Republic v Registrar of Societies, Association of Medical Laboratory Scientific Officers, Daniel C.A. Sanga, Kiprono Chepkok & Calistus Sabini Butiya Ex-Parte Michael Abala Wanga, Safari K. Kithi, Aglean Chelimo, Harun Anunda, Alex Osore, Robert Katsutsu & Harun Bowen [2017] KEHC 2800 (KLR) | Contempt Of Court | Esheria

Republic v Registrar of Societies, Association of Medical Laboratory Scientific Officers, Daniel C.A. Sanga, Kiprono Chepkok & Calistus Sabini Butiya Ex-Parte Michael Abala Wanga, Safari K. Kithi, Aglean Chelimo, Harun Anunda, Alex Osore, Robert Katsutsu & Harun Bowen [2017] KEHC 2800 (KLR)

Full Case Text

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

JUDICIAL REVIEW NO.  279  OF 2016

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

AND

IN THE MATTER OF  AN APPLICATION  FOR  JUDICIAL REVIEW   PROCEEDINGS   FOR ORDERS  OF CERTIORARI, MANDAMUS  AND  PROHIBITION.

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE SOCIETIES ACT ( CAP 108)  LAWS OF KENYA

AND

IN THE MATTER  OF THE MEDICAL  LABORATORY TECHNICIANS  AND  TECHNOLOGIST  ACT  (CAP 253 A ) LAWS OF KENYA

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE FAIR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION ACT, 2015 LAWS  OF KENYA

AND

IN THE MATTER  OF  THE  BY LAWS  ( CONSTITUTION) OF THE ASSOCIATION OF KENYA MEDICAL  LABORATORY  SCIENTIFIC  OFFICERS

AND

IN THE MATTER OF DECISION   BY THE  REGISTRAR  OF SOCIETIES  ALLEGING  CONTRAVENTIONS SECTION  31(4) AND  30(4) OF THE  SOCIETIES  ACT (CAP 108)  LAWS OF  KENYA  CONTAINED  IN LETTERS  DATED   16TH MARCH  2016   AND  22ND  MARCH  2016   RESPECTIVELY

AND

IN THE MATTER OF DECISION   BY THE  REGISTRAR  OF SOCIETIES  TO THE APPLICANTS  CONTAINED  IN A  LETTER  DATED  21ST APRIL  2016  CALLING  FOR A CONVENING  OF THE  ANNUAL   GENERAL MEETING  AND ELECTION  OF NEW OFFICIALS  WITHIN THE NEXT 60 DAYS.

REPUBLIC.............................................................................................................................APPLICANT

VERSUS

REGISTRAR  OF SOCIETIES...........................................................................................RESPONDENT

ASSOCIATION  OF MEDICAL LABORATORY SCIENTIFIC OFFICERS....1ST INTERESTED PARTY

DANIEL C.A. SANGA.....................................................................................2ND INTERESTED PARTY

KIPRONO CHEPKOK...................................................................................3RD  INTERESTED PARTY

CALISTUS  SABINI BUTIYA.........................................................................4TH INTERESTED PARTY

EXPARTE

MICHAEL ABALA WANGA, SAFARI K. KITHI, AGLEAN CHELIMO, HARUN ANUNDA,  ALEX  OSORE, ROBERT  KATSUTSU, HARUN BOWEN.

JUDGMENT ON CONTEMPT OF COURT ORDERS

1. By  a notice of motion dated  13th October  2016  brought  under the  provisions  of Section  5  of the  Judicature  Act,  Sections 1A, 1B  and  3A of the  Civil Procedure  Act, Order  51 Rule  1 of  the Civil Procedure  Rules  2010  and all other  enabling   provisions   of the law,  the 2nd, 3rd  and  4th interested  parties  Daniel C.A,  Sanga; Kiprono  Cheptok and Calistus  Sabini  Butiya seek  from this court the   following orders:

a. That the  exparte  applicants herein Michael Abala Wanga, Safari K. Kithi, Aglean Chelimo, Harun Anunda, Robert  Katsutsu  and  Haron Bowenbe committed  to civil jail for a term of six  months  for contempt  of court for  having  deliberately  disobeyed  orders  of this court  made and  issued on  10th October   2016.

b. That the  court be  pleased to make  any other  or further  orders of  the court geared  towards  protecting  the  dignity  and  authority  of the court.

c. That costs of the application be provided for.

2. The application is predicated on the grounds on the face of the motion and affidavit of Daniel C.A.  Sanga the 2nd interested party herein.

3. Principally, the applicants  herein who are  interested  parties  in these  Judicial Review proceedings  claim  that on  10th October  2016  they as applicants/ interested parties  herein obtained  from this court  an exparte order under certificate  of urgency  pending inter partes  hearing  thereof, prohibiting  the  exparte  applicants herein Michael  Abala, Wanga, Safari K. Kithi, Aglean Chelimo, Harun  Anunda, Robert  Katsutsu  and  Haron Bowen, by themselves  and  or through  their  agents, servants  and  employees  from convening  and or holding that conference  called the 23rd  Medical  Laboratory  Scientific  and  Exhibition  Conference  for the Association of Kenya Medical Laboratory Scientific  Officers (AKMLSO) scheduled to be held from 11th-14th  October  2016  at  the Acacia  Premier  Hotel; Kisumu and  further directing  the said application to be mentioned  on 12th October  2016  for further  directions.

4. It is alleged  by the applicants that  the  aforesaid  order  was  served  upon the  said  exparte  applicant’s  advocates  Nzaku & Nzaku  Advocates  on 11th October   2016  and also  personally  upon the exparte  applicants at the Acacia  Premier  Hotel, Kisumu on the same  day.

5. That  notwithstanding  personal service  of the order upon the  exparte  applicants, the exparte applicants/alleged contemnors deliberately  disobeyed  the orders issued  on  10th October  2016   and  also that besides personal service, they were made  aware  of the said orders  but that in complete  disregard  and  violation  of the said  order, the  exparte   applicants  proceeded and  convened and held that  conference called  the  23rd  Medical  Laboratory  Scientific  and  Exhibition  Conference  for the Association of Kenya Medical Laboratory Scientific  Officers ( AKMLSO) at  Acacia  Premier  Hotel, Kisumu.

6. It is  claimed that  by such  disobedience  of a court order the dignity and authority of the court must be  protected  at  all times  and the conduct and action of the exparte applicants  deliberately ignoring court orders greatly undermines the dignity and  authority of the court.

7. The applicants  assert  that the orders  sought are  just and  meant for  the  protection  of the cause of justice  and the Rule  of Law  and for protecting the authority  of the court  and the  supremacy of the law.

8. It is claimed that the order was served  on the  exparte applicants  by Alfred M.Njeru, a court  process  serve on 11th October  2016   at 7. 35 a.m. at Acacia Premier  Hotel situate along Jomo  Kenyatta Road next  to Uchumi Supermarket  Opposite  Maseno University, Kisumu as shown by the process server’s  affidavit  of  service annexed   to the applicant’s   affidavit   marked as  ‘DS2. ’

9. It is further  claimed that the  said order  was served upon  the  exparte applicant’s advocate Nzaku & Nzaku Advocates    and the Attorney  General  on 10th October  2016   as  shown  by annexture  DS3, the  affidavit of service  sworn by  Fred O. Mangoli, the process server.  It is  therefore alleged that the exparte applicants were aware  of the court order  but they  blatantly  disregarded  it and  proceeded to hold the  conference  which  was   prohibited  by the order  of this court, as   shown by  DS4  photographs taken at  the said  conference  on 12th  October  2016 and  DS5 press statement  issued  by the exparte  applicants  on  12th October  2016.

10. The applicants claim that  the  disobedience  of the  court order  is an example of  impunity, utter disregard  of the  rule of law and  judicial process  and a classic case of parties who have no respect for the  authority  and  jurisdiction of the court hence this court  should punish  the contemnors.

