Republic v Public Procurement Administrative Review Board & Republic v Public Procurement Administrative Review Board Review Board , Ministry of Defence & Joseph Chesire Chemuna t/a Avenue Butchery Exparte Adan Osman Godana t/a Eldoret Standard Butchery [2017] KEHC 6142 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI

JUDICIAL REVIEW NO.  622 OF 2016

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR LEAVE   TO APPLY JUDICIAL REVIEW   ORDERS OF CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION

IN THE MATTER OF THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT   ND ASSET DISPOSAL ACT, 2015

AND

IN THE MATTER OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT ADMINISTRATIVE   REVIEW BOARD

AND

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION NO.  98 OF 2016 AND 2ND DECEMBER, 2016 CONCERNING TENDER NO.  MOD/422(01103) 2016/2017 CONCERNING SUPPLY OF FRESH MEAT (BEEF) ON BONE   TO ELDORET BASED UNITS

BETWEEN

ADAN OSMAN GODANA T/A ELDORET STANDARD BUTCHERY…......EXPARTE APPLICANT

AND

PUBLIC PROCUREMENT ADMINISTRATIVE  REVIEW BOARD …….............1ST RESPONDENT

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ……………………...................................………..…...2ND RESPONDENT

JOSEPH CHESIRE CHEMUNA T/A AVENUE BUTCHERY …...INTERESTED PARTY/APPLICANT

RULING ON STAY

1. On 13th December this court  granted to the applicant  Adan Osman Godana T/A Eldoret Standard  Butchery, leave  to institute Judicial Review  proceedings  as sought  in prayers  No. 2 and  3   of his chamber summons  dated  3rd  December  2016.  The court also directed that the substantive motion be filed and served within 21 days from the date of leave.

2. The chamber summons also sought an order  that the leave granted  do operate  as  stay of   enforcement  of the decision of  the Public Procurement Administrative Review Board  (PPARB) which directed  the procuring entity (PE), Ministry  of Defence, the  2nd   respondent herein to proceed   to procure  for supply of  fresh beef  on bone  to Eldoret  based  units, as per  the tender  No.  MOD 423(01011)2016 -2017 by the interested party Joseph Chesire T/A Avenue Butchery.

3. The court   did direct that the prayer for stay of enforcement   of the decision by the Review Board be heard interpartes.

4. On 19th December  2016  all parties  appeared  before me  after service of the chamber summons  and I did grant  10  days to the respondents  and the interested  party to file replying  affidavits. I also set  the hearing  date for  25th January  2017  while ordering   that status  quo obtaining  as at  13th December  2016   do remain.

5. Mr Okara counsel for the interested party had  informed the court that the status quo   was that  it  is the interested party  who was supplying beef to the  recruits which position  was  confirmed by  Mr Munene counsel for  the  respondents.

6. Regrettably, the court  was not sitting on 25th January  2017 with notice to the  parties that  the court  was involved  in the training of judges  in Electoral  Dispute  Resolution(EDR) hence the  matter  was  rescheduled  for mention on  30th January  2017  on which date I gave a hearing  date of   20th  February  2017.

7. The applicant’s main  prayers in the chamber  summons sought for leave to apply  for an order  of certiorari removing to this court  for purpose of  being  quashed  the  decision of the Public Procurement Administrative Review Board (PPARB) made  on 7th December   2016  in application/Request for Review case No. 98/2016   of  2nd December  2016; That the leave be granted to the  applicant to apply for an order   of prohibitionto prohibit  and restrain the second respondent  from acting  upon  the decision  made by the first respondent  made on  7th  December 2016  and  or signing  any contract  with any  persons or entity  other than  the applicant  in respect of the tender  in  question; That the  grant  of leave do  operate  as stay of the decision, directives  and acts  of the 1st  respondent until determination of the application herein or until the court orders  otherwise.

8. On the ground in support of the prayer for stay which is grounds No.  (g)  the applicant averred that if stay  is not granted, there is a grave danger  that the second  respondent  will proceed   to act  and or enforce  the unlawful  decision  as made  by the  1st respondent  on 7th December 2016 with a grave danger that the applicant stands to suffer injustice and irreparable  loss and  damage  and  with  a real danger  that  the proceedings  herein  might otherwise  be rendered  superfluous; and that the application is made bona fides without delay and in the best interest of justice   and fairness.

9. The main challenge to the Review Board’s decision is that the Board  did not consider   relevant  factors in  failing  to consider the legality of the bid as tendered  by the interested  party especially in light of the  documents forming  part of the request   for  review  as a  result  the applicant suffered prejudice.

