Republic v Public Procurement Administrative Review Board Ex parte Jebess Contractors, National Government CDF Emgwen Constituency & Femji Enterprises Limited [2017] KEHC 7770 (KLR) | Judicial Review Procedure | Esheria

Republic v Public Procurement Administrative Review Board Ex parte Jebess Contractors, National Government CDF Emgwen Constituency & Femji Enterprises Limited [2017] KEHC 7770 (KLR)

Full Case Text

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

JUDICIAL REVIEW NO.  658 OF 2016

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY JEBESS FOR LEAVE TO APPLY

FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW ORDERS OF CERTIORARI & PROHIBITION

AND

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION UNDER ARTICLES 1,

47,227AND 232OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA 2010

AND

IN THE MATER OF THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT & ASSET DISPOSAL ACT, 2015

AND

BETWEEN

REPUBLIC........................................................................APPLICANT

VERSUS

PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD........................RESPONDENT

AND

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CDF

EMGWEN CONSTITUENCY.....................1ST INTERESTED PARTY

FEMJI ENTERPRISES LIMITED.............2ND INTERESTED PARTY

JEBESS CONTRACTORS........................EX-PARTE APPLICANT

RULING ON PRELIMINARY OBJECTION

1. This ruling determines the preliminary  objection argued   this morning  as  filed by the 2nd interested party’s counsel  Mr Masika   to the effect  that the chamber summons  dated  28th December 2016 filed on the even date is bad in law, misconceived  and  plainly  non sustainable and the same should be struck  out forthwith  with costs  as the application  is in flagrant  breach of the salient and mandatory provisions of the Oaths and  Statutory Declarations Act, Cap 15 Laws of  Kenya and  the Judicature Act, Cap  8  Laws of Kenya.

2. In his oral submissions, Mr Masika submitted that the annextures  filed by the exparte applicant  offends  Rule  9  of the Oaths and  Statutory  Declarations  Rules as they have not been  properly identified  save by  stickers. He  relied on  the  Rajput  Vs Barclays  Bank  of Kenya [2004] KLR 393   where the court  held that failure to  comply with  Cap 15 Provisions  and  Rules goes to the   substance   of the matter.

3. It was further submitted that   the application was filed in the vacation yet it was not properly before the court thereby offending the Judicature Act.  Counsel urged the court to strike out the application.

4. In response, Mr Apollo Mboya counsel for the exparte applicant opposed the preliminary objection and submitted that the same   was not merited. First, that the application was brought undeR the vacation Rules under the High Court Organization and Administration Rules, 2016 and that what was raised was form and not substance.

5. Further, that at the leave stage, the application was exparte hence the interested parties cannot seek for its dismissal.  In addition, it was submitted that the matter being raised can only be canvassed once leave is granted.

6. In a rejoinder, Mr Masika  submitted that at the leave stage  the court must  be satisfied that there is a  proper application before the court  which does  not offend the law and that  in this case Article 159 of the Constitution  would not come to the aid of the exparte applicant.

7. I have carefully considered the preliminary objection   as filed and  argued.  The issue for determination is whether the chamber summons dated 28th December 2016 is bad in law, misconceived and plainly unsustainable.

8. A preliminary objection must be based on a pure point of law which when raised does not require   the discretion of the court.  It determines the pleading or proceeding in limine. See Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd (1969) EA 696.

9. Rules 9 and 10 of the Oaths and Statutory Declarations Rules made   under Cap 15 Laws of Kenya provides that:

9.  All exhibits   to affidavits shall be securely sealed thereto under   the seal of the Commissioner, and shall be marked   with serial letters of identification.

10.   The forms of jurat and of identification of exhibits   shall be those set out in the Third Schedule.

10. The question   is whether the exhibits annexed   are securely   sealed and marked with serial letters   of identification. The answer is in the negative.  A casual look at the annextures shows that they are simply filed and separated by stickers   marked SK B1, SK B2 and SK B 3.  The exparte applicant did not dispute that fact of omission.

11. The next question is whether failure to comply with Rules 9 and   10 of the Statutory Declarations Act Cap 15 Laws of Kenya is fatal to the chamber summons.

12. The Rules made   under Section 5 and 6 of the subject Act have been interpreted  severally to the effect that they are directory and not mandatory.  In Litein Tea Factory Company Ltd  & Another vs Davis Kiplangat  Mutai  &  5 Others [2015] e KLR Gikonyo J  dealing with the same issue   was clear  and I concur  that:

“although   non compliance   with Rules  9 and  10  of the Act   was apparent  on the exhibits before him, but that  the affidavit   clearly   tendered   the exhibits   as a bundle and it   referred  to the  particular  exhibits   as a bundle…In any  event,  at worst, the matter  complained  of the annexture  in question   would be  a mere irregularity  which is a  matter of  form rather than substance, and such technicalities were deprecated by  Article  159   of the Constitution.”