11. The  exparte  applicants  filed  replying   affidavits   sworn on  31st October 2016 by Harun Anunda and  Harun Bowen denying  the  allegations  by the applicants  that the exparte  applicants   were served with any  Court order and or pleadings and stated that the affidavit of service by the process server was full of lies and perjury.

12. Mr Anunda  further deposed  that he wished  to cross  examine the  process  server  Mr Alfred M. Njeru on his  affidavit  of  service. Further, that  they  were  only made  aware of the   order of   10th October   2016 by their advocates  on 12th October  2016    through the  organization’s clerk  and  upon such  information being received, the conference was stopped.

13. It  was also  deposed   that the  contempt  of court are  meant to  harass and  intimidate  the  exparte  applicants, and   unmerited.

14. On the part of Mr Haron Bowen, he deposed that on the material  date  and time when  he  is alleged to  have been  served  with a court  order, he   was   not anywhere near Kisumu  attending  the  named conference  from  11th-14th  October  2016   at Acacia Premier  Hotel, Kisumu.  He deposes that  between  the  10th-14th  October  2016  he  was in Naivasha  attending  a training  by the Kenya School of Government  organized by the  Department of  Health Services, Baringo County Government on a Program-Based  Budgeting in the health sector course in which  he  was  awarded  a certificate  annexed  as  HB1’A’.  Mr Bowen therefore  avers that  the  allegations   that he  was  present  at the conference  in Kisumu or that he was served  with a court  order issued on  10th October  2016 is a blatant lie  and therefore  the  process  sever Mr Alfred  M. Njeru’s affidavit of service is false and he should be  punished for  perjury.

15. In addition, Mr Bowen  deposed  that the affidavit of service  sworn Alfred  M. Njeru  on 15th October  2016  to the effect  that he served  pleadings  upon the deponent for  directions on  17th October  2016  is misleading  and  shows how  dishonest  the  process server is.  Mr  Bowen  claims that  he  was only made  aware of the  contempt proceedings on 24th October 2016  which proceedings  are meant  to vex, harass and  intimidate his  co-applicants and  him.

16. The  2nd exparte applicant  Safari  Kithi also filed a replying  affidavit  sworn by him  on 16th November  2016   contending that  he  was never served  with the court order  and that neither  was he made aware  of the  alleged court order.

17. Mr Safari  deposed that  the  affidavit of  service by  one Alfred Njeru is  totally  misleading  and  full of lies  and  should be  expunged  from the record.  That it is practically impossible  and misleading  to receive  the court order  in Nairobi on 11th October  2016  and  serve  the same  in Kisumu  the same  day  at 7. 30 a.m.  That the affidavit of service by Alfred Njeru is vague and ambiguous at paragraph 4 thereof.

18. It was further contended that  Mr Bowen was conspicuously absent   from the conference  and that therefore as  none of the exparte  applicants were served with the  court order  which did   not even  have a penal notice  endorsed  thereon  of the consequences  of disobedience, this application for contempt  cannot stand.

19. Mr Kithi denied that his former advocates on record ever informed him of the existence of the court order allegedly disobeyed.

20. The replying affidavits of Haron Anunda, Michael Abala  Wanga and  Aglean Chelimo  all sworn  on 16th November, 2016  separately  replicate  Mr Kithi’s  affidavit  denying  that they were aware of or were served with the court order  allegedly  disobeyed.  The same   facts  denying   disobedience, service  or knowledge  of the court order  are also  deposed by  Robert   Katsutsu  on  16th November, 2016.

21. On  21st November  2016  and with leave of court, the interested  parties/applicants  herein filed  a further  affidavit  responding  to the  exparte  applicant’s  replying  affidavits.  The  further affidavit  which  was sworn on  21st  November  2016 by  Mr Daniel C. Sanga  on his  own behalf   and  on behalf of  the  3rd  and  4th interested  parties  reiterate the  contents  of the application for  contempt  of court dated  13th  October  2016 together  with the  contents of  his earlier supporting  affidavit.

22. Mr Sanga  maintains in his  further  affidavit that  the  exparte applicants  cited herein for contempt  of court were  served  with the order, certificate  of urgency, notice of motion  dated  10th  October  2016   together with  the  supporting  affidavit  on 11th October  2016  as  deposed  by the  process server  Mr Alfred M. Njeru  ‘DS2’ in his  supporting  affidavit and that  despite  being fully  aware of the court  orders made and  issued  by this court  on 10th October  2016, they  proceeded  to convene  and  hold the  conference  from  11th October  2016  to 14th October 2016 which  conference this court  had prohibited.

23. It is  further deposed  that on 14th October  2016  the same  Mr Alfred M. Njeru process server proceeded to serve upon  the exparte  applicants  with the same order at  about 7. 30 a.m.  at Acacia Premier Hotel in Kisumu as per ‘DS1’ copy of the said affidavit of service.

24. In addition, it was deposed that  even  after being served with  the order on 14th October  2016   the  exparte  applicants  proceeded  with the meeting  in total defiance of the court order  as per annexture ‘DS2’  copy of the  programme  of the conference; photographs taken on  14th October  2016   at the venue  of the meeting  marked ‘CDS3’ and  ‘DS4’ an  affidavit  of Dr  Stanley  Kinge Waithaka  who participated  in the said conference from 12th October, 2016 up to 14th October, 2016 .

25. Further, it was deposed that it is  therefore not  true and that  the exparte  applicants  are  misrepresenting  facts when  they  say that they were not  served with the court order  or that the  meeting  was  stopped on  12th October  2016   upon receipt  of a court order.

26. It was further contended that  on 3rd November 2016 the  exparte  applicant’s  replying  affidavits  were struck  out by the  court for being filed  out of time without leave of  court but  that despite the court granting the exparte applicants an opportunity  to address  the  court, they never  denied that  the  affidavits were sworn by Harun  Anunda.

27. It was also deposed that  the  activities  of the exparte  applicants  were to  hold themselves  as officials  of the  1st interested  party Association despite  the bar  under the  Societies Act.  That Harun Anunda   had already called for other meetings at the Nakuru Merika Hotel and an Annual Delegates meeting  to be held on 17th December 2016.

28. The court observes that the exparte applicants’ initial replying affidavits were struck out on 17th October  2016,  for having been filed out of time without leave of court.

29. Following  that order, Mr  Nzaku  counsel  for the exparte  applicants  became  uneasy and sought  leave  of court to  cease  acting for  his clients.  The court granted him time to file his application to cease acting which he did.

30. The court then heard the exparte applicants one by one following their  advocate’s  intention to  withdraw  from the proceedings and each of  the exparte  applicants  beseeched the  court to grant them more time to seek alternative legal representation and  leave to file fresh replying affidavits to the contempt  application.

31. The court after hearing the exparte applicants in person reviewed  its order  which had  directed  the  application  for contempt of court to proceed to hearing and allowed the  exparte applicants time to seek for legal representation and file  replying  affidavit  to the contempt  application.

32. On the basis of the proceedings of 3rd November  2016  the  exparte applicants filed fresh replying affidavits on 17th November 2016 which I have alluded to above and which the further  affidavit  referred to hereinabove  sworn  by Daniel C.A. Sanga   on  21st  November  2016  was filed with  leave of court, and  supplementary affidavits  were also filed on 2nd  December  2016  by the  6th exparte  applicant  Mr Robert  Katsutsu; the  1st  exparte  applicant, Michael Abala  Wanga  and the  3rd  exparte  applicant  Aglean  Chelimo  deposing and contending  that the affidavits of service sworn  by Alfred  M. Njeru  on 11th  November  2016  and  15th  October  2016  respectively  are   totally  misleading, full of lies  and should be expunged  from the record and praying that the court do summon the said  process  server for  cross examination on his  said affidavits.

33. It was contended that  in the affidavit  of Daniel C.A. Sanga  sworn on  21st November   2016   the  process server  purports to have  served the order, certificate of  urgency and  notice of motion  dated  13th November  2016  on 14th October  2016   without specifying  which order   was purportedly  served on the  exparte applicant.

34. The exparte applicants also denied what Dr Stanley Kinge Waithaka swore in the annexture DS4 that Michael Abala Wanga made remarks about a court order alleged was true.

