Republic v Senior Principal Magistrate Court at Narok, District Land Registrar, Narok, John Allan Onchiri Masese & Reuben Mabil [2014] KEHC 28 (KLR) | Judicial Review | Esheria

Republic v Senior Principal Magistrate Court at Narok, District Land Registrar, Narok, John Allan Onchiri Masese & Reuben Mabil [2014] KEHC 28 (KLR)

Full Case Text

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAKURU

JUDICIAL  REVIEW NO. 10 OF 2009

REPUBLIC.........................................................................................APPLICANT

VERSUS

SENIOR PRINCIPAL MAGISTRATE COURT AT NAROK.......1ST RESPONDENT

DISTRICT LAND REGISTRAR, NAROK................................2ND RESPONDENT

AND

JOHN ALLAN ONCHIRI MASESE........................................................SUBJECT

REUBEN MABIL.................................................................INTERESTED PARTY

RULING

By  a notice of motion dated 16/02/2009, the  exparte applicant  JOHN ALLAN  ONCHIRI MASESE, moved  this court by way of Judicial Review for  orders of certiorari to quash the order dated September 2008 issued by SPM Narok  in  which the  District Officer Mulot Division was ordered  to  offer  security to  the  District Land Registrar when visiting the ground for  purposes of establishing the boundaries  between parcel CIS-MARA/ILMOTIOK/463, 464and 465 respectively.  Secondly that the order of certiorari  also  do   issue  to  quash  the  letter  dated  14th January 2009 of the  District  Land  Registrar, which intended  to implement  the order dated  2nd  September 2008.

The  reasons for  seeking these orders are that there is  no decree which the  respondent is  purporting to  implement in  terms of section 7(2)  of the Land Disputes Tribunal Act No. 18 of 1990. Further, that there is an open glaring discrepancy in the respondent's and intention vis a  vis the findings of  the Tribunal in  Land Disputes Tribunal Case No. 6 of 2006.  The  order which the respondent in his  letter dated 14/01/2009 intends to implement is described as a nullity and that it  contravenes the prov1s1ons  of  the Land   Disputes Tribunal Act  because instead of  entering the verdict  of   the Tribunal as a Judgment of the court, the  trial magistrate went ahead to hear arguments from  the  advocates and Land Registrar.

Further, that the respondent's letter of 14th January 2009 does not tally with   the  numbers of parcels of land reflected in  the  order of 4th September 2008.  This letter is  faulted as a  nullity on grounds that  it  purports  to confer  powers  on   the  respondents  which  he   does  not have in  law.

It is also  contended that under section 21and 22 of the Registered Land  Act,   the respondent can only  move  on the   issue  of  boundaries  to  land  after  complying with various  steps  set  out  thereunder,  especially under section 21(4)  which provides that:-

"No court shall entertain any action or proceedings relating to a dispute as to the boundaries of Registered Land unless the boundaries have been determined as provided in the section."

It is the applicant's contention that  there  is a jurisdictional error in  the letter of 14th January 2009 and it  is  ultra vires the law relating to establishment of land boundaries.

In  opposing the  prayers,  the   Interested  Party REUBEN KIPNGETICH  MABIL has deposed in  the replying affidavit that the  orders sought are   governed  by  malice and are founded  on baseless arguments with no   foundation in law. It is his contention that the applicant does not question the decree issued by the magistrate at Narok but is more concerned with the letter that seeks to provide security. The Respondent insists that the Mulot Land Disputes Tribunal's decision was adopted by the magistrate's court at Narok as its judgment and a decree issued in  Misc. Land   Case No. 11 of 2007. It  took a while   for  the Registrar to  implement the   decree, so  on 26/08/2008,  the respondent  raised  the issue  before court, and a summons was  issued to  the   Registrar, and upon attendance, the  latter was  directed, in  the presence of the  exparte applicant to  fix  an appropriate date for  a ground  visit. Further, the District Office Mulot was ordered to   provide security during the   visit. On   two occasions  when  the ground  visit   was  scheduled,  the applicant  failed  to turn up, and  the letter dated 14th January 2009 was written by  the Registrar,  in implementation of the  decree.

