Republic v Speaker of Nairobi City County Assembly & Nairobi City County Assembly Exparte Evans Kidero [2017] KEHC 6101 (KLR) | Judicial Review Timelines | Esheria

Republic v Speaker of Nairobi City County Assembly & Nairobi City County Assembly Exparte Evans Kidero [2017] KEHC 6101 (KLR)

Full Case Text

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

JUDICIAL REVIEW NO.  480 OF 2016

IN THE MATER OF AN APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPLY FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW ORDERS OF CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION

AND

IN THE MATTER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PURSUANT TO ARTICLES  2(1),3(1),10,21(1),22(1),23(1)23(3)(f),27(1),47(1),50(2) 174,175,176,181,185(3),229(8),236(a)& (b) & of  CONSTITUTION OF KENYA,2010.

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE LAW REFORM ACT, SECTION 8 AND 9 CAP 26 LAWS OF KENYA

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE COUNTY GOVERNMENT ACT, 2012 OF THE LAWS OF KENYA

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE NAIROBI CITY COUNTY ASSEMBLY STANDING ORDERS

BETWEEN

REPUBLIC ………………….… ……….……………………………...APPLICANT

VERSUS

THE SPEAKER OF NAIROBI CITY

COUNTY ASSEMBLY …………….…….………………...….1ST RESPONDENT

THE NAIROBI CITY COUNTY ASSEMBLY …….…............2ND RESPONDENT

HON. DR. EVANS KIDERO………………...….……..…..EXPARTE APPLICANT

RULING

Issue: whether the Court exercising Judicial Review jurisdiction has power to extend time for filing of the substantive Notice of Motion under Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules.

1. By a notice of motion dated 13th December 2016 the exparte applicant Dr.  Evans Kidero who is the Governor for Nairobi City County seeks from this court orders:

a) Spent

b) That the court  be pleased to extend  the  21 days  period  that   was allowed for  the filing of the notice  of motion application  by 6 days;

c) That the court   does admit   the notice of motion filed   on 7th November 2016 as having been duly filed.

d) The court grants such further or other reliefs it may deem just and expedient to grant.

2. The  application  was expressly brought  under the provisions  of Order  50  Rule  6 of the Civil Procedure  Rules, Order  53  Rule   3(1)  of the Civil Procedure  Rules, 2012 Article  159  of the Constitution, Section 9(3) of the Law Reform Act, Cap  26 Laws of Kenya  and  all enabling   provisions  of the law.

3. The application is predicated on the grounds on the face of the notice of motion and supported by an affidavit sworn by Vera Lucy Awour advocate on 13th December  2016.

4. According to the grounds and  as replicated in the depositions  of Ms. Vera Lucy Awour, who is an associate advocate in the applicant counsel’s  law firm of Professor Tom Ojienda & Associates, on 10th October  2016  this court  did grant  leave to the  exparte applicant  to institute Judicial Review proceedings  as sought  in the chamber  summons  dated  10th October  2016;  and also  ordered that such leave  do operate  as stay of both the  summons dated  5th  October  2016   issued to  the applicant  and the impeachment  process against him  in the manner  that  had been contemplated  by the respondents’ Speaker  of  and  the Nairobi City County Assembly.

5. That  the said orders were subsequently served upon the respondents on 12th  October  2016 and the respondents  then filed  a comprehensive  application  seeking to set aside  the stay orders that had been obtained  by the exparte  applicant.

6. That counsel for the exparte  applicant  then focused  on filing  substantive responses  to the application which sought  to lift the  stay orders  based on erroneous  humogous accusations that the applicant had misrepresented facts and failed to disclose   material  facts  to the court hence, the preparation and filing of a 152 paged  replying  affidavit  dated  5th November   2016  and  the  311 paged  submissions  dated the same day.

7. That it took counsel for the applicant considerable  time  coming  up with  the comprehensive responses  which consumed  time hence  the delay in filing  of the substantive  notice of motion  within 21 days  as had been directed  by the court  and that instead  the motion  was filed  5 days  later  than the  21 days  period allowed  by the  court on 10th October 2016.

8. Further, that counsel was also under the  mistaken  belief  that Sundays  are  excluded  in the computation of time which  was  a mistake on her part and  not on the  part of the applicant.

9. That mistakes of counsel should never be visited upon an innocent client and that the court has wide discretion to extend time within which the substantive motion is to be filed if it establishes that the delay is not  inordinate, is  excusable  and has not  occasioned  prejudice to the respondents  as is  provided for under Order  50 Rule  6  of the Civil Procedure Rules.

10. Further, that  Article  159 of the  Constitution enjoins  the courts not  to pay undue  regard  to  procedural technicalities  but that instead focus  on meting  out substantive  justice  hence courts  of law should pay homage to their core duty of serving substantive  justice in Judicial  Review proceedings before  them so as  to ensure  that justice  is served.