35. It  was  further contended that the order of  10th October  2016   was specific to the  conference  of  11-14th October  2016  hence it should not be used  to frustrate and or paralyze the operations of the 1st interested party Association of Kenya Medical  Laboratory  Scientific  Officers.

36. The exparte  applicants urged the  court to dismiss  the  contempt  of court application as the applicants had failed to demonstrate  that they  ever served  the  orders upon  the alleged  contemnors   or that they made the exparte applicants/alleged contemnors aware of the  order of  10th October  2016.

37. The parties’ advocates agreed and made oral submissions for and against the motion seeking to commit the exparte applicants for contempt of court order dated 10th October 2016.  Mr Chebii submitted for the interested parties/applicants reiterating the contents  of the application and maintaining  that his clients  had established that the exparte  applicants had  flagrantly disobeyed  the orders  of  10th October  2016  which  was  served  on 10th October 2016 upon the exparte applicants  and their advocates as demonstrated by the affidavit of service sworn by Alfred Njeru.  Counsel maintained  that albeit  the  exparte applicants did not sign on the order but that  the  Hotel Manager  introduced  the exparte applicants to the process server and that on the same  day  the  order was served upon the  exparte applicant’s former advocates,  Nzaku &Nzaku advocates. Counsel  also sought  to correct the affidavit of service by Alfred Njeru on the date  of receipt  of   instructions.

38. Further, Mr Chebii submitted that in any event, the exparte applicant’s  counsel  had appeared  in court on 12th October  2016  and  told the court  that he had  received  the order  and  notified   his clients that morning of the existence of the order.  That   there  was  no allegation  made that  the  affidavit  sworn  by Mr Anunda  which  was  expunged from the court  record for being  filed out  of time  was  a forgery.

39. It was further submitted  that the interested  parties  had annexed  photographs showing  that the meeting went on from  11-14th October  2016  despite the  court  order as further  shown  by the  conference  minutes and  the affidavit  of one of the conference  participants  Dr  Waithaka Kinge.

40. It  was submitted  that albeit  Mr Harun Bowen  had  sworn  2 affidavits  alleging  that he  was not  present  at the conference  hence he  was  not served  with the court order, there is no Kenya  School  of Government in Naivasha but only in  Nairobi, Baringo and  Mombasa.

41. It  was submitted that annexture  HBI  is dated  15th September  2016, a list of participants  at Naivasha  and that  HB1 is a certificate of participation which does not show where the training  was held.

42. On the issue  of service  or  knowledge  of the court order, it  was  submitted that  authorities  on this  subject  state that knowledge  of the order  is sufficient.  The case of Shimmers Plaza Ltd v NBK [2015] eKLR  was relied  on and a submission made that the exparte applicant’s counsel was on record   as having said that he had notified his clients of the order.  Further reliance was placed on  Re-Edward Muhinda  Ndetei  & 15  Others [2015] e KLR  where it was held  inter alia that a prohibitory injunction operates  from time to time of  issue not  based on service. Counsel  for the  interested party applicant maintained that the exparte  applicants  were aware of the court order but proceeded to hold the  prohibited  conference.  Further, that those acts of disobedience of the court order erodes the dignity and authority of the court and therefore should be punished by committal to jail or be fined.

43. It  was  submitted that  the  main/substantive  motion was filed for  Judicial Review orders of certiorari and mandamus  to have the alleged contemnors  registered as  officials  of the  1st interested party, but that the  exparte applicants circumvented their own application and   conducted acts  which are  contrary to the Societies  Act  as they  were not  the  registered  officials  of the non-registered  society hence the  court  should  grant the  orders  sought.

44. On behalf  of the exparte  applicants, Mrs Manyarkiy  opposed  the contempt of court notice of motion maintaining that her  clients  never disobeyed  the court order as they were  neither  served  with the court order not made  aware of the court order  at any time before or  on 11th  October  2016  or before conclusion  of the conference.

45. Counsel for the exparte  applicants  urged  the court to examine  the  affidavit  of service sworn by Alfred Njeru. She  maintained  that the legal  requirement  for one to be held in  contempt  of court is  that service  must  be personal or the  contemnor  made  aware  of the  court order.

46. Counsel maintained that  there was  no way an order  issued  on 10th October  2016  could be  served the  same  day in Kisumu considering the distance  and mode of  service  alleged  which renders  the alleged  service on a Mr  Mwangi  a Hotel Manager  in Kisumu  suspicious.

47. Mr Manyarkiy maintained that Harun Bowen was not in Kisumu on the conference dates and that annexture HB1 is a list of those required to attend the seminar in Naivasha and the annexed certification of participation issued to Mr Harun Bowen.

48. Counsel maintained that Kenya School of Government is in Naivasha and that contempt of court proceedings are  quasi criminal in nature hence the court should be careful in holding  the alleged contemnors  culpable   since the degree  of proof  required is higher than  on the  balance  of probabilities.

49. Counsel submitted that the expunged affidavits were forgeries as Mr Nzaku advocate never notified his clients of the existence of the court order of 10th October 2016.

50. Further, it was   submitted on behalf of the exparte applicants that service upon an advocate in contempt proceedings is not proper service.  That service should be upon the alleged contemnors.  It   was further  submitted that  it was the  exparte  applicants  who brought  these proceedings and  obtained  leave  and  stay which  orders  were not  meant to curtail or frustrate  operations  of the exparte applicants and the 1st interested   party as the order  was specific  to the conference  in Kisumu.

51. Further, that there is no evidence of the presence of Dr Stanley Kinge at the conference in Kisumu hence his affidavit should be ignored.  It  was  also submitted that  there  was no penal notice to caution contemnors of legal consequences of disobedience and that without knowledge  and  personal  service of the  order  upon he exparte applicants, this application  for contempt must fail with costs.  Counsel relied on Gibson  Kariuki vs  Mugo  Mbacho & Others  HCC 124/2003  on the  prerequisites for contempt of court order and Catherine  Muthoni  Ireri  v George  Mwaura Kibui  HCC 1032/2003 on   the  standard  of proof  in contempt  of court proceedings  which is  beyond  reasonable  doubt.

52. On the requirement of a penal notice, reliance   was placed on Clementina Aoro Kabbis v Andrew Bwire Obara HC Miscellaneous 1742/2005.

53. On behalf of the respondent, Miss Mwangi submitted, supporting the application for contempt and stating that present day jurisprudence on contempt of court is that mere knowledge of an order is sufficient.  Counsel submitted that on 12th October 2016 counsel for the exparte applicants Mr Nzaku was in court and admitted that he informed his clients of the order of 10th October 2016.  Miss Mwangi further submitted that service was effected upon the exparte applicants and that despite the said service of the order upon the exparte applicants, the conference continued.  She emphasized that court orders are not cosmetic and therefore the rule of law and dignity of the court must be upheld.

54. In a brief rejoinder, Mr Chebii for the interested parties/applicants   submitted that  the  authorities  relied on by the exparte  applicant  are  old and  out dated  as the jurisprudence  on contempt of court has since developed.

DETERMINATION

55. I have  considered  the  foregoing  and  in my humble  view, the main  issues for determination in this matter  are:

1) Whether  the exparte  applicants  herein  were  served  with or  were made  aware of  the  order of  10th October  2016 prohibiting  them from  convening  or holding  a conference  of  the Association.

2) Whether  the  exparte  applicants  brazenly  disobeyed  the orders  of  10th October  2016.

3) What orders should this court make.

4) Who should bear costs  of the application for  contempt.

56. There  are  equally important ancillary questions that the court shall  answer  in the process  of resolving  the  issues  framed  herein  above.

57. Briefly, on  28th June  2016, Honourable  Odunga J granted  to the exparte  applicants herein  leave to  institute  Judicial Review  proceedings  seeking for  orders of certiorari to remove  into this court  and  quash the decisions  of the  respondent  Registrar of Societies contained   in her letter dated  21st April 2016 directing  the  exparte applicants  to call for  an Annual General Meeting   with a view  to electing new officials of the 1st interested party Association within 60 days; Mandamus  to compel the respondent  to register the exparte applicants  as the elected  officials of the 1st interested  party and prohibition  prohibiting  the  respondent  from interfering  with the running  of the affairs of the  1st  interested party Association.