Respondent confirms that the Land Registrar also wanted to correct an error in calculation of distance between Richard Ngeno's parcel and his, during the  visit - Richard Ngeno  did  not  complain about that correction, and it  is argued that the inclusion of his  name, so  there is  really no  discrepancy in  the   letter.   The respondent explains that, prior to writing the letter in question, the Registrar had written several other letters, seeking to  fix the  boundaries on  the   ground  but  this never materialised. The present application is faulted as being intended to frustrate the execution of the court's decree.

The respondent  wonders what harm  the  applicant  will suffer  when  security  is  granted  to   the  District  Land Registrar, saying it  is apparent that the applicant does not welcome the idea   of having the boundaries established because he knows he  is on  the  wrong and the exercising is likely to  make a finding in  the respondent's favour.  He argues that there is no reason whatsoever to stop the Registrar from implementing the order given by the   court. The reference to  section 7 (2) of  the  Land Disputes Tribunal Act  is said to be bad  in law.

Directions were taken in 2012 to the  effect that the application was to be disposed of by way of written submissions, but despite several mentions, the applicant's counsel failed to file any written submissions. The Interested Party's counsel filed  written submissions in which it is argued    that the motion is incurably defective by  dint of section 8 and 9 of the Law  Reform Act, Order 53 Rule    1(2),  together with the Supreme Court of England Practice Rules 1976 which require that the   facts must be  contained in  an  affidavit, yet   in  this instance the  applicant's own  verifying affidavit refers to it as "verifying all the averments and facts  as  set in the statutory statement." Counsel submits that facts are proceedings in an affidavit and have great evidential value in an application for Judicial Review, whereas a statement carried no more than the description of the applicant, the reliefs sought and the grounds relied on. In   this regard counsel submits that  the   statement  in these  proceedings cannot  be   alleged  to carry  and/ or verify   facts  to be relied  on, and  it means  that  the pleadings  are incomplete. The   court  is   urged  to   be guided by  the  cases of Egerton University & Another V R  and Another Appeal No.259  of  2004 Nku, and the case  of  Commissioner  General, Kenya  Revenue Authority through Republic V Silvano Owema Owaki Civil  Appeal No.45 of 2000 Kisumu.

As  regards the   decree, counsel submits that  there is  a competent decree upon the court's adoption of the Mulot Land Dispute  Tribunal's  decision, and  no appeal has been  preferred  against  the  Tribunal's  decision or the decree after it was  adopted by the  court. Further, that by 26/08/2008, the decree was ripe for execution. It  is pointed out that the orders of 2nd September 2008 were issued as a consequence of execution of a court's decree, and  the  PM's court  was  seized  with  jurisdiction to execute  the decree  after adoption  of  the  Tribunal's decision.

As  for  the contents of  the letter of  14th January 2009, counsel argues that  the same bears no offensive intention,  and  is  a very  honest plea and notice  by the District Land Registrar to  the  litigants on  the date of his intended visit  on  the ground for their own  benefit and the letter is not  ultra vires. Further that,  it is ridiculous to ask the court to  quash an event which ought  to  have been  carried out  in the  year 2009.

The application is described as an  abuse of court process and the court is urged to dismiss it with  costs.

The issues which arise for determination are:-

(1)  Whether the pleadings are  defective in  light  of the averments in  the  verifying affidavits and what are described as facts in the  statutory statements.

(2) Is there a competent decree?

(3) The status of the orders issued on 2nd  September 2008 vis a vis the  Land  Disputes Tribunal Act and the Registered Land  Act [Cap  300].

(4) Whether the  letter dated  14th  January  2009 is ultra vires.

Defective pleadings

I have considered the  decisions cited in  support of  the form of   procedure to  be  adopted   when filing an application for  Judicial Review. I have also  perused the verifying affidavit and  the   Statement of  Facts,  actually apart  from what  is   stated  at  para  2   of  the   verifying affidavit,  the   rest of  verifying affidavit and  statement  of facts comply with  the  provisions of Order  53 ( 1) (2) Civil Procedure Rules, section  8 and 9of  the   Law  Reform Act  (Cap   26)and  the  Supreme   Court   Practice   of England, and   that averment is  not   fatal.  The facts are alluded to  in  the   said verifying affidavit but I will  admit that they are not detailed.   However in  my  view  this is not  fatal  as  the  documents  in  totality  clearly communicate  the    applicant's  grievance. In any case Article 159 ( 1)  (d)  of  the  Constitution of  Kenya offer the   applicant refuge as procedural technicalities should not  be  a bar  to  substantive justice.  I also note that the decisions cited in this regard were made before 2010 when technical faults could easily bar   a party's pursuit to justice.   I therefore decline to dismiss the application on this procedural technicality.