10. In the replying  affidavit  filed  by Joseph  Chesire  Chemuna  and  Phillip Kipketer  Kosgei  T/A  Avenue  Butchery  and sworn jointly  on 28th December  2016,  it  was deposed, among  others that  the challenge to the tender process was made vide review application No. 72/2016  dated  8th September  2016  which decision   was in favour  of the interested  party on  30th September  2016, and that  on  16th November  2016  the applicant  herein  filed  a formal  request  for  review  dated  16th November  2016  and amended  and filed on  2nd December  2016  and vide a ruling  of 7th December 2016, the Review Board dismissed  the application (request) for review and directed  the 2nd  respondent (PE) to award  the render to  the interested party  lowest bidder hence  the  notification of award on  10th November  2016  and  an acknowledgment  on  30th November  2016.

11. That the mandatory  14 days  of stay started  running   from 30th September  2016   till  14th October  2016  hence the  request  for review  was filed  after lapse  of  14 days instead  of moving  to the High Court for  review.

12. Further, that illegality does not arise since the exparte applicant was notified but opted to file a request for review.

13. In his  submissions  in support of the application for stay, counsel for the  applicant, Mr  Masika submitted that unto 7th December 2016   the  applicant  supplied  fresh beef  on bone  to the  2nd  respondent  (PE) and that  on 19th December  2016  the court  directed  status  quo obtaining  as at  13th December   2016 to remain  for supply the (PE) with  meat  on bone  without  lawful   basis.  Reliance was placed on JR No. 658/2016 on the principles to be met in a case of this nature.  In counsel’s  view, the grant  of stay is discretionary  but that   there is  grave danger   that these  proceedings  might be   rendered  nugatory   if there is no stay as  the 2nd respondent (PE) will sign  a contract  with the interested  party if there is  no safeguard.

14. In opposition Mr Okara counsel for the  interested party submitted  relying  on his  client’s replying affidavit  filed on  29th December  2016  contending  that there is already a contract  between the  interested  party and the (PE);  That  the interested  party  has invested  a lot  in that  business  since  he  was   lowest  bidder  hence the  tender was lawfully awarded  to him.  Further, that if stay is granted, it will paralyze operations of the recruits;  That the decision of the board   was judicious  and that  the law  was followed  as required.

15. Counsel for the interested party urged the court  not to grant stay since  the decision  which  was being  challenged  had already been effected  hence the  stay  orders  were  overtaken by events.

16. Mr  Okara  filed an  authority later  in the day  being Jason  Ngumba  Kagu & 2 Others  V Intra Africa Assurance  Company Ltd (2014) e KLR on the possibility  of substantial  loss occurring  if stay is granted and  balancing  the act between  the right of  the respondent  to fruits  of his judgment   and the right  of the applicant  on the prospects  of the appeal ( as  stipulated   in Order  42  Rule  6  of the Civil Procedure  Rules. He also relied on James Wangalwa & Another vs Agnes Naliaka  Cheseto[2012] e KLR  where Gikonyo  J reiterated   the holding   that the applicant  must establish  other factors   which show  that the execution  will create  a state  of affairs  that will  irreparably  affect  or negate  the very essential  core  of the applicant  as the successful  party in the appeal  and what  substantial  loss would  entail.

17. The respondents did not respond to the application.

18. In a rejoinder, Mr Masika counsel for the applicant submitted  that  the decision of the Review Board was made on  7th December  2016  and that  therefore  no contract   was expected  to have been signed  and if there   was one  signed  then  the interested  party  was admitting   an illegality  and  in violation  of Section  175  of the Act  which stipulates  an automatic  stay of that  decision  and which  the interested  party and the PE  were  circumventing.  He added that there was no prejudice since the applicant   had been supplying meat.

19. The 1st and  2nd respondent’s  counsel, Mr Kevin  Odhiambo sought leave  of court to  be excused from the proceedings to attend to other official matters as his  clients  did not   wish to take any position in the matter  for stay  and the leave  was  granted excusing Mr Odhiambo from active participation in the application for stay.

DETERMINATION

20. I have carefully  considered the application for stay  sought by the exparte applicant as  supported by the statutory  statement, grounds  therein  and  the verifying  affidavit. I have  also considered  the interested  party’s  replying  affidavit  and both parties counsel’s oral  submissions  in support of their respective  clients positions.