58. The main motion was ordered  to be  filed within  14 days  from  28th June  2016  and the leave  so granted  operated  as stay of the respondent’s  decision that required the exparte  applicants  to call for  an Annual General Meeting  within  60 days  with a view  to electing  new officials.

59. The substantive  notice of motion which  is not  traceable in  this file is  said to  have been  filed on  11th July  2017  within  14 days  stipulated  in the order for leave.

60. Upon granting of leave, and stay, Honourable Odunga J directed that this file be placed before me for further directions on 20th July 2016.  On the 10thOctober 2016 the interested  parties/applicants to this application approached  this court  with an  application under certificate  of urgency  seeking for  orders  prohibiting the exparte applicants  from  convening  and holding a conference  of the 1st interested party  Association as scheduled  in Kisumu from 11-14th October 2016 at Acacia Premier Hotel as the exparte applicants were not  the elected officials  of the 1st interested  party to hold such conference, going by the exparte applicant’s own  application before  the court which was seeking  for orders  of certiorari and mandamus to compel the respondent to register them as officials  of the  1st  interested  party Association.

61. This court upon  considering the  application dated  10th October  2017 exparte and  under  certificate of urgency, granted   interim  orders  of prohibition in terms  of  prayer 2  of the motion  and directed the interested parties/applicants to serve the  other parties to the application for interpartes mention on  12th October   2018 for  further directions.

62. The record of the court shows that the said order was extracted, signed and sealed and issued by  the Deputy Registrar  on the same   day 10th October  2016.

63. On 11th October  2016, the court process  server, Mr Fred  O. Mangoli  swore  an affidavit  of  service  stating that  on  11th October  2016   he received  an order  CA, notice of motion and  supporting  affidavit  dated  10th October  2016  set for  mention on 12thOctober 2016 from M.K.Chebii and Company  Advocates  with instructions to serve the  exparte  applicant’s  advocates one Nzaku  & Nzaku  advocates  and the Attorney General on behalf of  the respondent.

64. The affidavit further states that on  the same day  at about  9. 49 a.m. the process server proceeded  to the offices  of Nzaku & Nzaku  Advocates  situate  at Sirona  House  Suite 218 Kaunda/Koinange Streets Junction Nairobi and  served upon  the  Secretary working   with the said  firm and she accepted  service by signing  and  stamping at the front page  of the copy returned.

65. The  said process server deposes  that on the same  day at  10. 30 a.m. he proceeded to the offices of the Attorney General at Sheria House  and  served a Secretary.

66. By another affidavit of service  sworn on  11th October  2016  by Alfred M. Njeru  a process server,  and filed  in court on  12th October  2016, he deposes that he received  the  court order, certificate of urgency, notice of motion and supporting  affidavit  dated  10th October  2016  and  set for  mention on  12th October  2016,  from Chebii & Company with instructions to serve  the  exparte  applicants  herein.

67. That on the same day at about 7. 30 a.m, he proceeded to  Acacia  Hotel  in Kisumu  where the meeting  was scheduled  to take  place and  upon arrival he met a receptionist  who advised him to wait for the manager.  That  at about 7. 35 a.m. the manager, Mr Mwangi came and  after  introductions the process server served  upon Mr Mwangi the named order and other documents but Mr Mwangi only accepted  service  and  declined  to sign.

68. It is further deposed  that  the process server inquired  from  Mr Mwangi on the whereabouts of the exparte applicants/alleged  contemnors  herein and that Mr  Mwangi  told  the process  server  that “ they  are the  ones who were in his company.”

69. That the  process server  introduced  himself  to the alleged contemnors and  the  purpose of his visit, and that he also confirmed them to be the exparte applicants  herein  and he tendered  to them  documents  and  requiring  their acknowledgment  on the  principal copies.  That they  accepted  service but  declined  to sign stating  that their  lawyers are the ones who are  in a position to receive the documents.

70. What later turned out, giving  rise to  these contempt  of court proceedings  is that despite the  alleged  service of the order issued  on 10th October  2016  upon the  exparte applicants and their advocates Nzaku & Nzaku  Advocates, the  exparte applicants allegedly  proceeded  with the holding  of the conference yet the order prohibited  them from  convening or holding  the said conference.

71. The exparte  applicants  in their replying  affidavits  vehemently deny ever  being  served  with the said  court order and  or being aware of the said court order as alleged by the interested party’s  appointed  court process  servers.

72. What  emerges from the above  analysis  is that indeed  there  was  and  is a  valid court   order issued  on 10th October  2016   by this court, which  order clearly  bars  the alleged  contemnors  from  holding the  conference  scheduled  for  11th-14th October 2016  for  the Assocation.

73. What  is  expressly  clear from the court  record is that  Nzaku Advocates and the Honourable  Attorney General  were served  with the court  order on the same  day that the  order  was  issued which  was  on 10th October  2016   as shown  by the affidavit   of service  sworn  by Fred O. Mangoli.  There are  clear endorsements  on the said  copies  of the order filed in court.

74. Mr Nzaku  advocate who previously acted for the  alleged contemnors  has not  sworn any  affidavit  denying  that his law firm   was served with the said  orders, or that the received stamp did not belong to his law firm or  challenging   the process  server’s  affidavit.

75. Mr Nzaku’s own admission in court on 12th October, 2016 that he had informed his clients of the court order that morning, and the affidavits in reply filed by him on behalf of his clients have also not been disowned by him.

76. In addition, the alleged  contemnors  have not sought  to  cross examine  the  process server  Mr Mangoli on the said   affidavit  of service to challenge the depositions  made on oath.  It follows that the fact of service of the  court  order upon   Nzaku  and  Nzaku advocates  remains  as such fact  which has  not been  controverted or at all.

77. The record  also bears  depositions by the alleged  contemnors  who state that they   were only  made aware  of the court order  of  10th October  2016  by  their advocates on 12th October  2016   and through their organization’s clerk and upon such  information being  received, the conference   was  stopped hence  there is no merit  in the contempt  proceedings  which are  meant to  harass  and  intimidate  them.

78. The court  further notes that on 12th October  2016  Mr Nzaku  advocate  did inform  the  court and it is on record  that when Mr  Chebii notified the  court of the  disobedience  of the court order of  10th October  2016, Mr Nzaku advocate stated as follows:

“ I called my clients this morning and told them that the orders  exist.  But my clients  are officials  and the issue  of recognition is different from the issues of holding a conference.  I am ready to file reply  and the authorities  within 2 hours.”

79. It was upon the court learning that there was an alleged  contempt of court order that is directed that an appropriate  application be filed and  considered  before any other issue in this matter  could  be  considered.

80. From the  above, it is clear to  my mind that the  court order  was indeed  served upon  Mr Nzaku advocate  on 10th October  2016  but he took  his time  until  12th October  2016  when he  called his clients and  notified them of the order.  I am therefore  inclined  to believe  the  alleged contemnors  when they  say that  they only learnt  of the court order on  12th October  2016   from their advocate  Mr Nzaku.

81. On the other hand, albeit  Mr Alfred  Njeru  the  process server  deposes that  he  received the court order on  11th October  2016  and  on the same  day  he proceeded to Acacia  Premier  Hotel in Kisumu and  served the  order upon  the alleged  contemnors  at  7. 30 a.m., it is  not practically possible  that he did  so on the same  day.  He does not state  at what  time he  received  the order in  Nairobi, how he  travelled to Kisumu and  arrived  at the Acacia  Hotel,  the conference  venue  and  managed to serve  the order that  early  morning.

82. On this aspect the applicant  has not  attempted  to explain  that impossible  situation, and so I decline  to accept the version that the exparte applicants/alleged contemnors   were served with  the  court order  on 11th October  2016  or that they   were made aware of the said order  before  12th October,2016.