13. The learned Judge   found the   affidavit competent.

14. In the instant case, what is being challenged   are exhibits  which are not  properly sealed  and or marked  for identification  as required  by Rules 9 and  10 of the Oaths  and  Statutory  Declarations   Rules.  Ringera J ( as he then  was) in Milimani HCC 462/97  Standard Chartered  Bank Ltd   vs Luncton(K) Ltd(unreported)  andHCC  26/2004 -  Patrick Thinguri & 1006 Others V KTDA Company & Another(unreported )  was clear  and  I adopt  that holding  that:

“There appears to be a common belief that the use of the word “shall” in a statute makes the provision under construction a mandatory one in all circumstances.  That belief is in my discernment of the law a fallacious   one.

As I understand the canons of statutory interpretation, the use of the word ‘shall’ in a statute only signifies that the matter is prima facie mandatory.  The use of the word is not conclusive.  It may  be shown  by a consideration  of the object of  the  enactment  and  other  factors  that the word is  used in a directory  sense  only.  As long ago as 1861 in the case of   Liverpool Borough Bank V Turner [1861] 30 L.J ch 379pages 380-381Lord Campbell had laid it down that:

“ No  universal  rule can be  laid  down  as to whether  mandatory  enactments  shall be   considered  directory only  or obligatory  with an implied  nullification  for disobedience.  It is  the duty of  courts of  justice  to try to get  at the  real  intention of the legislature  by  carefully  attending  to the whole  scope  of the statute  to be considered.  And  from principles  of statutory  interpretation by Justice G.P Singh  a former  CJ  Madhya  Pradesh  HC  in India, the  following  instructive  passage  appears  at page   242:

“ The use  of the word “shall”  raises  a presumption that the  particular provision is imperative; but this prima facie  inference  may be  rebutted  by other  consideration  such object  flowing  from such construction.  There are numerous cases where the word ‘shall’ has, therefore, been construed as merely directory.”  In Milimani HCC 26/2004 (supra) the court stated:

“Turning  to the defects  conveyed in  the jurat, it is  important  to consider  whether   the defect  as described  is as to form or is fundamental  and is  likely  to touch  on jurisdiction.  Firstly it is alleged that apart from appearing on a separate page, there is any other defect like in the name or place of swearing    for example.  The court  finds that  this is not  a  fundamental  defect  in irregularity and is  both curable  under the order  and  affidavits  namely  Order  18 Rule 7 which  reads: The court may  receive  any  affidavit  sworn for the purpose  of being used in any suit not  withstanding any defect by  misdiscription  of the parties  or otherwise in the file  or other  irregularity in the form   thereof:

15. In addition, Section 72 of the Interpretation and General Provisions Act Cap 2 Laws of Kenya provides:

“72. Save  as is otherwise  expressly  provided, whenever a form is prescribed  by a written  law  on instatement  or document  which purports  to be  in that   form shall  not be void   by reason  of a deviation  there from   which does not  affect  the  substance  of the  instrument  or document  or which  is not calculated  to mislead.”

16. In the present  case, albeit  the exhibits  are not sealed and properly  marked, the defect   does not  go to the  jurisdiction  or substance  and moreso, the court  has wide  powers   under Section  100 of the Civil  Procedure  Act and  Order 8 Rule 5 of the Civil  Procedure  Rules to, on  its own  motion, or  on application, to order that the application or any part of  any document   be amended  in such manner  as it  directs  and on such  terms as  to costs  or otherwise  as are just.

17. Rules are designed to facilitate access to justice and further its ends, although they cannot be   entirely ignored.

18. In the circumstances of this case, the court   has latitude   to order that properly sealed and marked   exhibits   be filed since the verifying affidavit identifies those exhibits.

19. Accordingly, I decline to strike out the application  on the ground of breach of Rule  9  of the Oaths and Statutory  Declarations Act  and order  that the applicant  files  freshly  sealed  and  marked  exhibits  for identification together  with a verifying  affidavit.

20. On the  other objection as to the filing of the application  during the  vacation, I find  the   objection   unfounded  as leave    was properly  sought  and  granted  under Rules  18 and  19 and  the High Court Organization and Administration Rules, 2016.

21. On whether Mr Masika’s client  has audience in an exparte chamber summons, Order  53 Rule 1(4) the proviso thereto is clear  that the  court can either  grant leave exparte or direct service and the matter be considered  interpartes within 7 days hence Mr Appollo Mboya’s submission has no merit.

22. In the end, I decline   to uphold the preliminary objection   and dismiss it with no orders as to costs.

23. The exparte applicant to file and serve sealed and marked exhibits within 2 days from todate.  The 2nd interested party to file their replying affidavit within 2 days from date of service. Hearing of the application for leave to be on 10th January 2017.  Interim stay granted until then.

Dated, signed and delivered in open court at Nairobi this 4th day of January 2017.

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE

In the presence of Mr Apollo Mboya counsel for the Applicant

Mr Masika Counsel for the 2nd interested party

N/A for the respondent

N/A for the 1st interested party

CA: Lorna