11. It was deposed that it was in the interest of justice, fairness and the public interest that application be allowed.

12. The respondents opposed the application vide a replying affidavit sworn on 12th January 2017 by Alex Ole Magelo the Speaker of Nairobi City County Assembly deposing that the allegations by the applicant are incredulous since  counsel Professor  Tom Ojienda  who has had  the conduct of this  matter on behalf  of the applicant  from  the outset is  an advocate of the rank  of Senior Counsel and therefore he knew  or ought  to have  known that Saturdays and Sundays  are not  excluded from the  court’s  computation of time unless explicitly  provided  as such by the court.

13. Further, that Articles 159 (2) (d) of the Constitution cannot be invoked to oust mandatory rules of procedure. That the applicant’s counsels have breached the court’s rules and procedure and that no credible reasons  have been  preferred for failure  to file or serve  the  substantive application in time, which fatal  omissions  cannot be wished away  by the applicant  and his advocates  under the   guise  of Article  159(2) (d)  of the Constitution.

14. It was further deposed that Order 53 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure  Rules  mandates  the filing of the substantive motion  within 21 days of the orders of  leave  which period is absolute and therefore not challengeable  under Order  50 Rule  6 of the Civil Procedure  Rules. Further, that the Law Reform Act, the substantive law  governing prerogative orders, does not provide for  enlargement of time within which a  party should  file the substantive  motion; and  that therefore  this court  has no jurisdiction to grant the applicant  leave to file  the substantive  application out of time.

15. That whenever  an advocate  by his  inexcusable  delay  deprives  a client  of his  cause of action, the proper  recourse  for the client  is to claim  damages  against  the advocate. Consequently, that for  legal business  to be  conducted  efficiently, the applicants’ advocates should  bear the consequences  of their   own professional  negligence  for failing  to file  the substantive  application in time  and that similarly, the applicant  should bear the consequences  of his choice  of advocates.

16. That even if  this court had  jurisdiction  to grant  extension of  time, such  extension  is not  as of right, but is  only available   to a deserving  party, at the discretion of the court but that  the conduct of the applicant throughout these proceedings is unworthy  of such discretion.

17. That the applicant has not discharged the burden of proving why he seeks for extension of time and that the reasons advanced for such failure are not only incredulous but frivolous.  That an extension should not be granted where the respondents will be adversely affected, as is the case herein; and that  the application  for  extension  of time   which is  dated  13th  December  2016   was filed  30 days  after the date of filing  the motion out of time  on 7th November 2016 and that it was only  filed on  12th January  2017.

18. That Judicial Review  proceedings are a  special jurisdiction and the statutory  timelines   set are  not intended to be extended  but that  instead, they  should be  strictly  adhered to  hence the   application is  an abuse  of the court process  for being  filed out of time hence it   should be dismissed  with costs.

19. The parties’  advocates canvassed the  motion orally  before me  on 30th January 2017 with Senior Counsel Professor Tom Ojienda urging the application on behalf of the applicant  whereas  Mr Karanja represented  the  respondents.

20. Professor Ojienda  also relied  on his written  submissions  filed on 27th January 2017 and reiterated the grounds and  depositions  made by  Veralucy Awour Advocate  maintaining that  this court  has  wide discretion   to extend  the time under  Order  50 Rule  6 of the Civil Procedure  rules as  read with  Section  9(1)  of the Law Reform Act. Reliance  was placed on Miscellaneous Civil Application  JR  8/2014  Kenya Bureau of Standards and  3 Others  V Kenya  Maritime  Authority  Exparte  Car Importers  Association [2014] e KLR where  Honourable Mureithi J held  inter alia,  that  whereas   the provision  relating  to the  6  months  period for  commencement  of proceedings   for certiorari  is statutory  being  expressed  by Section 9 of the Law Reform  Act, the requirement  for filing  of the notice  of motion upon  grant of  leave  is prescribed  by the subsidiary  legislation of the Civil Procedure Rules, which contain  a rule (Order 50 rule 6)  providing expressly for enlargement of time  for doing  anything  prescribed  under the Rules.

21. Further  reliance   was placed on this  courts own  decision in JR 371 & 372 of 2015  Republic V Public  Procurement  Administrative Review Board Exparte Syner Chemie  Limited [2016] e KLR where the court enlarged  time stipulated  under Order  53  of the Civil Procedure Rules.

22. Further reliance  was placed on Miscellaneous  Application   699 of 2007 Lucy Bosire V Kehancha Divisional Land Disputes  Tribunal  & 2 Others [2013] e KLR citing with  approval Branco Arabe Spanol vs Bank  of Uganda [1999] 2 EA  22 in  submissions  that the  court should  apply Article  159  2 (d)  of the Constitution to serve substantive  justice.