83. On  the part  of Mr Haron Bowen, he maintains that he  was not in the conference  as he  was attending  a seminar in Naivasha.  He also annexed  copy of certificate  of participation.  Albeit the  applicant  doubts  that Mr  Bowen   was in Naivasha  since the Kenya  School of Government is not in Naivasha, there is  no other contrary evidence to controvert the certificate of participation exhibited by Mr  Bowen.  Furthermore,  Mr  Bowen did not say that  there is  a Kenya School of Government  in Naivasha, but that  he   was  attending  a training by  Kenya  School of Government seminar in Naivasha, organized by Department of  Health  Services, Baringo County Government  on a programme  Based  Budgeting  in the Health Sector.

84. I have examined the affidavits  and  annextures  of the applicants  and especially the marked  photographs.  None of those  photographs  or affidavits  identify or name  Mr Haron Bowen  as having been in the Kisumu conference.  There is no  evidence that Mr Haron Bowen   was notified   of the order by Mr Nzaku advocate  or that he  was served  or had an opportunity, during that time, to know or believe  that a court order  had been  issued against  him.

85. Mr Bowen deposes that he  was  made aware of the contempt proceedings  on 24th October  2016.  Even if that  were not the case, and  even if  I were to believe Mr Alfred  M. Njeru  in his affidavit  of  15th October  2016  that  he served Mr Bowen  for court’s directions on  17th October, 2016, this  was after  the conclusion of the conference and not before  the holding  of the conference  which  had been stayed by  this court.

86. In the end I find that there is  no evidence linking  Mr Haron  Bowen  to the knowledge  of or service of  the order of  10th October   2016. Accordingly, I find him innocent and acquit him of the contempt allegations.

87. I further find that  it  was   practically  impossible   for  a process  server to  receive  an order  in Nairobi on  11th October  2016  and  serve it  the  same day  at 7. 30 a.m. in Kisumu without  indicating what time he received the order and  how he  travelled  to Kisumu, unless it was by remote control.

88. I further  find that Mr Nzaku  advocate  admitted in  court on  12th October  2016  that he had called  and informed  his  clients  that there  was  a court  order and  that it  was on  12th October  that the alleged  contemnors  except  Mr Haron  Bowen  learnt of  the  court order.

89. The only question for this court is, the alleged  contemnors  having  learnt  of the court  order on  12th October  2016  prohibiting  them from  holding the  conference  which had commenced on 11th October  2016  and   was   to end on 14th October  2016, did they obey that court  order or did they brazenly  disobey   it and continue  with the holding of the conference  as  if nothing  had stopped them from so holding?

90. According to the applicant, the alleged contemnors continued with the conference with impunity.  Photographs were produced/annexed showing that despite knowledge of the order, the conference  went on.  The alleged contemnors who also actively participated in the court proceedings and who were given the opportunity to address the court individually after Mr Nzaku their former advocate withdrew from representing them, never denied that the photographs produced  belonged to them. The court had the opportunity to see the alleged contemnors and confirms that the photographs belong to them.

91. An invited presenter  at the conference  Dr Stanley Kinge   Waithaka’s  affidavit  was  filed as  an annexure  DS4  to the further  affidavit  sworn by  Daniel C.A. Sanga sworn on  21st November  2016  to the effect that he ( Dr Stanley  Kinge  Waithaka)  participated in the said  conference  from 12th October  2016  to 14th October  2016  and that he  presented  a paper at the said  conference  pursuant  to the programme  on 14th October  2016.

92. Further,  that on the  closing  day of the  conference, the chairman  of the Association  Mr Michael Abala  Wanga one of the alleged contemnors herein informed  the  participants  in his closing  remarks  that“there  were some people  who had  obtained a court order  to stop the conference but in spite of the court order, the conference  had come to a successful conclusion.”

93. The  exparte  applicants  despite  such damning indictment against  them, never challenged  that evidence  which is  on oath  by Dr Stanley  Kinge Waithaka  who is  listed on the conference   programme as one of the  facilitators/speakers on  14th October  2016  at  12 noon -1210.  Nothing could  have been much easier  than calling  him for cross  examination the way the exparte applicants/alleged contemnors had earlier on  issued  notice to  cross examine  Daniel C.A. Sanga, Alfred  M. Njeru  and  Mr Mwangi on  21st October  2016.

94. Taking into account the  fact that  the  alleged contemnors  admit  by annextures  “DS5” knowing of the  order  on 12th October  2016, nothing  prevented  them from obeying the  order on 12th October  2016  when they learnt of  its existence   from their  own advocate Mr Nzaku which was in the morning hours. In United States v. Revie 834 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1987)cited with approval in the Shimmers Plaza (supra) case, the court held that: “the defendant had adequate notice of a show cause order because his attorney was on notice. Therefore, a client may be similarly "served" with a court's order by his attorney's communication of its contents and this communication is presumed if the attorney has knowledge of the order.”

95.  Although  the  alleged  contemnors  claim that upon learning of the court order they stopped  the meeting, their own letter  dated  17th October  2016  by Harun A. Anunda, the Secretary  General of the Association addressed  to the Principal  MTC is clear  that the conference   was held  at Acacia  Hotel in Kisumu  on Friday  14th October  2016  and the latter letter was inviting  the Principal  to a meeting   at Nakuru Merika Hotel on  20th October  2016   at  9. 00 a.m.  for  a follow  up to the Kisumu meeting.

96. More  specifically, the affidavit  sworn by  Haron  A. Anunda  on 31st  October  2016   at paragraph 5 thereof  states:

“ 5 That I aver that  in response  to paragraph 5,7,8 and 9 of the supporting  affidavit  I wish to state that  we  were made aware of  the court order of 10th October 2016  by our  advocate on  record on  12th October  2016   who relayed  the message of the orders issued therein through  the organization  clerk  and  the same was  relayed  to us and the conference  was put  to a  stop.”

97. Albeit  the initial  replying  affidavits filed  through  Mr Nzaku’s firm  and sworn by his clients before he obtained leave of court to withdraw  from representing  the alleged  contemnors were expunged  from the record, this particular copy of the replying affidavit  referred to above was  brought  in these proceedings by the  applicant  as   an annexture.

98. The alleged  contemnors  never opposed the inclusion of their former affidavits in reply, in evidence and  they neither applied for that  annexture  which now  came on  record  as and exhibit,  to be  expunged.  Instead, Mr Michael Abala Wanga  and his colleagues did on 2nd December 2016 swear   supplementary  affidavits  with similar  content  merely  denying  that they  knew of the order  or that they were served  with the order  and stating  at their respective  paragraphs  6  of the supplementary affidavits, that there was no way they could  have known that the  order  had been  issued suspending  the said  conference.  The above paragraphs 6  which is  replicated by all the  alleged  contemnors except  Mr Bowen  says  nothing about Mr  Nzaku’s  admission  in court on  12th October  2016  that he had notified his  clients  that morning  of the order.

99. Furthermore, there  was  no attempt  to call  Mr Nzaku  advocate to swear  an affidavit  disowning  his own  admission in court that he had made  his clients aware of the court  order on 12th October  2016  or  that he  did not  draft  on behalf  of his clients  the  replying  affidavits which they swore before a commissioner for oaths wherein they  expressly  admitted that they  were  notified  of the order on 12th October  2016  upon which they “stopped” the conference.

100. This  court will not rely on the  photographs  annexed  as proof  of  disobedience  of court order as  it is not clear  whether  the photographs  were taken before or after 12th October  2012 when the alleged contemnors  became  aware of the  court order.  The said photographs are  also not  dated.

101. Nonetheless, I am  persuaded  beyond doubt  that by the  sworn affidavit  of Dr Kinge, Mr Nzaku’s  submissions  in court on  12th October  2016  on behalf of his clients when the issue  of disobedience  of the court order  was first  brought up, and by  the  annexture “ DS-5” annexed  to Mr Daniel C.A. Sanga’s  further affidavit  which is the alleged contemnors’ respective sworn affidavits admitting that  the alleged contemnors  were made  aware of  the court order  of  10th October  2016  on 12th October  2016   during  the conference  which  was   ongoing  from 11th  October   2016  to  14th October  2016; and the letter by Mr Abala to the Principal of MTC, that the exparte applicants/alleged contemnors were made aware of the court order and therefore they were expected to obey it..

