Rex v Amri (Criminal Appeal No. 137 of 1942) [1943] EACA 7 (1 January 1943)

## COURT OF APPEAL FOR EASTERN AFRICA

## Before Sir Joseph Sheridan, C. J. (Kenya), Sir Norman Whitley, C. J. (Uganda) and MARK WILSON, Ag. C. J. (Tanganyika)

REX. Respondent (Original Prosecutor)

$\mathbf{v}$

AMRI bin ABDALLA, Appellant (Original Accused) Criminal Appeal No. 137 of 1942

Appeal from decision of H. M. Supreme Court of Kenya

Criminal Law—Intention—Section 14 Penal Code—Use of knife by intoxicated person—Provocation—Refusal of sexual intercourse.

The accused was convicted of the murder of a woman by stabbing her with a knife. There were 18 wounds on the deceased's body. The accused made an extra judicial statement which was not retracted, in which he said that he was very drunk and admitted stabbing the deceased, and gave as the reason that the woman refused to have sexual intercourse with him. There was evidence that the accused was intoxicated at the time.

Held $(18-1-43)$ .—(1) On the question of intoxication the use of a knife by an intoxicated person must always be a telling factor against him.

(Dictum of Alderson, B. in *Meakin's* case 7 C. and P. 297 approved.)

(2) A refusal of sexual intercourse does not let in the doctrine of legal provocation. The appeal was dismissed.

Appellant present, unrepresented.

Stacey, Crown Counsel (Kenya), for the Crown.

JUDGMENT (delivered by SIR JOSEPH SHERIDAN, C. J.).—The accused made an extra judicial confession which was not retracted. This Court has no reason to doubt the voluntary nature of that confession nor to doubt its truth. The learned trial Judge gave very careful consideration to the issue of drunkenness as bearing on the question of the capacity of the accused to form an intention to commit the crime of murder and whether he did form such an intention. On this question of intention the use of a knife by an intoxicated person must always be a telling factor against him (see the remarks of Baron Alderson in *Meakin's case*, 7 C. & P. 297) and we have no reason to disagree with the learned Judge in his having decided this issue against him. The reason for the murder put forward by the accused—a refusal of sexual intercourse—does not in the view of this Court let in the doctrine of legal provocation. The appeal is dismissed.