23. Further reliance was placed on Miscellaneous Civil Application  12/2014   Republic Vs  General  Manager, Moi International  Airport  & Another Exparte  Jared Adimo Odhiambo & Another [2014] e KLR where the court  emphasized  the need to place Order  53 Rule  3   of the Civil Procedure  Rules in  consistency  with Article  159  principle  that justice  should  be administered  without due regard  to procedural  technicalities  and  therefore that  the court  should invoke  its inherent  powers  to extend  time to achieve  substantive  justice.

24. It  was submitted that sufficient  explanation  was provided for the delay  in that the  applicant  swore  the affidavit   early enough and that there  were  only five  days  late due to the bulky documents  that had to  be prepared and filed  to challenge  the  respondent’s  application seeking  to vacate  the orders issued by  this court  on  10th October  2016,  which delay  was due to an  inadvertent   error  of the applicant’s  advocate   who has  owned  up and  absolved the party.

25. It  was  submitted, replying  on JR  12/14 Republic V GM Moil  Int’l Airport (supra)  case that  5 days  delay  could not be   inordinate  in the circumstances, bearing in  mind the  fact that  the substantive motion  has already been filed  hence  no prejudice  is occasioned to the respondents.

26. In response  to the  submissions by  Professor  Tom Ojienda Senior Counsel, Mr Karanja  submitted in opposition  reiterating  the contents  of the replying  affidavit  sworn by Mr Alex  Magelo while  replying  on written submissions  filed on  27th January 2017, emphasizing   that there  was  inordinate  delay of  39 days  of filing of  the motion out  of time.  Reliance   was placed on  the decision  in Aviation & Allied  workers  Union (K) KQ & 3 Others [2015] e KLR which lays  down principles  for extension  of time and that  the  Court of Appeal  made  it clear  that extension  of time is  not  a right; that there must  be  prove  why a party seeks  such extension; that there should  be no extension where  the respondent  will be  adversely affected; and   that the  application must have  been brought  timeously.

27. According to Mr Karanja, the court has no jurisdiction to enlarge time in  Judicial Review  proceedings  as the rest  of the provisions  of the Civil Procedure Act and Rules, apart from  Order  53  thereof  do not apply  to Judicial Review  proceedings  hence this  application is an abuse of the court process  and  therefore  it  should be  dismissed with costs.  Reliance   was  placed on Commissioner  of Lands V Hotel Kunste  CA  234/1995; M.M. Ole  Keiuwa  &  J.V. Odera  Juma V Yash Pal Ghai  [2002] e KLR where  the court made  it clear that Judicial Review proceedings are special jurisdiction  proceedings, neither  civil nor  criminal   hence Order  50 Rule  6 of the Civil procedure Rule is not applicable  as the prohibition  is statutory, as  was held in Republic V Kahindi Nyafula  & 3 Others Exparte  Kilifi  South  East  Farmers Co-operative Union [2014] and that  therefore Order  50 Rule  6  and  Article  159 (2) of the Constitution is not  available  to the applicant.   Further reliance   was placed on Section 3 of the Civil Procedure Act which recognizes special procedure prescribed by or under any other law.

28. On the  submission that Article  159  of the Constitution  is applicable, a  warning shot came from  Nicholas  Kiptoo Salat V IEBC  & 6  Others  [2013] e KLR  where the Court of Appeal  held that   courts must  never provide comfort  and cover  to parties  who exhibit  scant  respect  for  rules  and  timelines  hence, the  applicant  cannot  invoke   Article  159(2) (d) of the Constitution  to  oust  mandatory  rules of  procedure   as  was held  in Africa  Oil  Turkana  Limited  & 2 Others  V Edward Kings   Onyancha  Maina  & 2 Others [2016] e KLR.

29. It  was submitted that in this case, the applicant  has brought this application  after inordinate delay; the application  is highly  prejudicial to the  respondents  who  already face  contempt proceedings: the applicant  filed the motion out of time without  first obtaining  leave of  court; and that the  applicant  is guilty  of abuse  of the court’s  process for  abandoning Judicial Review  proceedings midway after securing exparte orders to the detriment  of the respondent.  That all the electorate   of Nairobi County is prejudiced as they await the outcome of these proceedings.  It  was further  submitted that the  applicant’s  remedy lies in the applicant  seeking for  damages  against  his advocate  and not extension  of  time.  Reliance   was placed on Michael Muriuki Ngubuini v EA Building Society Ltd [2015] e KLR.Mr Karanja   urged this court to dismiss the application herein with costs.

30. In a brief  rejoinder, Professor Ojienda  submitted that the delay  was only  of  5 days  not  46  days  and that no prejudice  had been  shown to  be occasioned to the respondents  if enlargement  of time  is granted, as the  respondent  will have  an opportunity  to respond to the  substantive motion  which is  already filed on  record.

DETERMINATION

31. I have carefully considered the applicant’s application for enlargement   of time within   which the substantive   notice of motion ought to have been filed.  I have also considered the grounds and the supporting affidavit.  I have  given equal  consideration to the replying  affidavit filed  by the respondents  in opposition to the application, and the  respective parties’  written   and  oral submissions  supported by constitutional, case law and   statutory  enactments.