102. Before I conclude on this  aspect of disobedience  of court order  of  10th October  2016  and  knowledge  thereof, I must  mention something  about the  affidavit  of service by  Mr Alfred M. Njeru.  I have  perused two  of his affidavits  of service, the one  claiming that he served  the order upon the  alleged  contemnors  on 11th October 2016 stopping the meeting at Kisumu and on 13th October 2016 for directions of  17th October  2016.  My own  assessment of those affidavits is that they are vague, ambiguous and  incapable  of persuading  this court  that Mr Alfred  M. Njeru  is a  competent  court process server.

103. My reasons  for the above  assessment are  that the  affidavits  do not disclose  the time and  place when  and where the process server  received  the court  orders  and  how he  travelled  to Kisumu to effect  service.  In the affidavit of 15th October  2016, he  says he received  the  order, among  other documents, for  service for directions set for 17th October 2016 from M.K. Chebii & Company Advocates  and  on  14th October  2016  at 7. 30 a.m  he proceeded  to Acacia  Premier  Hotel Kisumu  and  effected  service after waiting at the reception for the alleged  contemnors  to come out  of their rooms.  That after a while  the exparte applicants  emerged  and since  he had  known them all, served  them and that because  he  had served  them three days  earlier  he  was  able to  identify  them one by one.  He then  proceeds to  state that the alleged contemnors started to  hurl  abusive  words towards him  with arrogance, harsh and violence  but they  nonetheless accepted  service  but declined  to sign on the principal copy stating that  they had a lawyer on record  to whom  documents could be  channeled.

104. It is unbelievable   that all the  alleged contemnors   were served at the same time, or that they  all emerged  from their  respective  hotel rooms simultaneously at  exactly  or about  7. 30 a.m. and that  without mentioning  who among  them said  what, they all  simultaneous  hauled  abusive  words, were  arrogant, harsh or violent towards the process server.

105. To my mind, the affidavit of service does not meet the  standard  of service  expected of  a  competent  process  server.

106. Having said that, I reiterate that the earlier  affidavit  claiming that  the  process server served  the order on  11th October  2016  in Kisumu after  receiving  it the  same day  was an  impossible  task.

107. However, having  found that  the  exparte  applicants/alleged  contemnors  were aware of the court order of 10th October 2016 on 2th October 2016  when they were notified  by their advocate Mr Nzaku, the  question is whether knowledge of the court order without personal service is  sufficient  for one to be  expected to obey  that court order.

108. The exparte applicant’s/alleged contemnor’s advocate  maintained, citing ancient case law, that  personal service  of court order is a  pre condition in contempt  of  court proceedings  because  contempt  of court is  a quasi  criminal offence  and therefore  the  standard of  proof   required  is higher  than on merely  a balance of probabilities  hence the court should be careful in holding alleged contemnors culpable.  She maintained  that the  expunged  affidavits sworn by the alleged contemnors saying  they  were  notified  by their advocate  of the existence  of  the  order on  12th October  2016 was a forgery and that service on  an advocate  in contempt  proceedings  is not  proper  service.  She further  claimed that   there   was no penal notice  to caution the  contemnors  of the legal consequence   of  disobedience of a court   order.  Counsel relied on  3 cases  of Gibson Kariuki vs Mugo Mbacho & Others HCC  124/2003; Catherine  Muthoni Ireri v George Mwaura Kibui HC 1032/2003 and HC Miscellaneus Application 1742/2005 Auro Kabiis vs Andrew Bwire Obara.

109. To counter  the above position held  by the exparte  applicant’s  counsel, the applicant’s  counsel Mr Chebii contended that the cases  relied on were outdated  and that  they do not  reflect the current  legal position  on knowledge/service  of court order and the issue  of penal  notice  to warn on  legal  consequences  of disobedience  thereof.

110. He relied  on 4 cases  as filed  on  2nd  November  2016   namely  Shimmers Plaza Ltd vs NBK Ltd [2015] e KLR, Justus  Kariuki  Mate & Another v Honourable Martin Nyaga  Wambora & another [2014] e KLR; Equity Bank Ltd v Bryan Yongo & Another[2014] e KLR and Re Edward Mutinda  Ndetei & 15 Others [2015] e KLR.

111. I have  compared  the two sets of  decisions relied on by the respective  parties.  My take is  that  HCC  124/2003  is a High Court decision decided in Meru  High Court  on  27th  February  2008  by Honourable  W.Ouko J ( as he then  was) HCC  1032/2008  is a High Court  decision  made on  24th May  2007  by Honourable K.H. Rawal J ( as she then was)  whereas  HCC  1742/2005  is also  a High Court  decision  made on  B.P Kubo J ( as he then  was)  on 25th October  2006.

112. All the above  decisions  are well reasoned  but are not  binding  on this court.  In addition, they were  all decided  prior to 2010.  It  follows  that they are not  recent  decisions.

113. On the other hand, the applicant  cited  recent  authorities  of 2014, and  2015.  The shimmers  Plaza  case is a  Court of  Appeal  decision  and  an authority frequently cited on contempt of court and so is the  Justus Kariuki  Mate vs  Martin Nyaga Wambora case.

114. The Equity Bank vs  Bryan Yongo and Re Edward  Mutinda  Ndeteicases  are all High Court  decisions  with one  item  in common that  they echo  the holdings   in the Shimmers Plaza  Ltd  and  Martin Wamboracases whish latter are the Court of Appeal cases.

115. This court  is by  the rule  of  precedence  bound by the decisions  of the Court of Appeal and  Supreme Court  but not  bound by decisions made a court of concurrent  jurisdiction.

116. In the  Shimmers Plaza  case, the  Court of Appeal  accepted the  holding by Lenaola J ( as he then  was) in Basil Criticos  v Attorney  General & 8 Others[2012] e KLRon the  issues of  knowledge and personal service of the court orders  for purposes of contempt  of court proceedings  and  stated:

“……the law  has changed  and  as  it stands  today knowledge  supersedes  personal service ,…where  a  party clearly  acts and  shows  that he had  knowledge  of  a court order; the  strict  requirement  that personal  service  must be  proved is   rendered  unnecessary.”

117. The above  position  was affirmed  by the Court of Appeal  in the  Martin Wambora (supra case). And  in the said Martin  Wambora  case, the Court of Appeal  relied on Black’s Law  Dictionary, 9th Edition  which  defines  notice as “ A person has notice of a fact or condition if that  person:

Has  actual knowledge  of it;

Has  received  information about it;

Has  reason to know  about it;

Is considered as having been able to  ascertain  by checking  an official filing  or recording.

118. The court further stated:

[32]  “ The trial  court  was  correct in holding that the law as  then  was  in contempt  of court had  since changed; the law  as it stands  today is that knowledge  of an order is  sufficient  for  purpose  of contempt  proceedings.  The appellants  herein had notice  of  the  said order  through service  upon Boniface  Njiru (Advocate) and  out of what the  1st respondent  referred  to  as  abundant  caution” the same   orders  were advertised  in the local daily newspaper  to notify all and  sundry……..”

119. In the Shimmers s Plaza Ltd (supra) case  the Court of Appeal  stated:

“ On the other hand, however, this  court has slowly  and  gradually  moved from  the position that service  of the order along with  the  penal notice must be  personally  served  on a person  before contempt  can be proved.  This is in line with the dispensations covered under 81:8(1) (supra).

Kenya’s growing  jurisprudence right from  the High Court  has reiterated that knowledge of a court order suffices  to prove service and dispense with personal service for the purposes of  contempt  proceedings……..