Competent Decree?

The  dispute between the  parties was  deliberated upon by the  Mulot  Land  Disputes Tribunal as was provided under section 3 (1)  of  the   Land   Disputes tribunal  Act.  The decision was then forwarded to  the  magistrate's  court for purposes of  adoption as judgment of  the court, under section 7(2)of the  same Act  which provides as follows:­

"7(2) The  court shall enter judgment in accordance with the decision of  the Tribunal and upon judgment  being entered a decree shall issue and shall be enforceable in  the  manner provided for under the Civil  Procedure Act."

From the  proceedings,  the    decision  was  adopted  on 20/11/2007 in  the  following terms:-

"The award is stated (sic)and adopted as the judgment of the court."

The decision by the Tribunal had stated inter alia:­

"That the  area being claimed by  the claimant should be  sorted out by  the District  Land   Registrar and  the  owner be  given his right portion compared to the   map  (R.I.M.)    boundaries  adopted from  the Adjudication Map."

Following the adoption (which meant  that  the  decision was  now  a judgment of  the court), a decree issued, reproducing the very  findings of the  Tribunal. I am  afraid I am  unable to comprehend the  argument raised by the applicant that there is  no  decree to  be  implemented - I confirm that there is  infact a Decree on  record and duly signed  by  the   Principal  Magistrate Narok. There is no order setting aside the  Tribunal/s decision, or  the court's decree, nor  was  any material presented to  this court to the effect that  there was an appeal lodged against the judgment.   I therefore hold that there does exist a valid decree.

Status of Orders of 02/09/2011

From the court record, on  the aforementioned date, the parties or their representative were  present in court subsequent to  a  complaint raised by  the  respondent's counsel that the   District land Registrar had fixed  dates for  visiting the  ground to  implement the court's decision several times, but on  all  the  occasions, failed. As a result the court issued summons to  the  District Land registrar to show cause why  he  had not  visited the ground.

Indeed on 2/9/2008 the Land   Registrar attended court and explained his challenges, and expressed a willingness to visit the ground. Upon request by the applicant's counsel (which was not contested), the court directed that the D.O.  Mulot   Division provides security.  That was necessary so as to give effect to the implementation of the decision.  These directions did not in any way violate the provisions of section 21 and 22 of the Registered Land Act.  It did not touch on the determination of the boundary, it was  simply to facilitate the security of  the   individual who would carry out  the exercise and the  affected parties.  I hold that in  granting the  prayer that the  D.O. Mulot  Division provides security, the  Principal Magistrate did  not  act  in excess of his jurisdiction.

Status of the Impugned letter

It  is  important  to  reproduce the   contents of  the letter dated 14th January 2006 and signed by the  District Land Registrar P.M. MENGI, addressed to the applicant, the respondent, JAEL  KIPRONO  MUTAI  and  RICHARD NGENO.   The   subject is Cis-Mara/llmotiok/463,464, 465, 3248, and the letter reads:-

"The above subject matter refers.  I will be visiting the above mentioned parcels of land in the company of the surveyor on 4th February 2009 to implement the same court order. You are therefore required to be on site at 10. 00 a.m. for the exercise."

The letter is copied to  the District Officer  Mulot Division with a note to  provide security,  the   area Chief, and the District Surveyor.  I note that the  letter mentions parcel No.3248, which was  not  a subject of the  court order BUT the  applicant  does  not   claim to  be   the   owner  of  the parcel. There is absolutely nothing ultra vires or offensive in that letter. I am inclined to believe what the respondent says that the applicant is out to frustrate the exercise by raising every possible and imaginable object. The upshot is that the application has no merit and is dismissed with costs to the respondent.

Delivered and dated   this 24th day of September 2014 at Nakuru

H.A. OMONDI

JUDGE