32. The main issues for determination in this application are:

1. Whether this court has jurisdiction to enlarge time within which the substantive notice of motion ought to have been filed.

2. If the answer in (1) is in the affirmative, whether there was inordinate delay which is prejudicial to the respondents.

3. What orders should this court  make

4. Who should bear the costs of this application?

33. On  the first  issue  of whether  this court  has jurisdiction  to enlarge  time within  which the  substantive  motion ought   to have been  filed, it  was contended  by the respondents that Judicial Review  proceedings  are special proceedings  which are  neither  civil nor criminal  and therefore  the provisions   of the Civil Procedure  Act  and Rules (other than Order 53) do not  apply, and that  neither  would Article  159(2) (d) of the Constitution  come to  the aid of the  applicant  as  the issue  goes  to the substance  and  jurisdiction of the court and  not a procedural  technicality.

34. In the respondent’s views, the substantive law regarding  Judicial Review  proceedings  is Section  8 and  9 of the Law Reform Act, Cap  26 Laws  of Kenya  and that therefore   as the said  Act  whose procedure  is stipulated  in Order  53  of the Civil Procedure Rules  does not  provide for  extension  of time within  which the  21 days  can be  enlarged  or extended, this   application is an abuse of  court process  and  incompetent  hence it  should  be dismissed  with costs.  In other words, the  respondents maintain  that the period  of  21 days  stipulated  under Order  53  Rule  3 of the Civil Procedure  rules is not elastic  hence it  cannot be  enlarged or extended  by the court as it is fixed  by statute.  The respondents  relied on the Court of Appeal  decision in Commissioner for Lands  & Kunste  Hotel Ltd  [1997] e KLR  wherein  the Court of Appeal  held that  Judicial Review  proceedings  are neither  civil or criminal and therefore  not  a suit  as defined  under Section  2 of  the Civil Procedure Act.

35. The respondents also relied  on the High Court decision  in M.M. Ole Keiuwa  & Another  V  Yash Pal Ghai [2002] e KLR  wherein  the court at page 2/3 of the decision  emphasized  that the proceedings  under Order  53 of the Civil  Procedure  Rules  are special  proceedings  in nature  and that Order  53  stands alone exclusive of other provisions of the Civil Procedure  Rules and  Act, and  that Section 3 of the Act fortifies this position by recognizing special jurisdiction or procedure  prescribed  by or under any other  law for  the time  being in force.  Further  reliance   was placed on  Republic vs  Kahindi  Nyafula  &  3 Others  exparte  Kilifi  South  East Farmers  Co-operative [2014] e KLR where the Angote J citing Welamondi  V Chair Electoral Commission of Kenya  eKLR [2002] 285 and  Republic  vs  KBS  & Others [2006] EA 345 held inter alia, that  Judicial Review   proceedings  under Order  53  of the Civil Procedure  Rules are a special  procedure  and  that a party  other than  invoking   Order  53   cannot invoke  the provisions of the Civil Procedure  Rules made  there under.  Consequently,   that Order 50 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules which allows the enlargement of time by the court for doing of a particular act does not come to the aid of the exparte applicant; and neither does Article 159 (2) of the Constitution.

36. According to the respondents, the prohibition under Order 53   Rule 3 is statutory   and absolute and not challengeable   under any procedural provisions of the Civil Procedure Rules which provide for enlargement   of time.

37. On the part of the applicant  he was emphatic that although  Section  9 of the  Law Reform  Act Cap  26 Laws of Kenya which is  a  substantive   provision for  institution  of Judicial Review proceedings  provides for  statutory  6 months  within which the application for leave  ought  to be filed, and  gives no  room  for enlargement  thereof, the procedure  for  filing of the  substantive motion is  set out  in Order  53 of the Civil  Procedure  Rules  and  that owing to  the fact  that the 21 days  period is provided  for by the Civil Procedure Rules, it goes  without saying  that a party  can  ably make an  application for  extension  of the 21 days  period  under Order  50 rule  6 of the Civil Procedure  Rules, for  the filing of  the  motion.

38. The applicant’s counsel  relied on  Republic vs  General  Manager  Moi Int’l Airport  & Another, Exparte  Jared  Adimo  Odhiambo  & Another(supra) where the above  principle  was upheld  with the court holding  that the  court  has power  to enlarge  the 21 days period stipulated in Order 53 Rule 3 of  the Civil Procedure Rules.

39. The applicant’s counsel also hailed the decision of this court in JR 371 & 372/2015 Republic  Vs Public Procurement Administrative Review Board Exparte Syner –Chemie  Ltd [2016] e KLR; JR  8/2014  KBS  & 3 Others v Kenya Maritime Authority Exparte Car Importers Association (supra); and Miscellaneous 699/2007 Lucy Bosire V Kehancha Divisional Land Disputes  Tribunal  & 2 Others (supra)  citing  Branco  Arabe  Espanol  V Bank of Uganda (supra)  where the same  position was upheld.

