Constitution, this  court has no option but  to allow the application  for  review  of the orders  made  on 25th May  2017 striking  out the  application  dated  24th May  2017.

53. In M. Mwenesi v Shirley Luchhurst & another Civil Application No.  Nairobi 170 of 2000, the Court of Appeal held that:

“ A court of  justice  has no  jurisdiction to do injustice  and  where injustice  on a party  to a  judicial  proceeding  is apparent,  a court of  law is  under a duty  to  exercise  its inherent  power to prevent  injustice.”

54. In Bremier  Schiffbar  and  Maschinen  Fabrick  vs  South Indian Shipping  Corporation  Ltd [1981], Lord  Diplockin relation to inherent  powers of  the High Court, typified  such powers as enabling  the court to take  necessary  actions to maintain its character  as a court of justice.  In the words of Lord Diplock:

“ It would  dampen  the  constitutional role  of a court  if as  a court of  justice it  were not  armed with  power to prevent  its process  being  misused, in such a  way as to diminish  its  capability  to arrive at  a just decision  of a dispute.

55. Albeit the Respondent claimed that the order sought to be reviewed is not annexed to the affidavit in support, I find that objection to be a technical objection curable by application of Article 159(2) (d) of the Constitution which espouses that justice shall be administered without undue regard to procedural technicalities. The impugned order is and can be accessed in this court file and therefore to demand that a party extracts the order and annexes it to the application for review is a mere procedural technicality which does not go to the route of the matter. That objection is therefore rejected.

56. The application for review was also brought timeously without delay.

57. Accordingly, I allow the application for review  of the exparte order  of this court  made on 25th May, 2017 striking out the exparte applicant’s notice of motion for leave  dated  24th may, 2017 and order  and direct that  the said  application  dated  24th May 2017 shall be reinstated and heard  interpartes.  The respondent is accordingly granted 5 days from the date of this ruling to file a response to the said application for leave, which application was filed under certificate of urgency.

58. As the parties  had substantially  argued  some  of the merits of the  issues  involved  in the matter, I direct that  they now file brief written   submissions  for  consideration  by the court.

59. The respondent  shall  accordingly  file a response  together  with submissions  upon which the  applicant  shall  file a further affidavit if need be, together with written  submissions  within 3 days  of service  by the respondent.

60. The matter shall be mentioned interpartes on 20th November, 2017 to confirm compliance and for further directions.

61.  Each party shall bear their own costs of this application for review.

Dated, signed and delivered in open court at Nairobi this 7th day of November 2017.

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE

In the presence of:

Mr Omino advocate for the applicant

Mr Gachuba advocate for the Respondent

Court Assistant: George