21. The only issue for determination is whether the stay sought is merited.  The scope  and purpose of stay in Judicial  Review  was ably stated by Maraga J ( as he then was) in Taib A. Taib  V The  Minister for Local Government  & Others   Mombasa HC  Miscellaneous  Application  158 of 2006  wherein the learned judge   expressed himself  thus inter alia:

“Asinjunctions are not available against the government and public    officers, stay is a very important   aspect of the judicial review   jurisdiction.  In Judicial Review  applications, the court  should  always  ensure that  the  exparte applicant’s  application is  nit rendered  nugatory  by the acts  of the respondent during the pendency of the application and therefore  where the order is   efficacious  the court  should not  hesitate  to grant it   though it must  never be forgotten that the sty  orders  are discretionary  and their  scope   and purpose  is limited….

The purpose  of a stay  order in Judicial Review  proceedings  is to prevent  the decision maker  from  continuing   with the decision  making process  if the decision  has not  been made or to  suspend   the validity  and  implementation of the decision  that has  been  made and it  is not  limited to  judicial or quasi –judicial proceedings, as it  encompassed the administrative  decision making  process being undertaken  by a public body such as  a local authority  or minister  and the implementation of the  decision of such a body if it  has been  taken.  It is however not appropriate to compel a public body to act.  A stay order framed in  such a way as to  compel the respondents  to reinstate  order framed in such  a way as to  compel the respondents to reinstate the applicant before  hearing  the  respondent  cannot be  granted.”

22. In R (H) Ashworth Hospital Authority [2003] WLR 127 page 138, Lord Dyson held:

“The purpose of stay in a Judicial Review is clear.  It is to suspend the “proceedings” that are under challenge pending the determination of the challenge pending the determination of the challenge.  It preserves the status quo.  This will aid the Judicial Review process and make it more effective.  It will ensure, so far as possible, that, if a party is ultimately successful in his challenge. He will not be denied the full benefit of his success.  In Aron, Glidewell LJ said that the phrase “stay of proceedings” must be given the wide interpretation so as to enhance   the effectiveness of the Judicial Review jurisdiction.  A narrow interpretation, such as that which appealed to the Privy Council in vehicle and supplies, would appear to deny jurisdiction even in case A.  That would indeed be regrettable and, if correct, would expose a serious shortcoming   in the armory of powers available to the court when granting permission to apply for judicial review…

This it is common ground that “proceedings” includes not only the process leading up to the making of the decision but decision itself.  The administrative court routinely grants a stay to prevent the implementation of a decision that has been made but not yet carried into effect, or fully carried into effect, or fully carried into effect.”

23. What emerges from the above  jurisprudence  is that stay  in Judicial Review  is in the discretion of the court  and that  where the stay sought  is to compel  performance  of a duty then the court  will not grant  stay.  Further, that stay is not a matter of course, and therefore it is upon the applicant to prove to the satisfaction of the court that there are exceptional circumstances   warranting a stay of implementation of the decision of the administrative body.

24. Order  53  Rule  1  of the Civil Procedure Rules  gives to the court granting leave to order  that such leave shall operate  as stay, but  only where the substantive   orders  sought  are certiorari  and  prohibition, not  mandamus.

25. In Econet  Wireless  Ltd V Econet  wireless Nigeria Ltd & Another [FHC/KD/CS/208 the Nigerian High Court  at Kaduna  held:

“The decision to grant  stay involves a consideration  of some  collateral circumstances  and  perhaps  in some  cases  inherent  matter  which  may, unless the order of stay is  granted, destroy the subject matter or foist  upon the court….a situation of  complete hopelessness or render  nugatory  any order of the court to paralyze  in one  way  or another, the exercise   by the litigant of his constitutional  right or generally  provide a situation in which  whatever  happens to the case, and in particular even if the applicant  succeeds, there would be no return  to the status quo.”

26. Thus, parties  who have  invited  the court to adjudicate  on a matter  which they are seriously  disputing  over ought to  not to create  a  situation whereby  the decision to be  made by the court would  be of  no use, or  “foist  upon the  court a situation of complete helplessness or render  nugatory any judgment or order.

27.  where the decision sought to be   quashed has been implemented, however, the leave granted  ought not to operate  as stay  since where  the decision has  been enforced, stay is no longer  efficacious  as there may be  nothing  remaining  to be stayed.   It is therefore  only in  cases  where  the decision has not  been implemented  or where  the same  is in  the course  of implementation that stay may be  granted, as   was held  in George  Phillip  Wekulo vs  the Law Society of Kenya  & Another  KAKAMEGA HC Miscellaneous  Application 29/2005.  It therefore  follows  that even  where  leave is  granted, as was held  in Jared  B. Kangwana  vs  Attorney General Nairobi HCC 446/95, in considering  whether  that leave  ought  to operate  as stay, the court has  to be careful in what it states  lest  it  touch  on the merits  of the main application  for  Judicial  Review and  that where  the application  raises important  points  deserving  determination  by way of Judicial Review  it cannot  be said to be  frivolous.