120. It is  important however  that the court satisfies  itself  beyond  any shadow  of doubt that  the  person alleged  to be in contempt  committed the act  complained of  with full knowledge  or notice  of the existence of the order of the court forbidding it.  The threshold is  quite  high as it involves  possible  deprivation  of a person’s  liberty.  This standard  has not  changed since the old celebrated  case of Exparte Langley 1879, 13  Ch D 110(CA)where  Thesinger J  stated as follows  page 119.

“…..The  question in each case, and depending  upon the  particular circumstances of the case, must be, was there or was  there not such  a notice  given to the person who is charged with contempt  of court that  you can  infer from the  facts that he  had notice infact  of the order which  has been  made “ And  in a matter of  this kind, bearing  in mind that  the liberty  of the subject  is to  be affected, I think  that  those who assert  that there was such a notice ought to prove it beyond  reasonable  doubt.”

121. On whether knowledge of the judgment  or order by an advocate  of the  alleged  contemnor  suffices  for contempt  proceedings, the Court of Appeal  in the Shimmers  Plaza case stated  affirmatively.

“ We  hold it  does”  This is more so in a  case as  this one where  the  advocate   was in court representing  the alleged  contemnor  and the orders were made in his presence.  There is an assumption  which is  not unfounded, and which in  our  view  in irrefutable  to the effect  that when  an advocate  appears in  court on  instructions of a party, then it  behoves him/her  to report  back to the  client  all that transpired  in court that  has a bearing  on the client’s  case.

122. This is  the  position in other  jurisdictions  within and  outside the  commonwealth.

123. In addressing  the issue  of whether service  of a judgment  or order  on the solicitor  for the Ministers  is sufficient knowledge  of the order  on their part to found  liability in contempt; the Supreme Court of Canada in Bhatnager v Canada (Minister of  Employment  and  Immigration)[1990] 2 SCR  217 at page  226, LJ Sopinkaheld that:

“ In my opinion, a finding  of knowledge  on the part  of the client  may in some circumstances  be inferred  from the fact  the solicitor  was  informed.  Indeed, in the ordinary case in  which a party is involved in isolated pieces of litigation, the inference may  readily  be drawn.  In the  case of Minister’ of  the  Crown who  administers  large departments and  are involved in a multiplicity of proceedings, it would be  extraordinary if orders were brought, routinely to their knowledge, in such a  case there  must  be circumstances which reveal  a special  reason for  bringing  the  order to the attention  of the minister ( emphasis by underline).

124. The Court of Appeal  further went  on to cite  the Canadian  case above

“…….on other cases there can be no  doubt  that the common  law has  always  required  personal  service or  actual personal knowledge of a court order as  a precondition  to liability  in contempt…….knowledge is in most cases ( including  criminalcases) proved circumstantially, and in contempt cases  inference  of knowledge  will always be available  where facts capable of  supporting the inference  are proved ( see Avery v Andrews [1882] 5 I L Jch. 414  ( emphasis  by underline)

In United  States  v Revie  834  F. 2d  1198 (5th Cir. 1987)  the court held  that  the defendant  had adequate  notice of  a show cause  because  his Attorney  was on notice.  Therefore, a client  may be  similarly  “served” with a court’s  order by his attoney’s communication of its contents and this communication or presumed  if the attorney  has knowledge  of the order.”

125. In the instant  case, there is  overwhelming  evidence  beyond   any cloud of doubt  that Mr Nzaku’s office  which represented  the  exparte  applicants/alleged  contemnors  was served  with the court order  of  10th October  2016  on the same  day. The said advocate  Mr Nzaku  appeared in court on 12th October  2016   and confirmed  to court that he  had received the order and  had  communicated  its contents  to his  clients. His said clients who are the alleged contemnors then each swore  affidavits  in reply to the motion for contempt  saying they had only  been made  aware of  the  court order  on  12th October  2016  and  stopped d the ongoing  conference.

126. Later  after their  affidavits  in reply  were expunged  from the record because they were filed  late without  leave of court, their advocate  Mr Nzaku angrily  withdrew  from acting  for them in protest  and when  the court granted  them leave  to file  fresh  replying  affidavits, they disowned  the first  affidavits  saying they   were forgeries  because they  contained  facts admitting that the  alleged  contemnors  had been  made aware of the court order on 12th October 2016.  Nonetheless, the expunged affidavits were brought in these proceedings  as evidence by the applicant.  The alleged contemnors never brought in the proceedings their former advocates who filed  the expunged  affidavits  on their  behalf to deny that he received their instructions to file those affidavits on their behalf.

127. The allegation of forgery does not pinpoint what part or parts of the affidavits was or were forgeries. It was a general allegation of forgery.

128. It follows that the evidence of knowledge  of the court order  and  service upon the alleged contemnors’ advocates Nzaku & Nzaku and the fact that Mr Nzaku advocate notified the alleged contemnors of the contents of the order on 12th October 2016 was never  challenged by the alleged contemnors.

129. In Christine  Wangari Gachege v Elizabeth  Wanjiru  Evans   & 11 Others ( Civil  Application  No. 233  of 2007,it  was held:

“ The  dispensation of service  under Rule  81. 8 (1)  is subject  to whether  the person  can be said  to have  had notice  of the terms  of the judgment  or order.  The notice  of the order  is satisfied  if the person or his  agent  can   be said  to either  have been  present   when the judgment  or order was made  or given; or was notified  of its  terms by telephone, email  or otherwise.  In our view, ‘otherwise’ would  mean any other  action  that  can  be  proved  to have facilitated the  person having come  into knowledge  of the terms of the judgment  and or order.  This would definitely include a situation where a person is represented in court by counsel.

Once the applicant   has proved notice, the  respondent  bears  an evidential  burden  in relation to willfulness and  malafides disobedience.”

130. In this  case, it is clear  that  Mr Nzaku  was served  with the court  order on  10th October  2016 and on  12th October 2010 he notified  his clients, the alleged  contemnors.  On the  said latter  date, Mr Nzaku advocate attended court and   admitted notifying  his clients of the order  in question.  The said  order  was then said  to have been  disobeyed  and the  court directed  that an appropriate  application be filed  in court for directions  on 17th October  2016.

131. At that moment, no doubt, the alleged contemnors were  holding  a  conference which had  been prohibited  and nothing prevented  them  from stopping  the  conference and seeking   to vary the court’s  orders.  To date, no application to vary  the impugned  order has been placed  before the court. The order in issue was a prohibitory injunction in nature directed at the respondents/alleged contemnors to stop holding a conference.  It was  a clear order.

132. J.M. Paterson 6th Edition  of Kerr on injunctions  states.

“The agents, however, of a man  against  whom an  injunction has  been awarded, although not named  in the order, may  be committed for contempt, if having knowledge of the injunction, they act in contravention  of the order of the  court.  Moreover, any person, whether an agent or not , who, knowing of an  injunction,  aids and  abets the party enjoined  in committing a breach of it, is liable  to be committed.  In  such cases, the committal is not, technically for breach  of an injunction  but for a  contempt of court tending to obstruct  the course  of justice.”

133. In the instant case, it clearly emerges that the exparte  applicant’s  agents, Nzaku & Nzaku  advocates  were  served with the court  order and  they went  ahead to notify  the  alleged  contemnors.  There is  nothing  to show that Mr Nzaku  aided or  abetted the disobedience  of the court order by telling  his clients  not to obey it.  There is also no evidence to support the allegation that Mr Nzaku forged affidavits from his clients which affidavits were only  expunged  from the record  for being  filed out  of time without  leave of court  and  not because  of their contents.

134. In other words, any other party could still use the  said affidavits as the applicant  herein  did, in  evidence, by annexing  it to their  further affidavit.

In Republic v Attorney General  exparte  Envanson Gidraph Kamau Waitiki & Another Mombasa Civil Application  40/2000 Muriithi J stated:

“No matter how  judicious  an order  of the court is, if  it is not complied with, or implemented, the same remains  worthless paper directive with no practical  effect  in resolution of the dispute  adjudicated  by the court.”