40. What emerges from the two rival positions advanced by both parties’ counsels is that there is no settled position, currently, as to whether  the period  of  21 days  stipulated  in  Order 53  Rule  3 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, can be enlarged  by  application of Order 50  Rule 6  of the Civil Procedure  Rules which provides for  enlargement  of time.

41. That being the case, this court must endeavour to establish the position.  I have  already  pronounced myself  in several  decisions including JR 371 and 372 of 2015- Republic vs Public Procurement  Administrative  Review Board  Exparte Syner –chemie  Limited [2016] e KLR  that although  some courts  have applied  strict  interpretation  regarding  extension of  time within which the substantive  motion should be  filed,  this court, in the present  constitutional  framework should not  let the former  intricacies and obscurities hamper  the provision of effective  redress to  facilitate  access to justice  for all, and  therefore it  should adopt  a flexible  approach, which is not necessarily crafting or innovating its jurisdiction, but  an approach  that takes cognizance  of the  fact that  old case law  in the reach  of Judicial Review  remedies  may not be  of such practical  relevance  today.

42. Further, that  nonetheless, because  the legislature  has not given any  explicit  direction on the issue, the  court must  adopt  an  interpretation of the  silent  provisions that  best effectuates  the legislative  intent.

43. Judicial Review has its origin in common law and therefore the question is whether common law can override the spirit and letter of our 2010 Constitution. In the writings of Professor Louis Jafee, on Judicial Control of Administrative Action, 329[1965]:

“Common  law has  been particularly  prevalent  in Judicial Review, an area  that  encompasses  “ a whole  congeries  of  Judicial theories  and  practices” which  constitute “ the common  law of review” and which is a significant  of administrative  law  of the jurisdiction.  Accordingly, it is  expected  that where there  is a specific statutory  and  Constitutional  provision  on enactment, then  those enactments  must slowly  replace the traditional common  law  doctrines.”[emphasis Added].

44. The good Professor  Louis   was however  careful to caution that: “ the  change  to embrace the new thinking  will be  slow  and  halting   because  of the doctrine  of stare  decisis”as  was  observed by the Court  of Appeal  inCity Chemist (Nairobi & Another  V Oriental Commercial  Bank Ltd, Civil Application  No.  Nairobi 302 of 2008 (unreported 192/2008) that:

“……That  however, is not  to say that  the new  thinking  totally  uproots  well  established  principles  or precedent  in the exercise  of discretion  of the court which  is judicial process  devoid   of whim and caprice. On the contrary, the amendment enriches those principles and emboldens the court to be guided by a broad sense of justice and fairness as it applies the principles.  The application of clear and  unambiguous  principles and precedents  assist  litigants  and  legal  Practioners  alike   in determining  with some  measure of certainty the validity of claims  long before  they are  instituted  in court.  It also guides the lower courts and maintains stability in the law and its application.”

45. The question  that must be answered  is, whether, the  applicant  having filed  his application  of leave  to institute  Judicial Review  proceedings within the  6 months  stipulated  in Section  9(3) of the  Law Reform Act, but having  obtained  leave,  but having  defaulted to institute the  substantive motion within  the 21  days  stipulated  in Order  53   Rule 3  of the Civil Procedure  Rules, he  should be deprived of his cause  of action on account  of failure  to file the  motion within  21  days.

46. In my  humble view, even  going by  precedents  supplied  by the respondents, compared  to other  authoritative  precedents  from the Court of Appeal, the spirit of the  legislature  in placing  Order  53  of the Civil Procedure Rules within the rest of the Civil Procedure  Rules was  intended  to flex the  strict muscles  of  Section  9(3)  of the Law Reform  Act, Cap  26  Laws of Kenya, so as  to allow courts to  exercise  discretion  where there is default  occasioned  by inadvertent  mistake.  If  that  were not  to be  the case, in my view, the legislature  would have  promulgated  rules  separate  from the  armbit  of the Civil Procedure  Rules, for operationalization of  Sections  8 and  9 of the Law Reform Act.

47. By placing Order 53 within the Civil Procedure Rules, it   was intended that the order would operate alongside other enabling rules under the statute.  And if that    were not  the case, then the Court of Appeal would not  have stated  the following in the  case of Wilson  Osolo  v John Ojiambo  Ochola & the Attorney General  CA No. 6  Nairobi of  1995 while  considering  whether the court  has power or jurisdiction to enlarge  time  stipulated  under Order  53  of the Civil Procedure  Rules:

“ A can  readily  be seen that  Order  53  Rule  2  ( as it  then stood) is  derived  verbatim  from Section  9(3)  of the Law Reform Act.  Whilst  the time limited  for  doing  something  under the Civil  Procedure  Rules  can be extended  by an application  under  Order  49  of the Civil Procedure  Rules, the  procedure  cannot be availed  of the extension  of  time limited by statute, in this case, the Law Reform  Act.”