28. It is for  that reason that courts  have over time  held that  it is only  where the imminent  outcome   of the  decision challenged  is likely to render  the success  of the Judicial  Review  application nugatory or an  academic  exercise  that the court  would stay the  said  proceedings, the strength  or otherwise  of the applicant’s  case notwithstanding, in order  not to render the success of the Judicial Review  nugatory (see Re Meridian Medical Centre Nairobi HC Application No. 363/2013.

29. In some instances, stay of the decision may amount to temporarily reversing the decision in exceptional circumstances, especially where the respondent’s actions are intended to frustrate the outcome of the proceedings or are illegal.

30. In the  present case, the merits  or  success of the intended  Judicial Review proceedings  notwithstanding, it is not  disputed that the decision of the Review Board was rendered  on 7th December  2016,  and that these proceedings for  leave were commenced on 13th December  2016   within  6 days  of  the decision and leave to apply was granted  on the same  day of  13th December  2016  for the applicant  to commence  Judicial Review  proceedings  within  21 days  which lapsed  on 3rd January  2017.

31. The notice of motion was filed on 11th January 2017.  However, in view of the provisions of Order 50 Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the Notice of motion was filed in time. Order 50 Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Rules   provides that:

“50(4) except where otherwise directed  by a judge  for reasons  to be recorded  in writing, the period  between  the  21st  December, in any year  and  the thirtieth day of January  in the year next  following, both days  included, shall be  omitted from any  computation of  time(whether under these  Rules  or any order of the court) for the  amending  delivering  or filing  of any pleading  or the  doing of any other act:

Provided that this rule shall not apply to any application in respect of a temporary injunction.”

32. Thus, the notice of motion  was filed   within 21 days  excluding the days that  Order  50  Rule  4  of the Civil Procedure  Rules  provide, that they should be  excluded.

33. In the replying  affidavit  sworn and filed  on 29th December  2016  by the interested  party it is acknowledged that the decision which is subject of these  proceedings  was made  on 7th December  2016  by the Review Board, dismissing  the applicant’s  application  for review, and  directing    the  2nd respondent Procuring Entity  to  award  the tender  to the interested   party  who was the  lowest  tenderer.

34. The interested  party  claims  that  14 days started  running from  30th September  2016   till 14th October   2016   but that  the  applicant  filed  a request  for  review  after  lapse   of  14 days   instead of   moving the High Court for an appeal.

35. In paragraph( c)  of the facts   relied  on by the applicant, it is stated that previous  request  for review  No. 72/2016  of 9th September 2016 whose decision was rendered on 30th  September  2016  the  Review Board  nullified  the entire tendering    process  and directed  the Procuring Entity  to carry out  fresh technical  and  Financial Evaluation of all the   tenders  and  award the  lowest  evaluated  bidder within 7 days  of the date  of the decision and that the Procuring Entity did not   adhere to the above decision of 30th September 2016 hence these proceedings.

36. Although  the applicant in his affidavit  does not  clearly state how these   proceedings  came about, the decision of the Review Board of  7th December  2016  is clear  and the Review Board at  page 15 of its  decision only  determined  one issue, of whether its decision in ARB  No. 72/2016 Avenue  Butchery vs  MOD  was  implemented  by the procuring  entity as ordered.

37. I have also carefully considered the   facts relied on   by the exparte   applicant and it is   alleged that the decision of the respondent   was tainted with illegality.  It is  also claimed that  the  Review Board’s conduct  exhibited bias  and  partiality; among  other accusations  contained  in the  grounds.

38. In the submissions  by the  interested  party,  it is contended  that the  contract   has already  been performed  between the interested  party and the procuring   entity  hence there  is nothing to be stayed.  It is also  submitted that from 7th December  2016  the interested  party  has been  supplying  beef to the Procuring Entity and if stay is granted, it  will disrupt  the supply to the recruits.

39. No copy of the signed contract was annexed to the replying affidavit.  However, even if there was evidence of a signed contract, the question is whether that contact is valid   in law.  The answer  lies in  Section 175(1)  of the Act   which stipulates  that a person  aggrieved  by a decision  made by the  Review Board  may seek  Judicial Review   by the High Court  within  14 days   from the date   of the Review  Board’s decision, failure to which  the decision  of the Review  Board  shall  be final and  binding to both parties.”

40. From the above provision, it is clear that the decision of the Review Board only becomes binding   upon the parties as final if no Judicial Review is filed to the High Court within 14 days of the date of the decision.