135. And the Court of Appeal  in the Shimmers  Plaza  Ltd (supra)  case citing  Romer L.J Hadkison  vs Hadkison [1952] 2 ALL ER 567 at  page 569where it held:

“it is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person  against or  in respect  of, whom  an order  is made  by a court of competent  jurisdiction to obey it unless  and  until that  order is  discharged.  The  uncompromising  nature of this  obligation is shown by  the fact that  it  extends even to cases where  the  person  affected  by an order  believes it  to be  irregular  or even void.Lord Cottehn ham, L.C, temp.  Cotts.342):

“ A party  who know as of  an order, whether null or valid, regular or irregular, cannot be permitted  to disobey it.  It would be most dangerous  to hold that the suitors, or their solicitors, could themselves judged whether  an order  was  null  or valid- whether it was  regular or irregular.  That is why  they should  come to the  court and not take upon themselves to determine such a question.  That the course of a party knowing  of an order, which  was  null  or irregular, and  who might  be discharged , as long  as it  existed  it must not  be  disobeyed.  Such  being the nature of this obligation, two consequences will, in general, follow  from its  breach.  The first  is that  anyone  who disobeys an order of the  court( and I am not  now considering disobedience  of orders relating  merely  to matters of procedures, is in contempt and may be punished by committal  or attachment  or otherwise.  The second  is that no  application to the  court by such person  will be  entertained until he has  purged himself  of his contempt.”

136. In the instant case, there is every indication and  sufficient cogent  evidence to show that  the alleged  contemnors  had knowledge  of the court order, and that therefore  the  alleged service  by Alfred Njeru on  13th October  2016  was  unnecessary  since their advocate  Mr Nzaku  was  served  and   he  was  present  in court on  12th October  2016  when the  issue of disobedience  of the said  court order  was  raised.

137. There is also sufficient evidence and which is beyond  reasonable doubt  that  the chairman  of the Association  did give his closing  remarks on 14th October  2016  to the effect that the conference had successfully  come to an  end despite  a court order stopping  them from continuing  with the conference.  The affidavit by Mr Kinge    was not contradicted or at all.  There  was  evidence that  Dr Kinge  was on the programme  of the conference  on 14th October   2016   as a speaker   from 12. 00 noon-12. 10 and he deposed that he arrived  at  the conference on 13th October  2016.  The alleged contemnors have not disowned the conference programme which was  produced  as an exhibit by the  applicants. They have not given reasons why Dr Kinge would be motivated to lie against them in such a serious matter of contempt of court.

138. Consequently, I find and  hold that  the alleged  contemnors  brazenly  disobeyed the court order of 10th October  2016 by continuing  to hold a  conference  on 12th-14th October  2016  at Acacia Premier  Hotel, Kisumu despite knowledge  of the court order  and  service  of the said  court   order on their advocate Mr  Nzaku   who conceded  in court that he notified the alleged contemnors of the court order  on of 10th October, 2016 on 12th October  2016  in the morning.

139. The terms  of the order of  10th October  2016  are clear  and  unambiguous, it  was  an interim  injunctive  order  temporarily  prohibiting  the exparte  applicants from  convening  and  or holding the scheduled conference called 23rd Medical  Laboratory Scientific & Exhibitions Conference for the Association of Kenya Medical Laboratory Scientific  Officers(AKMLSC) scheduled to be held  from 11th- 14th October  2010  at Acacia Premier  Hotel, Kisumu.

140. The  order was not final as  it  were issued  exparte  in the first instance  pending hearing  interpartes.

141. From  the conduct  of the  respondents, that of  continuing  with the conference  even after  being  notified of the order  stopping the same, it is clear that they had  the  necessary  mensrea  to disobey  the  court order.  This is so because the chairman  Mr Abala had the  audacity to give  closing  remarks  saying that although there  was a court  order halting  the conference, it had gone on  successfully.  In other words, no court order could have  stopped  the  scheduled conference  and therefore his  depositions  that  the conference  was  stopped  upon  learning of the court order, or that  they could have  stopped  the conference   had they  been served  with the court order is nothing  but pure cosmetic  public relations stunts.

142. Temporary injunctions  are granted  in order to  prevent  the ends of  justice  from being  defeated.  It is  for that  reason that  Section  63(c )  of the Civil Procedure Act  provides that  incase of  disobedience  of such temporary injunction, the court  may commit  the person  guilty  thereof  to prison  and  order that  his property  be attached  and sold.

143. In addition, Order 40 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules  prescribes the procedure of  punishment  of breach of  temporary  injunction   as follows:

“3(1) In cases of disobedience, or breach  of any such  terms, the court  granting  an injunction  may order  the property  of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may  also order  such person  to be detained in prison for a  term not exceeding six months unless in the meantime  the  court directs  his release.”

144. In the instant case, albeit the exparte applicants  counsel claimed  that the order did not have a  penal notice  on the consequences  of disobedience, from the plethora of  authorities cited, it is clear that knowledge of the order is sufficient and not personal service.  Furthermore, the provisions  of  Section 63(c )  of the Civil Procedure Act  does not mandate that a penal notice be appended on the order before service or before one can be  found  guilty of contempt  of court.  On  the face of it, the order  of 10th October  2016 as extracted the same  day is clear  as to  what  was being  prohibited  and  who was  being  prohibited  from doing what.  It  does not  require  any other  interpretation.

145. In Johnson V Walton [1990]1FLR350 at 352 Lord  Donaldson MR  stated :

“ It cannot be  too clearly  stated that, when an injunctive  order is made or when  an  undertaking  is given, it operates   until it is revoked  on appeal or by the  court itself, and it  has to be  obeyed  whether   or not it should have been  granted in the first instance.”

146. Section  5 of the Judicature Act ( now repealed  by the Contempt  of Court  Act , 2016) conferred on the High Court  and the Court of Appeal the power  to punish  for  contempt of court.

147. The provisions of Section  63( c )  and  (e)  and  Order  40 of the Civil Procedure  Act and Rules  respectively  confer  on the court  whose orders  have  been breached   the jurisdiction to punish  for contempt.

148. In Spoke  V Bankany  Board of  Health, Wood  Vc stated:

“The  simple and  only view is that  an order must be obeyed.  That those  who wish to  get  rid of that  order must do so  by  the proper cause, an appeal.  So long  as it exists  the order must be  obeyed  and obeyed to the letter.”

149. In Stan crub v Trow brudge  VDC, Warringlon  J( cited in  Mwaniki Silas Ngari  V John S. Akama  & Another  [2015] e KLR it  was stated:

“If  a person or corporation is restrained  by injunction  from doing  a particular  act, that person or corporation  commits s a breach of the injunction, and is liable for a process  of contempt,  if he or  it infact  does the act, and if  it is no  answer  to say that  the act  was  not contumacious  in the sense  that, in doing  it,  there  was no direct  intention to disobey  the order.”

150. Theodore Roosevelt, the 26th President of the United States of America once said:-

“No man is above the law and no man is below it; nor do we ask any man’s permission to obey it. Obedience to the law is demanded as a right; not as a favour.’’

151. Having found  there exists  a clear  valid order  of this court  made on  10th October 2016  and  which order  the  exparte applicants (except)  Mr Haron Bowen  and Mr Alex  Osore, were made  aware  of on  12th October 2016; and  having found that the exparte  applicants brazenly  disobeyed the  said order by continuing  with the conference despite the prohibition, I hereby  find each of  the exparte  applicants herein namely Michael Abala Wanga, Safari K. Kithi, Aglean Chelimo, Harun Anunda, and Robert  Katsutsuguilty of contempt  of court  order issued on 10th October  2016  and  convict each of them accordingly for contempt of court.

152. I shall pronounce appropriate sentence only after hearing the exparte applicants/contemnors hereinabove in mitigation.

153. The contemnors shall meet the costs of these contempt proceedings, payable to the applicants, to be agreed or assessed by the court.

Dated, signed, and delivered in open court at Nairobi this 9th day of October, 2017.

R. E. ABURILI

JUDGE

In the presence of:

Mr Chebii for the applicants

Mrs Manyarkiy for the contemnors

Miss Mwangi for the Respondent

All contemnors are present in court

CA: George