48. In the same judgment, the Court of Appeal stated:

“ It  was  a mandatory  requirement  of Order  53  Rule  3 (1)  of the Civil  Procedure  Rules  then ( and  it is now  again so)  that  the  notice  of motion must  be filed  within 21  days  of  grant of such leave.  No such  notice  of motion  having been  apparently filed  within 21  days  on 15th February  1985  there  was no proper  application  before the Superior  court.  This  period  of 21 days  could  have been  extended  by a reasonable  period  had there  been an  application under Order  49  of the Civil Procedure Rules.”

49. The above  judgment  was delivered  by the Court of Appeal  on  6th  August  1996  when the provisions  of  Order 49  of the Civil Procedure  Rules  were in force  and after  amendments in 2010,  it is now  Order  50  Rule  6 of the Civil  Procedure Rules, which  permit the  enlargement  of time stipulated  by  the rules or  set by the order of the court.

50. It is for  the above  reason that I  concur with Professor Ojienda’s  acceptance  of my holding in the  Republic vs  Public Procurement Administrative  Review Board  Exparte  Syner –chemie  Ltd case (supra) that even if there  was no specific  provision for  enlargement   of time in a procedural rule  like Order  53  Rule 3  of the Civil Procedure Rules, what this court needs  to satisfy  itself   is that  there is no  demonstrable  prejudice  caused to  the adverse  party  because of delay  and  whether refusal   to enlarge  time would  occasion  hardship  and  result  in an injustice  to the applicant.   In so  doing, this court’s  inherent  discretion is not  fettered  to ensure  that  justice is  done to the parties since there is  no prohibition for  enlargement  of time and   in the absence of a specific prohibition  by the Rules Committee, the court  infers that  the Civil Procedure   Rules  were not  meant  or intended to preclude meritorious  claims.

51. In Raval  Vs  The Mombasa  Hardware  Ltd[1968] EA  392, the court considered  inherent  jurisdiction  of the court  and  held that  the reason  usually  given by the court  for resorting  to its  inherent  jurisdiction  which is not conferred  by any statute  or constitutional  provision  is to prevent  a miscarriage  of justice, especially where the  adverse  party is not  prejudiced  in any way if  the court extended  time.

52. Article 159(2) of the Constitution is clear  that in exercising  judicial authority, the courts  and  tribunals  shall be  guided by principles  including(a)  justice  shall be  administered  without undue  regard to  procedural  technicalities.  This is not to say that procedural rules shall be disregarded for they are handmaidens to substantive provisions of the law.  However, as  was  stated  in Bremer  Vulcan  Schiffbar  and Maschinen  Fabrick  vs South  Indian  Shipping  Corporations  Ltd [1981] AC 909  by Lord  Diplock in relation  to the inherent  powers   of the  court,  typifying  such powers  as enabling  the  court to take  necessary  actions to  maintain  its character  as a court  of justice;

“ it would  dampen the  constitutional role of a court if as a court of justice it   were not  armed  with power to prevent  its process  being abused, in such a way as  to diminish  its  capability  to arrive   at a just decision   of the dispute.”

53. In my  humble view, therefore, I find  that Order 50 Rule 6 of the Civil  Procedure Rules on enlargement of time under the rules is applicable to Judicial Review applications contemplated in Order 53 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure  Rules and  even if it was not so, this court retains its inherent power to extend the time limited by Order  53 Rule  (3),  as a strict application of the rule would not be a legitimate restriction on the right of access to justice  which is a  constitutional right stipulated  in Article  48  of the Constitution.

54. Further, albeit the words used  in Order  53  Rule  3  of the Civil Procedure  Rules are  “ shall  be filed  within  21  days…..”, the Supreme  Court in Deynes Mureithi  & 4 Others s V Law Society of Kenya  & Another[2016] e KLRapplying  a High Court decision  in Kisii High Court   Peter Ochara  Anam & 3  Others  V CDF  Board  & 4 Others, Constitution  Petition No. 3  of 2010 [2011] e KLR, found that albeit  the issues  in the petition   were neither  civil nor criminal, were civil in nature  and  held:

“In as much as the constitutional petition is a special jurisdiction, it is in the nature of civil proceedings.  In the absence of rules made thereunder, the procedure of handling such a petition must be akin to civil proceedings.  It cannot be that merely because it is a special jurisdiction, the rules of evidence, for instance should not apply, be ignored nor witnesses should not be sworn, pleadings should not be signed   and questions in cross examination should not be asked.  That will be a direct invitation to judicial chaos and legal absurdity.  I do not  therefore  wholly agreed  or  subrule   to the subscribe  to the submissions of the  petitioners that the petition  being  neither  a criminal  nor civil proceedings, it must be conducted  in a vacuum.(emphasis  by the Supreme Court).”