41. It therefore follows that the law does not   contemplate that any contract would be entered into between the Procuring Entity and the ‘successful’ tenderer before elapse of 14 days of the date of the decision by Review Board.  To  do so  would not doubt be in  violation of  Section 175(1)  of the  Act, which it has been  held, not once or twice, operates  as an automatic  stay  of  any action by the Procuring Entity until the elapse  of the  14 days or until the court gives directions as to stay.

42. In this case, there is open admission of violation of that law which this court cannot sanitize. There  was no reason  or at all  to rush  to violate  the law since  the record  is clear that the Procuring Entity was  receiving  supplies  of meat from the  applicant  prior to  7th December  2016   hence it  would not  be disrupted  or at all, for the 14 days stipulated  in Section 175(1)  of the Act.

43. In my humble  view, that impunity  on  the part  of the Procuring Entity must  be halted  by granting  a stay and directing  that status quo prevailing  prior  to the decision of  7th December  2016  when the  Review Board  made its decision shall be reverted  to pending  hearing  and determination of these Judicial  Review  proceedings  as filed.

44. A party cannot be  allowed  to conduct  themselves  in a manner  as to Circumvent  the clear provisions of the law  or to frustrate  the judicial process  which is  in motion or foist upon the court a situation of hopelessness contrary to the stipulations under the law and  get away with it.

45. In my humble  view, the interested  party and the 2nd  respondent shall  not suffer  any prejudice if stay is granted as they  were in an illegal  relationship  which this court  has inherent  power to nullify  and which  I have  hereto declared a nullity hence they cannot be allowed  to continue  benefiting  from an illegal  act.

46. I am  fortified  by several decisions  including  JR  371  of 2016  Republic  vs Public Procurement Administrative Review Board  Exparte  Syner  Chemie  Limited, and in   Republic vs Public Procurement Administrative Review Board Exparte Noble Gases  International  Ltd [2013] e KLR where the  court  was   emphatic, concerning  Section   100 of the  repealed  2005 Act which is  in parimateria  with Section   175(1)  of the current   2015 Act an d where it was observed that:

“ In my view, where Judicial Review proceedings  are commenced  within 14 days  from the  date  of the respondent’s   decision the said decision  is neither  final nor binding  and  hence ought not to be  implemented.  Thus, there is an automatic stay under  Order 53   of the Civil Procedure  Rules. The  14 days  is a window  period  availed to serve the purpose  of limiting  the time  frame  within which a review  against the Board’s  decision can be lodged  in the High Court  for purpose of expediency  and  conclusiveness of the Board’s decision  as these activities  are time  bound and the procurement   process  ought not to be  held hostage   to indefinite  proceedings…..

The decision of the Board after the application for review has been filed remains subject to the court’s directions and decision. This provision answers the core question in contention, that is whether the filing of Judicial Review proceedings before the High Court within the prescribed period of 14 days   acts as an automatic stay.  I take the position that Section 100 of the Act implies that the Board’s decision is to be kept in abeyance until the court makes its final decision.  The use of the term “shall take effect” discloses the legislative   purposes and intent.

For all  practical purposes, the Board’s  decision  was  ‘frozen’ so to  speak until  such a time  as the High Court  issued  an order of Judicial Review contemplated under  the Section  over the decision or after the lapse  of the 14 days  period, whichever comes  first.  I find and hold that provision a statutory stay.”

47. From the  foregoing, it is clear that the Procuring Entity  cannot enter  into any binding  contract  with a tenderer  within  the  1st  14 days   of the decision  of the Review Board.

48. In the instant case, although the interested party relied on two authorities   which espouse the principles of stay pending appeal under Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules.  Regrettably, those principles though relevant are not applicable to Judicial Review proceedings.  I have set  out the  applicable  principles  and in the circumstances   of this case, without  going into  the merits  of  the Judicial Review  proceedings commenced, I am  satisfied  that  a stay is necessary  in order to preserve the status quo prevailing  as at  7th December  2016  and before the decision of the Review Board was made  so as not to render the   applicant  a pious  explorer  in the  judicial process, should his application succeed,  and or not  to foist in the court a situation of hopelessness  or render  its decision  an academic  exercise  and therefore nugatory.

49. Accordingly, the order for stay as sought in prayer 4 of the chamber summons dated 9th December 2016 be and is hereby allowed as prayed until these judicial review proceedings are heard and determined.

50. Costs shall be in the cause.

Dated, signed and delivered at Nairobi this 28th day of February 2017.

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE

In the presence of

Mr Wachira h/b for Mr Langat &Mr Okara for interested parties

Mr Were h/b for Masika for the applicant

CA: George