55. In Equity Bank Limited v West Link       MBO Ltd Civil Application(Appeal) no 78 of 2011, it was held that:

“ Courts of law  exist  to administer  justice and in doing  so, they must  of necessity  balance  between  the competing  rights  and  interests   of different   parties but within  the confines  of  the law, to ensure  the ends of  justice  are met.  Inherent power is the authority possessed by a court implicitly without it being derived from the constitution or statute.”

56. For  the foregoing  reasons, I find  that  this court has jurisdiction to enlarge  time within which an  application  under Order  53  Rule  3  of the Civil  Procedure Rule  is to be  filed, upon leave  of court  being  granted.

57. On the  second issue  of whether  there  was  inordinate  and inexcusable delay in filing  this application, the respondents  contended that the  applicant   was guilty  of delay of  46  days  and that therefore  he should  not benefit  from the court’s  discretion, assuming  that the court  had the  power to  enlarge  the time for the filing  of the substantive  motion, which  delay   was said to be inordinate  and prejudicial to the respondents  and all the Nairobi City County Electorate who have been  anxiously  waiting for  the  disposal of this case.  Further, that there is no good reason given for the delay.

58. On the part of the applicant, it  is averred  that the substantive  motion    was filed  5 days  after the  21 days  period  and that  delay  was occasioned  by an  inadvertent error  on the part  of  the applicant’s advocates who got  heavily engaged   in preparing  documents and affidavits in response to the respondent’s  motion seeking  to set aside  the orders  given  by this court  on 10th October  2016. Further, that counsel was under a mistaken belief that Saturdays and Sundays are not included in the computation of time.

59. The respondents contend  that it is the applicant’s counsel who should  therefore  bear  the blame of being  professionally  negligent  to his client  and not  to seek  to abuse  court  process by  delaying  the proceedings.

60. The court’s rendition on this issue is that the applicant  was on  10th October  2016  granted  leave to  institute  Judicial Review  proceedings within  21  days  from that date.  It was therefore expected that the substantive motion would be filed on or before 31st October 2016.  However, the motion was filed on 7th November 2016 it is dated the same day. The application is supported by the affidavit sworn by Dr Evans Kidero sworn on 31st October 2016.

61. The record  also shows  that on 12th October  2016  2 days  after grant of  leave, the respondents filed  a notice  of motion under  certificate  of urgency seeking to suspend  orders  issued on 10th October 2016 operating  as stay of the notice of the  respondents  to the  applicant  inviting  him to appear  before  a sitting of the  County Assembly to respond  to allegations  brought  against him; stay of orders staying  implementation  of the contemplated  impeachment  of the  applicant  and  set aside or discharge  order  of 10th October  2016  granting  leave to the  applicant  to apply for  Judicial Review  orders of certiorari  and  prohibition  and that the court do strike out the entire Judicial Review  proceedings.

62. That application, upon being served  upon the applicant, elicited  a response  from the applicant, filed on  7th November  2016  by way of a replying  affidavit  sworn  on 5th November  2016  comprising  57  paragraphs, 18 pages and  several annextures  including  legal authorities.

63. However, it was not  until 13th December  2016  that an application  for enlargement  of time  was  filed seeking  to validate  the notice of motion dated  7th November  2016  filed  6 days  out of the  21 days stipulated  in the order of  10th October  2016 and  as per Order 53 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules.

64. The application for enlargement of time came about 43 days after 31st October 2016 when the motion ought to have been filed.  The question is whether there was inordinate   delay and if so, whether despite the delay, the court can grant the orders sought in the interest of justice.

65. In Ivita v Kyumba [1984] KLR 441, the court held, in considering an application for dismissal of suit for want of prosecution that:

“ The test  applied by the courts…….is whether  the delay is  prolonged  and  inexcusable, and if it is, whether  justice can be  done despite  delay.  Thus, even if the delay  is prolonged, if the court is satisfied d with the plaintiff’s  excuse  or the delay  and that  justice can still be served  to the parties, the action will not be  dismissed  but it will be ordered  that it be  set down  for hearing   at the earliest  time.  It is a matter of discretion of the court.”

64. On extension of time, the principles   applicable were laid down in Aviation and  Allied  Workers  Union vs KQ Ltd  (supra) where the Supreme Court  stated that  the following  principles should  be considered  by the court  in the exercise  of such discretion:

1. Extension of time is not a right of  a party, it is an equitable  remedy that  is only  available  to a deserving  party  at the discretion  of the court;

2. A party who seeks extension of time has the burden   of laying a basis, to the satisfaction of the court.

3. Whether the court should exercise the discretion to extend time, is a consideration to be made on a case to case basis;

4. Where there is (good) reason for the delay, the delay should be explained to the satisfaction of the court;

5. Whether there will be any prejudice suffered by the respondents if the extension is granted;

6. Whether  the application has been brought  without undue  delay; and

7. Whether in certain cases, like election, petitions, the public interest should be a consideration for extending time.”

66. The above principles were enunciated by the same Supreme Court in Nicholas Arap Korir Salat v IEBC & 7 Others Sc Application No. 16 of 2014.

67. Applying  the above principles  to this  case, the court notes  that indeed  there  was  delay in filing of  the substantive  motion by  7 days which in my humble view is not inordinate delay.  Secondly, albeit  there  was  delay  in filing of  the application for  validation of the  filed motion, that  delay of  43   days  has been satisfactorily explained  to the court.  The court  accepts  the explanation that the applicant’s  counsel  however  senior he is, was caught  up in the mix  of responding  to the  application  by the respondents seeking  to vacate  the orders  of 10th October  2016  issued by this court and therefore concentrated on that  response  instead  of filing  the substantive  motion  and only  came to  when, from  the record, the application for  contempt  was  being  mentioned.

68. Although  the respondents contend  that Senior Counsel  should not  have been  such  careless, and that he  should compensate  his client  for professional negligence  instead of seeking to validate  an application which is  invalidly on record, the court notes  that Order 50  Rule  6 of the Civil Procedure Rules permits the  filing  of an application for  enlargement  of time even if  such time  has elapsed.

69. Further,  in  Belinda Murai & others vs Amos  Wainaina (1978 ) KLR 278 per Madan JAcitedwith approval by Nyeri CA 18/2013 Richard Ncharpi Leiyagu vs IEBC & 2 Others– Visram, Koome & Odek JJA it was stated that a party  ought not to be denied an opportunity  to ventilate  his  grievances  as that would  oust them from the judgment seat. Madan JA (as he then was) stated quite clearly that:

“A mistake is a mistake.  It is no less a mistake   because it is committed by Senior Counsel.  Though in the case of junior counsel the court might feel compassionate more readily.  If  a blunder  on a point  of law  can be  a mistake, the door to  justice  is not  closed  because  a mistake  has been  made  by a lawyer  of experience who ought  to know better.  The court may not condone it but it ought to certainly to do whatever is necessary to rectify it if the interest of justice so dictate.”

70. The learned Madan JA further stated:

“ It is  well  known that courts  of  law themselves make mistakes  which  is politely  referred  to as  erring  in  their  interpretation  of laws  and  adoption of  legal point of view  which  courts of appeal  sometimes overrule…..”

71. Further, in Phillip Chemwolo & Another Vs Augustine Kubende [1982-1988] KAR at 1040, Apalloo J (as he then   was), citing with approval Nyeri CA 18/2013 Richard Ncharpi vs IEBC, the Court of Appeal in the latter case stated:

“ Blunders  will continue  to be made  from time  to time  and it does not  follow  that because  a mistake has   been made  that a party  should  suffer the  penalty of not having   his case heard on merit.  I think the broad equity approach to this matter is that unless there is fraud-or intention to overreach, there is no error or default that cannot be put right by payment of costs.

The court as it often said exists for the purpose of deciding rights of parties and not the purpose of imposing discipline.”

72. In the instant  case, it is  my finding  that the mistake  which has been  admitted by Senior Counsel  is inadvertent  and  genuine, not  intentional  and despite  that delay, this court  finds   that justice  can still be done to  the parties  by enlarging  time and  allowing the  issues  which are  raised in the  motion ventilated  or canvassed  at an  appropriate  hearing. The respondents, in my humble view, have not demonstrated any prejudice that has been or is likely to be occasioned to them of the enlargement of time is granted.

73. There is no evidence that the delay was intended to cause the respondents any hardships and no hardship or injustice has been demonstrated. In my humble  view, to deny the  applicant   the orders sought  would   be depriving  him of  the  right to apply and therefore  would work  definite  injustice.  It is the applicant who claims that his constitutional rights are being infringed and or threatened to be violated.  It therefore  follows that  if the applicant  is  not accorded  an enlargement  of  time, he  will  suffer more injustice  than the  respondents  who  are  by law  expected to perform their constitutional  mandate  in accordance  with the stipulated  legal  framework.

74. Furthermore, the inconvenience caused to the respondents can be adequately compensated by an award of costs.

75. It is for  those reasons that this  court  proceeds  to exercise  its discretion in favour of the applicant  and  grants the prayers sought in  the notice  of motion  dated 13th  December, 2016.

76. As the  mistake  and  error  was occasioned by the advocate  for the applicant  and who  has acknowledged  that mistake, I order  that the advocate, Senior Counsel Professor Tom Ojienda  do personally pay to the respondents  thrown away  costs of kshs  100,000/- one hundred  thousand  Shillings only within  14 days  from the date hereof, being compensation for the inconvenience  caused to the respondents .  In default, execution to issue for recovery.

Dated, signed and delivered in open court at Nairobi this 13th day of February 2017.

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE

In the presence of Miss Awour h/b for SC Prof Tom Ojienda for applicant

Mr Karanja for respondents

CA: George